Transcript For Love of the Frivolous Lifeboat Earth and the Myth of

For Love of the Frivolous
Like impact craters
Is humanity’s devastating ecological impact truly
the result of overly anthropocentric ideologies?
What is the appeal of this narrative?
How could it be true?
The vilification of anthropocentrism
The anthropocentrism of classical
ideologies in the West ascribes intrinsic
value to humanity alone.
The vilification of anthropocentrism
According to traditional ideologies, all nonhuman
aspects of the environment, biotic or abiotic, are
of merely instrumental value. As such, they are
justifiably exploited and utilized in the pursuit of
human ends—regardless of how frivolous those
ends may be.
This presumably accounts for the widespread
adoption of policies that collectively permit the
mass extinction of Earth’s biota as well as the
overuse of toxic and/or limited resources—
ultimately leading to radical ecosystem
transformations on a mounting, global scale.
Reason for suspicion
What such a narrative fails to account for,
however, is the widespread presence of racism,
sexism, xenophobia, drastic socioeconomic
inequalities, and other institutionalized forms of
human devaluation among the various cultures
within the societies that, presumably, have
adopted exploitative relationships with the
environment—all because of their ascription of
intrinsic value to humanity.
In other words
If such societies are truly anthropocentric—
truly value humanity intrinsically—why does
their anthropocentrism account for their
members’ negative interactions with the
environment but not for their negative
interactions with one another or for their lack
of concern for other humans separated from
them by space and time?
How can vast numbers of people, under
the sway of an anthropocentrism that
values humans intrinsically but
nonhumans instrumentally, so readily
purchase food and luxury items for their
‘pets’ while they disregard fellow
humans who are undernourished,
abandoned, impoverished, etc.?
A case of mistaken identity
Anthropocentrism is thus not the problem.
What has been criticized under the term
‘anthropocentrism’ is actually something more
akin to ethical egoism—the attitude that one’s
moral concerns need not extend beyond
oneself or one’s interests, narrowly limited
spatiotemporally.
Anthropocentrism(s)
Bryan G. Norton (1984) argues that the issue
of intrinsic vs. instrumental value should be
considered irrelevant to policy concerns and
distinguishes two forms of anthropocentrism.
• Strong anthropocentrism – based on the
satisfaction of felt preferences.
Individualistic and potentially irrational.
• Weak anthropocentrism – based on the
satisfaction of considered preferences.
Non-individualistic and rational.
Rational (or genuine) anthropocentrism
In a vein similar to that of Norton, I conclude
that any rationally defensible worldview
meant to inform policy regarding humanenvironment interactions must be genuinely
anthropocentric—i.e., any respectable
environmental ethic must favor the long-term
‘good’ of not merely individual humans but
of the species as well. Whether or not one
labels valuations of self and environment as
‘intrinsic’ could indeed be beside the point.
Rational (or genuine) anthropocentrism
The human species is necessarily valued on a
geologic scale of space and time, not one
confined to a single human’s life or limited
concerns. Thus, a rational form of
anthropocentrism cannot condone the
widespread adoption of frivolous, selfish
interactions with ‘nature’ that are detrimental to
the longevity of Homo sapiens.
Rational (or genuine) anthropocentrism
Furthermore, if there is any hope for such
a rational form of anthropocentrism to be
adopted, it must also be fair, impartial,
and just in its concerns for individual
humans—those currently living as well as
those who will possibly, probably, and/or
actually live in the future.
Parfit’s Paradox
The concern that arises for those who worry over
Derek Parfit’s paradox (1984), or the person-affecting
principle, is that we who currently live can only
directly affect other particular (identifiable) humans—
i.e., either those currently living or immediately
foreseeable through impending births. Thus, taking a
morally responsible attitude toward the species seems
highly problematic. In order to care for and affect the
species itself, one must take into consideration
fundamentally unknowable humans separated from
oneself on a geologic scale of space and time. Such
impartiality may not be a problem, however, for those
who eschew the ethical egoism which is surely to
blame for much of what has been critiqued as
‘anthropocentrism.’