Transcript RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM IN RUSSIA

THE SILOVIKI REGIME IN RUSSIA
A. Illarionov,
CATO Institute, Washington, USA
Institute of Economic Analysis, Moscow, Russia
Evenings at FEE, Foundation for Economic Education,
Irvington-on-Hudson, November 10, 2007
© CATO Institute, Institute of Economic Analysis
www.cato.org, www.cato.ru, www.iea.ru
“I’ll buy all, says gold.
I’ll take all, responded steel.”
Alexander Pushkin, great Russian poet
2
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The Russian version
of the eternal Hamlet question
“To be or not to be?”
in today’s Russia sounds like
“To be or not to be behind bars?”
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“If you are not behind bars yet
it is not your merit,
it means the system does not work properly.”
Russian people’s wisdom
“Our system must work better.”
From the documents of the Russian government
4
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If you are already behind bars,
there are three rules to follow:
“Do not trust.
Do not be afraid.
Do not beg”.
Varlam Shalamov, The Kolyma Stories.
5
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In most cases people do not
voluntarily chose to stay behind bars.
Usually they are forced to be there.
The specially trained people in charge of
using force (or: sila in Russian)
against other people, including decisions
to held other people behind bars,
are called enforcement personnel,
or: siloviki in Russian.
Siloviki is a distilled essence of coercion.
6
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Siloviki in today’s Russia are those who are
or have been employed in the enforcement
agencies of different kinds – military, interior,
security, guard, intelligence, prosecutor office,
secret police (total 22 agencies).
Siloviki have education, training, vision, and
overall mentality rather different from civilians.
Enforcement in today’s Russia doesn’t
necessarily imply enforcement of Law.
It means enforcement of Force and Power
regardless of Law, often against Law.
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Siloviki at power have created the Siloviki Regime.
State power has been captured by
Siloviki coming mainly from
the former Soviet secret police, namely FSB,
the historical successor
to KGB, MGB, NKGB, NKVD, OGPU, VChK.
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The Siloviki form The Corporation,
the Corporation of Secret Police
(other terms – Brigada, Orden, Artel, Tovarishestvo).
The Siloviki Corporation is a type
of the organized crime
(mafia-type) organizations.
Among them one can find both private as well as
government organizations like Cosa Nostra,
Ndragetta, Tryads, secret police of Cuba, North
Korea, Guards of Islamic Revolution in Iran, etc.
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The Siloviki Regime is a type of political
regime where all powers belong
to members of the CSP.
Power of Siloviki has a profound effect on
contemporary Russia’s Political and Economic
Systems, State, Government, Foreign Policy,
Society, Ideology.
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The Siloviki Regime.
1. Overall description.
2. Ideology.
3. Sociology.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Economics.
Institutional development.
International positioning.
Foreign policy.
8. Social behavior.
9. Intermediary conclusion.
10. Western response.
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1. Overall Descriptive Approach (1).
1. Appropriation of executive power by the Corporation
of Secret Police (CSP).
2. Capture of the bodies of the Russian state
(Presidential Administration, Government apparatus,
Tax agency, Courts system, Prosecutor offices, MFA,
MoD, Parliament) as well as business and mass-media
by the CSP. Use of them in the interests of the CSP.
3. Concentration and monopolization of all significant
resources (political, legal, military, economic,
financial, media) in the hands of the CSP.
4. Destruction of the rule of law with its replacement
by rule of thugs: the CSP is above law, no people or law
above the CSP.
12
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Overall Descriptive Approach (2).
5. Rise of state monopolies with privatization of profits
and nationalization of costs as their leading principle.
6. Personal control by the CSP members over main
financial flows in the economy.
7. Siloviki-type PPP (public-private partnership) –
coercion of private business to fulfill orders of the CSP
and bear the costs.
8. Main award of the CSP is “paratrooping” its
members (doesn’t matter - whether Russian or foreign)
into the state company or state-friendly company.
