Transcript چشم انداز توسعه اقتصادی

‫تاثیر تحریم اقتصادی آمریکا بر ایران‬
‫محمد حافظی‬
‫گروه مطالعات‬
‫ایرانی دانشگاه ‪MIT‬‬
‫دانشجوی دکترای فیزیک نظری دانشگاه هاروارد‬
‫آبان ماه ‪۱۳۸۳‬‬
‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
Motivations
Why we are studying U.S. sanction on Iran ?
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Iran’s importance (oil, market, military,
nuclear, multi-ethnicity etc.)
Geopolitical distinction of Iran
in Middle East (Iraq’s present
situation, Caspian Sea,
Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda)
Success of Libyan experience
Iranian Studies Group at MIT
‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
History of U.S. Executive orders against Iran
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Carter Nov.1979: freezing Iranian assets in U.S. banks and
their foreign subsidiaries.
Carter April 1979: prohibiting of all financial transaction,
embargo imports, banning all travel, impounded Iranian military
equipment (Iran’s claim $12 billion)
Reagan Oct.1987: embargo all import including oil, prohibiting
14 export items. (oil loopholes: third country, U.S. company)
Clinton March1995: banned all investment in Iran’s petroleum
sector
Clinton May1995: prohibiting imports exports and investment of
any kind. “get-tough policy”  hurting Iran’s economy
Clinton ILSA August 1996: closing the third country loophole
and transforming sanction into a multilateral one.
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‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
The impact of sanction on Iran
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
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10.
11.
12.
U.S.-Iran direct trade
U.S.-Iran indirect trade effect
Reduced U.S. and Non-U.S. export financing (no U.S. export
financing from the U.S. Export-Import bank since 1990)
Higher Cost and Reduced Availability of Commercial Financing (high
LC confirmation)
Reduced IMF/World bank Financing ( 8 project dropped,valued $1
billion)
Higher Debt Rescheduling Fees (U.S. rejection Paris Club
rescheduling payment)
Reduced Foreign Direct Investment
Pipeline across Iran and oil swaps
Reduced Tourism Receipts
Non-participation of U.S. entities in Iran-Related Business
Psychological effects of U.S. sanction on Iranians and Non-Iranians
Impact on Iranian Economic Policies (high profile project with Japan
and Europe that may not be always in Iran’s best interest)
Iranian Studies Group at MIT
Estimated Reduction in Direct Trade as a result of
Sanction ($ billion)
3
2.5
Est. reduction in U.S.
2
export to Iran
Est. reduction in U.S. 1.5
import form Iran
1
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0.5
0
19
80
19
82
19
84
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86
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88
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90
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92
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94
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96
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98
‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
U.S.-Iran direct trade
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In 1998-1999 16.2
percent of Iran’s
non-oil export
($516million) was
going to Dubai.
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
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UAE exports to
Iran totaled $551
million in 1998
which were almost
re-exports from a
third part.
500
0
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
Indirect trade : Dubai Effect
U.S. Export to the UAE ($ million)
U.S. Import from the UAE ($ million)
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Iranian Studies Group at MIT
20
15
10
5
LC fee (percentage)
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
0
1994
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25
1993
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No U.S. export financing from
the U.S. Export-Import bank
since 1990.
The absence of the U.S. export
financing has curtailed trade
financing for Iran from other
countries and also raised their
rates due the absence of
competition.
The estimate is based on the
loss in U.S. export credit for
Iran (4.3% of total credit) plus
LC confirmation fees (5-10%),
those will add up to a $20-30
million yearly loss.
Similarly in Commercial
financing has been affected
(loss per year $100 million )
1992
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1991
‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
Reduced U.S. and Non-U.S. export financing
‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
World Bank Financing
Eight World Bank
projects with Iran
dropped due to the
U.S. opposition
valued $1 billion,
considering an
interest difference
of 2 percent will
give rise to a loss
roughly equal to
$20 million.
Iranian Studies Group at MIT
Date
Approved
Project Description
Amount $
million
March91
Earthquake
Recovery
250
May92
Tehran Drainage
77
May92
Sistan Flood Control
57.1
March93
Irrigation
Improvement
157
March93
Health and Family
Planning
141.4
March93
Power Sector
Inefficiency
165
May2000
Tehran Sewerage
145
May2000
Health Care
87
‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
Higher Debt Rescheduling Fees
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U.S. rejection Paris Club for rescheduling Iran’s debt payment
(1993-1994)
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$13-55 million loss per year
Reduced Foreign Direct Investment
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GDP wise (or population-wise) Iran should have a $4.3 billion
($8.6 billion) share in the world’s FDI. In 1999 global FDI in
Iran was only $85 million while it was $9.2 billion in Middle
East.
