Transcript Slide 1

Negative Offsite Impacts of
Ecological Restoration:
Understanding and Avoiding Conflict
Sacramento River Conference
Mark Buckley
Environmental Incentives
April 9, 2007
Fricker
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
How do we conserve and restore
large/landscape scale natural
processes?
• Conservation is limited to areas unwanted by
other land uses.
• Area characteristics that promote natural
processes are often beneficial to other land
uses as well.
• Conversion of land use is often the only way
to improve natural processes for valuable
landscapes.
TNC
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Land use
Urban, 1%
Upland
Vegetation, 8%
Other, 1%
Riparian
Vegetation, 14%
Agriculture, 76%
• Inner River Zone and Conservation Area
(pre-restoration)
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Impacts of Riparian Restoration on
Agriculture
• Weeds and pests (vertebrate and
invertebrate)
• Disturbances
– fires
– out of channel flood flows
•
•
•
•
•
Endangered species
Trespassing
Pollinators and pest control
Cultural
Financial
Buckley
Buckley
– tax revenues
– economies of scale for production
SF Chronicle
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Impacts of Farmers on SRCA
Restoration and Conservation
• Increased usage of chemicals
• Removal of endangered species
• Increased fencing, riparian
vegetation removal, and riprapping
• Political activity to reduce the full
project area from 217,000 acres to
80,000 acres (2002)
• 4 of 7 counties have opted out of
outer zone participation
• Colusa enacted more stringent
limitations on restoration projects
Buckley
Buckley
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
U.S. Census of Agriculture 1987-2002
• Farmers in SRCA are doing worse than others:
– % decrease in total acreage greater than CA as a whole
– Avg. farm size has dropped 10 % faster than CA
– Total sales went up 55% faster in CA
• Farmers in SRCA are doing better than others:
– Number of farms has gone down in CA, but up in SRCA
– All size categories lost farms for CA, all size categories EXCEPT
over 1000 acres went up in SRCA
– Avg. total farm production expenses grew 17% faster for CA
– Avg market value of farms in SRCA increased faster than CA
– Orchard acreage increased 33% for CA, 54% for SRCA
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Markets: Function and Failure
Rival
Non-Rival
Excludable
Non-Excludable
Private Goods (only case
Common-Property
Resources (potential govt.
where markets function)
•Land parcels
•Agricultural Crops
regulation)
Toll Goods
•Bridges
•River Access
Public Goods (potential govt.
•Atmosphere
•Rivers
provision)
•Flood protection
•Natural Air/Water
Purification
•Externalities caused by consumption exist for rival goods only
•Externalities caused by degradation exist for all goods
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Interdependence of Restored and Developed
Areas
pollution, edge effects, barriers
habitat, migratory routes, nutrition
+
Restored
Natural
Areas
Socially
Developed
Areas
-
weeds, pests, fires, endangered species
+
ecosystem services (air and water quality, wildlife)
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Ecological and Social Compatibility of
Restoration Effects by Land Type Pairing
Ecologically
Compatible
Socially Compatible
Socially Incompatible
Mutually Beneficial
Direct Conflict
•Pest predation (Agriculture)
•Bird pops. (Suburban/Urban)
•Pollination (Residential, Ag)
•Endangered species (Forestry)
•Large predators (Ranching)
•Natural flood regimes (Residential)
Ecologically Inefficient/Infeasible
Incompatible •Fish populations (Urban)
•Native vegetation (Brownfields)
•Bald Eagles (Suburban)
Mutually Undesirable
•Intense fires (All)
•Nonnative species (Agriculture)
•Ecological disequilibria (Forestry, Ag)
•Positive externalities are generated under social compatibility
•Negative externalities are generated under social incompatibility
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Negative Offsite Impacts (Externalities)
of Restoration