9. Hierarhization and casting of the Russian society.
Political, economic, legal discrimination of the nonmembers of the GSP.
10. The leading method of problems’ solution is
coercion not restricted by law, tradition and morale.
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Overall Descriptive Approach (3).
11. Secrecy and information asymmetry.
12. Plurality of ideological and propaganda
products for consumers inside and outside country.
13. Ideology for CSP members – “chekism” and
“nascism” (“our ownism”) with selectiveness/
absence of identical rules as a leading principle.
14. Ideology for Russian general public (non-CSP
members) – fortress besieged from outside and
undermined by betrayers and traitors from inside.
15. Ideology for the Western political elite –
protection against terrorism and fascism.
16. Personal union of the Siloviki leaders with the
Western political and business leaders.
14
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2. Ideological Approach.
Principles of Chekism and Nacsism.
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Secrecy and disregard of people
“The people shouldn’t know
who governs them.“
Mikhail Boyarsky, Russian popular actor,
staunch supporter of Vladimir Putin
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Superiority complex
“Falling into abyss, the post-Soviet society
clang to Chekist’s hook. And hang on it”.
“We helped to save the country
from the final degradation”.
“I wish the Chekist corporation be a norm setter. Both
for Chekists themselves and for the whole nation.“
Victor Cherkesov, Head of Federal Anti-Drug Service,
former KGB operative, Mr.Putin’s friend, October 9, 2007
17
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Corporate-type thinking and acting
“The so called enlarged government, i.e. federal
authorities plus regional governors, must work more
articulate, more effective – like one corporation.”
President of Russia at the State Council Meeting,
December 24, 2005.
“The accumulation of powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary – in the same hands, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”
James Madison. Federalist papers, # 47.
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Disregard of Constitutional duties
“We have a state corporation and we are electing
the top management of our state corporation“.
Vladimir Churov, Chairman of Central Election Commission,
August 31, 2007.
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Legal ignorance and neglect
“The Constitution should be changed
in order to allow removal the limit
for the number of presidential terms
and increase in the presidential term
from 4 to 7 years“.
Sergei Mironov, Chairman of Federation Council,
March 30, 2007.
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Mistrust and mistreatment of representative power
and mass-media.
«In principle the heads of enforcement bodies
must know it. If they don’t know it, they may not
stay in enforcement bodies, they should be
somewhere else. For example, in the parliament or
newspaper».
Vladimir Putin. Interview to G8 mass-media.
June 4, 2007
Infallibility syndrome
“Vladimir Putin can not be wrong.“
Vladimir Churov, Chairman of Central
Electoral Commission, April 9, 2007
22
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Personality Cult
23
Source: Levada-Centre.
© ИЭА
3. Sociological Approach.
Security Services (SS) Disease –
accumulation and concentration
of security personnel
in the government apparatus.
Hypertrophy of Siloviki power.
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Professional background of government personnel
among top 100 bureaucrats, 2007.
Source: IEA data.
25
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President of the Russian Federation:
“There is no such person
as a retired secret police operative”
“No matter how you will dress up the wolf
he will not become a grandmother.”
26
© ИЭА
Professional background of government personnel
in today’s Russia (top 1016 bureaucrats).
27
Source: O.Kryshtanovskaya’s data.
© ИЭА
“I want to report to you that the mission of the
group of FSB officers sent undercover to work
at the government is being accomplished
successfully.”
Vladimir Putin, Speech at the Chekist Day,
December 1999
28
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Hypertrophy of Siloviki power. Number of flash-lighted
cars among agencies and bodies of the Russian state.
29
Source: Russian Government Decision №737, December 1, 2006 “On Special Light
and Sound Signals"
© ИЭА
Division of powers in modern Russia. Distribution
of 977 flash-lighted cars among branches of power:
judicial, legislative and executive (including security).
30
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4. Economic Approach.
4a. “Soviet Disease” –
concentration of economic resources
at the federal level.
