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Human dignity
Ever since 20th century, human dignity has been a
term that figures frequently in all-important human
rights documents, such as the Charter of the United
Nations (1945) and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (1948).
The preamble to the Charter of the United Nations begins
with: “We the people of the United Nations, determined
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,
which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to
mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in
the rights of men and women and of nations large and
small…”
And in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, one
find the recognition “of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family.”
And it is the same term that figures even more
frequently in contemporary bioethical discussion of
such issues as abortion, euthanasia, and human
enhancement.
Arguably, the idea of human dignity plays a
significant role in philosophers’ deliberation about
human rights and human life.
The fact that human dignity, since 20th century, has
been an oft-mentioned term in documents pertaining
to human rights should not mislead us into thinking
that it played an insignificant role in the traditional
Western morality. Quite the reverse.
According to Rachels [1990: 86], “the basic idea that
forms the core of Western morals, and that is
expressed, not only in philosophical writing, but in
literature, religion, and in the common moral
consciousness,” is the traditional idea of human
dignity.
Such a core idea, embraced by religious and secular
thinkers alike, says that humans and non-human
animals are in different moral categories, and that
“the lives and interests of human beings are of
supreme moral importance, while the lives and
interests of other animals are relatively unimportant.”
[171]
問題
日常生活中的哪些實作(practice)預設了人性尊嚴的
想法?
The idea of human dignity
What, exactly, is the traditional idea of human dignity?
Human dignity, as the basic idea that forms the core of
Western morals, has two parts, and involves a sharp
contrast between human life and non-human life:
(1) human life is regarded as sacred, or at least as having
a special importance; and so, it is said, the central concern
of our morality must be the protection and care of human
beings.
(2) non-human life does not have the same degree of
moral protection. Indeed, on some traditional ways of
thinking, non-human animals have no moral standing at
all. Therefore, we may use them as we see fit.
Western religious tradition
According to the Western religious tradition, a blend of Judaism and
Christianity, man was made in the image of God, with the world intended
to be his habitation, and everything else in it given for his enjoyment and
use.
Throughout human history, God has continued to watch over and interact
with man, communicating with him through the saints and prophets.
One of the things he has communicated is a set of instructions telling us
how we are to live; and almost all those instructions concern how we must
treat other humans: our fellow humans are not to be killed, lied to, or
otherwise mistreated. Their lives are sacred. Their needs are always to be
taken into account, their rights always respected.
The other animals were given by God for man’s use, to be worked, killed,
and eaten at man’s pleasure. Like the rest of creation, they exist for man’s
benefit.
The ‘image of God’ thesis
Man is special because he alone is made in the image
of God, and above all other creatures he is the object
of God’s love and attention; the other creatures,
which were not made in God’s image, were given for
man’s use.
The matching moral idea is that human life is sacred,
and the central concern of our morality must be the
protection and care of human beings, whereas we
may use the other creatures as we see fit.
The secularization of man’s
specialness doctrine
If we are made in the image of God, it should be
possible to identify the divine element in our makeup. But in what way, exactly, do we resemble the
Almighty?
According to the doctors of the Church, the divine
element in man is his rationality.
The rationality thesis
Man is special because he alone is rational. Nonhuman animals are not rational, and so are not to be
compared, in this regard, with humans.
St. Thomas Aquinas: “Of all parts of the universe,
intellectual creatures hold the highest place, because
they approach nearest to the divine likeness.
Therefore the divine providence provides for the
intellectual nature for its own sake, and for all others
for its sake.”
The idea of a unique human mental capacity—a capacity
unlike anything to be found elsewhere in nature—may
therefore be viewed as the secular equivalent of the idea
that man was created in the image of God. It does the
same work in our moral system, namely, it buttresses the
idea that, from a moral point of view, humans are special.
This means that, even if the image of God thesis is
rejected, the matching moral idea need not be abandoned.
Secular thinkers who reject religion can continue to
believe in human dignity, and can justify doing so by
pointing to man’s unique rationality.
Implications of the idea of
human dignity
The sanctity of innocent human life: such practices as
suicide, euthanasia, and infanticide are violations of
innocent life, and so they are not permitted.
Suicide serves as a convenient example. One might think
that, since the suicide takes only his or her own life, the
prohibition upon it would not be so strict as the
prohibition upon killing others. Prior to the coming of
Christianity, the philosophers of Greece and Rome took
this attitude. Although they condemned cowardly
suicides, they thought it could be permissible in special
circumstances. The Christians, however, took a sterner
view.