• Mutually Undesirable
– Indirect effect
– Technical or cost problem
– Generated because costly to control or effective control
options do not exist
• Direct Conflict
– Direct effect
– Tradeoffs occur
– Bargaining potentially necessary/beneficial
Lack of bargaining resolution success can lead to government
intervention
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Cooperative Outcome
• Use Nash Bargaining Solution as a target
max ∏(ui – di)
• Universally individually-rational
– Most stable = most individual gains = most equitable
– Gains measured from non-cooperative outcome, NOT from prior case
• Non-cooperative outcome is a function of pre-existing state
• Net welfare gains possible when non-zero sum
Present State
Fully Restored
Fully Developed
Possible Outcomes
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Basic Restoration and Defense
Decisions
Farmer
Restorationist
restore
nothing
Restoration with
defense
defend
nothing
Restoration only
No Restoration
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Restoration Decisions with Mitigation
Restoration with
defense
Farmer
defend
nothing
Restorationist
restore
restore with
mitigation
nothing
defend
nothing
Restoration only
Restoration with
mitigation and
defense
Restoration with
mitigation
No Restoration
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Weeds
70%
70%
60%
60%
50%
50%
40%
40%
30%
30%
20%
20%
10%
10%
0%
0%
1 year
1 year w/mitigation
10 years
10 years w/mitigation
70%
70%
60%
60%
50%
50%
40%
40%
30%
30%
20%
20%
10%
No restoration
Restoration with defense
Restoration with mitigation
Restoration only
10%
0%
20 years
0%
20 years w/mitigation
20 years
20 years
w/mitigation
1 year
10 years
20 years
% more restoration with mitigation option
11%
10%
7%
% less defense with mitigation option
19%
17%
20%
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
10 Year, 1 Farmer Weed Simulations
B
C
ecological
effects (+)
A
agricultural effects (-)
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Conclusions
• Compatibility of other land uses can influence restoration
success
• Ecological and social compatibility both influence existence of
externalities, negative externality resolution options, and
necessary tradeoffs
• Beliefs and expectations of all parties influence outcomes and
potential cooperative gains
• Mitigation and cooperation can lead to mutual gains
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Acknowledgements
• National Science Foundation (Biocomplexity and Economic
programs)
• STEPS Institute for Innovation in Environmental Research
• USDA CSREES NRI Managed Ecosystems Program
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives
Parameter
Value (for 100 acres)
discount rate
5 percent
Source
Farmers
weed control costs (chemicals
and labor)
1 yr -
vertebrate pest control costs
1 yr -
walnut prices
$0.47 to $0.77 per pound
UC Ag Ext., 2003
walnut yields
2400 to 8400 lbs./acre
UC Ag Ext., 2003
expected damage
0 to 50 percent of yield
Falta, 2003
restoration mitigation effect
80 percent
neighboring farmer externality
25 percent
Revenues
1 yr - Y=-808.8-(O*0.078)+P*O net returns above operating
costs:
$13,000 to $500,000
10, 20 yrs - Y=-2038.8-(O*0.078)+P*O
net returns above total costs:
10 yrs: -$890,000 to $3,000,000
20 yrs: -$1,400,000 to $4,900,000
UC Ag Ext., 2003
cost of land
$10,000/acre
UC Ag Ext., 2003, Efseaff, 2005
cost of restoration
$4500/acre, over 3 years=$429,000
Efseaff, 2005
cost of weed control
1 yr -
cost of vertebrate pest control
1 yr - $40,500 10 yrs -
ecological benefit
1 yr $23,700 to $160,000 10 yrs - $193,000 to
$13,000,000 20 yrs - $295,000 to $19,000,000
loss from defense
0 to 100 percent
loss from 2nd defense
additional 75% of first damage
$9150 10 yrs -
$74,000 20 yrs - $120,000
$41,500 10 yrs - $105,000 20 yrs - $150,000
UC Ag Extension guidance, 2003
Pierce and Wiggers, 1997; UC, 2003
Restorationist
$40,000 10 yrs - $324,000 20 yrs -
$523,000
$97,000 20 yrs - $137,000
Efseaff, 2005
Pierce and Wiggers, 1997; UC Ag Ext.,
2003
Loomis et al., 2000
Mark Buckley, Environmental Incentives