Transcript Taking Evolution Seriously

Globalization and the Race
to the Bottom
Economic Competition (a.k.a.
Globalization)
Aging populations
Increasing frustration/distrust of
public authority
Fiscal Crises
Expected Ef fects of Globalization on Taxes and
Public Spending
60
Percent GDP
50
40
30
20
10
0
1980
1990
Sweden
Germany
2000
USA
2010
Japan
In Fact we see Variation Not Convergence
Total Tax Burden as % of GDP
60
50
40
30
20
10
Unweighted OECD Av e.
United States
Japan
Sweden
0
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
Year
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Is Globalization
like
Global Warming?
Variation: Not Convergence
The Scientific Method -
Derived from the Hard Sciences
[Social scientists] envision a world composed of
linear relationships among variables, parity in the
size of cause and effect, recurrent patterns over time,
and the fundamental insignificance of chance
happenings.
Alan Zuckerman (1997)
Evolutionary Science?
Evolutionary science has required an
investigation of “additional principles that
apply only to living organisms… This
required a restructuring of the conceptual
world of science that was far more
fundamental than anyone had imagined at
the time.” Ernst Mayr, 2004
If politics were mechanics:
We could:
Assume variable
independence
Omit or control for:
emergence
contingency
Human Agency
Accurately predict change.
My argument:
Political Systems are
Complex Adaptive Systems:
They Evolve and Adapt in a dynamic environment
(which they, in part, create themselves)
This model explicitly brings in:
•Historical context (the dynamic ecology)
•Contingency
•Emergence
•Symbiosis and Co-Evolution
•Agency (source of Variation)
How Political Systems Evolve
• Institutions are the ‘rules’ structuring political
life
• Institutions, like genes, are nothing more than
behavioral instructions (rules).
• Human agency and creativity are the sources
of variation in institutional evolution.
• Humans rationally calculate as much as they can,
but are biased thinkers.
• History Matters:
• Institutions structure strategic choices AND
ultimately shape preferences because institutional
choices at time A become part of the ecological
context at time B.
Two Evolutionary
Narratives (if time allows)
The USA - The Land of Milk and
Honey, racing toward the bottom.
Sweden - The Bumble-bee that
should not fly
The United States:
Contingent Conditions
Massive natural resources and huge
land mass to exploit.
Destination for world’s greatest
migration
Fear of the democracy.
Institutional fragmentation
Checks and balances, federalism, etc.
Slavery
America Adaptation and
Institutional Choices
 Early Century - FDR and the push for a public
sphere. Why did it fail?
 Both Political Institutions and Cognitive
Frames are Biased against Government
(New Deal, Great Society, War on Poverty)
 Second best choices: Targeted social welfare
benefits (esp. via tax incentives)
 Increasing Distrust of Government
 Growing inequality
Welcome to the Tea Party
Sweden: Contingent
Conditions
Small homogeneous population
Significant natural resources
Northern edge of expanding Europe
Able to stay neutral in TWO wars - arms
supplier and manufacturing advantage
Late/concentrated industrial
development
Huge conflict between economic classes
Sweden:
Adaptation and
Institutional Choice
Highly concentrated economy (unions
and employers)
Electoral Rules bias towards
compromise
The “Historic Compromise” - Saltsjöbad
Women instead of immigrants into labor
market
Universalism: A simple
Model
Pre-Ta x
In come
10,000
50,000
100,000
Ta x Rate 30%
3,000
15,000
30,000
After tax In come
7,000
35,000
70,000
Be n efi t per
Family
16,000
16,000
16,000
* 3,000 + 15,000 + 30,000 = 48,000 / 3 = 16,000
Income Ratio before taxes and benefits
(10,000 to 100,000)
1 to 10
Income Ration after taxes and benefits
(23,000 to 86,000)
1 to 3.7
Fi n al In come
23,000
51,000
86,000
Increasing Support for the
Universal Welfare State
Sweden
Answers to the fo llowing question: ÒTaxes are used for various purposes. Do you think the revenues
spent on the purposes mentioned below should be increased, held the same, or reduced?ÓT he figures in
the table represent the percentage of those wishing to increase expenditures minus the percentage of
those wishing to reduce them.
Program
Health care
Support for the elderly
Support to families with children
Housing allowances
Social assistance
Primary and secondary education
1981
+42
+29
+19
-23
-5
+20
Opinion Balance
1986
+44
+33
+35
-23
-5
+30
1992
+48
+58
+17
-25
-13
+49
1997
+75
+68
+30
-20
+-0
+69
2002
+77
+69
+26
-40
-7
+70
Sweden: A case of
Increasing Returns?
Table 2.1 Swe de n:Socialand Economic Data and W orld Ranking
Figure
50.7
54.3
35.1
6.5
1 (highest)
1 (highest)
2 (from highest)
G lobal Competitiveness Rank
R+D per capita (US $)
Employment rate (2006)
Internet users per 1,000 inhabitants
1112
74.5
320
3 (from highest)
1 (highest)
6 (from highest)
3 (from highest)
G ini Index
Human Development Index (World B ank, 2005)
Life expectancy (2005)
Paid maternity + parental leave (weeks) (1998-2002)
WomenÕsemployment rate (2006)
G ender wage gap (% ) (2004)
Poverty Rate
Infant mortality rate per 1000
2.52
.956
80.6
78
76.0
14.8
6.5
3.7
1 (most equal)
6 (from highest)
6 (from highest)
1 (highest)
3 (from highest)
6 (from lowest)
3 (from lowest)
4 (from lowest)
Tax as % GDP (2005)
Public Spending as % G DP (2006)
Social Spending as % G DP (2003)
Public Spending on Education as % G DP (all levels)
World Rank
Sweden’s success is
neither obvious, nor
inevitable.
Competitive, open economy and the
“Universal Social Welfare State”
High trust society
Political Evolution and
Institutional Choice
Institutions, like genes, are rules that structure
behavior by telling actors how to behave in particular
contexts.
History “evolves” precisely because humans have
the capacity to create, select and copy institutions.
When building institutions, we build part of the
ecological contexts in which future generations make
new choices.
Human’s thus make their own ‘evolutionary history’
but they cannot make it exactly according to their
wishes.