Transcript Strengths and Weaknesses of Professional Codes

Professional Ethics
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In Chapter 1 we described "professional
ethics" as one of the three main perspectives
through which computer ethics issues can be
identified and analyzed.
When applied to computing, professional
ethics is a field of applied ethics concerned
with moral issues that impact computer
professionals.
Why a Separate Category of
Professional Ethics?
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The same ethical rules involving honesty,
fairness, and so forth should apply to
professionals as well as to ordinary
individuals.
So, if it is wrong for ordinary people to steal,
cheat, lie, and so forth, then it is wrong for
professionals to do so as well.
Thus, one might conclude that a separate
field of study called "professional ethics" is
not really needed.
Separate Category of
Professional Ethics (continued)
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Ethicists argue that some moral issues affecting professionals are sufficiently distinct and
specialized to warrant a separate field of
study.
Some also argue that professionals can have
special moral obligations that exceed those of
ordinary individuals.
To grasp the arguments for this view, it is
useful first to understand what is meant by
the terms profession and professional.
What Exactly is a Profession?
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A profession can be understood in terms of
the attributes and requirements of a
professional practice, such as "calling in
which special knowledge and skill are used
in...the service of mankind." (Firmage, 1991)
Greenwood (1991) believes that professions
are occupational fields distinguishable in
terms of five characteristics: (i) systematic
theory, (ii) authority, (iii) community
sanction, (iv) ethical codes, and (v) a culture.
Who is a Professional?
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Professionals who comprise a given
profession also tend to have certain defining
attributes and requirements.
Medical doctors, lawyers, accountants, etc.
find themselves in situations in which their
decisions and actions can have significant
social effects, and have roles and responsibilities that exceed those of ordinary individuals.
Sometimes these roles and responsibilities
differentiate professionals from others.
Who is a Computer
Professional?
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A computer professional might be interpreted
to mean anyone who is employed in the
computer, information-technology, or
information/communications fields.
Or a computer professional might be thought
of in more narrow terms, in which case only
software engineers would be included.
There are various gradients in between the
two ends of this spectrum.
Definition of a Computer
Professional (Continued)
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A computer professional could be defined in
such a way that, in addition to software
engineers, software quality analysts, software
technical writers, and software managers and
supervisors.
A software engineering team includes those
who contribute by direct participation to the
analysis, specification, design, development,
certification, maintenance, and testing of
software systems.
Do Computer Professionals
Have Special Responsibilities?
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Gotterbarn (1999) believes that because
software engineers and their teams are have
significant opportunities to:
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(i) do good or cause harm
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(ii) enable others to do good or cause harm
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(iii) influence others to do good or cause
harm.
Critical-Safety Software
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Gotterbarn suggests that the roles and
responsibilities involved in the
development of safety-critical systems
is a differentiating factor.
A "safety-critical system" is often used
to refer to computer systems that can
have a direct life-threatening impact.
Safety-Critical Software
(Continued)
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Examples of safety-critical software
systems and applications typically
include:
aircraft and air traffic control systems
mass transportation systems
nuclear reactors missile systems
medical treatment systems.
Additional Safety-Critical
Systems
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Bowyer (2002) extends the range of
safety-critical applications to include
software used in the:
design of bridges and buildings;
election of water disposal sites;
development of analytical models for
medical treatment.
Professional Codes of Ethics
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Many professions have established
professional societies, which in turn have
adopted codes of conduct.
The medical profession established the AMA
(American Medical Association),
The legal profession established the ABA
(American Bar Association).
Both associations have formal codes of
ethics/conduct for their members.
Professional Codes for
Computer Societies
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The computing profession has also has
professional societies.
The two largest are:
The Association for Computing Machinery
(ACM);
The Institute for Electrical and Electronics
Engineers – Computer Society (IEEE-CS).
Both organizations have adopted professional
codes of ethics.
Purpose of Professional Codes
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Professional codes of ethics are often
designed to motivate members of an
association to behave in certain ways.
Four primary functions of codes are to:
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inspire
guide
educate
discipline the members.
Criticisms of Ethical Codes
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Ladd (1995) argues that ethical codes rest on
a series of confusions that are both
"intellectual and moral."
His argument has three main points.
First, ethics is basically an "open-ended,
reflective, and critical intellectual activity."
Second, codes introduce confusions with
respect to micro-ethics vs. macro-ethics.
Third, giving codes a disciplinary function
makes them more like legal than ethical rules.
In Defense of Professional
Codes
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Gotterbarn argues that we need to
distinguish between:
codes of ethics;
codes of conduct;
codes of practice.
In Defense of Professional
Codes (Continued)
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Codes of ethics as "aspirational," because
they often serve as mission statements for
the profession and thus can provide vision
and objectives.
Codes of conduct are oriented more toward
the professional and the professional's
attitude and behavior.
