Transcript Debt Management Practices and Financial Stability

Debt Management and
Financial Stability: Potential
Roles for SAIs
Reviewed Proposal by SAI –
Canada
June 2011
Outline
1. Introduction: Financial turmoil
2. Fiscal expansion and impact on public debt
1.
2.
3.
4.
Fiscal expansion, ↑ Spending measures
↑ Financial requirements, ↑ Borrowing
Trend in D/GDP
Changes in debt environment
3. Debt Management, financial stability and
potential roles for SAIs
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Relationship between debt management and financial
stability
New role for debt managers
Risk management and funding mix
Management of contingent liabilities
Debt target and performance measurement
Fiscal sustainability of public debt
4. Conclusion
1
1.0 Introduction:
Context to the
Financial Turmoil
2
1.0 Introduction: Context to
the Financial Turmoil
Pre 2007: Global economy had a long period of
steady growth
Low inflation / low interest rate
However large imbalances in the world economy
Concern over the quality of economic expansion
 Large Current Account deficits
 Low i / low ∆p: more risks as investors searching for
higher yield
 Assets price bubble (housing, commercial real estate)
Concerns over the growing household debt (e.g.
US)
3
2007 Financial crisis and
economic downturn
Until recently crises focussed on Emerging
Markets (EM) (e.g. southeast Asia, Latin
American debt crisis)
Most recent crisis epicentered in the United
States with global consequences
Through complex interactions and
relationships: affected Advanced Economies
more than Emerging Economies
Many elements in explanation
4
US Subprime mortgage
market collapsed
Poor lending standards
 Borrowers encouraged into variable rate mortgages
 Teaser rate
Financial institutions taking risks (assume housing
prices ever increasing)
Homeownership encouraged and subsidized by
government
Inadequate Regulation / Supervision in Large
Economies






Light regulatory regime (poor implementation of Basel II)
Liquidity levels not robust
Too big to fail
Too complex to fail
Too interconnected to fail
Moral hazard reducing market discipline
5
Financial markets under
pressure
Housing prices started to fall / default rate rose sharply
Value of complex derivatives based on mortgages uncertain
Markets dried up as market for derivatives because uncertain –
bad assets
Originating institutions stuck with mortgages that had intended to
sell
Short-term financing / interbank lending markets dried up as:


FI desire to hold liquid assets
Concern over counterparties’ solvency (questioned value of assets)
Concern about quality of household and business loans on balance
sheets of FI
6
Potential for insolvency in
FI as crisis evolved
Holding subprime mortgages
Holding ABS and CDOs as investments
Holding of commercial mortgages, loans, credit cards… where
borrowers fell into arrears as economy weakened
Exposure to CDSè
Severe downturn in housing prices
 Decline in stock prices
 Psychological worries as financial sector under pressure, as
unemployment began to rise
 Pressure on household spending (especially big ticket items: auto,
housing)
Banks reluctant to make new loans (because of liquidity pressure,
shortfall in capital, balance sheets problems, concern over quality of
loans and effects on future losses)
Growth in emerging economies slowed down (reduced exports, capital
markets tight, financial sector problems)
Exceptions: China, India
7
2.0 Fiscal
Expansion and
Impact on Public
Debt
8
2.0 Fiscal Expansion:
context
Liquidity measures, address solvency problems (e.g.
Lehman Brothers) and regulatory issues
Macro situation declining; accommodating monetary
policy
With weakening economy: governments turn attention
to fiscal policy
Fiscal stimulus measures introduced (however fiscal
space was often limited and poor fiscal credibility)
New stimulus measures announced by G-20 countries
$US 820 B (2009), $US 660 B (2010)
G-20 support for the financial sector totalled 32% as a
percentage of 2008 GDP
(49% for advanced economies, 2% for emerging
economies)
9
Fiscal deficit
Budget deficit for the OECD as a whole is
estimated to have peaked at 7.5% GDP $US 3.3
Trillion (est. 6.5% of GDP in 2011)
For the G-20, the increase in the average overall
fiscal deficit is estimated at 5.4 percent in 2010
Net borrowing requirements are estimated to fall
from $US3T (2010) to $US2.9T (2011).
Long-term interest rate expected to rise to 5.1%
(2011) from 3.7% (2009)
10
Public Finance:
Sustainable?
