Transcript Network Security and Threats Power Point

CHAPTERS 9-10 TJADEN
Computer Network Security
and Network Security Threats
Dr. Suzanne Buchele
(Most content borrowed from Ed Crowley at
The University of Houston)
OVERVIEW OF NETWORK SECURITY
ISSUES
Network security involves protecting a host (or a
group of hosts) connected to a network
 Many of the same problems as with stand-alone
computer systems apply and are more difficult:

User authentication and authorization – determine the
identity and privileges of users accessing the system
 Access control – policies that govern access privileges
and mechanisms limiting what actions are permitted

ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES OF NETWORK
SECURITY

Networking increases message vulnerability to:






Interception
Modification
Destruction
Delay
Reordering
Repetition
Networking implies cooperation, sharing, and trust
 Networking also…

Exposes a system to a larger pool of potential attackers
 Decreases the likelihood of intruders getting caught

AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORIZATION

Issues:

For the Server:
Is the Client really who they say they are?
 Is the request from the Client fresh?
 Will an eavesdropper be able to read my response?


For the Client:
How do I know I’m really talking to the Server?
 Will an eavesdropper be able to read my request?

Kerberos - Purpose

Needed in environments in which:
local distributed environment
 users on one computer can access services on other
computers or servers in the network

not all users have the authorization to access all other
services or servers on the network
 users need to be authenticated for particular services


users cannot be trusted to correctly identify themselves
a user could pretend to be another user
 a user may alter the network address of their computer so
that requests appear to be coming from a different computer
 a user may eavesdrop on exchanges and attempt attacks to
gain unauthorized access to a service or server
 e.g. replay or man-in-the-middle attacks

KERBEROS - OVERVIEW
One approach – have a distributed authentication
protocol, so that each server can self-authorize all
attempted access from all users
 Kerberos approach:

centralized authentication server on the local network
 authenticates users to servers and servers to users
 issues “tickets”
 uses symmetric key cryptography only

reading says uses DES, latest version can use AES
 since local network, can physically distribute keys
securely

KERBEROS – HOW IT WORKS
Central Authentication Server (AS) shares a secret key
with each user
 Step 1:



Step 2:


User is authenticated to the Authentication Server (AS),
is issued a ticket to be used to request access to services
from the TGS
User uses ticket from AS as authentication, so it can
obtain tickets from the TGS for specific services it needs
Step 3:

User presents a ticket to a server and is granted the
service
KERBEROS - STEP 1: GETTING TICKET FOR
TICKET GRANTING SERVICE (TGS)
User enters username and password
 Requests ticket for TGS from the AS
C => AS:(C, TGS)
 AS generates a ticket:

Name of client; Name of TGS; IP address of client;
time of issue; lifetime of ticket; session key for client
and TGS
 All encrypted with secret key shared by AS and TGS



client can’t read the ticket
AS replies to client with ticket and session key for
client and TGS, all encrypted with secret key
shared by AS and client
AS => C:(Encrypt((TicketAS, KC,TGS),KC,AS))
KERBEROS - STEP 2: GETTING A TICKET
FOR A SERVER
Client generates an authenticator for the TGS:
AuthC,TGS = Encrypt((C, IPC, Timestamp), KC, TGS)
 Client contacts TGS and requests a ticket for Server,
using the ticket from the AS and the authenticator:
C => TGS:(S, TicketAS, AuthC,TGS)
 If ticket and authenticator are both valid, TGS
generates random session key for Client and Server and
embeds in a ticket issued to the client:



TicketTGS: Encrypt((C, S, IPC, Time, Lifetime, KC,S),KS, TGS)
TGS sends generated ticket and session key to Client,
encrypted with key shared by Client and TGS
TGS => C:(Encrypt((TicketTGS, KC,S), KC, TGS)
KERBEROS – STEP 3: REQUESTING A
SERVICE FROM A SERVER
Client generates an authenticator for the server:
AuthC,S = Encrypt((C, IPC, Timestamp), KC, S)
 Client contacts Server and requests a service using the
ticket from the TGS and the authenticator it generated:
C => S:(Request, TicketTGS, AuthC,S)
 Server decrypts the Ticket to learn the session key (KC,S),
then uses the session key to decrypt the authenticator
 If the Client has requested that the Server authenticates
itself to the Client, the Server returns to the Client the
Timestamp+1, encrypted with the session key:
S => C:(Encrypt((Timestamp+1),KC,S))

