Transcript Chapter 2

Growth in the 1990s:
Pleasant and Unpleasant
Surprises
Presentation to ICRIER
September 28, 2004
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Five disappointments
Length, depth, and variance in the “transition
recession” in the FSU/EE countries
Severity and intensity of the financial crises
Argentina’s implosion
Weakness of the response to reform,
particularly in Latin America
Continued stagnation in Sub-Saharan Africa
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How long? How Deep?
Output
Depth
Duration
Beginning
Of transition
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Time
3
Deep, long, and variable
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Markets miss the mark on East Asia
100.0%
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
Interest rate
differential, June 1997
60.0%
50.0%
Nominal devaluation,
June-December 1997
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
Thailand
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Indonesia
Korea
5
Collapse of convertibility in
Argentina
The Mexican debt crisis marked the end
of one era, the Argentina crisis perhaps
the end of another
The severity given the collapse was not
a surprise—it was design.
What was surprising was that it
collapsed in spite of every attempt to
“pre-commit”
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Growth came, but did not stay in
Latin America, despite steady
reform progress
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The predicted “renaissance” in
Africa recedes into the future…
While there are brief episodes of growth
in some SSA countries, there is no
“locomotive” to pull the rest along.
This is a disappointment, but a
surprise?
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Lessons from the 1990s
Growth in the 1990s: A Mixed Record
(divergence “big time”)
200
EAP
Per capita GDP (1990=100)
180
160
140
SAR
120
OECD
LAC
MNA
100
AFR
ECA
80
60
1990
1991
EAP
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1992
ECA
1993
1994
LAC
1995
MNA
1996
1997
SAR
1998
AFR
1999
2000
OECD
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Four pleasant surprises
Strong growth in the India, China, and
Vietnam.
Robust progress in social indicators, in
spite of low growth in many countries
Resilience of the world economy to
stresses
Bright spots of continued growth
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Coal to Newcastle: Growth rates in
India (per capita, PPP)
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The star performers in growth are
middle of the pack in many
indicators
Rank in:
China
Control of Regulatory Growth
corruption quality
63
94
3
Vietnam
105
135
4
India
86
101
14
Out of N:
151
180
136
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Brazil has slow growth but
substantial progress on
enrollments—especially of the poor
Percentage
99
98
97
95
94
97
93
87
83
75
1992
5th quintile
richest 20%
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4th quintile
2001
3rd quintile
2nd quintile
1st quintile
poorest 20%
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A pleasant surprise: the sky did not
fall
I would say the biggest misjudgment that I can
remember making…was the sense of
profound pessimism about Russian economic
reform that I had in the fall of 1998, and that
if you had said that by 2003, they would be
issuing Eurobonds at300 basis points spreads,
I would have thought that its was absolute
madness.
Lawrence Summers, in
Practitioners in Development
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Continued growth, in spurts
The 1990s did see rapid growth in a
number of countries…
• Dominican Republic
• Uganda
• Poland
• Chile
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What did we learn about growth?
Growth is enormously volatile over the
medium run—with many booms and
busts—little growth persistence
The “symptoms and syndromes”
emerge from growth regressions
Centrality of “institutions”
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Growth is not steady, but is a series
of episodes…
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And from millions of growth
regressions? Syndromes
Syndrome
Symptoms
Excessive
Generalization
Bad Governance
Corruption,
instability
“democracy is
good/bad for growth”
Macroeconomic
Instability
High and variable
inflation
“Reducing deficits will
increase growth”
External policy
Inability to finance
needed imports
“Tariff reductions will
raise growth”
Financial sector
Low savings rates
“Privatization of banks
will raise growth”
Bad Luck
Terms of trade
shocks
“Resource exporters
will have slow growth”
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“Institutions” are central
The first, overwhelming lessons we learned in
the 1990s, is the transcendent importance of
the quality of institutions and the closely
related question of the efficacy of the
administration. Well- executed policies that
are 30 percent off are much more effective
than poorly executed policies that are spot
on.
• Lawrence Summers, Practitioners in Development
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