Public finances unsustainable in some countries – interest
rates will further augment as D/GDP ratio increase (4bps for
every percentage point > 75%)
Debt sustainability :
“Ability to service debt without
large adjustments to revenue and/or expenditure as well as
the lack of an ever-increasing debt burden”
Debt sustainability is a bigger problem for advanced
economies.
Risk of sovereign default (e.g. Ireland, Portugal, Greece)
Debt downgraded by Credit Rating agencies (e.g. reduced
outlook for US, Japan)
11
Debt/GDP for Emerging Countries (%)
80
Argentina, B, Stable
Brazil, BBB-, Stable
Bulgaria, BBB, Stable
Chile, A+, Positive
Lithuania, BBB, Stable
Mexico, BBB, Stable
Ukraine, B+, Stable
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Source: Standard & Poor's (long-term credit & outlook); International Monetary Fund (debt), Wall Street Journal
12
Debt/GDP for Countries with a Negative Outlook
(%)
160
140
120
100
80
Greece, BB-, Negative
60
Iceland, BBB-, Negative
Ireland, BBB+, Negative
40
Spain, AA, Negative
20
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Source: Standard & Poor's (long-term credit & outlook); International Monetary Fund (debt), Wall Street Journal
13
Debt/GDP for G-7 Countries (%)
300
250
Canada, AAA, Stable
France, AAA, Stable
200
Germany, AAA, Stable
Italy, A+, Stable
Japan, AA-, Stable
150
U.K., AAA, Stable
U.S., AAA, Negative
100
50
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Source: Standard & Poor's (long-term credit & outlook); International Monetary Fund (debt), Wall Street
14
Debt/GDP for other OECD countries (%)
80
70
60
Austria, AAA, Stable
50
Korea, A, Stable
Norway, AAA, Stable
40
Russia, BBB, Stable
Sweden, AAA, Stable
30
20
10
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Source: Standard & Poor's (long-term credit & outlook); International Monetary Fund (debt), Wall Street
15
Borrowing increased after
financial crisis
Financial requirements increased rapidly
as government spends more.
 Gross borrowing requirement in 2009
(OECD) : $16 trillion
Government in advanced and emerging
economies need to borrow more funds
 USD 16 trillion (2009)
 USD 17.5 trillion (2010),
 USD 19 trillion (2011 -- nearly twice that of
2007)
16
Changes in debt environment
Impact on debt managers: reported that issuance condition
worsened (weaker auctions)
Debt managers modified their borrowing strategies in terms
of maturity, currency and type of instruments.
Debt program more opportunistic for some sovereigns
Challenges for borrowing programs:
 1) Significant increase in short-term debt issuance (short notice




and lowest borrowing cost possible for capital injections or for
recapitalisation of banks)
2) Liquidity pressures in secondary markets
3) Record volume of sovereign issuance
4) Crowding-out effects (especially if above benchmark): risk
premia
E.g In early April 2011Portugal sold 1B Euros 6mths T-Bills @
yield 5.11%(compared to 2.98). One year rate = unsustainable
10 year bonds
17
Recent changes in financial markets: selected countries
Recent changes in issuing procedures and debt instruments: selected countries
Austria
More emphasis on investor relations.
Canada
Re‐introduction of 3‐year maturity. Reduction in the regular buy‐back programme but maintained switch
operations in long-end to support market liquidity. Introduction of additional benchmarks for 2‐year and
5‐year sectors.
Hungary
More flexible auction calendar (bi‐weekly bond auctions with dates but without tenors in calendars). More
flexibility in the amounts offered. Introduction of top‐up auctions (non‐competitive subscription) and
auction fees. More frequent use of reopening
of off‐the‐run bonds and buy‐back auctions. Planned introduction of exchange auctions. Introduction of
direct, regular meetings with institutional investors.
Korea
Since September 2009, single price format of auctions was changed to a multiple price format.
Introduction of conversion offers
Mexico
Tap issues of both short and long term bonds.
United Kingdom
Mini tenders were introduced in October 2008 as a more flexible supplementary distribution method
alongside with the core auctions programme. In 2009‐10 the DMO is using syndicated offerings to
supplement its auction programme (as of 1 October
2009, three syndicated offerings have been held). Introduction of a post‐auction option facility.