KERBEROS – OVERVIEW OF MESSAGES



Step 1:
a. Request for TGS ticket
b. Ticket for TGS
Step 2:
c. Request for Server Ticket
d. Ticket for Server
Step 3:
e. Request for service
f. Server authentication (optional)
TGS
AS
c
b
a
d
e
Client
Server
f
KERBEROS – SECURITY AND LIMITATIONS

Adding Kerberos typically significantly strengthens
security
authenticates all parties involved
 uses cryptographic protocols
 no information transmitted that could be used maliciously


Limitations:

Scalability
TGS could be a bottleneck
 Cross-realm authentication needed for large networks


Single point of failure brings down system


AS and TGS
Prone to password-guessing attacks at initial
authentication
SESAME


Used in Europe, whereas
Kerberos more used in US
Very similar to Kerberos

TGS is PAS (Privilege Attribute
Server)

Tickets are Authentication
Certificate (AC) or Privilege
Attribute Certificate (PAC)
AS
PAS
Server
Client
CORBA OVERVIEW
Developed by the Object Management Group (OMG)
 Standard that allows distributed applications,
running in heterogeneous distributed environments,
to interoperate


Objects are entities that provide services to requestors
through well-defined encapsulating interfaces

Hides “low-level” details from the objects

Object Request Broker (ORB) mediates the requests
between objects
FUNCTIONS OF THE ORB

Deliver A’s request to B and B’s reply to A

Hide “low-level” details from calling objects:
Location (local or remote)
 Implementation details (language and platform)



Uses a universal Interface Definition Language (IDL) to communicate
with the ORB
Communication mechanisms (TCP/IP, shared memory, local
method invocation)
CORBA

The Common Object Request Broker Architecture
(CORBA) standard:
Defined by OMG
 Allows different ORBs to interoperate
 The CORBA Security specification:

Optional
 If implemented, the ORB provides basic security
functionality to all objects:
 Authentication
 Communications security
 Access control
 Auditing
 Also used for secure interoperability between ORBS

INTERACTION BETWEEN TWO SECURE ORBS
ACCESS CONTROL FOR NETWORKS

Problems:

Enforce an access control policy


Protect local internet from outsiders attempting to:


Obtain information, modify information, disrupt
communications
Solution: firewall


Allow trust relationships among machines
Forms a barrier that protects one network from dangers of
another
A firewall can:
Partition machines into those inside the organization and
those outside the organization
 Enforce an access control policy about what types of traffic
are allowed in and out

IMPLEMENTING A FIREWALL WITH A
SCREENING ROUTER

Screening routers perform packet filtering:

Examine some fields in the packet header:
Source and destination IP address
 Protocol
 Source and destination port numbers

Allow a packet to pass if it meets the screening criteria
 Filtering rules are stateless to increase speed

Doesn’t take into account what happened just before or is
happening right after
 E.g. C => S (Nonce) for authentication
S => C (Nonce) - same one!
 can get C to do authentication for S

FILTERING RULES

Administrator can specify rules regarding which
packets should not pass through the firewall

Can block:
Outgoing packets to certain addresses - restrict which
outside sites local users can access
 Incoming packets from certain addresses – restrict access to
specific external sites
 Incoming and outgoing requests to specific services
 Etc.