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Regional and local budget revenue
as % of consolidated budget, 1992-2007
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Federal government non-interest expenditures
as % of GDP has almost doubled from 2000 to 2007
33
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The fastest growing items are expenditure
on military and police…
National defense and police expenditure as a share of GDP
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… as well as on administration.
National expenditure on administration as a share of GDP
35
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As a result, the number of Federal government employees
has significantly increased…
36
Source: Rosstat.
© ИЭА
…and their share in total employment
has dramatically expanded.
Public administration as a share of total employment
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The rise in government expenditures has led
to an increase in non-market employment…
Employment in non-market sector as % of total
38
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… therefore reducing employment in market sector.
Employment in market sector as % of total
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4. Economic Approach.
4b. “Argentinean Disease” –
use of “structural policy”
to “correct” “undesirable” structural changes
by redistributing value added from energy sector
into other sectors, primarily into machine building,
military-industrial complex, government apparatus.
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Beginning of structural policy in Russia, 2002-2004:
41
•
Increase in taxation of oil companies
•
Increase in government expenditure,
including government investments
•
Setting up different government-regulated
transport and energy tariffs for different
sectors, industries and companies
•
Further differentiation of import duties
•
Introduction of import quotas
© ИЭА
The second stage of structural policy –
“developmental policy” (MERT), 2005-2006:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
42
•
Differentiation of taxation for different companies.
Expanding of old and creation of new state financial
“developmental” institutes – Bank of Development,
Government Investment Fund, Government Venture
Funds.
Creation of Special Economic Zones.
Granting taxation privileges to different
municipalities.
Adoption of Programs of Development for different
industrial sectors.
Introduction of limits to foreign ownership in 39
“strategic” sectors.
Adoption of Innovation and Technology Development
programs, including such as the Program for
Government Support of Design.
MERT: “Actually, we have many more ideas...”
© ИЭА
4. Economic Approach.
4c. “Venezuelan Disease” –
nationalization and quasi-nationalization of private
assets in oil and gas as well as in
transportation, construction, automobile industry,
aviation, shipbuilding, etc.
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© ИЭА
Private sector share of Russian oil production
shrank from 83,5% in 2003 to 32% in 2007
44
Source: Oil & Capital
© ИЭА
“Are you seriously thinking that could be
companies independent of the state?”
Yuri Trutnev, Minister for Natural Resources,
August 30, 2007
45
© ИЭА
4. Economic Approach.
4d. “State Corporativist Disease” –
appropriation of public financial resources
through and by state corporations.
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New stage of economic policy –
private appropriation of public money, 2006-2007:
•
•
•
•
•
47
Priority National Projects (health, education,
housing, agriculture, demography)
IPO of public companies with resources raised
being left to their management (Rosneft, RAO UES).
Creation of state corporations not reporting neither
to the Parliament, nor to the Government in
different industries: Rosoboronexport, Rosnanotech,
Rosoboronprom, Rosrybflot, Avtodor, Rosviakosmos,
Rosatom, Foundation for Housing Reforms, Olympic
Corporation.
Capitalization of state corporations with public
money from the Stabilization Fund.
New law allowing crediting the state corporations
by the Central Bank.
© ИЭА
“We should create big corporations and
support their international expansion”.
Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Prime Minister,
June 8, 2007
“Yes, many want to be there [in the state
corporations]. It’s better to be there than here,
in the government. Because you will have more
money there, but you will do the same as we, in
the government, do here. And you don’t need to
steal!”
Mikhail Fradkov, Prime Minister, 2004-2007
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4e. Intermediary Economic Results
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Financial results of Yuganskneftegaz after transfer
from private YUKOS to state-owned ROSNEFT became
a triumph of ineffectiveness and incompetence.
Yuganskneftegaz’ financial results
in Jan-Sep 2005 in constant prices as % in Jan-Sep 2004.
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After 4 years of unprecedented growth in 2000-2003
within YUKOS the “pearl” of Russia’s oil industry,
Yuganskneftegaz, saw its output collapsed.