Augustine’s view on suicide
St. Augustine: “Christians have no authority for
committing suicide in any circumstances whatever.”
Why?
Argument: the sixth commandment says “Thou
shalt not kill.” Augustine points out that the
commandment does not say “Thou shalt not kill thy
neighbor’; it says only “Thou shalt not kill”, point.
Thus, the rule applies with equal force to killing
oneself.
Kant’s view on suicide
Kant: humans have “an intrinsic worth, i.e., dignity”,
which makes their value “above all price”.
If human life has such extraordinary worth, then it is
only to be expected that a man can never justify
killing himself.
Kant: people may offer various reasons to justify selfmurder, but these attempted justifications overlook
the crucial point that “humanity is worthy of esteem.”
Kant’s view on suicide
To kill oneself is to regard one’s life as something of such
little value that it can be obliterated merely in order to
escape troubles. In the case of mere animals, this might be
true—we kill animals to put them out of misery, and that
is permissible. However, we should not think that the
same may be done for a man, because the value of a
man’s life is so much greater: “If [a man] disposes over
himself, he treats his value as that of a beast.” Again, “the
rule of morality does not admit of [suicide] under any
condition because it degrades human nature below the
level of animal nature and so destroys it.”
Implications of the idea of
human dignity
The lesser status of non-human animals: the doctrine
of man’s specialness serves to exalt man at the
expense of the other creatures that inhabit the
earth—we are morally special, and they are not.
Because we have a different nature, we have a moral
standing that they lack.
Aquinas on the moral status of
non-human animals
Aquinas: although man’s rationality gives him a special
status, other animals have a very different place in the
natural order.
“Other creatures are for the sake of the intellectual
creatures.” Therefore, It is not wrong for man to make use
of them, either by killing or in any other way whatever.”
But shouldn’t we be kind to them out of simple charity?
Aquinas: ”The love of charity extends to none but God
and our neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be
extended to irrational creatures, since they have no
fellowship with man in the rational life. Therefore charity
does not extend to irrational creatures.”
Kant on the moral status of nonhuman animals
For Kant, non-human animals, lacking the all-important quality of
rationality, are entirely excluded from the sphere of moral concern.
It is man who is an ‘end in himself’. Other entities have value only
as means, to serve that end.
Thus, animals have the status of mere things, and we have no
duties to them whatsoever: “so far as animals are concerned, we
have no direct duties. Animals…are there merely as means to an
end. That end is man.”
By a ‘direct duty’ Kant meant a duty based on a concern for the
animal’s own welfare. We may indeed have duties that involve
animals, but the reason behind these duties will always refer to a
human interest, rather than to the animal’s own interests.
Kant adds that we should not torture animals pointlessly, but the
reason, he insists, is only that “He who is cruel to animals becomes
hard also in his dealings with men.”
Is vs. Ought
The image of God thesis and the rationality thesis are,
speaking loosely, matters of fact. The matching
moral idea is a normative view. What, exactly, is
supposed to be the relation between them? It cannot
be that the latter follows logically from the former,
because, as Hume observed, normative conclusions
cannot legitimately be derived form factual premises.
What is the relation between the image of God thesis (or
the rationality thesis) and the matching moral idea?
It is not that the former is supposed to entail the latter.
Rather, it is that the former is supposed to provide good
reason for accepting the latter.
In traditional morality, the doctrine of human dignity is
not an arbitrary principle that hangs in logical space with
no support. It is grounded in certain (alleged) facts about
human nature; those facts are what (alleged) make it
reasonable to believe in the moral doctrine. The claim
implicit in traditional morality is that humans are morally
special because they are made in the image of God, or
because they are uniquely rational beings.
How Darwinism might
undermine traditional morality
The claim that Darwinism undermines traditional
morality is not the claim that it entails that the doctrine of
human dignity is false.
It is, instead, the claim that Darwinism provides reason
for doubting the truth of the considerations that support
the doctrine: form a Darwinian perspective, both the
image of God thesis and the rationality thesis are suspect.
Moreover, there are good Darwinian reasons for thinking
it unlikely that any other support for human dignity can
be found.
Thus, Darwinism furnishes the ‘new information’ that
undermines human dignity by taking away its support.
Discussion
Is Darwinism incompatible with the Image of God
thesis, and the rationality thesis as well?
Does Darwinism undermine the idea of human
dignity?
Can you find any other support for the idea of
human dignity?
Once the idea of human dignity is abandoned, is
there any implication for our moral practice?