SAMPLE FILTERING RULES
Row 1: Block incoming packets from any source to
any destination for the finger service (TCP port 79)
 Row 2: Block incoming packets bound for the TFTP
service (UDP port 69)
 Row 3: Block outgoing packets bound for any
machine on network 128.112

Incoming/ Source IP Destination Protocol Source
Outgoing Address
Address
Port
Destination
Port
Incoming
*
*
TCP
*
79
Incoming
*
*
UDP
*
69
Outgoing
*
128.112.*.*
*
*
*
SCREENING ROUTERS

Advantages:
Relatively cheap
 Help improve security by blocking packets from/to
dangerous sites and services


Disadvantages:
Still vulnerable to attacks on enabled services
 Potential services are large (and growing) requiring
frequent maintenance
 Decisions must be made statelessly

PROXY GATEWAY

A Proxy gateway is more powerful than a screening
router and can do more/better checking:
Examine data (not just header) portion of packets
 Remember the past behavior of a connection
 Consider context – is this a response from the outside to
a request that originated on the inside?
 Etc.


Uses two barriers:
Outer barrier: blocks all incoming/outgoing traffic not
to/from the proxy gateway
 Inner barrier: blocks all incoming/outgoing traffic not
from/to the proxy gateway

PROXY GATEWAYS (CONT)
Global Internet

Bastion
Host
Organization’s Internet
Each barrier is implemented by a screening router:

Screening routers block all traffic not going to/from the proxy
gateway on the Bastion Host
Global Internet
Screening
Router
Organization’s Internet
Bastion
Host
Screening
Router
PROXY GATEWAYS (CONT)
The bastion host runs a set of application gateway
programs
 Act as middlemen between hosts inside and outside
the firewall

Internal hosts communicate with the application
gateway program running on the proxy gateway
 Application gateway program relays request to the
external host
 The external host’s reply is sent to the application
gateway program
 Application gateway program performs some checking
and then passes the reply on to the internal host

PROXY GATEWAY - EXAMPLE

An FTP server behind a proxy gateway firewall

An external client issues commands to establish a
connection and transfer files


Proxy gateway acts as a middleman between the client and
server
The proxy can check incoming commands:
Pass only valid FTP commands on to the server
 Protects the server from malformed or dangerous input


If the external client attempts to upload a file to the
server:

The proxy may pass the file through virus-scanning software
PROXY GATEWAYS – ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES

Advantages:


Provides better protection than a screening router
Disadvantages:





Additional cost
Proxy gateway could be a:
Bottleneck
Single point of failure
Tempting target for attackers

But, also generally secure
DYNAMIC FIREWALL TECHNIQUES
Screening routers and proxy gateways enforce
static security policies
 Dynamic filters allow administrators to set up
triggers:



Provides additional flexibility:


Temporarily add, delete, or modify certain rules in
response to particular events
Permit or deny traffic in special circumstances
Provides additional security:

More stringent rules triggered when suspicious
traffic is observed
NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL - SUMMARY

Access Control – need to protect local
machines/networks from outsiders attempting to:
Obtain information
 Modify information
 Disrupt communications


Solution: firewalls (screening routers, proxy
gateways, etc.)

Form a barrier that protects one network from
dangers on another
Next… Chapter 10
NETWORK SECURITY THREATS - OVERVIEW

Network communications exposes one to many
different types of risks:

Sniffers used to intercept and store network traffic for
later analysis, or alter packets


privacy, integrity, and authentication issues
Traffic analysis - study communications patterns in
order to guess the likely contents of the messages
Who is communicating with whom
 How much
 How often


Exploitation of the TCP/IP suite of network protocols

Not originally designed with security in mind
OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNET PROTOCOL (IP)

The Internet Protocol (IP) provides an unreliable
packet delivery service

IP packets, called datagrams, contain a header and
data portion:
OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNET PROTOCOL (CONT)

Important header fields:
VERS (4 bits): version
 HLEN (4 bits): length of header in 32-bit words
 TOTAL LENGTH (16 bits): the length of the entire
datagram (header and data) in 8-bit octets



Max possible length of version 4 IP datagram is 65,536 bytes
IDENTIFICATION, FLAGS, and FRAGMENT OFFSET:
used to control datagram fragmentation
A datagram may be too large to travel whole over a network
 IP specifies a way to divide a datagram into smaller pieces
 At the final destination, fragments are reassembled into the
original datagram