Yuganskneftegaz oil output growth as % to previous year
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© ИЭА
In a response to the assault by the Siloviki,
annual growth rate in oil output fell from 12%
in June 2003 to about 2% in 2005 – 2007.
Oil Production Annual Growth Rates, January 1996 – September 2007
52
© ИЭА
Growth in oil output in Russia has slowed significantly.
Yet it has not reached the Russian level in the USSR.
53
Source: Rosstat.
© ИЭА
Gas output of Gazprom remained flat for the last 7 years,
while independent producers more than doubled it.
250
226,5
230
210
191,5
190
199,4
170,9
170
147,4
150
155,8
130,3
130
110
100100
95,7
93,7
95,5
98,9
99,8
100,2
100,6
90
70
50
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Independent gas producers
Source: Institute of Energy Policy, “Gazprom”
54
2004
2005
2006
"Gazprom"
© ИЭА
Foreign direct investment in non-fuel industries
as a share of GDP fell by 40%, 1998−2006.
55
© ИЭА
Losses in potential GDP growth rate due to quality
of policies and institutions became enormous.
Real GDP growth adjusted for windfall profits received.
GDP real growth minus windfall profits, percentage of GDP
56
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Russia’s real GDP growth rates among FSU countries fell
from 3rd place in 1999–2000 to 13th place in 2004-2006
57
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Russia’s GDP as a share of that of the FSU
fell from 65,4% in 2000 to 62,5% in 2006
58
© ИЭА
Russia’s GDP as a share of that of countries in transition
fell from 12,8% in 2000 to 11,4% in 2006.
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© ИЭА
5. Institutional Approach.
“Zimbabwean Disease” –
establishing next to total control of executive
power over public and social life
leading to destruction of virtually all
political and social institutions
of modern civilization –
legislative and judicial powers, political parties,
private businesses, mass media, NGO,
religious organizations.
60
© ИЭА
“The most important task for us
is to learn how to use state instruments
for securing all freedoms –
personal freedom, entrepreneurial freedom,
freedom of development of institutes
of civil society”.
Vladimir Putin, State of Russia Address,
July 8, 2000
61
© ИЭА
By Political Rights Index Russia occupies 146-156th place
among 192 nations in 2006
62
Source: Freedom House.
© ИЭА
Political Rights Indices and Russia’s Ranks, 2004−2006
63
© ИЭА
By Economic Freedom Index Russia occupies 112-116th
place among 141 nations in 2005
64
Source: Fraser Institute/Economic Freedom Network.
© ИЭА
Economic Freedom Indices and Russia’s Ranks,
2005-2006
65
© ИЭА
“State functions and state institutions differ from
business ones since they may not be purchased or sold,
privatized, leased or rented. Government service needs
professionals for whom the only criteria is law.
Otherwise the state will open path to corruption…
That is why we insist on only one dictatorship –
dictatorship of law”.
Vladimir Putin, State of Russia Address,
July 8, 2000
66
© ИЭА
By Rule of Law Russia occupies 163th place
among 208 nations in 2005
67
Source: World Bank.
© ИЭА
Rule of Law Indices.
Rank of Russia, 2005−2006
68
© ИЭА
By Corruption Index Russia occupies 115-123th place
among 154 nations in 2006
69
Source: Transparency International.
© ИЭА
Corruption Indices and Russia’s Ranks, 2004−2006
70
© ИЭА
“Our position is utmost clear:
only strong, effective, … and democratic state
is capable to protect civil, political and economic
freedoms, as well as able to create environment
for happy life of people and for prosperity
of our Motherland”.
Vladimir Putin, State of Russia Address,
July 8, 2000
71
© ИЭА
By Press Freedom Index Russia occupies 164-165th place
among 195 nations in 2007
72
Source: Freedom House.
