Turkey and EU - Hiram Reads! — Where Hiram College Talks

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Transcript Turkey and EU - Hiram Reads! — Where Hiram College Talks

Turkey and EU
Presentation for TASNO
19 August 2005
Dr. Uğur Aker
1
Outline
Short History
 Economic Effects

Single market
 Institutional reform
 Expected Migration from Turkey to EU
Cultural Factor


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Short History
European Coal and Steel Community
(1951) - cooperation between six
countries.
 Treaty of Rome - EEC Treaty(1957) formation of customs union.
 Turkey applied for associate membership
in 1959.

3
Short History

Turkey signed an association agreement
with EEC (first step to membership) in
1963.


Czech Republic signed an association
agreement in 1993.
Turkey submitted a formal application for
membership in 1987.

Poland and Hungary applied in 1994.
4
Short History

EU granted financial assistance and
preferential tariffs initially but during the
70s and early 80s gradual, mutual
reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers
were suspended.
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Short History

Customs Union started in
1996 and completed in
2001.


Industrial goods between
Turkey and EU are free from
tariffs and quantitative
restrictions.
Turkey has aligned its trade
policies with the EU.
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Short History


The agreement with Turkey goes beyond a
normal Customs Union. It also covers the
harmonization of technical legislation, the
elimination of monopolies and the protection of
intellectual property.
Negotiations continue on the mutual opening of
public procurement markets, liberalization of
trade in services, and the abolition of restrictions
on the freedom of establishment.
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Short History

In Helsinki (1999) Turkey became the only
candidate for membership without a
timetable.


Cooperation for adopting the legal framework
(acquis communautaire).
In Nice (2000) a revision of vote
distribution excluded Turkey implying that
EU-15 did not plan for Turkey to become a
member in the foreseeable future.
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Short History

The Progress Report in 2002 stated that
Turkey did not fulfill the Copenhagen
(1993) criteria of political and human
rights.

Political and human rights: “stability of
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule
of law, human rights and respect for and
protection of minorities.”
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Copenhagen Criteria


Economic criteria declared to
be fulfilled in 2003 Progress
Report: harmonizing with EU
in terms of electricity,
financial services, agriculture
and telecommunications.
Progress Report in October
2004 acknowledged
fulfillment of the political and
human rights criteria.
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Short History

“Major political
developments in the
country led to the
decision to open
accession
negotiations at the
December 2004
European Council
summit.” ROMANO PRODI, THE
PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Ankara, 14 January 2004
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EU Objections
“Turkey is too big; it will be the most
populous country in EU.”
 “Turkey is too poor.”
 “Turks will flood Europe.”
 “Turks are a different culture.”

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Economic Effects
Budget burden
 Becoming a single market
 Institutional reforms
 Migration

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EU Budget Burden
Current framework: 2000-2006 (EU-15)
 2007-2013 Framework (EU-25)
 2014-2020 Framework (EU-27/28)
 The optimistic date for Turkey’s accession
is 2015 under rules determined by EU27/28.
 Full budgetary support will not be
implemented before 2020.

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EU Budget Burden

Daniel Gros, Director of Center for
European Policy Studies, estimates that
Structural Funds (for regions with a GDP
per capita at PPP below 75% of the EU
average) contribution to Turkey in 2015
would be about 0.16% of EU-28 GDP
under the current rules, assuming that
Turkish GDP reaches 4% of EU-28 by
2015.
17
Agriculture

In 2001, agriculture comprised 14.2% of value
added in the Turkish economy. This share was
smaller than that for Bulgaria (28.2%) and Romania
(19.3). It was much larger, however, than in the
CEEC-10 (6.9%), and the EU-15 (2.5%).






5% of GDP transferred to farmers.
guaranteed output prices,
import protection,
export subsidies,
subsidized services to farmers
Agricultural policy is being gradually reformed,
eliminating market interventions in favor of direct
payments.
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EU Budget Burden
Assuming that Turkish agriculture will
comprise 10% of Turkish GDP in 2015 (it
is 12% today), and the CAP support will
still be 20% of agricultural income, the EU
CAP burden will be (0.2*0.1*0.04) 0.08%
of EU GDP.
 But Turkey will be required to contribute
1.2% of its GDP to EU Budget.

