The Village at Penn College
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Transcript The Village at Penn College
Developing an Effective &
Affordable Security Infrastructure in
a Small College Environment
About Penn College
Williamsport Technical Institute, founded 1941
Williamsport Area Community College, founded 1965
Pennsylvania College of Technology, founded 1989
Special Mission Affiliate of Penn State University
Accredited - Middle States Association of Colleges and
Secondary Schools
6,358 headcount - 5,891 FTE
288 FTE faculty, 518 FTE staff
B.S., A.S. and certificate degrees in over 100 majors
Specialize in vocational and technology-based education
Strong focus on small class sizes and hands-on instruction
www.pct.edu
Williamsport, PA
IT Infrastructure
2,600 College-owned computers, 1,400
student-owned computers in residential
complexes
1,600 computers in 50+ academic
computer labs, student to computer ratio
of 4:1
Standard computer lab software includes
Microsoft Windows XP, Office 2003,
NetMail POP3 e-mail system
IT Infrastructure (cont’d)
1,000 staff/faculty PCs
Standard employee image: Windows XP,
Office 2003, Novell GroupWise, iSeries
client
Novell Directory Services (NDS)
IBM iSeries mainframe, home-grown
legacy administrative applications
WebCT, Sirsi, eRecruiting, Raiser’s Edge,
Cbord Odyssey, EBMS
25 Novell, 15 Microsoft, 3 Linux, 1 Sun, 1
AIX server
IT Infrastructure (cont’d)
100% Cisco network infrastructure
except for Packeteer Packetshaper
Fast Ethernet via CAT5 for all building
LANs, Gigabit Ethernet via fiber for
backbone
Dual Cisco 6500s for redundant core
Fractional T-3 (30 Mbps) Internet
service
Dial-up Internet access provided for
employees, not students
About 50% wireless coverage
Campus Network Layout
Information Technology Services
Organization (50 employees)
Desktop Computing
Academic Computing
Technical Support/Help Desk
Technical Writer/Trainer
Administrative Information Systems
Network Applications
Mail & Document Services
Media Services
Telecommunications
Post Y2K IT Security “Problem”
Increasing threats from viruses, trojans,
worms, hackers, etc.
Lack of security standards
No coordinated security response
Poor security awareness
Minimal security policy
No security testing
The “Challenge”
Limitations
Budget
Staff
Time
Large backlog of post Y2K projects
Balancing security effectiveness with
efficient resource management
Solution Analysis
Dedicated security staff vs. security team
Advantages of team approach:
Utilizes existing staff and expertise
Spreads/diffuses the importance of security
across all functional IT areas
Funded through existing budgets
Disadvantages:
No centralized focus/authority
Long lead time to develop expertise
Staff time directed away from other projects
Not invented here syndrome
The “Solution”
IT management recommended forming a
campus “security team.”
Each area of the IT department
committed one employee and a
percentage of its budget.
A senior manager was designated to
provide leadership and coordination of
this team effort.
The team met weekly over an initial 18
month period, then bi-weekly.
Rotating duty officer/CERT format
The Context
Risk vs. investment
Scope and impact for priority
Mitigating risk factors
Administrative data locked up in IBM
iSeries (AS/400)
GroupWise e-mail system
Institutional policy requiring data files
to be stored on network drives
Centralized IT management and
budget culture
7-Layer Security Approach
Layer
Layer
Layer
Layer
Layer
Layer
Layer
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-
Physical
Internet
Network
ResNet
Servers
Employee PCs
Social
Layer 1 - Physical
Before
Distributed servers,
not physically
secured, some
actually in
staff/faculty offices
Network components
not secured
Minimal UPS
protection
After
Most non-academic
servers moved to
secured data center;
backup generator
Wiring closets
secured
UPS for all servers
and network
equipment
Layer 2 - Internet
Before
Internet router with public IP addresses
No filtering of ports
After
Cisco PIX firewall with PAT translation initially,
later acquired additional IPs, changed to NAT
(still occasional problems, need an XLATE clear)
Access control list on Internet router (example)
Packeteer - Although purchased for bandwidth
control, provides another layer of “protection”
and “detection”
Internet Router ACL
access-list 115 permit tcp any 0.0.0.0 255.255.255.0
established
access-list 115 deny ip 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any
access-list 115 deny ip 127.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 any
access-list 115 deny ip 172.16.0.0 0.15.255.255 any
access-list 115 deny ip 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 any