Codes of practice relate to operational
activities within a profession.
Table 4-1: Some Strengths
and Weaknesses of
Professional Codes
Strengths
Weaknesses
Codes inspire the members of a profession to
behave ethically.
Directives included in many codes tend to be too
general and too vague.
Codes guide the members of a profession in
ethical choices.
Codes are not always helpful when two or more
directives conflict.
Codes educate the members of a profession
about their professional obligations.
A professional code’s directives are never
complete or exhaustive.
Codes discipline members when they violate one
or more of the code’s directives.
Codes are ineffective (have no “teeth”) in
disciplinary matters.
Codes “sensitize” members of a profession to
ethical issues and alert them to ethical aspects
they otherwise might overlook.
Codes do not help us distinguish between microethics issues and macro-ethics issues.
Codes inform the public about the nature and
roles of the profession.
Directives in codes are sometimes inconsistent
with one another.
Codes enhance the profession in the eyes of the
public.
Codes can be self-serving for the profession.
Conflicts of Professional Responsibility:
Employee Loyalty and Whistle-blowing
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What exactly is employee loyalty?
Do employees and employers have a special
obligation of loyalty to each other?
Should loyalty to one’s employer ever
preclude an employee’s "blowing the whistle"
in critical situations?
In which cases can whistle-blowing be
justified?
Do Employees Have a Special
Obligation to Employers?
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Some believe we have a prima facie
obligation of loyalty in employment
contexts.
In other words, all things being equal,
an employee should be loyal to his or
her employer and visa versa.
Does employee loyalty still make sense in the
context of a large computer corporation?
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Duska (1991) argues that in
employment contexts, loyalty only
arises in special relationships based on
a notion that he calls "mutual
enrichment."
So in relationships in which parties are
pursuing their self-interests, the notion
of loyalty would not be applicable.
Duska’s Argument (continued)
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Duska believes that employer-employee
relationships – at least where corporations
are concerned – are based on self-interest
and not on mutual enrichment.
He concludes that employees should not
necessarily feel any sense of obligation of
loyalty to corporate employers.
Corporations like employees to believe that
they have an obligation of loyalty to their
employers because believing that serves the
corporation’s interests.
Ladd’s Criticism of Employee
Loyalty
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Ladd also believes that in the context of corporations, loyalty can only be in one direction.
He argues that a corporation cannot be loyal
to an employee in the same sense that
employees are supposed to be loyal to it.
A corporation's goals are competitively linked
to the benefits employees bring to the corp.
A corporation can be good to employees only
because it is good for business, i.e., it is in
the company's own self interest.
Ladd’s and Duska’s Criticisms
(Continued)
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Both Duska and Ladd cite corporate selfinterest as an obstacle for a balanced
employer-employee relationship that is
required for mutual loyalty.
Consider that corporations often go through
downsizing phases in which loyal employees
who have served a company faithfully for
several years are dismissed as part of
restructuring plans.
Sometimes Employers Have
Been Loyal
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Consider a case in which an employer
continues to keep an employee on the payroll
even though that employee has a chronic
illness, which causes her to miss several
months of work.
Also consider a case in which several
employees are kept on by a company despite
the fact that their medical conditions have
caused the corporation's health insurance
costs to increase significantly, thereby
reducing the company's overall earnings.
Employer Loyalty (continued)
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Consider a recent case involving the owner of
Malden Mills, whose physical plant in
Massachusetts was destroyed by fire.
The mill's proprietor, Aaron Feurestein, could
have chosen to rebuild his facility in a
different state or country where employees
would work for lower wages.
Instead, Feurestein continued to pay and
provide benefits for his employees while a
new facility was being built in Mass.
Do Computer Professionals Have Special
obligations of Loyalty to Their Employers?
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They have to balance their obligation of
loyalty owed to an employer against other
obligations of loyalty they also may have?
Loyalty is not something that an employee
must give exclusively or blindly to one’s
employer.
Loyalty should also be seen as an obligation
that individuals have to society as a whole,
especially where safety and health issues are
at stake.
Divided Loyalties
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Divided loyalties can result in serious
conflicts for employees.
In certain cases, the moral dilemmas
they generate are so profound that an
employee must determine whether to
"blow the whistle."
Whistle-blowing
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Bowie (1982) defines whistle-blowing as "the
act of an employee informing the public on
the immoral or illegal behavior of an
employee or supervisor."
Bok (1997) defines whistle blowing as an act
in which one "makes revelations meant to call
attention to negligence, abuses, or dangers
that threaten the public interest."
Whistle-blowing (continued)
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Whistle-blowing situations can arise in
cases of overt wrongdoing (i.e.,
involving specific acts that are either
illegal or immoral).
They can also arise in instances of
negligence where one or more
individuals have failed to act.
