Transcript History of Ethics

History of Ethics
Section 4
John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism
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John Stuart Mill

Best interpreted as a rule-utilitarian,
adhering to moral rules not as mere
generalizations of beneficial deeds but as
an ideal moral code.
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Mill’s Utilitarianism
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The goal of life and also the standard of morality
are lives of happiness, lives, that is, as exempt as
possible from pain and as rich as possible in
enjoyments:
‘actions are right in proportion as they tend to
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce
the reverse of happiness’ (see note 1 [final slide of
this Section]).
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Mill’s Rule-utilitarianism

Since it is not single actions that can be said
to tend to promote anything, but rather types
of actions, this account of rightness is best
interpreted as saying that it is types of
actions, such as actions complying with a
rule or practice, which are made right or
wrong by what they tend to promote.
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To consider
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Distinguish between actutilitarianism & rule-utilitarianism.
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Pleasures
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Unlike Jeremy Bentham, Mill compared
pleasures by quality as well as quantity.
It is far from clear that this move is consistent
with keeping pleasure (& the absence of pain)
as the sole criterion of a good life.
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But…
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Mill can consistently defend introducing
secondary right-making rules, & resorting
to his primary criterion to resolve clashes
between them.
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Proof of the Desirability of the General
Happiness
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Just as the only proof that an object is visible is that people actually
see it, the only proof that anything is desirable is that people actually
desire it.
But each person desires their own happiness, & so happiness is a
good; accordingly the general happiness is a good for people in
general (see note 2 [final slide of this Section]).
Besides, happiness is the sole object of desire, for nothing is desired
which is not either a means to happiness or a part of happiness.
Happiness must then be the sole end of human action, and so its
promotion is the test of conduct & the criterion of morality (see note 3
[final slide of this Section]).
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Some objections
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(1) ‘Desirable’ is not comparable to ‘visible’, as ‘visible’
just means ‘able to be seen’, whereas ‘desirable’ means
‘fit to be desired’, & is used of what there is reason to
desire. So his argument seems to move fallaciously from
facts about desire to value-claims about desirability.
(2) Even if each person desires his or her own
happiness, it does not follow that everyone desires the
general happiness, let alone that the general happiness
is desirable.
(For further objections, & replies to those objections, see ‘Mill’s Proof’ in
Sec. 4, History of Ethics Chapter.)
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Reply to (1)
Although Mill’s attempted proof confronts some objections,
it’s not as obviously a fallacy as it seems:
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(1) Being able to be desired is at least a necessary condition
of being desirable. Further, if, as Mill thinks he can show,
only one thing is actually desired, & if, as nearly everyone
assumes, something or other is desirable, then this will have
to be the one thing that can be desired (for nothing else is
eligible) & is desired. So his opening move need not be
construed as a fallacy at all, although it depends on the
vulnerable claim that only one thing is actually desired.
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Reply to (2)
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(2) The relation of the general happiness of society to
society could be regarded as analogous to the relation of
the happiness of one person to that person. Since what is
desirable is what there is reason to desire, the happiness of
society will be even more desirable for society than
individual happiness is for that individual.
(Mill disclosed in a letter that he was not arguing that the
general happiness will be desirable to each person, but
rather that since happiness is desirable & can be multiplied
as the number of happy people increases, the aggregate
happiness is also desirable, & multiply so.)
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Obligations
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Mill well distinguishes obligations of
justice, other moral obligations, & morally
desirable deeds that are not obligatory
(that is, supererogatory acts).
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Mill & Justice
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When discussing justice, Mill claims that
utilitarianism embodies impartiality &
equality.
His stance on impartiality can be defended,
but only with difficulty over the charge that
utilitarianism permits unsatisfactory
distributions.
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Rejection of Paternalism
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In rejecting coercion
except to prevent
harm to others, Mill
condemns
paternalism
(constraining
someone for their
own good).
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But…
there is a moral
case for
paternalistic
interventions,
despite Mill’s
arguments.
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To Consider
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What is at issue when paternalism is pitted
against autonomy?
Explain Mill’s view of paternalism.
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Notes
1. Mill, J.S. (1910), Utilitarianism, On Liberty
and Representative Government,
Everyman edition (London: J.M. Dent &
Sons, and New York: E.P. Dutton & Co.),
p.6.
2. ibid., pp. 32-33.
3. ibid., p. 36.
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