access-list 115 deny ip 224.0.0.0 15.255.255.255 any
access-list 115 deny ip host 0.0.0.0 any
access-list 115 deny ip 12.23.198.0 0.0.0.255 any
access-list 115 deny ip 12.23.199.0 0.0.0.255 any
access-list 115 deny ip any 0.0.0.255 255.255.255.0
access-list 115 deny tcp any any eq 135
access-list 115 deny udp any any eq 135
access-list 115 deny tcp any any eq 137
access-list 115 deny udp any any eq netbios-ns
access-list 115 deny tcp any any eq 138
access-list 115 deny udp any any eq netbios-dgm
access-list 115 deny tcp any any eq 139
access-list 115 deny udp any any eq netbios-ss
access-list 115 deny tcp any any eq 445
access-list 115 deny udp any any eq 445
access-list 115 deny tcp any any eq 593
access-list 115 deny udp any any eq 593
access-list 115 deny tcp any any eq 3333
access-list 115 deny udp any any eq 3333
access-list 115 deny tcp any any eq 4444
access-list 115 deny udp any any eq 4444
access-list 115 deny tcp any any eq 69
access-list 115 deny udp any any eq tftp
access-list 115 deny tcp any any eq 161
access-list 115 deny udp any any eq snmp
access-list 115 deny tcp any any eq 162
access-list 115 deny udp any any eq snmptrap
access-list 115 deny udp any any eq 1993
access-list 115 deny tcp any any eq 1900
access-list 115 deny udp any any eq 1900
access-list 115 deny tcp any any eq 5000
access-list 115 deny udp any any eq 5000
access-list 115 deny udp any any eq 8998
access-list 115 permit icmp any any echo
access-list 115 permit icmp any any echo-reply
access-list 115 deny ip any any log-input
Layer 3 – Network - Before
10.x.x.x organized geographically; each
“building complex” has a subnet;
10.1.x.x, 10.2.x.x, 10.3.x.x, etc.
Any to any routing philosophy
Simple telnet to devices
No central security scheme
Layer 3 – Network - After
10.1.x.x network
100% VLAN scheme
equipment
10.2.x.x servers
VLANs based on
10.3.x.x printers
computer/user role
10.4.x.x staff
Internet style ACLs applied
10.100.x.x ResNet
on traffic leaving VLANs
Etc.
Traffic denied entering VLAN if
no reason for the traffic
Extended today to separate VLANS for point-of-sale
stations, HVAC, wireless, dial-up; each with its own
ACL
SSH required to access devices, coordinated
userid/password with Cisco ACS server that LDAPs
to our NDS
Layer 4 – ResNet
Before
Single VLAN
Normal network
subnet
No restrictions
ISP attitude
No scanning
After – version 1
ACL limited access to other
campus VLANs
After – version 2
VLAN per 48 port switch
Internet style ACL “rule set”
to block known bad ports
such as 445
Routine scanning and
quarantining
Layer 5 – Servers - Before
Public IP address via firewall conduit
Distributed physically
No port filtering
Inconsistent patch strategy
No virus protection
Inconsistent HTTPS implementation
Many outside of the “network” department
No scanning for vulnerabilities
No disaster recovery plan
Layer 5 – Servers - After
Servers in data center or managed by server group
HTTPS required for any sensitive data
Private IP addresses mapped to public via “conduit” in the firewall
Port filtered in the firewall, deny all, allow those required for
specific services
Port filtered coming out of ResNet and student computer labs
Managed patch strategy, critical patches applied in 24 hours
Symantec Anti-Virus on servers
NetMail/CA eTrust anti-virus and RBL filtering for e-mail
GWAVA/Symantec Anti-Virus e-mail filtering
GWAVA attachment filtering
Routine Nessus scanning
Comprehensive disaster recovery plan
Layer 6 - Employee PCs
Before
Public IP address
No anti-virus
No patch
management
No scanning
After
Private IP address via
PAT/NAT
Managed Symantec AntiVirus
“Push” of critical Microsoft
security patches via Novell
ZenWorks
Nessus scanning
Layer 7 - Social
Before
Little or no public
awareness
No AUP
Loose user ID and
password policies
“It won’t happen
here, we know
everyone personally
After
Acceptable Use Policy
Accounts blocked after
3 failed log in attempts
Passwords changed
every 180 days
Regular communication
via online newspaper
Security education
classes
What’s on the radar screen?
Spyware
PC firewall
Instant Messenging issues
VPN
Network access control
Two factor authentication
Security as it affects privacy issues
E-mail security
Conclusion
Security team was the right
approach for us
Effective, no significant
down-time except for
Blaster/Welcia, fall 2003
Cost-efficient
Diffused security
awareness across the
department
Developed security skills
across ITS
Security Infrastructure
Cisco PIX firewall
Packeteer Packetshaper
Cisco VLANs/ACLs
Symantec Anti-Virus
Novell ZenWorks
GWAVA Antivirus/attachment filtering
Nessus
Discussion
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