© ИЭА
Freedom of Press Indices and Russia’s Ranks, 2006-2007
73
© ИЭА
By Property Rights Index Russia occupies 114th place
among 125 nations in 2006
74
Source: World Economic Forum.
© ИЭА
Property Rights Indices.
Rank of Russia, 2006
75
© ИЭА
By Organized Crime Index Russia occupies 91-101th place
among 125 nations in 2006
76
Source: World Economic Forum.
© ИЭА
Physical Property Rights Indices and Russia’s Ranks,
2006
77
© ИЭА
By Functioning of Government Index Russia occupies
119-124th place among 167 nations in 2006
78
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
© ИЭА
Functioning of Government Indices and Russia’s Ranks,
2004−2006
79
© ИЭА
“The authorities themselves must not abuse
administrative levers at their possession.
They must open all new possibilities to strengthen
institutes of real democracy in the country”.
Vladimir Putin, State of Russia Address,
April 25, 2005
80
© ИЭА
Deterioration in Electoral Process Index in Russia.
81
© ИЭА
“The goal of the Government is to polish
the work of the state institutes,
supporting the work of the market.
We could not secure sustainable development
without genuinely independent courts and
effective system of law enforcement bodies”.
Vladimir Putin, State of Russia Address,
July 8, 2000
82
© ИЭА
Deterioration in Judicial Framework & Independence
Index in Russia.
83
© ИЭА
“We can solve no problem our country faces
without securing rights and freedoms of our citizens,
without effective organization of the state itself,
without development of democracy
and civil society”.
Vladimir Putin, State of Russia Address,
May 10, 2006
84
© ИЭА
Deterioration in Governance Index in Russia.
85
© ИЭА
Deterioration in Civil Society Index in Russia.
86
© ИЭА
“The strong government is unthinkable
without respect to human rights
and personal freedom”.
Vladimir Putin, State of Russia Address,
July 8, 2000
87
© ИЭА
Deterioration in Independent Media Index in Russia.
88
© ИЭА
Civil Liberties and Political Rights Index (CLPRI)
in Russia, 1991-2006.
89
© ИЭА
Zimbabwean disease:
Civil Liberties and Political Rights Index
in Zimbabwe and Russia, 1991−2006
90
© ИЭА
6. International Position Approach.
Deviationism Disease –
Russia under Siloviki Regime is moving farther
from economic and institutional standards
of the OECD, EU, transition countries
and majority of the world
91
© ИЭА
Political Rights Index
Russia as % of OECD
92
Source: IEA calculations by Freedom House data.
© ИЭА
Press Freedom Index
Russia as % of OECD
93
Source: IEA calculations by Freedom House data.
© ИЭА
Voice and Accountability Index
Russia as % of OECD
94
Source: IEA calculations by World Bank data.
© ИЭА
Corruption Perceptions Index
Russia as % of OECD
95
Source: IEA calculations by Transparency International data.
© ИЭА
Bureaucratic Quality Index
Russia as % of OECD
96
Source: IEA calculations by ICRG data.
© ИЭА
Civil Liberties Index
Russia as % of OECD
97
Source: IEA calculations by Freedom House data.
© ИЭА
Physical Integrity Rights Index
Russia as % of OECD
98
Source: IEA calculations by CIRI data.
© ИЭА
Russia’s Ranks as % of the OECD in 2006
99
© ИЭА
In 1991−2006 Russia was the main contributor
to decline in Political Freedom Index in the CIS-12
100
© ИЭА
In 2003 Political Rights Index in Russia fell lower
than that of Sub-Saharan Africa.
In 2005 it fell lower than that of Middle East.
In 1972-2004 Middle East was the World’s worst region in terms of
deficit of political freedoms.
101
Source: IEA’s calculations on Freedom House data.
© ИЭА
By changes in Political Freedom Index in 1991-2005
Russia occupies 190th place
among 193 countries of the World.
102
© ИЭА
Another G8 by speed of destruction of political freedom
in the World in 1991-2005.