SOURCE and DESTINATION IP ADDRESSES (32 bits)
ATTACKS ON THE INTERNET PROTOCOL TEARDROP

The Teardrop tool enabled attackers to crash
vulnerable remote systems by sending a certain type
of fragmented IP datagram
Normal datagram fragments do not overlap
 Teardrop created fragments that did overlap
 Some implementations of the TCP/IP IP fragmentation
reassembly code do not properly handle overlapping IP
fragments


Windows and some Linux kernels
Caused system crash
 Later fixed by software patches

ATTACKS ON THE INTERNET PROTOCOL –
IP SPOOFING
DESTINATION ADDRESS field is used to route a
datagram to its final destination
 SOURCE ADDRESS field identifies the sender so that
the receiver knows where to send a reply
 IP spoofing – sender of a datagram inserts the
address of another machine (or a nonexistent machine)
in the source address field

Prevent the receiver from determining the host from which
an attack datagram originated
 Reply sent to a another (victim) host

OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNET CONTROL
MESSAGE PROTOCOL (ICMP)



A sub protocol (part of IP) used to transmit error messages and
report other unusual situations
Different formats depending on type of error transmission
Composed of a header and optional data portion and are
encapsulated in the data portion of an IP datagram:
OVERVIEW OF THE ICMP (CONT)

Fields:

TYPE (8 bits): identifies the type of the message
e.g. 0 = echo reply
 e.g. 8 = echo request


CODE (8 bits): identifies the subtype of the message

e.g. 0 = echo reply/request
CHECKSUM (16 bits): integrity check on header and
data portion of ICMP message
 IDENTIFIER and SEQUENCE NUMBER: enable the
sender to match each reply to the proper request
 DATA: any data included in an echo request is copied
into the data portion of the reply message

ATTACKS ON ICMP - PING OF DEATH
Attacker constructs an ICMP echo request message
containing 65,510 data octets and sends it to a victim
host
 The total size of the
resulting datagram (65,538
octets) is larger than the
65,536 limit specified by IP
 Several systems did not
handle this oversized IP
datagram properly




hang the system
crash the system
Fixed by software patches
ATTACKS ON ICMP - SMURF

Attacker sends ICMP echo request messages to a
broadcast address at an intermediate site
Broadcast address: a copy of the datagram is delivered to
every host connected to a specified network
 For some broadcast address, a single request could
generate replies from dozens or hundreds of hosts

The source address in each request packet is spoofed so
that replies are sent to a victim machine
 Result: the victim’s machine/network is flooded by
ICMP echo replies
 Solution: Many sites have reconfigured their machines
so that their machines do not respond to ICMP echo
requests sent to a broadcast address

OVERVIEW OF THE USER DATAGRAM
PROTOCOL (UDP)
IP delivers data from one machine to another
 UDP runs on top of IP and delivers data from one
application to another

A port (represented by a positive integer) is a unique
destination on a single machine
 Standard services run on reserved ports:
 ECHO (port 7)
 DISCARD (port 9)
 TIME (port 37)
 TFTP (port 69)
 NTP (port 123)
 Etc.
 Programs can request an unused (dynamic) port and
receive messages that arrive on that port

OVERVIEW OF UDP (CONT)


The basic unit of communication in UDP is the user
datagram: UDP header and UDP data
Entire datagram is transported in the data portion of IP
datagrams


Header = 8 octets
Maximum length of
data portion = 65,536-8
= 65,528 octets
ATTACKS ON UDP - FRAGGLE

Similar to Smurf attack

except uses UDP instead of ICMP
UDP port seven is an echo service
 Attacker sends user datagrams to port seven of a
broadcast address at an intermediate site

Spoofed source addresses pointing to victim
 Random source ports (or port 7 for more effective attack)

Each request generates replies from many machines
 Result: flood victim’s machine/network with UDP
replies
 Solution: filtering out UDP echo requests (or anything
else that might generate a response) sent to a broadcast
addresses