OECD, 2009
18
19
3.0 Debt
Management,
financial stability
and potential
roles for SAIs
20
3.1 Relationship between debt
management and financial
stability
Debt structure and sound debt management practices are essential
complements to fiscal consolidation and financial stability in a post crisis
environment.
Debt stock will affect the government’s balance sheet
Weak debt structure can be a source of financial instability (high debt
stock, large proportion of short-term debt stock with low term to
maturity, large foreign currency debt,…).
Higher volatility could result as refinancing large debt stock can lead
financial instability.
Can also put pressure on FI balance sheets where marking to market of
government securities increase risk and impact on capital requirements
For financial markets, a poor debt structure will lead to market
pessimism and reduced liquidity (incl higher interest rates)
21
Strong interrelations between
debt management and
financial stability (DNB Working Paper, 2010)
Debt
Management
Financial
Stability
Fiscal Policy
Monetary Policy
Financial
Regulation &
Supervision
22
3.2 Sound debt management
practices matter
Inappropriate debt structure can lead to
fiscal vulnerability and financial
instability
Lower cost debt strategy (short-term,
foreign denominated debt) are subject
to higher risk in the event of
unexpected shocks
Financial crises of the ‘90s illustrate
how the debt portfolio impact on
resilience to external shocks
23
Sound debt management
practices matter (cont’d)
Currency exposure (e.g. Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Russia)
 Mexico (1994) issued Tesobonos – bonds linked to US dollars. The next
year the currency was devalued, increasing the debt stock and financial
instability). Mexico (early 2000) improved debt structure: domestic
financing of deficit, lengthening of maturity structure, liquid yield curve
for domestic debt, increase predictability and transparency of debt
issuance
Exposure to imp-licit contingent liabilities (e.g. Turkey, Korea,
Thailand)
Debt structure that are too short can generate confidence crises
 Short ATM entail high rollover and refinancing risk : if interest rates
increase large fiscal impact
Concern that government will not have sufficient funds to redeem
maturing bonds on due date.
 Lower demand for debt instruments, higher yield, increase debt charges
24
New environment for debt
managers
Implication of debt management strategy are
broader than expected
Debt management influences the soundness
and solvency of balance sheet.
Debt management a factor that underpins the
credibility and reputation of sovereign
Debt management conditions debt capital
markets and impacts on FI that hold public
debt
Financial crises can have significant impact on
debt mangers when market conditions and
fiscal conditions degrade
25
New environment for debt
managers (cont’d)
Combined this can lead to
unsustainable public debt situation in
the short term
SAIs must remember that public
debt will impact on financial stability.
New challenges for SAIs when
auditing the management of public
debt
26
New environment for debt
managers (cont’d)
SAIs need to revisit the soundness of debt
management practices: SAIs should audit debt
management practices to determine if debt managers
opted for debt structure that supports financial stability.
Need for debt managers to develop strategic
benchmark to help determined desired l.t. structure of
liability (currency, interest, maturity, liquidity,
indexation)
SAIs could examine processes / tools in place to
support funding mix decisions
SAIs may also want to include in its audit scope the
need to maintain large liquidity levels in order to build
cash buffers to meet sudden shock on financial markets
27
New environment for debt
managers (cont’d)
Increasing foreign currency liquidity
needed:
 for multiple episodes to protect value of
currency,
 to cover financial requirements during
funding disruptions
 to demonstrate the government’s ability
to support market confidence
(benchmarked against other sovereigns
reserves-to-debt ration)
28
3.3 Risk Management
Post financial turmoil: increased emphasis on risk assessment
and risk management
Risk associated to assets (e.g. , liquidity for cash
management, FX reserves) and liabilities (bond/bills program)
management.
Importance of Risk management: key for achieving debt
management objectives.




Market Risks (interest and currency)
Credit Risks
Liquidity Risks
Refunding Risks (rollover)
Operational Risks + legal risks + risks associated with
contingency liabilities less likely to be managed
Define a framework for assessing portfolio performance in
relation to cost, risk and return
29
Risk Management practices
and impact on funding mix
Strategic benchmark (SB) plays a
key role in the control of risk. SB is
a management tools that requires
the government to specify: risk
tolerance and portfolio preferences
between expected cost and risk
trade-off.
30
Risk Management practices
and impact on funding mix
(cont’d)
Debt managers need to have a view on
optimal debt structure of portfolio.