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EU Budget Burden
Maximum budgetary cost, full membership
Structural Funds
CAP receipts
Total receipts
Contributions to EU budget
(Max) Net receipts for Turkey
Turkey 2015 in an enlarged
EU (in % of EU GDP)
0.16
0.08
0.25
0.05
0.20
According to Michaele Schreyer, Commissioner responsible for the Budget,
the cost of CEEC-10 will be 0.08% of EU-15. (Brussels, 18 April 2002).
Yet, the European Commission estimates that the long-run effect will be
positive 0.4% of GDP for EU-15.
20
Economic Effects



Trade liberalization of Turkey integrated her
more to the rest of the world.
The sum of imports and exports as a share of
GDP was only 18% in 1980; it increased to
almost 50% in 1999, and 54% in 2004.
A relatively low degree of openness implies that
a trade increase due to the single market has
less effect on the total economy than for
countries with a higher degree of openness.
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22
Membership Means More
Customs Union has not
catapulted Turkish
standard of living as
much as membership
did for the other
comparable countries.
23
Economic Effects

Accession to the internal market may increase
trade for at least three reasons.



Administrative barriers to trade will be eliminated or at
least reduced to levels comparable to those between
current EU members: less time delays, less
formalities at the border.
Reduction in technical barriers to trade. Mutual
recognition of different technical regulations, minimum
requirements and harmonization of rules and
regulations.
Risk and uncertainty will be mitigated. Especially
political risks and macroeconomic instability may
reduce substantially.
24
Economic Effects
According to Lejour & De Mooij, aggregate
trade with the EU can rise by 34% if
Turkey were full member of the EU, as
compared to the situation in 2001.
 WorldScan simulations yield 20.3%
increase (8.1% exports and 12.2%
imports).

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Institutional Reform




Turkey has to conform to all EU legislation and
enforcement by the European Court of Justice.
Turkey will regularly be assessed by the
European Commission and other Member
countries on its economic policies.
EU-membership can thus trigger institutional
reform in Turkey and reduce corruption.
Internationally Turkey ranks low on the
corruption index.
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Turkey’s rank in 2004 was 77th with a score of 3.2.
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Institutional Reform

If by improving institutions and obtaining
more discipline within bureaucracies, the
TI Corruption Perceptions Index of Turkey
would rise from 3.2 to 6.3 (Portugal’s
rank), aggregate trade of Turkey would
rise by 57%.
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Migration

Most migration predictions use
Proximity
 Income differences
 Job opportunities
 “Kinship” connections

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Productivity

These productivity comparisons show that
the Turkish economy is not only on
average ‘more developed’ than the
economies of Romania and Bulgaria, but
Turkish productivity outside agriculture is
close to, or in some cases even higher
than what we observe in the new member
countries.
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•EU-15 labor markets closed up to 7 years after accession.
•Full mobility of Turkish workers in 18-25 years. EU labor markets in 2025
•ageing of the population (not only among the EU-15, but also the new members)
•there might be labor shortages, instead of the widespread unemployment.
•If Turkey grows according to its potential, it might no longer be so attractive for
Turkish workers to emigrate.
•The experiences of Greece, Portugal and Spain indicate that a successful
accession period with high growth and effective implementation of the reforms
reduces and gradually eliminates the migration pressures.
38
Slower Growth More Migration
Deutsche Bank suggests three possible
scenarios for Turkey over the next 15
years. In the first, Turkey pursues the
economic and political reforms needed to
converge with the EU; in the second, it
drifts back to the weak governments of
the 1990s, but with less economic
volatility; and in the third, it is destabilized
by geopolitical uncertainty, kept at bay by
the EU and polarized by tensions
between secular and religious forces. The
long-term annual growth rates associated
with these scenarios are, respectively,
4.1%, 3.1% and 1.9%
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Migration

Keeping GDP per capita at 31% of EU-15
average but including demographic
changes into their calculations, Lejour and
De Mooij forecast migration from Turkey to
the EU of 2.7 million people by 2025. This
equals 4% of the current Turkish
population, or another 0.7% of the current
population in the EU-15.
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Why?




