Historic Retrospect of China

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Transcript Historic Retrospect of China

Sino-US Relations (1989-1999):
from Cooperation to Friction and Competition
Guo Xuetang
Department of International Studies & Public
Administration
SHUPL
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1, Aftermath of the Soviet Union Collapse
and the End of the Cold War
• In 1989 and 1990, the Soviet Union and East
European countries declared the end of
socialism in these countries.
• Ending of the cold war, signified by the fall of
the Berlin War, came soon after a domestic
political unrest in Tiananmen Square in May
and June, 1989.
• The west, led by the United States, waged a
campaign of sanctions against China.
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2, China-U.S. Diplomatic Conflict
• George Bush, “The President’s News Conference”,
June 5, 1989
“I am ordering the following actions: suspension of all
government-to-government sales and commercial exports
of weapons, suspension of visits between US and Chinese
military leaders, sympathetic review of requests by Chinese
students in the US to extend their stay, and the offer of
humanitarian and medical assistance through the Red
Cross to those injured during the assault, and review of
other aspects of our bilateral relationship as events in
China continue to unfold.”
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• However the president also says:
“I don’t want to see a total break in this relationship,
and I will not encourage a total break in the relationship.
This relationship is, when you see these kids struggling
for democracy and freedom, this would be a bad time
for the United States to withdraw and pull back and
leave them to the devices of a leadership that might
decide to crack down further. Some have suggested I
take the Ambassador out. In my view, that would be
180 degrees wrong……. ”
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3,New Guiding Principles of China’s
Foreign Policy
•
A correct judgment of the world situation
 Peace and development, not revolution and war, would
become the tendency of the time. (和平与发展是时代的主题)
 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the two-polarized
world was replaced by a multi-polarized one, and China
could be one of the five “poles”. (世界多极化取代两极化)
 However, hegemony still exited and the United States, the
only remaining super-power, continued to bully the weak
nations.(美国强权欺凌弱国)
 China and other developing countries should unite to
struggle against the unjust world order, whose rules of the
game had been designed by the developed nations. (中国
与其他发展中国家应该团结起来)
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• Deng Xiaoping put forward the well-known
“Guiding Principle of Twenty-four Characters”:
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watch the world with a calm mind(冷静观察);
stand firmly(稳住阵脚);
confidently deal with the difficulties(沉着应付);
keep a low profile(韬光养晦);
never act as a leader(永不当头);
and do something(有所作为).
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• The Missions of Bush’s Envoys
– One of most controversial moves made by President
Bush was sending two officials, the National Security
Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of
State Lawrence Eagleburger, to Beijing to privately
meet with Chinese leaders twice in 1989, first in July
and then in December.
– The second meeting was made public on December 9, only
after Scowcroft and Eagleburge arrived in Beijing. The July
visit was not revealed to the public until December 19.
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The President‘s Daily Brief (总统每日简报,PDB), sometimes incorrectly
referred to as the President's Daily Briefing or the President's Daily
Bulletin, is a top-secret document produced each morning for the
President of the United States.
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4, The Disputes on MFN Status and Human Rights
• Soon after June 4, there were calls for wide-sweeping
sanctions. Many in Congress latched on to the
removal of China’s most-favored-nation (MFN) status
as the most appropriate instrument to demonstrate
American outrage and push the Chinese government
to improve its human rights practices.
• Congress voted on China’s MFN (later renamed
PNTR [permanent normal trade relations] ) status
every year between 1990 and 2001.
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• MFN: to link or de-link to human rights?
• During the 1992 election campaign, Democratic
presidential candidate Bill Clinton made the promotion of
democratization an organizing principle of his foreign
policy and said that if elected, he would condition
extension of China’s MFN status on progress in human
rights, market access, and proliferation.
• In his first two years in office, President Clinton
implemented and then abandoned this policy, drawing
praise and criticism at both junctures
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Statement on Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status for China
By Bill Clinton
May 28, 1993
The core of this policy will be a resolute insistence upon
significant progress on human right in China. To implement
this policy, I am signing today an Executive order that will
have the effect of extending most-favored-nation status for
China for 12 months. Whether I extend MFN next year,
however, will depend upon whether China makes significant
progress in improving its human right record.
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The President’s News Conference on May 26, 1994
“Extending MFN will avoid isolating China and instead will permit
us to engage the Chinese with not only economic contacts but with
cultural, educational, and other contacts and with a continuing
aggressive effort in human rights, an approach that I believe will
make it more likely that China will play a responsible role, both at
home and abroad.