Allows the pricing of risks against
expected cost of debt service
Funding mix = f (structure of economy,
economic shock, preference of
investors)
31
Risk Management practices
and impact on funding mix
(cont’d)
Crisis situation: deviation for strategic
benchmark
Eg. May issue more s.t. maturity
instruments that previously announced.
When normal conditions return DM need
to return to earlier announced debt
strategy (e.g. reduce floating debt,
increase maturity of domestic debt)
32
Risk Management practices
and impact on funding mix
(cont’d)
Designing and implement strategic
benchmarks: complex /challenging; in
particular in emerging economies
 Limited domestic currency borrowing
 Quantitative risk management tools are
harder to implement (e.g. models are less
stable)
 Cost-risk tradeoffs more difficult. Hence
difficult for EM debt managers to construct
optimal debt portfolio for performance
measurement
 Risk of default is such that EM debt
managers aim for lower D/GDP ratios
 Less foreign debt and more reserves
33
Need to audit risk management
governance /procedures
Audit Function plays a crucial role in
reviewing
Broader policy reform need to
integrate: debt and risk management
(incl. strategic benchmark)
SAI should assess the quality of risk
control systems
34
Need to audit risk management
governance /procedures (cont’d)
SAI could examine the risk management
framework that support debt management
decisions:
 How risks are identified, monitored, mitigated
 How risk tolerance levels are established
 The use by debt managers of benchmarking and





stress testing to set risk limits
Use of quantitative models (stochastic models,
robustness, stress testing, use of model in debt
strategy, use of model for benchmarking,
performance measurement,…)
How risks are integrated in modeling exercise
Governance structure in place / Mandate of risk
committees
Reporting on risk operations to Treasury operations
/ Minister / Parliament /Legislature /
Overall risk management of the balance sheet
35
3.4 Contingent liabilities:
potential financial claims
on the government.
Refer to obligations that may become government
liabilities whose size and timing = f(uncertain
future events outside the control of government)
Contingent Liabilities: significant risks on the
balance sheet
In fact, main risk to fiscal sustainability come from
contingent liabilities (including publicly guaranteed
debt)
Contingent debt such as guarantees is latent form
of government debt
36
Contingent liabilities
Hana Polackova-Brixi (1999, World Bank)
published a tool that provides a snapshot
of a country’s fiscal exposures. Bank
failure is considered an implicit contingency
(ie. that there is a moral obligation to
intervene in the case of a bank failure or
default of a private entity on
nonguaranteed debt).
Collapses in the financial services sector
can seriously damage the fiscal position of
governments and can be a major source of
fiscal vulnerability.
37
Categorisation of fiscal risk
Source: Hana Polackova-Brixi (1999, World Bank)
38
Contingent liabilities:
effective management
required
Need principles for reporting and pricing contingent
liabilities
Need measures of cost and risks that encompass both
guarantee portfolio and regular debt portfolio: debt
managers well positioned to manage both
Need rules and procedures so that costs of guarantee
are made explicit and reported
Design/ management of contingent debt/guarantees
 Guarantees may entail higher financial risks
 Are risks management processes in place?
 Is government sharing risks?
39
Contingent liabilities
(cont’d)
Failures in the financial system of a country
can lead to both explicit and implicit
contingent liabilities. The same is true for
collapses of major non-bank corporations
(e.g. automobile manufacturing sector in
the United States and Canada).
Guarantees to support the financial sector
totalled 28% of 2008 GDP (2009 average
advanced economies)
Guarantees totalled only 0.1 % for
emerging economies
40
Contingent liabilities: role
for debt managers
Monitoring of contingent liabilities by debt
managers
How are debt managers integrating risks
associated to contingent liabilities in
conventional debt management (including
probability of default when conducting national
debt management strategy analysis as well as
strategies for financing contingent liabilities
which are likely to become actual liabilities in
the short-to – medium term)
Accounting principles for off-balance sheet
commitments
41
Contingent liabilities: role
for debt managers (cont’d)
SAI could examine the role played by debt
managers in managing explicit and implicit
contingent liabilities. Attention should be
given to contingent liabilities and impact on
balance sheet.
SAIs could audit the need for government
to compile and publish accurate and timely
date on all government guarantees and
other contingent liabilities – as well as
disclose and report of loan guarantees as
part of the budget process.
