#### Transcript Possible Explanations for Frequency of Entrant Failure

```Entry costs and market structure


There are many potential entrants into a
market.
Entrants simultaneously decide whether
or not to enter the industry.
– Entry costs F, which is not recoverable if
the firm decides to exit the industry.

The number of firms in the industry
becomes known, and firms compete in
the market.
Entry & market structure,con’t

What is the equilibrium number of firms
in the market?
– As more firms enter, profits decrease.
– Let (n) represent the present value of
each firm’s post-entry profits, as it depends
on the number of firms that enter.

We need to find n* such that:
– (n*)-F  0 > (n*+1)-F

n* is the “free entry equilibrium”.
Entry & market structure,con’t

Assume:
– Cournot competition.
– All firms are identical and each firm has a
constant marginal cost c.
– Demand=(A-P)S where S = size of market.
– Thus inverse demand is P = A - Q/S.


From our earlier analysis of the n-firm
Cournot model, we determined that
q* = (A-c)/[B(n+1)]
So q* = (A-c)/[1/S(n+1)] = s(A-c)/(n+1)
Entry & market structure,con’t

Assume:
– Cournot competition.
– Each firm has a constant marginal cost c.
– Demand=(a-P)S where S = size of market.



Then (n) = S[(a-c)/(n+1)]2/r - F.
Thus n*  (a-c)(S/rF)1/2 - 1.
n* is increasing in market size and
decreasing in entry costs, although
impact is less than proportional.
Entry & social welfare

What happens when an additional firm
enters a market?
– Existing firm profits decrease (business
stealing as well as lower prices)
– Consumer surplus increases (lower prices)

Entry is welfare enhancing only if
cumulative effect is positive.
Entry & social welfare, con’t

When can entry be welfare decreasing,
i.e., inefficient?
– If firms are colluding, then price will not
change with entry so consumer surplus will
not change nor will revenue. However,
– If entrants falsely differentiate products,
entry can cause inefficiency.
Empirical Evidence of

Sutton study of soup markets in US/UK.
– Campbells: pioneer in US, still dominant.
– Heinz: pioneer in UK, still dominant.

Urban study of market share and order
of entry in 47 markets.
– First firm to enter after market leader has
29% lower market share than leader.
– Second has 42% lower, third 49%, etc.
Empirical Evidence of

Golder and Tellis studied entry order
and success in 36 markets.
– Half of all “pioneers” fail. Average current
market share of pioneers is 10%.
– Average current market share of “early
– Sustained dominance: early market
Why Does Early Entry Matter?

– Brand loyalty
– Learning-by-doing

– Predatory pricing
– Pre-emptive investments
Sequential Entry and Prices

Pharmaceutical Case Study:
– Developer of drug gets 17 year patent,
once patent expires any firm can produce it
subject to FDA approval.
– 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration act facilitated entry of
generic drug products after expiration of
patent by streamlining FDA requirements.
– Study looks at the effect of generic entrants
on drug prices.
Pharmaceutical Price Analysis




18 major drugs which were exposed to
generic competition between 1983-1987.
Prices measured by average cost per unit
paid by drugstores and hospitals.
Market share is measured by number of units
sold.
– How fast does entry occur in new markets?
– How fast does the market share of entrants grow?
– How do prices respond to entry?
Price Analysis, con’t



Within 1 year the avg number of generic
suppliers is 17. Within 2 years, there are 25.
Serious erosion of the market share of the
patented firm. After 2 years, generics had
50% of the market.
Generics come in at 60% of the patent firm’s
price, on average.
– Generic prices fall rapidly -- 22% lower at the end
of the first year, 35% lower by the end of the 2nd.

Price of pioneers rises slightly after generic
entry.
Price Analysis, con’t

Conclusions:
– Unique market.
– Although products basically homogeneous,
patented firm able to maintain considerably
higher price and significant market share
(50%).
– Order of entry does make a difference both
for patented firm and for generic entrants.
```