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Networking, Sensing and Control (ICNSC), 2013 10th
IEEE International Conference on
102064535 黃川洁
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Outline
 INTRODUCTION
 BOTNET LIFE CYCLE
 BOTNET ARCHITECTURES
 DETECTION OF BOTNET ATTACK
 PREVENTION & MITIGATION OF BOTNET
 FUTURE PROSPECTS
 CONCLUSION
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INTRODUCTION-1
 BOTNET is a large network of compromised computers
used to attack other computer systems for malicious intent.
 NetBus and BackOrifice2000
 several techniques for BOTNET attack detection
 data mining, fuzzy logic based on some statistical data, anomaly based, structure based
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INTRODUCTION-2
 Testbed environment should focus on following
requirements:
 The ability to test with a variability of bot types (both known and unknown)
deploy on variety of standard operating system.
 To be capable of conducting experiments in a secure mode such as one that
poses no threat to the greater internet
 To be able to form a flexible and realistic botnet technologies and
configuration.
 To perform and conduct experiments at scale and under realistic conditions.
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BOTNET LIFE CYCLE-1
 In start it primarily infects other computer.
 Then injects small code
 File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), Peer to Peer (P2P), and
combination of HTTP and P2P (HTTP2P) etc.
 When user connects to internet code is executed
automatically to establish a connection in which it
connects to Command & Control (C&C) server.
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BOTNET LIFE CYCLE-2
 Command and control the zombie computers through C &
C server.
 To remain transparent and active by using Dynamic
Domain Name Server (DNS) and keeping zombie updated
and in existence to maintain and use them accordingly.
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BOTNET ARCHITECTURES
 Centralized Botnet Architecture
 Peer to Peer (P2P) Botnet Architecture
 Hybrid Botnet Architecture
 Hypertext Transfer Protocol Peer to Peer (HTTP2P)
Botnet Architecture
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Centralized Botnet Architecture
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Peer to Peer (P2P) Botnet Architecture
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Hybrid Botnet Architecture
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Hypertext Transfer Protocol Peer to
Peer (HTTP2P) Botnet Architecture
 P2P has threat of Sybil attacks

Sybil Attack:是一種攻擊者透過大量匿名實體增加不成比例的巨大影響,
來破壞P2P網路的信譽系統。(TWCERT/CC)
 Combined HTTP and P2P
 Become harder to be detected by to bypass firewall and
client server architecture
 Cipher the message
 While the Soldier-Bot does not contact dynamically to
Supervisor-Bot or other soldier-bots rather it waits for a
call from its supervisor.
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Centralized
Botnet
Architecture
Peer to
Peer (P2P)
Botnet
Architectur
e
Hybrid
Botnet
Architecture
Hypertext Transfer
Protocol Peer to Peer
(HTTP2P) Botnet
Architecture
隱密性
低
高
高
高
加密
無
有
有
有
管理
容易
困難
困難
偵測
容易
較困難
較困難
困難
阻絕
容易
較困難
較困難
困難
monitoring
and healing
(for
Supervisorbot )
容易
困難
較容易
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DETECTION OF BOTNET ATTACK
 Structured Based Detection
 Signature Based Detection
 DNS Based Detection
 Behavior Based Detection
 Anomaly Based Detection
 Communication Pattern of Botnet
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Signature Based Detection
 The first and most widely
 Only successful for already known Botnets
 Two way
 list of IRC nicknames and applied n-gram analysis
 IP addresses
 Other system
 Honeynet, Honeypots, and Snort
 good cost and without false positives
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DNS Based Detection-1
 DNS queries
 In 2004-05 ideas were given to detect domain names by
unusually high or temporary intense DDNS queries.
 In following year, abnormally recurring NXDOMAIN
reply rates approach was proposed.
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DNS Based Detection-2
 Passive analysis of DNS based Black-hole list (DNSBL)
lookup traffic
 Two problems
 high false positive
 cannot detect distributed inspection
 Hyunsang Choi et al
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Anomaly Based Detection-1
 high network latency, high volumes of traffic, traffic on
unusual ports, and unusual system behavior
 cannot detect a BOTNET in sleeping mode
 Binkley and Singh solved by combining TCP based
anomaly with IRC tokenization and IRC message statistics
to create a system
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Anomaly Based Detection-2
 Gu et al. have proposed Botsniffer
 Botnet C&C channels
 local area network
 low false positive
 Basheer Al-Duwairi and Lina Al-Ebbini proposed
BotDigger
 fuzzy logic
 not work on a specific pattern
 the most reliable and flexible
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Communication Pattern of Botnet -1
 Cyber security defenders checks the communication
characteristics between a Supervisor-Bot and a SoldierBot on transport layer such as for TCP or UDP.
 Defenders check its source and destination IP, Port and
Protocol Identifier.
 Static characteristics

header
 dynamic characteristics

arrival, departure, throughput, and burst time of payload
information
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Communication Pattern of Botnet-2
 selecting precise set of characteristic and defining unique
flow as object
 comparing with other objects provide more information
 encrypted with the evolution of Botnet
 data mining techniques are applied on that limited data to
overcome the problem
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PREVENTION & MITIGATION OF
BOTNET
 In 2007 Collins et al. work to detect future botnet address
by the help of unclean network
 spatial (compromised hosts to cluster)
 temporal (tendency to contain compromised hosts for
extended period)
 Alex Brodsky et al. proposed a distributed content
independent spam classification system to defend from
Botnet generated Spam’s.
 Trend Micro provided Botnet Identification services
 real- time Botnet C&C bot-master address list
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FUTURE PROSPECTS-1
 Some of the steps to be taken to study the mind of
supervisor- bot are as follow:
 Make data warehouse of known bots for future use in data
mining, and to make an algorithm to use that data as
mitigation for attacks.
 Honeypots based defense is so popular and used mostly; it is
predicted and possible that one day supervisor- bots will
have a defense mechanism for detection of honeypots in
their bots.
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FUTURE PROSPECTS-2
 To make anti-bot application software which can work
against Botnet attack as antivirus does against viruses etc.
 New Testbeds are required to be developed which allow
testing in large-scale network either open or closed
environments.
 Getting of Botnet sample code is required for analyzing but
criminals don’t want to examine their malware as well as
cyber defender also feels hesitation with un-trusted ones.
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CONCLUSION
 In this survey we analyzed the protocols being used by the
Supervisor-bots and how they evolved with the passage of
time. How cyber defenders proposed and work for the
detection of a cyber-attack from known and unknown
BOTNETs and given ideas and techniques for its
prevention and mitigation. But unfortunately for
prevention and mitigation till now no sufficient work has
been done.
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