Transcript Handout - Ohio State Computer Science and Engineering

Network Layer Security
1
Outline
r IPsec
r Security in Routing
r DDoS at Network Layer and IP Traceback
r IPv6 Security
2
Network Layer: IP Security Overview
r RFC 1636: “Security in the Internet Architecture”
m Issued in 1994 by the Internet Architecture Board (IAB)
m Identifies key areas for security mechanisms
• Need to secure the network infrastructure from unauthorized
monitoring and control of network traffic
• Need to secure end-user-to-end-user traffic using authentication
and encryption mechanisms
m
IAB included authentication and encryption as
necessary security features in next generation IP (IPv6)
• The IPsec specification now exists as a set of Internet standards
3
Applications of IPsec
r Provides capability to secure communications across a
LAN, private and public WANs, and the Internet
r Examples include:
m
m
m
m
Secure branch office connectivity over the Internet
Secure remote access over the Internet
Establishing extranet and intranet connectivity with partners
Enhancing electronic commerce security
r Principal feature of IPsec: can encrypt and/or
authenticate all traffic at network (IP) level
m
So all distributed applications (remote logon, client/server,
e-mail, file transfer, Web access) can be secured
4
IP Security Scenario
5
Benefits of IPSec
r
When IPsec is implemented in firewall or router, it provides strong
security applicable to all traffic crossing the perimeter
m
Traffic within company/workgroup has no overhead from securityrelated processing
IPsec in firewall resists bypass if all outside traffic must use IP and
the firewall is the only way Internet traffic enters organization
r IPsec below the transport layer (TCP, UDP); transparent to
applications
r
m
r
IPsec can be transparent to end users
m
r
No need to change software on a user or server system when IPsec is
implemented in the firewall or router
No need to train users on security mechanisms, issue keys on a peruser basis, or revoke keys when users leave organization
IPsec can provide security for individual users if needed
m Useful for offsite workers, setting up secure virtual subnetwork
within an organization for sensitive applications
6
Routing Applications
r IPsec can play vital role in the routing architecture
required for internetworking
r IPsec can assure that:
m
m
m
m
Router advertisement comes from authorized router
Router seeking to establish or maintain a neighbor
relationship with a router in another routing domain is an
authorized router
Redirect message comes from the router to which the
initial IP packet was sent
Routing updates are not forged
7
Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP)
• Consists of an encapsulating
header and trailer used to
provide encryption or
combined
encryption/authentication
• The current specification is
RFC 4303, IP Encapsulating
Security Payload (ESP)
Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
• A collection of documents
describing the key management
schemes for use with IPsec
• The main specification is RFC
5996, Internet Key Exchange
(IKEv2) Protocol, but there are a
number of related RFCs
Authentication Header (AH)
• An extension header to
provide message
authentication
• The current specification is
RFC 4302, IP Authentication
Header
Architecture
• Covers the general concepts,
security requirements,
definitions, and mechanisms
defining IPsec technology
• Current specification is RFC
4301, Security Architecture for
the Internet Protocol
IPsec
Documents
Cryptographic algorithms
• This category encompasses a
large set of documents that
define and describe
cryptographic algorithms for
encryption, message
authentication,
pseudorandom functions
(PRFs), and cryptographic
key exchange
Other
• There are a variety of
other IPsec-related RFCs,
including those dealing
with security policy and
management information
base (MIB) content
8
IPsec Services
r IPsec provides network layer security services by enabling
a system to:
m
m
m

Select required security protocols
Determine the algorithm(s) to use for the service(s)
Establish crypto keys required to provide requested services
RFC 4301 lists the following services:
m
m
m
m
m
m
Access control
Connectionless integrity
Data origin authentication
Reject replayed packets (form of partial sequence integrity)
Confidentiality (encryption)
Limited traffic flow confidentiality
9
Transport and Tunnel Modes
Transport Mode
Tunnel Mode
• Provides protection mostly for