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Lost and delayed in energy FDI due to the sanction: $700-840
million (out of $10-12 billion incul. North Pars excul. Caspian)
Lost and delayed non-energy FDI : $0.5-1 billion
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‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
Pipeline and Oil swap
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Baku-Ceyhan route:
construction,
maintenance, transit etc.
($300-600 million)
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Oil swap: 750,000 b/d
saving $90 million
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1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
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2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
Total loss (max)
Total loss (min)
1995
‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
Summery of Iran’s loss from U.S. sanction
($ million)
‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
The impact of sanction on U.S.
($ millions)
1200
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1000
800
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600
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400
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200
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0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Est. Min
Est. Max
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FDI(nonenergy)
FDI(energy)
Oil pipeline
Oil swaps
Financial
services
‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
Conclusion
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Iranian Economic indicator are healthier than at any
time since the early 1990’s.
The sanction hasn’t brought Islamic republic
economy to it’s knees but it may handicap it in the
race to rapid economic growth.
Iran can live with U.S. sanction with much less
difficulty than Cuba or Vietnam, although it can’t
prosper without Washington’s blessing.
American sanction has not been effective in the
sense that it hasn’t induced a noticeable change in
Tehran’s policies.
Iranian Studies Group at MIT
‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
References
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J. Amuzegar. 1997. “Adjusting to Sanction Foreign” Affairs 76 :31-41.
H. G. Askari et al. 2003. “Case Studies of U.S. economic sanctions:
the Chinese, Cuban and Iranian experience.” Praeger Pub. London.
H. G. Askari et al. 2003. “Economic sanctions examining their
philosophy and efficacy.” Praeger Pub. London.
N. Hadian. Oct 2003. “Iran: Security Threat & U.S. Policy”, Capitol
Hill Testimony, U.S. Senate Washington D.C.
Hufbauer et al. 1990. “Economic sanction reconsidered” Washington
D.C.: Institute for International Economics
Iranian Studies Group at MIT
‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
Backup Slides
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‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
Political Context and Background
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Overthrown of elected prime minister, Mohammad
Mussadeq, by a CIA instigated coup, 1953
Islamic revolution 1979, American Embassy
Hostage Crisis
American support towards Saddam Hussein during
Iraq-Iran war, lack of support for Iran’s assertion
before the UN regarding Iraq Biological Chemical
Weapons, 500,000-plus casualties due to the war.
Iranian Studies Group at MIT
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Iranian Studies Group at MIT
2000
1997
1994
1991
1988
1985
1982
Iran’s debt/GDP ratio was
at %9.5 and debt service
ratio was around %18 at
2000 which a significant
achievement for a
developing country.
GDP(billions of
current $)
1979
‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
Iran Economic Record
‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
Health and Education Indices
Literacy rates have
increased from about
50 percent in 1987 to
around 80 percent in
1997. Enrollment rate
in primary education
reached 100 percent
in 1980.
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80
60
40
20
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80-85 86-90 91-95 96-97 97-98
Infant mortality per 1000 live births
Access to safe water
Hospital beds/100,000
Life expectancy at birth (F)
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‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
Domestic Policy consideration in Iran
(IMF 2000 report)
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Domination of the public sector : In 1996 IMF
estimated public sector holds 70 percent of the total
employment.
Credit allocation and Foreign trade is controlled
heavily by the government along with high tariff rate
(18 percent of tax+duty in 1994)
Baby boom : the population doubled between 19792000 which puts a lot of pressure on infrastructure,
education, health and employment.
Heavy subsidies on energy and petroleum product
up to 17 percent of GDP in 2000.
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‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
The foundation of the Oppressed
(Bonyad Mostazafan)
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It was formed after revolution with confiscated
asset of the Pahlavi foundation and family.
It plays a significant role in the public-sector and
private-sector (est. 20 percent) economy: 1.5
percent of Iran GPD with direct employment in
excess of 70,000.
Private sector laws don’t apply to this foundation
and it’s only answerable to the supreme leader.
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‫تی‬.‫آی‬.‫گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه ام‬
Five Year Development Plans
(IMF 2000 report)
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First FYDP(1990-94) : initiating decontrolling a significant
part of domestic prices, lower income taxes, stating
privatizing public enterprises, infrastructure development.
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Second FYDP(1995-2000): slow progress in economic
opening despite the recovery of the oil price in first three
years of the plan. But finally macroeconomic instabilities
and declining economic growth resulted in shifting
polices and delaying the much-need structural reform.
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Third FYDP (2001-2005): limited reform of the multiple
exchange rate, abolition of the state monopoly in
telecom, railway etc., permitting the establishment of
private banks and free trade zone, polices to attract
foreign investors.
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