42
3.5 Performance Measurement
Metrics should be used by debt managers
to support debt strategy decisions and to
assess their performance relative to debt
management objectives
 Debt Costs: low-cost funding
 Budgetary risk: minimize volatility in budgetary
outcomes and provide stability to the fiscal
planning process
 Debt Rollover: refinancing needs and ability to
meet these needs in the event that markets
cease to function
 Market Impact: maintaining a well-functioning
government securities market to keep debt costs
low and to foster efficient capital markets
43
Metrics and Performance
Measurement
Debt Costs
Budgetary Risk
Debt Rollover
Market Impact
Average term
premium
Average term to
maturity
Maturity profile
Size of treasury
bill stock
Average term to
maturity
Duration
Fixed/Floating
ratio
Duration
Fixed/Floating
ratio
Maturing share of
debt
Size of bond
benchmarks
Maturing amount
as a percentage
of GDP
Floating share as
% of GDP
Refinancing
coverage
44
Few countries use metrics and
even less are reported (*)
Country
Metrics
Australia
Duration *
Fixed-Rate Share of Debt *
Belgium
Fixed-Rate Share of Debt *
Maturing Share of Debt *
ATM
Duration
Canada
Fixed-Rate Share of Debt
ATM
Duration
Denmark
ATM *
Fixed-Rate Share of Debt
Re-fixing share of GDP
Debt Composition
Finland
Average Term-to-Re-Fixing *
Duration
Fixed-Rate Share of Debt
France
ATM *
45
Few countries use metrics and
even less are reported (cont’d)
Country
Metrics
Germany
Average Term-to-Re-Fixing *
Nominal Debt Charges *
Duration
Italy
ATM
Duration
Average Term-to-Re-Fixing
Japan
Average Term-at-Issuance
Maturity
Netherlands
Re-fixing Share of GDP *
ATM
Sweden
Debt Composition *
Duration *
ATM
UK
Duration
ATM
Maturing Share of Debt
USA
ATM
Duration
Maturing Share of Debt
46
Few countries use metrics and
even less are reported (cont’d)
Large issuers such as the US, Japan, and the
UK do not communicate any debt structure
targets to the public. Smaller issuers do tend to
communicate targets
SAIs could audit if and how debt management
metrics are used by debt managers for
monitoring and reporting performance.
SAIs could also examine how targets and
results could be communicated to Parliament,
Legislature, Congress and the public
47
3.6 Sustainability of public debt
SAIs should understand the arithmetic of the public
debt:
(1)
 where D represents a country’s gross public debt stock
 r captures the real interest rate paid on public debt
outstanding
 PB represents the government’s primary balance, i.e. the
government’s fiscal balance before net debt interest
payments
48
Debt arithmetic (cont’d)
The above identity can also be expressed in percent of
GDP, which puts the public debt stock in relation to the
size of the economy (government’s underlying potential
tax base):
(2)
After rearranging we obtain:
(3)
where d denotes the public debt stock
pb the primary budget balance (both in percent of GDP)
g represents the annual real GDP growth rate (% p.a.)
49
Debt arithmetic (cont’d)
Stabilizing the current debt-to-GDP
ratio
(4)
Where pb, represents the required
primary balance to stabilize the debtto-GDP ratio
50
Debt arithmetic: debt
sustainability (cont’d)
Lowering debt-to-GDP ratio to
target levels
In order to lower the current debtto-GDP ratio to a target level d* over
the next T years, the required
permanent primary balance pb** is
given by:
(5)
51
Sustainability of public debt
(Deutsche Bank Research, March2010)
Pre-crisis
debt, %
of GDP
Current
debt, % of
GDP
Baseline
Scenario,
% of GDP
2007
2010
2020
Argentina
56
49
25
Brazil
73
62
Canada
65
Chile
Required
Primary
Balance
To lower 2010 debt
stock to 2007 level
To stabilize
2010 debt
stock, % of
GDP
Achievement of debt
reduction (% of GDP in:
5 Years
10 Years
-0.7
-2.0
-1.4
49
1.8
0.0
0.8
86
89
0.4
4.3
2.4
15
23
0
-1.0
0.8
0.0
France
70
92
114
0.4
5.1
2.6
Germany
65
82
97
1.2
4.8
2.7
Greece
104
123
171
2.4
6.8
4.0
Ireland
28
81
118
1.3
11.7
6.0
Italy
112
127
131
1.9
5.2
3.1
Japan
167
197
246
-0.5
5.3
2.4
Korea
26
37
20
-0.8
1.5
0.4
52
Sustainability of public debt
(Deutsche Bank Research, March2010)
Pre-crisis
debt, %
of GDP
Current
debt, % of
GDP
Baseline
Scenario,
% of GDP
2007
2010
2020
Mexico
21
24
13
Portugal
71
91
Russia
7
Spain
Required
Primary
Balance
To lower 2010 debt
stock to 2007 level
To stabilize
2010 debt
stock, % of
GDP
Achievement of debt
reduction (% of GDP in:
5 Years
10 Years
-0.1
0.5
0.2
132
1.8
5.7
3.5
10
0
-0.5
0.0
-0.2
42
68
93
1.0
6.2
3.3
Sweden
48
55
39
-0.7
0.9
0.0
United
Kingdom
47
83
124
0.6
7.7
4.0
United
States
62
92
133
0.5
6.4
3.5
53
Sustainability of public debt
SAIs could report on the impact of rising public debt
considering the pressure on sovereign financing
capacity as well as inter-generational impact.
