Transcript Bauman Brief - APAN Community SharePoint

REGIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT
OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM
IN LCB
1.770.329.5588 / [email protected]
Research Objective
To deepen [USG’s] understanding of CVE dynamics and
potential development responses in targeted regions in the LCB and
help to refine tools to engage with key stakeholders in these regions .
Focus countries: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria
Overarching research questions:
1. What are key VE risks and drivers in cross-border areas?
2. What are the threats of VE in the region, including ways women
and men contribute to VE and to its mitigation?
3. What are the key resiliencies and capacities unique to the
borderlands that contribute to cross-border CVE?
4. What recommendations emerge for programming in the region?
Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Intervention
Regional Transformation
8 LCB Countries
4 Riparian Countries
•
Peripheries of 8 weak states incapable or uninterested in managing borders
•
Threatened livelihoods & increased migration due to climate change and desertification
•
N’Djamena only capital near Lake Chad borderlands
Area affected by the conflict
Geographical area transposed to Europe
Expansion of ISIS
Lake Chad Basin (LCB)
Environment Conducive To Chronic Instability, Violent Conflict & Extremism
Enabling Factors
1. Climate change, desertification, & ecological degradation of Lake Chad
2. Diminishing viability of traditional livelihoods & competition over NR
3. Increased urban and rural migration, intra- and inter-communal conflict over land & NR
4. Breakdown of social cohesion & decreased respect for traditional and religious authorities
5. Poor governance, corruption, lack of basic human security, inadequate infrastructure
6. Inequitable distribution of diverse & abundant natural resources
7. Ineffective development of human capital (poor education system)
8. Remote & neglected borderlands, vast porous borders, ungoverned spaces
9. Lack of state legitimacy & national identity
10. Historic cross-border relations & socioeconomic bonds provide greater benefits then governments
Factors manifest and mutate based on complex, dynamic, and fluid contexts
1. Inter & intra-state conflict
2. Riots, rebellions & coup d'état
3. Armed gangs & banditry
4. Illegal and extra-legal trade & illicit trafficking of
arms, drugs and people
5. Safe haven for “economic and military refugees”
6. Hub for VE groups (refuge, recruit & stage attacks)
7. Formation of civilian self-defense “vigilante” groups
Enabling factors manifest & mutate depending on context
1. South - Niger Delta
Militias & Rebellion (oil)
Amnesty ending… issues remain
2. Middle-belt
Intra and inter-ethnic conflict
agro-pastoral
Christian-Muslim
Indigene-settler
3. North East – Violent Extremism
4. Lack of a national identity and competing narratives
 Christian South (fear Islamization) vs. Muslim North (fear western, Christian democracy, culture, education)
 Moderate (West African Sufi Islam) vs. Conservative Islam (Izala/Salafism/Wahabi)
 Conservative vs. Fundamental (who promotes and practices the purest form of Islam)
 Competition over interpretation, practice & followers (Saudi Arabia or Qatar vs. local)
Formation of Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad
"People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad”
Mohammed Yusuf killed in police custody (2009)
Evolution of Boko Haram
1980 Maitatsine, Kano (almajiri system)
2000 Sharia Law reinstated in North
2002 Mohammed Ali, Nigerian Taliban
2004 Mohammed Yusuf founds BH
2007
Assassination of Sheik Adam,
graduate of Madinah University
(Saudi Arabia), respected Wahhabi
reformist
2009
Extrajudicial killing of Jusuf
2010
Ideology to vengeance (Jihad)
Shekau launches operations to
create a caliphate in NE Nigeria
2013
Escalation and spread
2014
Use of women & girls as wives,
fighters, and suicide bombers
2015
BH pledges allegiance to ISIS
Future Trends - Scenarios
1. Conflict fatigue coupled with negotiations - If underlying conditions remain, BH
temporarily disperses, mutates and reappears
2. Follow the course of the Lord’s Resistance Army - Take refuge and continue attacks from
remote rural areas of Borno state & neighboring countries.
3. Internationalize - Continue attacking neighboring countries and international targets in
Nigeria, directly threatening national and regional stability. In 2015, BH pledged allegiance to
ISIS (Islamic State, West Africa Province) and announced plans to build an Islamic caliphate.