upper-layer protocols, e.g., TCP or
UDP segment, ICMP packet
• Typically used for end-to-end
communication between two hosts
• ESP in transport mode encrypts
and optionally authenticates the IP
payload but not the IP header
• AH in transport mode authenticates
the IP payload and selected
portions of the IP header
• Provides protection to the entire IP
packet
• Used when one or both ends of a security
association (SA) are a security gateway
• Number of hosts on networks behind
firewalls can securely communicate
without implementing IPsec
• ESP in tunnel mode encrypts, can
authenticate entire inner IP packet,
including inner IP header
• AH in tunnel mode authenticates the
entire inner IP packet and selected
portions of outer IP header
10
Tunnel Mode and Transport Mode Functionality
11
IPsec Architecture
12
Security Association (SA)
Uniquely identified by three parameters:
r One-way logical
connection between
sender and receiver that
affords security services
to traffic carried on it
r In any IP packet, the SA
is uniquely identified by
the Destination Address
in the IPv4 or IPv6
header and the SPI in
the enclosed extension
header (AH or ESP)
Security Parameters
Index (SPI)
• A 32-bit unsigned integer
assigned to this SA with local
significance only
Security protocol
identifier
• Indicates whether the
association is an AH or
ESP security association
IP Destination
Address
• Address of destination
endpoint of SA, which
can be an end-user
system or a network
system, e.g., firewall or
router
13
Security Association Database (SAD)
r Defines the parameters associated with each SA
r Normally defined by the following parameters in a
SAD entry:
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
Security parameter index
Sequence number counter
Sequence counter overflow
Anti-replay window
AH information
ESP information
Lifetime of this security association
IPsec protocol mode
Path MTU
14
Security Policy Database (SPD)
r The means by which IP traffic is related to
specific SAs
m
Contains entries, each of which defines a subset of IP
traffic and points to an SA for that traffic
r In more complex environments, may be multiple
entries that potentially relate to a one or more
SAs associated with a single SPD entry
m
m
Each SPD entry is defined by a set of IP and upperlayer protocol field values called selectors
These are used to filter outgoing traffic in order to
map it into a particular SA
15
SPD Entries
r The following selectors determine an SPD entry:
Remote IP
address
Local IP
address
This may be a
single IP address,
an enumerated
list or range of
addresses, or a
wildcard (mask)
address
This may be a
single IP address,
an enumerated
list or range of
addresses, or a
wildcard (mask)
address
Latter two
required to
support more
than one
destination
system sharing
the same SA
Latter two
required to
support more
than one source
system sharing
the same SA
Next layer
protocol
Name
Local and
remote ports
A user identifier
from the
operating system
The IP protocol
header includes a
field that
designates the
protocol
operating over IP
Not a field in the
IP or upper-layer
headers but is
available if IPsec
is running on the
same operating
system as the user
These may be
individual TCP
or UDP port
values, an
enumerated list
of ports, or a
wildcard port
16
Host SPD Example
17
Processing Model for IP Packets
18
Processing Model for Inbound IP
Packets
19
ESP Format
20
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
r
Used to encrypt the Payload Data, Padding, Pad Length, and Next
Header fields
m
r
An optional ICV field is present only if the integrity service is
selected and is provided by either a separate integrity algorithm or a
combined mode algorithm that uses an ICV
m
m
m
r
If the algorithm requires cryptographic synchronization data then these data
may be carried explicitly at the beginning of the Payload Data field
ICV is computed after the encryption is performed
This order of processing facilitates reducing the impact of DoS attacks
Because the ICV is not protected by encryption, a keyed integrity algorithm
must be employed to compute the ICV
The Padding field serves several purposes:
m
m
m
If an encryption algorithm requires the plaintext to be a multiple of some
number of bytes, the Padding field is used to expand the plaintext to the
required length
Used to assure alignment of Pad Length and Next Header fields
Additional padding may be added to provide partial traffic-flow
confidentiality by concealing the actual length of the payload
