Transcript Meta-ethics - Bloomsbury

Meta-ethics
Section 3
Moral Realism
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Moral Realism


Holds that moral properties are real &
independent of people’s states of mind.
Moral claims can be true or false.
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Rival Theories
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Non-cognitivism (see Section 1 of this Chapter).
Error theory: moral claims purport to be true
but fail, & are all false (see note 1 [final slide
for this Section]).
Subjectivism: moral truths are truths about
attitudes / approvals.
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Consider…
 These rival theories are not without their
problems.
Why might each of these theories be
problematic? Consider some of the problems
raised in Section 1 of this Chapter.
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Link between Moral Language & Action
Non-cognitivism:


This link may be thought to give non-cognitivism
the edge over cognitivism.
For the non-cognitivist, moral judgements express
prescriptions, & prescriptions guide action (see
Sec.1, this Chapter).
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Moral Language & Action
Realism:

But the action-guiding role of moral language
can be reconciled with realism, & does not
require resort to non-cognitivism.
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Main Objection to Realism

Prevalence of radical moral disagreement.
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Reply
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Moral realists can explain such disagreement.
The mere fact of disagreement doesn’t of itself
suggest that there are no facts of the matter
in question.
Can argue (contrary to Hume) that moral
judgements are amenable to reason.
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Further Objection

J.L. Mackie: the objection from the relation of
moral language to motivation.
This objection will be considered more fully in
Section 4 of this Chapter.
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Defending Cognitivism

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Cognitivism holds that some moral claims
amount to knowledge.
So, one of the best ways to argue for moral
realism (& at the same time for cognitivism) is
to present examples of moral knowledge.
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Moral Knowledge
Consider…


Renford Bambrough’s example (see note 2
[final slide for this Section]).
Joel Kupperman’s example (see note 3 [final
slide for this Section]).
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To Consider…
Relate the argument for moral cognitivism from
such examples to the case for moral realism.
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Further Support for Realism

Some moral beliefs are more securely held than
any ground for questioning them could be.
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Cognitivism & Realism
 The grounds supportive of moral
cognitivism & of moral realism are mutually
supportive.
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Notes
1.
2.
3.
J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
(Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1966).
Renford Bambrough, Moral Scepticism and Moral
Knowledge (London and Henley: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 15.
Joel J. Kupperman, Ethical Knowledge (London:
Allen & Unwin and New York: Humanities Press,
1970), pp. 130-131.
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