SAIs should examine measures taken to restore
fiscal credibility. Difficulty of achieving required
primary balance to stabilize or reduce debt /GDP
SAIs should examine whether debt targets have
been established and review the measures taken to
reach a sustainable debt level
54
Sustainability of public
debt (cont’d)
SAIs need to ensure governments
comply with the WB/IMF guidance on
Medium-Term Debt Management
Strategy (MTDS- 2009))
SAIs need to ensure governments
consider long-term fiscal sustainability
issues and its impact on public debt –
this is aligned with IPSASB proposal on
the need for government to report on
long-term fiscal sustainability.
55
4.0 Conclusions
and Potential
Roles of SAIs
56
4.0 Potential Roles for SAIs
Recent financial crisis has highlighted the
benefits of developing and implementing a
sound debt management strategy to meet
the related financing and fiscal challenges
Close relationship between debt
management and economic recovery
 Borrowing needs will remain high.
 Crowding-out effect: sovereign issuers are facing
increased competition on markets and need to
accept higher/expensive risk premia.
57
Potential Roles for SAIs (cont’d)
SAIs could audit for:
 Soundness of debt strategy and funding




mix is key to ensure sustainable public
debt
Effective Risk management
Need to establish performance
management and metrics
Reporting and management of
contingent liabilities
Sustainable public debt level to reduce
vulnerability
58
Potential Roles for SAIs (cont’d)
In addition to debt management
practices, SAIs may want to address the
need for initiatives to reduce fiscal
vulnerability and restore credibility :
fiscal rules, expenditure management,
broaden/protect tax base, fiscal
transparency, institutional reforms…
Challenge: SAIs need competency and
capacity; clear mandate
59
Exposure draft should be completed
in time for the next meeting in 2012.
Overlap with other WGPD projects?
Support of SAIs?
QUESTIONS ?
60
Hans Blommestein, How to Integrate Contingent Liabilities in Public Debt Management Strategies,
OECD, 2008.
Hans Blommestein, Responding to the Crisis, Changes in OECD Primary Market Procedures and
Portfolio Risk Management, OECD, 2009.
Hans Blommestein (et al), OECD Sovereign Borrowing Outlook, No. 3,OECD, 2010.
Hans Blommestein (et al), Debt markets: Policy Challenges in the Post-Crisis Landscape, OECD,
2010.
Udaibir S. Das (et al), Public Objectives and the Influence of Marco-economic Policies and the Quest
for Financial Stability, 20th ECD Global Forum on Public Debt management, OECD, 2011.
Development Finance International, Fiscal Sustainability of Debt, Joint Ministerial Forum on Debt
Sustainability, Commonwealth Secretariat, 2009.
Deutsche Bank Research, Public Debt in 2020, 2010.
Lex Hoogduin (et al), Public Debt managers’ Behaviour: Interactions with Macro Policies, De
Nederlandsche Bank, 2010
Marc Robinson, Accrual Budgeting and Fiscal Policy OECD, 2009.
Allen Schick, Post Crisis Fiscal Rules : Stabilizing Public Finance while responding to Economic
Aftershocks, OECD, 2010.
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