21
Anti-Replay Mechanism
22
Transport Mode vs. Tunnel Mode
Encrypted
TCP Session
External
Network
Internal
Network
(a) Transport-level security
Corporate
Network
Encrypted tunnels
carrying IP traffic
Corporate
Network
Corporate
Network
Internet
Corporate
Network
(b) A virtual private network via Tunnel Mode
23
ESP Encryption and Authentication
IPv4
IPv6
orig IP
hdr
orig IP
hdr
extension headers
(if present)
TCP
Data
TCP
Data
(a) Before Applying ESP
authenticated
encrypted
IPv4
orig IP
hdr
ESP
hdr
TCP
Data
ESP ESP
trlr auth
authenticated
encrypted
IPv6
orig IP
hdr
hop-by-hop, dest, ESP
dest
routing, fragment hdr
TCP
Data
ESP ESP
trlr auth
Data
ESP ESP
trlr auth
Data
ESP ESP
trlr auth
(b) Transport Mode
authenticated
encrypted
IPv4
New IP ESP orig IP
hdr
hdr
hdr
TCP
authenticated
encrypted
IPv6
new IP
hdr
ext
headers
ESP orig IP
hdr
hdr
ext
headers
(c) Tunnel Mode
TCP
24
ESP Protocol Operation
Application
Data
TCP
orig IP
hdr
IP
orig IP
hdr
IPsec
ESP
hdr
TCP
hdr
Data
TCP
hdr
Data
TCP
hdr
Data
ESP ESP
trlr auth
(a) Transport mode
Application
Data
TCP
hdr
Data
orig IP
hdr
TCP
hdr
Data
ESP orig IP
hdr
hdr
TCP
hdr
Data
ESP ESP
trlr auth
ESP orig IP
hdr
hdr
TCP
hdr
Data
ESP ESP
trlr auth
TCP
IP
IPsec
IP
new IP
hdr
25
(b) Tunnel mode
Combining Security Associations
r
r
r
An individual SA can implement either the AH or ESP protocol but not both
Security association bundle
m Refers to a sequence of SAs through which traffic must be processed to provide a
desired set of IPsec services
m The SAs in a bundle may terminate at different endpoints or at the same endpoint
May be combined into bundles in two ways:
Transport
adjacency
Iterated tunneling
• Refers to applying more than one security protocol to the
same IP packet without invoking tunneling
• This approach allows for only one level of combination
• Refers to the application of multiple layers of security
protocols effected through IP tunneling
• This approach allows for multiple levels of nesting
26
ESP with Authentication Option
r In this approach, the first user applies ESP to the
data to be protected and then appends the
authentication data field
Transport mode ESP
• Authentication and encryption apply to the IP payload delivered
to the host, but the IP header is not protected
Tunnel mode ESP
• Authentication applies to the entire IP packet delivered to the
outer IP destination address and authentication is performed at
that destination
• The entire inner IP packet is protected by the privacy mechanism
for delivery to the inner IP destination
m
For both cases authentication applies to the
ciphertext rather than the plaintext
27
Transport Adjacency
r Another way to apply authentication after
encryption is to use two bundled transport SAs,
with the inner being an ESP SA and the outer
being an AH SA
m
m
m
m
m
In this case ESP is used without its authentication
option
Encryption is applied to the IP payload
AH is then applied in transport mode
Advantage of this approach is that the authentication
covers more fields
Disadvantage is the overhead of two SAs versus one
SA
28
Transport-Tunnel Bundle
r The use of authentication
r One approach is to use a
prior to encryption might
be preferable for several
reasons:
bundle consisting of an
inner AH transport SA
and an outer ESP tunnel
SA
m
m
It is impossible for anyone
to intercept the message and
alter the authentication data
without detection
It may be desirable to store
the authentication
information with the
message at the destination
for later reference
m
m
Authentication is applied to
the IP payload plus the IP
header
The resulting IP packet is
then processed in tunnel
mode by ESP
• The result is that the entire
authenticated inner packet is
encrypted and a new outer
IP header is added
29
Combinations of Security Associations
Tunnel SA
One or More SAs
Router
Security
Gateway*
Router
Host*
Host*
Local
Intranet
Internet
Local
Intranet
Host*
Local
Intranet
Internet
Tunnel SA
Security
Gateway*
Host
Local
Intranet
One or Two SAs
Security
Gateway*
Host
Internet
Local
Intranet
(c) Case 3
Tunnel SA
Local
Intranet
Security
Gateway*
Host*
(a) Case 1
Security
Gateway*
One or Two SAs
Host*
Internet
Host*
Local
Intranet
30
(b) Case 2
(d) Case 4
Internet Key Exchange
r The key
management
portion of IPsec
involves the
determination and
distribution of
secret keys
m
A typical
requirement is four
keys for
communication
between two
applications
• Transmit and
receive pairs for
both integrity and