ATTACKS ON UDP - TRINOO

Trinoo is a distributed denial of service attack tool that
enables an attacker to inundate a victim with UDP
traffic from many different hosts simultaneously

Daemon program
Setup:
 Search for machines and attempt to break into them using
a number of different exploits
 Install the Trinoo daemon and root kit on as many of these
hosts as possible, add to list of “owned” hosts
 Attack:
 When given a victim by a master server, sends a large
number of UDP packets to random ports on the victim

ATTACKS ON UDP – TRINOO (CONT)

Master servers
Each master server controls many daemons on different hosts
 An attacker normally controls a number of master servers (on
different hosts)
 Commands (password protected):
 Start/stop it running
 Test that it is alive/listening
 Ask for a list of all the daemons that it controls
 Instruct it to order its daemons to attack a given victim


Attacks:
In August 1999 trinoo daemons from over 200 different
machines flooded a Univ of Minnesota host for several days
 In February 2000 trinoo used to attack several major
e-commerce sites on the Web

OVERVIEW OF THE TRANSMISSION
CONTROL PROTOCOL (TCP)

TCP runs on top of IP and provides reliable delivery
of a stream of data between two applications
Like UDP, TCP messages are sent inside IP
datagrams
 TCP:

Divides a stream of data into chunks that will fit inside
IP datagrams
 Insures that each datagram arrives at its destination
 Uses an acknowledgement and retransmission scheme as
necessary
 Reassembles the stream at the destination

OVERVIEW OF TCP (CONT)

TCP messages that carry data and acknowledgements
are called segments
OVERVIEW OF TCP (CONT)





Important fields:
SOURCE and DESTINATION PORT (16 bits) = port identifiers
SEQUENCE NUMBER (32 bits) = identifies the position of the
data in the segment in the data stream
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT (32 bits) = acknowledge the receipt of all
data up to given point
CODE BITS (6 bits) = URG, ACK, PSH, RST, SYN, and FIN
OVERVIEW OF TCP (CONT)

Establishing a TCP connection using the three-way
handshake:

Two parties exchange messages to ensure each is
ready to communicate and to agree on initial sequence
numbers for the conversation
Message 1 (SYN + SEQ)
Host A
Message 2 (SYN + SEQ + ACK)
Message 3 (ACK)
Host B
OVERVIEW OF TCP (CONT)

Closing a TCP connection (one-way):
Connection is closed from A to B
 B may continue sending data to A before fully closing
the connection


When B has sent all remaining data, then B performs the
same closing protocol to close the connection from B to A
Message 1 (FIN + SEQ)
Host A
Message 2 (ACK)
Host B
ATTACKS ON TCP – SYN FLOOD

Recall the three-way handshake to establish a TCP
connection



After the second message has been sent but before the third
message has been received the connection is half opened
Most hosts store these half-opened connections in a fixedsize table while they await the third message
Half-opened connections are timed out after after half a
minute or so
Message 1 (SYN + SEQ)
Host A
Message 2 (SYN + SEQ + ACK)
Message 3 (ACK)
Host B
ATTACKS ON TCP – SYN FLOOD (CONT)

Attacker attempts to fill up the half-opened connection
table
Attacker sends the victim machine a large number of SYN
segments with spoofed source addresses
 Produces a large number of half-opened connections at the
victim’s machine that will never become fully open
 The half-opened connection table fills and no new
connections can be accepted until space is available


Attacker attempts to keep it full


Continue sending SYN segments to replace half-open
connections as they time out
Result: the victim host cannot accept any other,
legitimate attempts to open a connection
ATTACKS ON TCP - LAND
Attack tool exploits a vulnerability in certain TCP
implementations
 Attacker creates an invalid TCP SYN segment:

Spoofed source address is identical to the destination
address
 Source port is identical to the destination port