103
© ИЭА
List of countries with quality of institutions
comparable to the Russia’s level
104
Beginning
of the 1990s
End of the 1990s
2004 – 2006
Argentina
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Venezuela
Colombia
Albania
Mexico
Mexico
Bangladesh
Thailand
Mozambique
Dominican Republic
Ukraine
Pakistan
Kazakhstan
Philippines
Paraguay
Pakistan
Ecuador
Ukraine
Ethiopia
© ИЭА
Russia’s group by the level
of the Index of the Modern State Institutions
105
© ИЭА
7. Foreign Policy Approach.
7a. Isolationism.
The Siloviki Model in
the international relations led to
failure of Russian-Western integration
and growing isolation Russia from
the Enlarged West and even from the CIS.
106
© ИЭА
Since 2001 intensity of the international summits
of the Russian President was gradually falling.
After November 2006 it fell by half.
107
© ИЭА
Intensity of Russian President’s summits
with leaders of the Enlarged West and East
108
© ИЭА
Regional preferences of the Russian President’s
summits have change dramatically,
especially after November 2006
109
© ИЭА
Structure of the Russian President’s summits
has undertaken radical changes
110
© ИЭА
Political preferences of the Russian President
have changed dramatically.
Monthly average of Political Freedom Index for the countries with
leaders of which the Russian President held summits
111
© ИЭА
7. Foreign Policy Approach.
7b. Aggressive and Maniacal Syndrome
Saudi/Saddam Disease –
use of nationalized and
quasi-nationalized resources
(including energy and infrastructure)
as a weapon in domestic and international relations,
export of political and economic non-freedom.
112
© ИЭА
Backed by an unstoppable influx
of financial resources into the country
the Siloviki’s foreign policy becomes
more assertive, more arrogant
and more aggressive.
Foreign policy warfare has been used against
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Poland, Lithuania,
Belarus, Estonia…
113
© ИЭА
First cyber war in history. Number of DDoS-attacks
against Estonian government web-sites, May 2007.
Source: Arbor Networks
114
http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2007/05/estonian-ddos-attacks-a-summary-to-date/
© ИЭА
First cyber war in history. Number of DDoS-attacks
against Estonian government web-sites, May 2007.
Source: Arbor Networks
115
http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2007/05/estonian-ddos-attacks-a-summary-to-date/
© ИЭА
8. Social Behavior.
Sicilian Disease –
use of coercion and violent force
unrestricted by law, tradition, morale
and now even economic resources.
It is the essence of the Siloviki Regime.
116
© ИЭА
By recorded Intentional Homicide per 100,000
Russia occupies 114th place among 121 nations in 2006
117
© ИЭА
Physical Survival Indices.
Rank of Russia, 2004−2006
118
© ИЭА
Violence rate in Russia more than doubled
in the last 8 years.
Crimes against personality (murder, assault, rape,
robbery) per 100 000 of population (1998 г. =100%)
119
© ИЭА
Homicide rates in Russia and Baltic countries,
1985-2006
120
© ИЭА
The key criteria of the effectiveness
of any political regime:
– safety, freedom and
relative prosperity of citizen –
fell sharply. Violence rate skyrocketed.
121
© ИЭА
9. Intermediary conclusion
122
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“By Weber’s definition, structures in which
the ruling group commits crimes against
other members living in the same territory
would still be called a state,
albeit a predatory one (e.g., the former
Republic of Zaire under Mobutu Seko–Seko)”.
Leshek Baltzerovich, Towards the Limited Government
123
© ИЭА
“Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but
great robberies? For what are robberies themselves,
but little kingdoms? The band itself is made up of men;
it is ruled by the authority of a prince, it is knit together
by the pact of the confederacy; the booty is divided by
the law agreed on. If, by the admittance of abandoned
men, this evil increases to such a degree that it holds
places, fixes abodes, takes possession of cities, and
subdues peoples, it assumes the more plainly the name
of a kingdom, because the reality is now manifestly
conferred on it, not by the removal of covetousness, but
by the addition of impunity”.