confidentiality
The IPsec Architecture document mandates support
for two types of key management:
• A system administrator
manually configures each
system with its own keys and
with the keys of other
communicating systems
• This is practical for small,
relatively static environments
Manual
Automated
• Enables the on-demand
creation of keys for SAs and
facilitates the use of keys in a
large distributed system with
an evolving configuration
31
ISAKMP/Oakley
r The default automated key management protocol of
IPsec
r Consists of:
m
Oakley Key Determination Protocol
• A key exchange protocol based on the Diffie-Hellman algorithm
but providing added security
• Generic in that it does not dictate specific formats
m
Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
(ISAKMP)
• Provides a framework for Internet key management and provides
the specific protocol support, including formats, for negotiation of
security attributes
• Consists of a set of message types that enable the use of a variety
of key exchange algorithms
32
Features of IKE Key Determination
r Algorithm characterized by 5 important features:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
• It employs a mechanism known as cookies to thwart clogging attacks
• It enables the two parties to negotiate a group; this, in essence, specifies
the global parameters of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
• It uses nonces to ensure against replay attacks
• It enables the exchange of Diffie-Hellman public key values
• It authenticates the Diffie-Hellman exchange to thwart man-in-themiddle-attacks
33
IKEv2 Exchanges
Initiator
Responder
HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni
HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ]
HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,] [IDr,] AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr}
HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr}
(a) Initial exchanges
HDR, SK {[N], SA, Ni, [KEi], [TSi, TSr]}
HDR, SK {SA, Nr, [KEr], [TSi, TSr]}
(b) CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange
HDR, SK {[N,] [D,] [CP,] ...}
HDR, SK {[N,] [D,] [CP], ...}
(c) Informational Exchange
HDR = IKE header
SAx1 = offered and chosen algorithms, DH group
KEx = Diffie-Hellman public key
Nx= nonces
CERTREQ = Certificate request
IDx = identity
CERT = certificate
SK {...} = MAC and encrypt
AUTH = Authentication
SAx2 = algorithms, parameters for IPsec SA
TSx = traffic selectors for IPsec SA
N = Notify
D = Delete
CP = Configuration
34
IKE Formats
Bit:
0
8
16
31
24
Initiator’s Security Parameter Index (SPI)
Responder’s Security Parameter Index (SPI)
Next payload
MjVer
MnVer
Exchangetype
Flags
Message ID
Length
(a) IKE Header
Bit:
0
Next payload
8
31
16
C RESERVED
Payload length
(b) Generic Payload Header
35
IKE Payload Types
36
Cryptographic Suites for IPsec
37
Summary: IPsec
r
IP security overview
m
m
m
m
m
m
r
Applications of IPsec
Benefits of IPsec
Routing applications
IPsec documents
IPsec services
Transport and tunnel
modes
r
m
m
m
m
r
IP security policy
m
m
m
m
Security associations
Security association
database
Security policy database
IP traffic processing
Encapsulating security
payload
Combining security
associations
m
m
r
Cryptographic suites
Authentication plus
confidentiality
Basic combinations of
security associations
Internet key exchange
m
m
ESP format
Encryption and
authentication algorithms
Padding anti-replay service
Transport and tunnel modes
m
Key determination protocol
Header and payload formats
38
Outline
r IPsec
r Security in Routing
r DDoS at Network Layer and IP Traceback
r IPv6 Security
39
Routing in the Internet
• The Global Internet consists of Autonomous Systems
(AS) interconnected with each other:
–
–
–
Stub AS: small corporation
Multihomed AS: large corporation (no transit)
Transit AS: provider
• Two-level routing:
– Intra-AS: administrator is responsible for choice: RIP,
OSPF
– Inter-AS: unique standard: BGP
40
Internet AS Hierarchy
Intra-AS border (exterior gateway) routers
Inter-AS interior (gateway) routers
4: Network Layer 4b-41
Intra-AS Routing
r Also known as Interior Gateway Protocols (IGP)
r Most common IGPs:
m
RIP: Routing Information Protocol (distance vector –
Bellman-Ford algorithm)
m
OSPF: Open Shortest Path First (link state –
Dijkstra’s algorithm)
m
IGRP: Interior Gateway Routing Protocol
(Cisco proprietary) (distance vector)
4: Network Layer 4b-42
Inter-AS routing
4: Network Layer 4b-43
Why different Intra-AS, Inter-AS routing?