Increase sophistication of recruitment, military tactics, and media strategy
Increase appeal and build morale of soldiers
Emboldened leaders, global legitimacy and an appeal for Jihad supporting the rhetoric of a
caliphate
Internationalize membership beyond the majority Kanuri population & home areas
Global Terrorism Index listed BH as the deadliest terrorist group in the world - responsible
for at least 6,644 deaths in 2014, an increase of 314 percent from 2013
Since the research…
1. Newly elected President Muhammadu Buhari pledged to curb corruption and crush BH
2. MNJTF increased cooperation, but unable to eliminate BH or secure the population
3. Limited non-military response & high risk of backlash (closing mosques, anti-terror laws, targeting Kanuri)
4. Population, political, traditional, and religious leaders fear reprisal for cooperating with BH & security forces
5. Victims of BH and security forces receive limited to no assistance
6. Rescued women and girls receive limited support and often disappear into military camps
7. Incommunicado detentions, extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances continue
8. Inadequate detention centers and limited judicial capacity
9. Conditions for IDPs, refugees, and host communities remain stressed & relief efforts inadequate
10. Enabling environment (push & pull factors) are exacerbated
Population is expected to nearly double in the next two decades
exacerbating deteriorating socioeconomic & environmental conditions
Gender Dynamics
Women and Girls are vulnerable, can be victims & may be (un)intentionally complicit.
Indicators of women’s health & education
Country
Fertility (est)
Literacy
School Life Expectancy
Niger
7.0
11%
5 years
Chad
5.0
30%
6 years
Nigeria
5.2
50%
8 years
Cameroon
4.8
70%
10 years
“What to do with over 7,000 abducted women & girls?”
Critical Questions
1. What is the collateral damage of sustained military intervention? What will fill the void left by the destruction
created by BH and military interventions? With limited human and financial resources, how can interventions be
implemented quickly enough to avoid the immediate return of BH or other VE groups?
2. Is there a viable, complementary non-military strategy? If so, what is the long-term vision, and are the various
stakeholders capable of implementing it effectively? Who will fund it, and for how long?
3. Can security actors guarantee communities security after retaking BH-controlled territory? If not, how will
communities respond to that insecurity? Will it push them to support BH or other groups in the absence of other
options?
4. If Boko Haram is defeated militarily, how will former BH militants be reintegrated into society? How can
governments distinguish between Boko Haram sympathizers, forced or voluntary recruits, and criminals, and
devise specific protocols and programs to deal with each category? Do any of the regional governments have the
judicial capacity to handle the cases? Will interventions provide incentives for community members who did not
join BH as well?
5. How can trust be rebuilt between citizens and the State after years of neglect, perceptions of corruption and poor
governance, and existing fear and distrust of State security actors?
6. How can trust be rebuilt among individuals, families and communities?
7. If Boko Haram is diminished, contained or defeated, how will host governments, donors, INGOs, and the citizens
of the four LCB countries manage expectations of change? In addition to existing grievances, which have been
exacerbated by the crisis, unmet expectations add another grievance to the list.
8. Who are the potential spoilers who can take advantage of the vacuum and unmet expectations, and how can
they be managed or contained?
8. How to provide hope & manage expectations?
Country Case Studies
1. No succession plan
2. Weak opposition, civil society & military
3. Collapsed Cameroon = destabilized Chad
4. Ethno-tribal, cultural, familial, socioeconomic
dependencies w/ Nigeria (Maiduguri) & Chad
(N’Djamena) challenge national integration
5. High population density - limited opportunities
6. Increased tension- IDPs, refugees, hosts
7. High insecurity - strong distrust in security actors
8. Humanitarian crises (BH & CAR) expose weakness
reinforcing perception of neglect, isolation,
marginalization & relative deprivation (schools & health
centers closed, farms & cattle abandoned, borders &
motorcycles restricted, access to markets halted)
9. Population opposes Salafism & western ideology
10.BH corridor, refuge, recruitment ground - economic
incentives, peer pressure, coercion/force
11.Noticeable increase in Salafism (rogue Imams)
Large, oil dependent, land-locked country
 Dependent on Cameroon & Nigeria for import/export
Insecure borders with Nigeria, Sudan, Libya, CAR
Chronic instability
 No succession plan, co-opted opposition, elections
 Politics of oil, patronage, corruption & impunity
perpetuate ethnic fractionalization
 History, climate, ethnicity, religion accentuate
divisions
 Influx of IDPs, refugees, and returnees
Militarization (violence = power & livelihood)
 Thriving illicit-informal cross-border economy
 Trafficking & banditry
 Frustrated, disaffected, idle youth w/out options
 Social pressure to have family
 Former young militia members, war widows &
orphans
Low internal risk of VE
 Majority Tijaniyya - Minority Ansar al-Sunna
 Corridor, safe haven, sleeper cells
 Decrease respect for elders - petits marabouts
 Religious expansionism (Gulf States)
 Political entrepreneurs, criminal & VE groups align
to achieve their own interests.
Five steps of recruitment:
1. Denigrate western education.
2. Denigrate the State.
3. Lack of governmental presence.
4. Collapse of traditional livelihoods.
5. Respond to immediate grievances.
6. Once in – no way out.