Augustin of Hippo, City of God
124
© ИЭА
Path of Russia’s Transition in 1991-2007.
Areas of
public life
Departing
point in 1991
N.American/
European
Model
New Russian
Regime by 2007
Political
system
Communist
dictatorship
Liberal
democracy
Siloviki regime
Nature of
state
mechanism
Party monopoly
state
Competitive
state
Corporatist state
(State captured by the
Corporation of SP)
Economy
Centralized
planned
Free market
economy
Capitalism of state
monopolies and
corporations
Legal system Rule of the Party
Rule of Law
Rule of Thugs
Foreign
policy
Confrontation and
aggression
Peaceful
neighboring
Confrontation and new
type aggression
State
ideology
Communism,
social hatred
Social patience “Chekism”/”Nascism”
and ethnic
sovereign democracy,
tolerance
social hatred
© ИЭА
125
10. Western Approach.
10a. Policy of Appeasement Disease –
encouragement of aggressive behavior
in domestic and international affairs
126
© ИЭА
West’s approval of the Siloviki Model
(esp. since July 2006)
1. The IPO of Rosneft at the London Stock Exchange, July
2006.
2. The G8 summit in St. Petersburg, July 2006.
3. The US support for WTO membership in November 2006,
after full-scale blockade of Georgia and murder of Anna
Politkovskaya.
4. Foreign business leaders’ gratitude to the Russian
leadership for their expulsion from Sakhalin, Kovykta, Stokman
and other projects, all time.
5. The US President Bush response to the Russian President
Putin speech in Munich, February 2007.
6. Participation of ENI and BP in grabbing of the remaining
YUKOS assets, March-April 2007.
7. The Condoleeza Rice visits to Moscow seeking cooperation,
2007.
8. EU-Russia summits seeking long-term cooperation
agreement, May and October 2007.
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10. Western Approach.
10b. Great Leader Appreciation Disease –
irresistible passion to be thankful
for everything under the Sun
to the Great Leader
(Stalin, Mao, Kim Il Sen, Turkmenbashi).
Personality cult.
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“He’s done a helluva of a job. The country has made tremendous
strides in the time we’ve been there, and you’ve got to give Putin
credit for that. He did a lot of positive things in a very short
period of time.”
Mark Mobius, Tempelton Asset Management Ltd.
WSJ, January 22, 2007
“Two key factors in any emerging market are economic
predictability and political stability. Russia has the first thanks
to oil, and the second thanks to Putin.”
Chris Weafer, chief economist, Alfa Bank,
WSJ, January 22, 2007
“Thank you for supporting this truly historic event. We sincerely
welcome Gazprom as one of our partners in the project… This is
historical situation for all sides… I am grateful to you, Mr.
President, for your assistance.”
Van der Veer, Royal Dutch Shell,
Meeting with the Russian President, December 21, 2006
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Press Conference by the President George W. Bush,
February 14, 2007, White House:
“Q Is the Vladimir Putin who said the United States is undermining
global security and provoking a new arms race the same Vladimir
Putin whose soul you looked into and found to be trustworthy? Has
he changed? Are U.S.-Russian relations deteriorating?
THE PRESIDENT: I think the person who I was referring to in 2001
is the same strong-willed person…
We work together on… common interests, we can accomplish
important things for the security of our own people, as well as the
security of the world.
There's also a relationship in which we can find common ground to
solve problems. And that's the spirit -- that's the spirit I'll continue
to work with Vladimir Putin on.”
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070214-2.html
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THE SILOVIKI REGIME IN RUSSIA
A. Illarionov,
CATO Institute, Washington, USA
Institute of Economic Analysis, Moscow, Russia
Evenings at FEE, Foundation for Economic Education,
Irvington-on-Hudson, November 10, 2007
© CATO Institute, Institute of Economic Analysis
www.cato.org, www.cato.ru, www.iea.ru