Wholesale versus Within Institution Change: Pacting
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Transcript Wholesale versus Within Institution Change: Pacting
Wholesale versus Within
Institution Change:
Pacting Governance
Reform in Brazil
Aaron Schneider
Institute of Development Studies
April 28, 2005
World Bank Seminar
Governance Reforms
Accountability and Capacity
Change in Institutions
New “Rules of the Game,” new
equilibrium
Institutional change is discontinuous,
significant
But how does it happen?
Punctuated Equilibrium
Modelling Wholesale Change
Gradually build consensus, make
pacts
When actors, interests, and power
have shifted sufficiently, pass a
threshold and. . .
Wholesale Change
If actors, interests and power do not
shift enough, Within Institution
Change
Brazil 1990s
Wholesale versus Within Institution
Change
Some reform processes altered
interests, changed power to form a
new consensus and pact (fiscal
federalism)
Others left old pacts intact (tax)
Kinds of Reform
Both are public finance reforms
We look for threshold breaching,
discontinuous, wholesale change in
institutions
• Macrosocial shift – Patrimonial
democratic/Bureaucratic Authoritarian
to Liberal democratic
Politics in Brazil
Feckless Democracy
• Demos-constraining federalism
• SNG power over tax, personnel, Banks
• Weak parties, fragmented interest grps
Institutional Restraint
• Strong president veto, agenda,
patronage
• Party discipline in Congress
Fiscal Responsibility Law
Limits on public debt
No bailouts across levels of
government
Control electoral-cycle
Transparent accounts
Personnel ceiling
Fiscal crimes law with administrative,
financial, political, criminal penalties
25
20
15
Tax Burden (% GDP)
TAX - % of GDP
35
30
10
1999
1995
1991
1987
1983
1979
1975
1971
1967
1963
1959
1955
1951
1947
Year
Causal Process of Wholesale
Change
Fiscal responsibility law
• Machiavellian manoeuvres and
capable bureaucracy
• Actors and interests breach a
threshold, new pact and consensus
among democratic centre and state
level elites
• New rules of the game
• Rational administration enforcing
fixed fiscal rules
Causal Process of Within Institution
Change
Tax reform
• Machiavellian manoeuvres and
capable bureaucracy
• Still, no threshold, no new
consensus or pact
• Changes occur within old
institutions
• Increase tax but at cost of
efficiency and regressivity
Causal Process Observations
Both involved subtle and incremental
shifts
Both involved high politics and
capable bureaucracy
Fiscal crisis had opposite impacts
New consensus and new pact for
federalism – wholesale change
Within institution change of tax