Policy:
r Inter-AS: admin wants control over how its traffic routed, who
routes through its net.
r Intra-AS: single admin, so no policy decisions needed
Scale:
r Hierarchical routing saves table size, reduced update traffic
Performance:
r Intra-AS: can focus on performance
r Inter-AS: policy may dominate over performance
4: Network Layer 4b-44
Routing Security Issues
r Security attacks can come from:
m Misconfigured routers
m IP packet handling bugs
m SNMP “common” strings
m Weak passwords, poor encryption
m DoS from malformed packets
r However, these attacks are well-known; defense
measures can defend against them
45
Routing Protocol Attacks
r Intra-AS Routing Attacks
m RIP Attack
m OSPF Attacks
r Inter-AS Routing Attacks: BGP
46
Intra-AS: RIPv1 Overview
 Routing decisions based on number of hops
 Works only within a AS
 Supports only 15 hops ⟹ unsuited for large networks
 RIP v1 communicates only its own information
 Has no authentication
 Can’t carry subnet mask so applies default subnet
mask
47
Intra-AS: RIPv2 Overview
 Can communicate other router information
 Supports authentication up to 16-char password
 Can carry subnet information
 But authentication is provided in clear text…
48
Intra-AS: RIP Attack
 Identify RIP router via nmap scan:
nmap –v –sU –p 520
 Determine routing table:
If you are on same physical segment, sniff it
 Remotely: run rprobe, sniff

 Add route using srip to redirect traffic to your system
49
Intra-AS: Safeguards (RIP Attack)
 Disable RIP, use OSPF: security is better
 Restrict TCP/UDP port 520 packets at border router
50
Intra-AS: OSPF Attack
r OSPF: dynamic link-state routing protocol
r Keeps map of entire network, chooses shortest path
r Update neighbors using LSAs messages
r “Hello” packets generated every 10 s, sent to 224.0.0.5
r Uses protocol type 89
51
Intra-AS: OSPF Attack
r Identify target: scan for proto 89
r NCSU: JiNao project identified 4 OSPF attacks
m Max Age attack
m Sequence++ attack
m Max Sequence attack
m Bogus LSA attack
r Attack tool: nemiss-ospf (hard to use?)
52
Intra-AS: Safeguards: OSPF Attack
r Do not use dynamic routing on hosts wherever not
required
r Implement MD5 authentication
m
You need to deal with key expiration, changeover and
coordination across routers
53
Inter-AS: BGP overview
r Allows inter-domain routing between two ASs
r Guarantees loop-free exchange
r Only routing protocol which works on TCP (179)
r Routing information is exchanged after connection
establishment
54
Inter-AS: BGP Attacks
r Large network backbone: special attention to security
r So medium size networks are easier targets
r Packet injection vulnerabilities: very dangerous
r If we identify BGP routers, they have similar
weaknesses as TCP:
m
m
m
m
SYN flood attacks
Sequence number prediction
DoS
Possible advertisement of bad routes
55
Outline
r IPsec
r Security in Routing
r DDoS at Network Layer and IP Traceback
r IPv6 Security
56
DDoS Attacks at Network Layer
r What is a DDoS attack?
r How do we defend against a DDoS attack?
57
What is a DDoS attack?
 Internet DDoS attack is real threat
o On websites
 Yahoo, CNN, Amazon, eBay, etc. (Feb. 2000)
 Services were unavailable for several hours
o On Internet infrastructure
 13 root DNS servers (Oct, 2002)
 7 were shut down, 2 others partially unavailable
 Lack of defense mechanisms on current Internet
58
What is a DDoS Attack?
 Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks:
o Attempt to prevent legitimate users of a service from using it
 Examples of DoS attacks include:
o Flooding a network
o Disrupting connections between machines
o Disrupting a service
 Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) Attacks
o Many machines are involved in the attack against one or
more victim(s)
59
60
What Makes DDoS Attacks
Possible?
r Internet was designed with functionality, not security,
in mind
r Internet security is highly interdependent
r Internet resources are limited
r Power of many greater than power of a few
61
Addressing DDoS attacks
 Ingress filtering
o
P. Ferguson and D. Senie, RFC 2267, Jan 1998
o
Block packets that has illegitimate source addresses
o
Disadvantage : Overhead makes routing slow
 Identification of origin (Traceback problem)
o
IP spoofing enables attackers to hide their identity
o
Many IP traceback techniques are suggested
 Mitigating the effect during the attack
o
Pushback
62
IP Traceback
• Allows victim to identify attackers’ origin
• Several approaches
– ICMP trace messages
– Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM)*
– Hash-based IP traceback
– …
*S. Savage, D. Weatherall, A. Karlin, and T. Anderson, “Practical
Network Support for IP Traceback”, Proc. SIGCOMM 2000.