Causes some TCP implementations to freeze or crash
 Fixed with software patches

ATTACKS ON TCP – TRIBE FLOOD NETWORK
Tribe Flood Network (TFN) is a distributed denial of
service attack tool
 Used in February, 2000 to attack several major ecommerce sites on the Web
 Similar to trinoo:

Daemon programs: listen for and execute commands from a
master
 Master programs
 Control a number of daemons
 Communicate with an attacker and pass his/her commands
on to daemons

ATTACKS ON TCP – TFN

“Improvements” over trinoo:





Random protocol (TCP, UDP, or ICMP) for
communication between master and daemons
Can send out “decoy” packets to random IP addresses to
obscure the true target of the attack
Daemons spoof the source IP address in the attack
packets they send
Daemons can attack multiple targets
Wider variety of attacks:
UDP flood (like with trinoo)
 TCP SYN flood
 ICMP ping flood
 ICMP directed broadcast flood (smurf)
 All of the above

SCANS AND PROBES

Attackers typically engage in a variety of
reconnaissance activities before attacking:
To identify important/interesting hosts
 To identify potential vulnerabilities that could be
exploited

A port scanner is a program that tries to determine
which ports have programs listening on them
 Example:

Attempts to open a TCP connection to each port in order
 If a connection is made then immediately close it and
record the fact that the port opened
 If the connection fails then the port is closed

PORT SCANNING (CONT)

Using fully-open connections to scan is likely to draw
a lot of attention to the scan

Most hosts log:
Each attempt to connect to a closed port
 Each time a newly-opened connection is closed with little
or no data having been sent


Clandestine scanning methods:

SYN scan:
A SYN segment is sent to each port, and any port that
responds with a SYN+ACK segment is opened
 Instead of completing the handshake, a RST (reset)
segment is sent to close the connection before it fully opens
 Some hosts do not log half-opened connections

PORT SCANNING (CONT)

Clandestine scanning methods (cont):

FIN scanning:
A FIN segment is sent to each port
 opened ports will ignore (since no connection has been
established)
 Closed ports are required to respond to a FIN with a RST
segment
 so ports that do not answer are opened
 Again, many hosts do not log responses to FINs, so detection
is less likely

TRACEROUTE FOR NETWORK SCANNING

The traceroute program discovers the path that an IP
datagram follows to reach a target host
Start by sending a probe message with a TTL value of 1
bound for the target host
 If the target host cannot be reached in one hop then:

The datagram is dropped
 Machine that drops it returns an ICMP TTL-exceeded message
 Traceroute records the name and address of the machine and
the round trip time

The TTL value is incremented by 1, probe is sent again
 This process continues until the target is reached, and
traceroute generates a report of its findings
 Can be used to gain info about the topology of a network

REMOTE OPERATING SYSTEM
FINGERPRINTING
Certain attacks only work on certain operating systems
(and certain versions of those operating systems)
 Techniques enable attackers to try to determine what
operating system is running on a host
 Typically, specially crafted (and usually invalid) IP,
ICMP, UDP, or TCP packets are sent to a host
 Different operating systems (and sometimes different
versions of the same operating system) are known to
respond to these packets in certain ways
 Examples:

FIN segments for closed connections
 TCP options field

SECURITY ASSESSMENT TOOLS
Tools that allow system administrators to
scrutinize their sites for vulnerabilities
 Examples:

SAINT (http://www.wwdsi.com/saint)
 SARA (http://www-arc.com/sara)
 SATAN (http://www.fish.com/satan)

Many others
 Some automate the fixing of vulnerabilities that
are identified

NETWORK SECURITY THREATS - SUMMARY

Network communications exposes one to many
different types of risks:

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
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
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Attacks on the privacy, integrity, or authenticity of
messages
Traffic analysis
Exploitation of the TCP/IP suite of network protocols
Attacks on IP (Teardrop, IP Spoofing)
Attacks on ICMP (Ping of Death, Smurf)
Attacks on UDP (Fraggle, Trinoo)
Attacks on TCP (SYN Flood, Land, TFN)
Probes and scans
NEXT…

5 minute break, then Lab