“I am moving, therefore, to delink human rights from the annual
extension of MFN trading status for China.”
----------Bill Clinton
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5, China’s Bid for the 2000 Olympics
• In 1993, Beijing was one of the finalists competing for
the right to host the 2000 summer Olympics (the other
cities were Sydney, Manchester, Istanbul, and Berlin).
• The U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution
in July urging the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
to deny Beijing’s bid when the IOC met to vote in late
September.
• Although the congressional resolution was nonbinding
and only one of IOC’s 88 members was from the U.S.,
many in China blamed Washington for Beijing’s loss.
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6, The Debate on How to Dealing with a
Stronger China in the U.S.
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In the 1990s, American experts and officials started to more
seriously consider the ramification of a stronger China for U.S.
interests.
In 1992 and 1993, several sources, among them the IMF, estimated
that China had the world’s second or third largest economy in terms
of purchasing power parity. In addition, China’s economy in 1992
resumed its fast rate of growth, leaving some to project that the size
of China’s economy would surpass that of the U.S. early in the first
decade of 21st century.
Coupled with relatively slower growth in the U.S. and a recession in
Japan, such estimates were welcomed by the business community,
while those who considered the potential security implications were
more concerned.
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(The) economic growth and changed strategic circumstances
have already made China’s increasing power a potential threat
to U.S. interests. It is time Americans began to adjust their
policies, and more importantly their perspectives, to prepare for
the possibility of a China stronger than any they have seen
before.
-----------------------------Thomas McNaugher,
“A Strong China: Is the United States Ready?” Brookings
Review, Fall 1994. Brookings Institution.
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Containment aims to prevent war. But a change in
regime to a tolerant, democratic China is the better
guarantee of peace. Time to apply the pressure and
keep it on.
-----------------------Charles Krauthammer, “Why We
Must Contain China,” Time,
Vol.146, No.5, July 31, 1995
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7, Conflict in the Taiwan Strait
• In May 1995, President Clinton decided to grant Taiwan
“president” Lee Tenghui a visa so that he could visit his
alma mater, Cornell University.
• In response, P.R.C. recalled its ambassador from
Washington and in July 1995 conducted military exercises
in waters near Taiwan.
In Feb and Mar. 1996, China conducted even larger
exercises and test fired missile that flew close to the island.
The U.S. first warned the PRC of “grave consequences”,
then sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity,
further signaling its opposition to the PRC’s actions.
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PLA’s military exercises in waters near
Taiwan in 1995 and 1996
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8, To be Back on Track
• As a consequence, the Chinese leadership and
the Clinton administration intensified efforts to
stabilize and broaden the official relationship.
The key symbols of these efforts were the
summit meetings held between Clinton and
Jiang Zemin in Washington in Oct. 1997 and in
Beijing in June 1998.
• The two countries issued a joint statement in
Washington on October 29, 1997.
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Jiang Zemin delivered his speech at Harvard University
on Nov.2, 1997.
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President Clinton paid a state visit to Beijing in June 1998.
In Shanghai during his visit, Clinton reaffirmed U.S. adherence to
the "Three No's" principles on Taiwan (the United States does not
support independence for Taiwan, or "one China, one Taiwan," or
"two Chinas," or its membership in any international bodies whose
members are sovereign states)
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In short, treat China with a view toward how you want
it to behave. It is in our interest that China becomes rich
and interdependent with us all, but only if it plays by
the rules and is constrained from using force.
Gerald Segal, “Speak Plainly to the Paper Tiger”,
New Statesman, April, 1998.
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9, The Crisis Again and Coming of 21st Century
• April 6-13, 1999: Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji
paid an eight-day official visit to the United States
at the invitation of US President Bill Clinton.
• May 8th, 1999: the bombing of Chinese embassy
by the US-led NATO in the former Yugoslavia.
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Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, post bombing. You can see the path the
shell took before exploding.
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Anti-American protests in Beijing, China (1999) over the
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.
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Chinese policemen surround the U.S. embassy in Beijing on May 10 to prevent
demonstrators from storming the compound, following the accidental NATO
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Tens of thousands besieged the
U.S. embassy for three days, attacking it with chunks of concrete and glasses.
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Suggested Readings:
• Sino-US Joint Statement (1997)
• The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue
(Feb. 21, 2000)
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• According to your opinions, what will be
the prospect of Sino-US relations?
A) Partnership
B) Adversary
C) Competitive and cooperative
D) Other
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