63
PPM (1)
r PPM scheme:
m Probabilistically
inscribe local path
information
m Use constant space in
the packet header
m Reconstruct attack path
with high probability
64
PPM (2)
Legitimate user
Attacker
Victim
65
PPM (3)
legitimate user
attacker
Victim
66
PPM (4)
legitimate user
attacker
Victim
67
PPM (5)
legitimate user
attacker
R
R
R
R
R
Victim
V
68
What is Pushback?
r Mechanism that lets a router ask adjacent
upstream routers to limit the traffic rate
r How it works:
m
m
m
A congested router asks other adjacent routers to limit
the rate of traffic for that particular aggregate.
Router sends pushback message
Received routers propagates pushback
69
Outline
r IPsec
r Security in Routing
r DDoS at Network Layer and IP Traceback
r IPv6 Security
70
IPv4 Security Limitations
r IP packets can be sniffed
r IP addresses can be spoofed
r IP connections can be hijacked
71
IPv6 Security Features
r Two header extensions proposed for IPv6 security:
m Authentication Header (AH): ensures authenticity and
integrity of datagram
m Encrypted Security Payload (ESP): contains encrypted
data
r Security Associations (SAs) used for senders and
receivers to agree on security requirements, e.g.,
cipher to be used
r These are very similar to respective IPsec
concepts
72
IPv6 Limitations: Mandatory IPsec
r IPv6 mandates IPsec support
Myth: “So IPv6 has improved security”
r IPsec already exists for IPv4
r Problems with IPsec deployment as a general end-
to-end security mechanism
r Deployment of IPsec (v6) has similar problems as
those of IPsec (v4). So IPsec (v6) is not deployed
as a general end-to-end security mechanism…
73
IPv6 Limitations: Address Space
r 128-bit IP address ⟹ ~1038 possible IP addresses
Myth: “It is unfeasible to brute-force scan an IPv6
network for alive nodes, as the IPv6 address space is
so large. Such a scan would take ages!”
r [Malone, 2008] measured IPv6 address assignement
patterns
r For hosts: 50% autoconf, 20% IPv4-based, 10%
Teredo (IPv6→IPv4 conversion), 8% “low-byte”
r For infrastructure: 70% “low-byte”, 5% IPv4-based
r Most compromised systems are hosts, which makes
brute-force scanning feasible (after compromise)
D. Malone, “Observations of IPv6 Addresses,” Proc. Passive and Active Measurement
Conference (PAM), LNCS 4979, 2008.
74
IPv6 Limitations: Autoconfiguration
and Address Resolution
r Based on Neighbor Discovery (ND) messages in ICMPv6
r Stateless autoconfiguration more powerful than IPv4
counterpart…but also provides more potential vectors for
attackers to exploit
r Less support in Layer 2 machines for mitigation of ND
attacks
r Secure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) was specified for
mitigating ND security threats, employing:
m
m
m
Cryptographically-Generated Addresses (CGAs)
RSA signatures (RSA signature option)
Certificates
r Not widely supported (e.g., in Windows XP/Vista/7)
75
IPv6 Conclusions
r IPv6 is in its infancy:
m Few attack tools publicly available
m Many bugs to be discovered…
r IPv6 not widely supported in intrusion detection
systems (yet)
r Much training is needed for IPv6 networks
76
Final Remarks
r IPsec provides network layer security (IPv4):
authentication, encapsulation, crypto key setup
r Routing protocols (e.g., RIP) prone to attacks
r DoS attacks possible at network layer
m
Mitigation: ingress filtering, traceback, etc.
r IPv6 may offer better security (in theory)
m In practice, attacks can still occur
m Training and safeguards needed for IPv6 networks
77
Acknowledgement
r These slides are partially based on
W. Stallings, Network Security Essentials, Pearson, 2011,
http://williamstallings.com/NetworkSecurity/NetSec5eInstructor/ (Ch. 9)
B. Rathore, “Router and Routing Protocol Attacks”,
http://www.slideshare.net/vaceitunofist/router-and-routingprotocol-attacks
F. Gont, “The Truth about IPv6 Security,” FutureNet 2010,
http://www.gont.com.ar/talks/futurenet2010/fgontfuturenet2010-ipv6-security.ppt
78