Transcript Kantian Vegetarianism:

From Pyrrhonian Skepticism to
Justification for Belief
 I. Rationality
and Kant’s Ethics
 II. Kant’s Metaphysics, Pyrrhonian
Skepticism and the Equipollence of Animal
Rationality
• II.1. Kant’s Antinomies
• II.2. Kant’s Synthetic A Priori Judgments
 III. The
Epoché Regarding Animal
Rationality, Practical Reason, Morality and
Belief
 IV. The Categorical Imperative and
Vegetarianism
 V. Conclusion
 Practical
Rationality and Theoretical
Rationality
• Practical Rationality- goal oriented and problem
solving
• Theoretical Rationality-abstract thinking
 Korsgaard’s Interpretation of Kant
• Incentives-motivate acts
• Principles-guidelines for how to act
• Instincts-primitively and automatically intuited as
appropriate given a particular incentive
• Rationality-ability to be aware of and question the
principles grounding instinctual beliefs and actions
• Ethics-Reason and will; Legislate morality by
questioning principles and acting based on
questions
 The
Categorical Imperative-universalize
maxim (the statement of the principle from
which one acts).
• First Formulation-Principle of Non-Contradiction:
“Act only according to that maxim whereby you can
at the same time will that it should become universal
law.”
• Second Formulation-Principle of Rationality as End:
“Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether
in your own person or in the person of another,
always at the same time as an end and never simply
as a means.”
 Empirical
evidence of animal behaviors is
indicative of practical and theoretical
rationality.
 René Descartes-Animals are machines.
• Animals act merely on instinct, learned behavior,
and/or mimicry because animals do not convey
thought associated with theoretical rationality.
 The problem of other minds.
• “How do we know other humans are rational?”
• We have objectively sufficient grounds for assenting
to knowledge of human rationality because we can
extrapolate our experiences onto other beings who
have an extreme likeness to us.
 Grier-“Mathematical
Antinomies”-thesis
and antithesis as disjunctive and reduce
both to the absurd.
 Forster-Pyrrhonian skepticism invokes
the epoché by offering equally plausible
contradictory claims, i.e. equipollence.
 The Thesis- “Animals are rational.”
 The Antithesis- “Animals are not
rational.”
 Suspend judgment or false dichotomy?

The thesis: Animals are rational. Humans are rational.
Rationality is a cognitive faculty. Cognitive faculties give rise
to specific behaviors. If both humans and animals are
rational, then both humans and animals share some of the
same cognitive faculties. If humans and animals share some
of the same cognitive faculties, then they share some of the
same specific behaviors. Specific behaviors are indicative of
what a being is thinking. If humans and animals share some
of the same specific behaviors, then humans would
intuitively know what animals are thinking by observing
animals’ specific behaviors that are the same as human
behaviors. Humans study animal behaviors to try to
determine what animals are thinking. Therefore, humans do
not intuitively know what animals are thinking. Therefore,
either humans are not rational or animals are not rational.
Humans are rational. Therefore, animals are not rational.

The antithesis: Animals are not rational. Humans are rational.
Instincts are not rational. Animals act on instincts and humans act
on instincts. Instincts are responses that are primitively and
automatically intuited as appropriate given a particular incentive.
Instincts are both inborn and learned responses to incentives.
Instincts are automatic responses to incentives. Instincts are
cognitive faculties; abilities of the mind. Rationality is the ability to
be aware of and question the principles grounding one’s
instinctual beliefs and actions. Rationality is both inborn and a
learned behavior. Rationality is an automatic response to
incentives (which rouses awareness and questioning of the
grounds of principles). Rationality is a cognitive faculty; an ability
of the mind. Rationality has the same primary characteristics as
instincts and rationality fits the definition of instincts. Therefore,
rationality is a type of instinct. Therefore, to act rationally is to act
on instinct, but to act on instinct is to not act rationally. Therefore,
either instincts are rational or rationality is not a type of instinct.
Rationality is a type of instinct. Therefore, instincts are rational. If
animals act on instincts and instincts are rational, then animals are
rational. Therefore, animals are rational.
Analytic A Priori, Synthetic A Posteriori,
Synthetic A Priori.
 Hanna-Synthetic A Priori Judgments-true based
on intuitions of space and time. Propositions that
can only be true in conjunction with human
experience. Without human experience, these
judgments would be “truth-valueless.”
 False dichotomy-third option; propositions are
synthetic a priori.
 Propositions about animal rationality would be
“truth-valueless” because humans are unable to
experience as subjective observers via space
and time animal cognitive faculties.

 Forster-Rescuing
metaphysics and morality
from Pyrrhonian skepticism.
• Sextus Empiricus-Suspend judgment on own
epoché.
• Kant-What we do know is that we do not have
objectively sufficient grounds for knowledge
(probable to a moderate to high degree).
 Williams-The
Categorical Imperative as the
supreme dictate over practical and
theoretical reason.
 Chignell-Moral grounds offer sufficient
justification for belief when objectively
sufficient grounds are absent.
 Active
Maxim: “I will kill animals to eat
them despite not knowing if they are
rational.”
• EquipollenceEpoché
 Passive
Maxim: “I will not kill animals to
eat them despite not know if they are
rational.”
• Maxim able to be universalized as non-
epistemic, subjectively sufficient, justified belief.
Maxim: I will kill animals
to eat them despite not
knowing if they are
rational.
Animals are not rational.
Animals are rational.
Fits with
principle of
noncontradiction?
Yes.
Fits with
principle of
noncontradiction?
Yes.
Fits with
treating rational
beings as ends
in themselves?
No.
Fits with
treating rational
beings as ends
in themselves?
Yes.
Are both parts
of the
Categorical
Imperative
satisfied?
Yes.
Are both parts
of Categorical
Imperative
satisfied?
No.
Equipollence
Epoché
Maxim: I will not kill
animals to eat them
despite not knowing if
they are rational.
Animals are not rational.
Animals are rational.
Fits with
principle of
noncontradiction?
Yes.
Fits with
treating rational
beings as ends
in themselves?
Yes.
Fits with
principle of
noncontradiction?
Yes.
Are both parts
of the
Categorical
Imperative
satisfied?
Yes.
Fits with
treating rational
beings as ends
in themselves?
Yes.
Are both parts
of the
Categorical
Imperative
satisfied?
Yes.
Maxim able to be
universalized as nonepistemic,
subjectively sufficient
justified belief.
Kant states doctrinal belief is purely theoretical but:
“It is quite otherwise with moral belief. For here it is absolutely
necessary that something must happen, namely, that I must in all
points conform to the moral law. The end is here irrefragably
established, and according to such insight as I can have, there is only
one possible condition under which this end can connect with all
other ends, and thereby have practical validity, namely, that there be
a God and a future world […] I inevitably believe in the existence of
God and in a future life, and I am certain that nothing can shake this
belief, since my moral principles would thereby be themselves
overthrown, and I cannot disclaim them without becoming abhorrent
in my own eyes.” A828/B856
 In regard to moral belief, Kant continues:
“Thus even after reason has failed in all its ambitious attempts to
pass beyond the limits of all experience, there is still enough left to
satisfy us, so far as our practical standpoint is concerned. No one,
indeed, will be able to boast that he knows that there is a God, and a
future life […] No my conviction is not logical, but moral certainty;
and since it rests on subjective grounds (of the moral sentiment), I
must not even say, ‘It is morally certain that there is a God, etc.’, but ‘I
am morally certain, etc.” A829/B857