Economic calculations yield positive results
for EU and for Turkey.
Turks overwhelmingly want to become a
member country.
But why is there such a visceral objection to
Turkey’s membership?
What is the “cultural” difference?
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Turkey Is Knocking, but EU Is Hesitating
Since when do you toss a rotten apple into the barrel to improve the diversity of
the pippins and macintoshes? Europe is planning its own cultural demise by
aquiescing to the demands of Turkey to be admitted to the EU, which will allow the
free flow of Turkish Muslims throughout Europe. Officials are aware of the
dangers, but are willing to plunge ahead anyway, despite all the recent Muslim
violence and the chasm of culture.
In Turkey, the practice of "honor killing" continues, and dozens of girls and
women are murdered annually for affronts to impossibly rigid gender behavior
codes.
As is increasingly the case in modern "democracies," multiculturalismbrainwashed elites in government are ignoring the polls which show their citizens
reject the scheme. Seventy percent of Germans believe that Islamic culture does
not fit in the west, and 55 percent are against Turkey's EU entry, as are 67 percent
of the French.
The BBC believes Turkey's EU inclusion will "disprove the theory of a clash of
civilisations between Islam and the West" — as if a political union could end the
tribal nature of human psychology or obliterate a thousand years of enmity.
http://www.limitstogrowth.org/WEB-text/archive-dec04.html
44
Thousands took to the streets in Milan
Dec. 19 to protest Turkey's accession
to the EU, calling it a "Muslim
invasion." In a statement, leader of
the Northern League Umberto Bossi
said, "Without our history we are
dead, our history is not up for sale."
Organizers estimated that 50,000
took part in the demonstrations.
Justice Minister Roberto Castelli
spoke to the crowd gathered around
Milan's gothic cathedral and asked,
"What will happen when 80 million
Islamists with a high birth rate have
the right to settle on our land?"
http://www.limitstogrowth.org/WEB-text/archive-dec04.html
45
”It would be “the
end” of the EU if
Turkey were ever
actually to get in.
Turkey is by
definition
unacceptable as
an EU member.”
Valerie Giscard D’Estaing
Another fear-mongering site: http://www.e- grammes.gr/ turkman.htm
46
Voices of Reason

European Union is, above all, a
community of shared values based on the
principles of liberty, democracy, human
rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule
of law. All these values are enshrined in
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union.
SPEECH OF ROMANO PRODI, THE PRESIDENT OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, AT THE TURKISH GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. Ankara, 14 January 2004
47
Voices of Reason

The proposition that Europe can be
defined by religion is a false one, not to
say dangerous. In many ways, the
European Union is a reaction against the
idea that we can define ourselves by
religion or ethnicity — and thus define
others as beyond consideration. Chris Patten,
EU Commissioner for External Affairs (From his May
2004 speech)
48
Two Perceptions of Culture
Pre-political: ascriptive - identity and
collective unity based on common
descent, religion, race, ethnicity etc.
 Political: centered on the civic aspect of
one’s identity and collective unity based on
citizenship.
 In the construction of modern Europe,
ascriptive culture has been the problem
and civic culture the solution.

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Voices of Reason

What is common to the modern Europe of
nation-states is precisely a civic culture
embedded in a secular, democratic and
constitutional concept of citizenship equipped
with individual rights and responsibilities. This is
the achievement of the European nation-states
against the background of a painful history of
wars, massacres, and expulsions that were
inflamed by differences of religion, sect, race
and ethnicity. Whereas ascriptive cultures divide
Europe, it is the achievement of civic culture that
unites them. Prof. Ilkay Sunar
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Turkey and EU

Turkey as a potential member needs to
be judged by not the ascriptive criterion of
culture but by civic standards, and not by
its history but by its commitment to the
same democratic culture practiced by
other members of the EU.
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"As a GERMAN NATIONALIST, I am against Turks' being accepted into the EU."
"And as a TURKISH NATIONALIST, I am against Turkey's entering the EU."
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Turkey’s Ithaca
Even if the extremists
were to win and Turkey is
denied membership, as
long as the next ten years
establish the institutional
reforms for a society that
respects the rule of law,
rights of minorities, and
democratic processes,
Turkey’s journey would
have been worth it.
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