Transcript Poland's Power and Influence in the European Union: Can a

Poland's Power and Influence
in the European Union: Can a
New Member State Set the
Agenda in External Relations?
Dr. Nathaniel Copsey
Wider Europe Seminar, Bratislava
13 June 2009
Plan
• Polish preferences on for EU relations with
the eastern neighbours: Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus and Georgia
• What factors determine these preferences?
• Poland’s potential capacity to exercise power
and influence
• Exercising power and influence: has Poland
helped set the agenda?
• Conclusions: towards the Polish EU
Presidency 2009–11
Polish Preferences for Relations
with the Eastern Neighbours
• Relations with the eastern neighbours were
not a political priority within Poland during the
1990s – took a firmly second place to the
Western axis of foreign policy, even more so
after 1997 when invited to join NATO
• Rose steadily up the political agenda as EU
accession drew nearer
• Pre-accession Eastern Dimension proposal of
2003
• But what do the Poles want?
Polish Preferences
• First and foremost to have sovereign
independent, democratic, stable and
prosperous neighbours to the East
• Not to be the eastern border of the Union in
perpetuity
• Democratization of Belarus
• European integration of Ukraine and Georgia
leading to eventual full membership
• This field of relations with the east benefits
from a high level of political consensus
Polish Preferences
• What about Russia?
• Poland’s relationship with Russia is not easy
• Security concerns about Russia persist at the
elite and popular level: ‘yesterday tanks;
today gas’ mentality
• Ideal would be to have a good working
relationship with Russia
• Considerable amount of variety or nuance in
positions between political parties,
governments and presidents
What Factors Determine
These Preferences?
• Counter-intuitively, Polish preferences on external
policy towards the east are determined by classical
realist interpretation of hard security interests
• Geopolitics, geostrategic concerns about hard and
soft security
• Giedroyc and Bączkowski
• History: fear of Russia and sense of responsibility for
the territories of the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth (amongst conservative elites)
• Far less consideration is given to national interests
calculated as a cost–benefit analysis: economic
determinants (trade/migration), JHA-related concerns
etc.
Poland’s Capacity to Exercise
Power and Influence
• Independent variables: population and
economic strength
• Dependent variables: intensity of policy
preference, skill at alliance forming,
administrative capacity, persuasive
advocacy, receptiveness of other
Member States, domestic political
strength
Fixed Variables
Table 1: The Crude Political Power of the Five Largest
Member States by Population and GDP
Germany
UK
France
Italy
Spain
Poland
Population
(millions)
83.25
60.59
60.76
59.7
45
38.6
GDP
(trillions US
$)
3.414
2.933
2.656
2.174
1.524
0.444
Source: IMF (2008).
Dependent Variables
T able 2: PolandÕsVariable Political Power and Influence inthe European Union in
the Case ofits Eastern Policy
Intensity of Policy Preference
Skill at Alliance Building
Administrative Capacity
P ersuasive Advocacy
Receptiveness of other Member States
Domestic Political Strength
High
Low
Low
Low
Low
Medium
Source: Wallace (2005) andauthorsÕown data.
Has Poland Exercised Power and
Influence in External Relations?
• Negative influences: veto of discussions on a new
agreement with Russia
• Positive influences: eastern partnership with Sweden
• Policy learning/adaptation: case of Polish minority
living in Belarus
• Learning to sound European/becoming ‘good
Europeans’
• Shift focus from defence and promotion of
Polishness, Roman Catholic church etc. towards
protection of ‘minority rights’
• Mixed balance sheet, but the first few years of
membership have been somewhat disappointing.
Why?
Explanations for Poland’s
Weak Performance
• Administrative capacity remains weak and may
worsen before it improves
• Full maturity as a Member State not yet achieved
• Friction, competition and tension, between PM Tusk
and President Kaczyński since 2007, on both
substance and style (Georgian crisis, attendance EU
summits, attitudes towards Germany and Russia)
• Political coordination lacking
• Alliance-building problems
• Most importantly, receptiveness of other Member
States was a problem – although this is shifting
Attitudes of other Member
States
• Usual split between northern/eastern and
southern Member States over priorities
• Stark differences between Member States
over the issue of potential enlargement:
Giscard’s view; this colours perceptions of the
eastern neighbours
• Very wide-ranging views on Russia, again
this is a strong influence on Member State
preferences for the eastern neighbours
Conclusions: Looking Forward
to the Polish EU Presidency
• Much depends on what becomes of the
Eastern Partnership: will ENP be devolved
into Union for the Mediterranean and Eastern
Partnership?
• Relations with the Eastern Neighbours are
likely be a major priority of the Polish
presidency
• Next Parliamentary and Presidential (2010)
elections may help improve political
coordination