When Should an Employee
“Blow the Whistle”?
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Colleen Rowley, an FBI employee, came forth
to describe the way in which critical messages
had failed to be sent up the Federal Bureau's
chain of command in the days immediately
preceding the tragic events of September 11,
2001.
Was it appropriate for this individual to blow
the whistle on her supervisor?
Was she also possibly being disloyal to her
supervisor and fellow employees in doing so?
When Should an Employee
“Blow the Whistle” (continued)
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Should individuals in positions of authority in
corporations such as Enron and WorldCom
have blown the corporate whistle about the
illegal accounting practices in those firms?
One could argue that failing to blow the
whistle in the Enron case resulted in
thousands of individuals losing their
retirement savings, and in some cases their
entire life savings.
Cases Where Whistle-blowing
Could Have Saved Lives
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Three cases:
Challenger Space Shuttle (O-rings);
Ford Pinto (faulty gas tank);
BART case (controversial).
Controversial Political Issues in
Whistle-blowing
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SDI (“Star Wars”) Case
Parnas blew the whistle on Star Wars because
of three factors:
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1. The specifications for the software could not be
known with any confidence.
2. The software could not undergo realistic
testing.
3. There would not be sufficient time during an
attack to repair and reinstall failing software (no
"real-time" debugging).
Criteria for Blowing the Whistle in an Engineering Context
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De George (1981) offers some specific
conditions for when an engineer is:
(a) permitted to blow the whistle;
(b) obligated to do so.
When an Engineer is
Permitted to Blow the Whistle
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1) The harm that will be done by the product
to the public is serious and considerable.
2) The engineers (or employees) have made
their concerns known to their superiors.
3) The engineers (or employees) have
received no satisfaction from their immediate
supervisors and they have exhausted the
channels available within the corporation,
including going to the board of directors.
When an Engineer is Required
to Blow the Whistle
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De George claims that two additional criteria
are needed for requiring an engineer to blow
the whistle.
4) The engineer has documented evidence
that would convince a reasonable, impartial
observer that his/her view of the situation is
correct and the company policy wrong.
5) There is strong evidence that making the
information public will in fact prevent the
threatened serious harm.
Evaluating De George’s
Criteria
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James (1991) believes that De George's
conditions are too lenient.
An individual has a moral obligation to blow
the whistle when the first three conditions are
met, as well.
We have a prima facie obligation to "disclose
organizational wrongdoing" that we are
unable to prevent, which could also occur
when De George's first three conditions are
satisfied.
James’ Critique of De George’s
Criteria (continued)
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For James, the degree of the obligation
depends on the extent to which we are
capable of foreseeing the severity and the
consequences of the wrongdoing.
He worries that De George's model leaves us
with no guidance when we are confronted
with cases involving sexual harassment,
violations of privacy, industrial espionage, and
so forth.
Also there is a problem with the word “harm.”
Alpern’s Criticism of De
George’s Criteria
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Alpern (1991) argues that De George's model
lets engineers off too easily from their
whistle-blowing responsibilities.
Alpern believes that engineers must be willing
to make greater sacrifices than others
because they are in a greater position to do
certain kinds of social harm.
He believes that these obligations come from
a fundamental principle of "ordinary morality"
– viz., we must do no harm.
Ladd’s Defense of De George’s
Criteria
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Ladd (1991) believes that requiring engineers
to blow the whistle in non-extraordinary
cases (such as in De George's conditions 1-3)
can be undesirable from an ethical point of
view because it demands that these
individuals be "moral heroes."
Engineers should not have to be heroes or
"saints."
An Alternative Strategy
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De George and Ladd seem correct in
claiming that engineers should not be
required to be moral heroes or saints.
James and Alpern also seem to be
correct in noting that engineers,
because of the positions of
responsibility they hold, should be
expected to make greater sacrifices.
A Compromise View
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McFarland (1991) argues that, collectively,
engineers might be held to a higher standard
of social responsibility than ordinary
individuals.
However, the onus of responsibility should not
fall directly on engineers as individual
engineers.
Rather, it should be shouldered by engineers
as members of the engineering profession.
McFarland’s View (Continued)
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McFarland's model is based on the
assumption that, as moral agents, we
have a prima facie obligation to come to
the aid of others.
In describing the nature of this
obligation, he uses a non-engineering
analogy involving the infamous Kitty
Genovese case.
McFarland’s Argument
(continued)
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The analogy for engineers, McFarland draws
from the Genovese case is that when no
other sources of help are available, engineers
should take responsibility by banning
together.
If engineers act as individuals, they might not
always have the ability to help.
If they act collectively, however, they might
be able to accomplish goals that would
otherwise not be possible.
McFarland’s Argument
(continued)
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McFarland believes that an engineer's work
must be seen in a wider social context, i.e., in
its relation to society.
Without that context, an adequate account of
moral responsibility for engineers can’t be
given.
Unless engineers work collaboratively on
ethical matters, they will not be able to meet
all of their responsibilities.
McFarland’s Argument
(continued)
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McFarland's model encourages
engineers to shift their thinking about
responsibility issues from:
the level of individual responsibility (at
the micro-ethical level), to responsibility
at the broader level of the profession
itself (i.e., the macro-ethical level).
Responsibility, Liability, and
Accountability
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Responsibility requires that two
conditions must be satisfied:
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causality
intent.
Some agent, X, is held morally
responsible for an act, Y, if X caused Y.
Responsibility (Continued)
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A person could be held responsible even if he
or she did not intend the outcome.
Robert Morris, who launched the "Internet
worm" in 1988, claimed that he did not
intend for the Internet to be brought to a
standstill.
Morris was held responsible for the outcome
caused by his act of unleashing the computer
worm.
Responsibility (continued)
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Agents can also be held responsible when
they intend for something to happen, even if
they ultimately fail to cause (or bring about)
the intended outcome.
Suppose a disgruntled student intends to
blow up a computer lab, but is discovered at
the last minute and prevented from doing so.
Even though the student failed to carry out
his objective, we hold the student morally
culpable because of his intentions.
Liability vs. Responsibility
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Liability is a legal concept.
It is sometimes used in the narrow sense of
"strict liability."
To be strictly liable for harm is to be liable to
compensate for it even though one did not
necessarily bring it about through faulty
action (e.g., when a someone is injured on a
person’s property).
The moral notion of "blame" may be left out.
Accountability (vs. Liability and
Responsibility)
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Responsibility is only part of what is covered
by the notion of accountability. (Nissenbaum)
Accountability means that someone, or some
group of individuals, or perhaps even an
entire organization is answerable.
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...there will be someone, or several people to
answer not only for malfunctions in life-critical
systems that cause or risk grave injuries and
cause infrastructure and large monetary losses,
but even for the malfunctions that cause individual
losses of time, convenience, and contentment.
Table 4-2: Responsibility,
Liability, and Accountability
Moral Responsibility
Legal Liability
Accountability
Attributes of blame (or
praise) to individuals.
Does not attribute
blame or fault to those
held liable.
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Typically applies in the
case of corporations
and property owners.
Does not necessarily
attribute blame (in a
moral sense).
___________________
Can apply to
individuals, groups of
individuals, and
corporations.
________________________
Usually attributed to
individuals rather than
"collectivities" or
groups.
___________________
Notions of guilt and
shame apply, but no
legal punishment or
compensation need
result.
___________________
Compensation can be
required even when
responsibility in a
formal sense is not
admitted.
_____________________________
Someone or some
group is answerable
(I.e., it goes beyond
mere liability).
The Problem of “Many Hands”
in a computing Context
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Computer systems are the products of
engineering teams or of corporations, as
opposed to the products of a single
programmer working in isolation.
So "many hands" are involved in their
development.
It is difficult to determine who exactly is
accountable whenever one of these safetycritical systems results in personal injury or
harm to individuals.
The Problem of “Many Hands”
(continued)
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Two problems for assigning
accountability (e.g., Therac 25 Case):
(a) we tend to think of responsibility as
something that applies to individuals
but not to groups (or collectivities);
(b) we tend to think of responsibility in
exclusionary terms: If X is responsible,
then Y is not, and vice versa.
Assessing Risk
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Gotterbarn (2001) argues that "ethical
risks" associated with the entire
"software development life cycle" must
also be taken into consideration.
The life cycle of software includes the
maintenance phase, as well as the
design and development stages.
Risk Assessment (continued)
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Gotterbarn worries that the concept of risk
has typically been understood in terms of
three conditions, where software is either:
(i) behind schedule;
(ii) over budget;
(iii) fails to meet a system's specified
requirements.
Software can satisfy all three conditions and
still fail to meet an acceptable standard of
risk assessment (e.g. Aegis Radar System).
Risk Assessment (continued)
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Gotterbarn believes that failures like the
Aegis System are due to:
(1) an overly narrow conception of risk;
(2) a limited notion of "system
stakeholders."
Risk Assessment (continued)
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Gotterbarn argues that a model of risk
assessment based solely on cost
effectiveness, i.e., in terms of criteria
such as budget and schedule, is not
adequate.
Instead, the notion of risk analysis must
be enlarged to include social, political,
and ethical issues.
Risk Assessment (continued)
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Gotterbarn also notes that the stakeholders
who are typically given consideration in risk
assessment models for software development
are limited to: (a) the software developers
and (b) the customers.
This limited notion of "system stakeholders"
leads to developing systems that have
unanticipated negative effects (Aegis case).
We need a more robust model of risk
assessment for software development.