Transcript “Stronger” Web Authentication: A Security Review

“Stronger” Web Authentication:
A Security Review
Cory Scott
Problem Area
• Username and password are insufficient
authenticators for high-value assets
accessible via an untrusted network.
• Pressures:
– Regulatory: FFIEC guidance / mandate
– Consumer confidence
– Financial loss: Phishing and fraudulent activity
– Technical: Defense-in-depth for web applications
Authentication As
Ceremony: Prior Work
• Introduced by Walker / Ellison
– Model for protocols involving users as opposed
to machines
• Authentication Mechanism, as defined by
Kaliski, contains the following:
– Selected authentication factors
– Particular evidence about those factors; and a
– Specific protocol for conveying the evidence
Authentication As
Ceremony: Impact
• We can adopt compound authentication mechanisms that
combine different factors and assign a level of risk to each
factor.
• Example factors:
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User credentials
IP Address
ISP / Geo-location
Challenge questions
Access device
Prior suspicious activity on any of the factors
Certificates
OTP tokens / scratch cards
Voice confirm / SMS messages
Nature or Business Impact of request
• As a result, we can have “risk-based authentication”.
Two-factor Too Much
• Consumer acceptance of traditional commercial
two-factor solutions in the US untested and
expensive.
• Industry Solutions:
– Mutual authentication (watermarking / HA SSL certs)
– Introduction of “soft” factors:
• Challenge questions
• Device identification
• Geolocation / IP Risk Profiling
– Application of risk-based authentication decisions based
on the above factors.
(Note: Value, in terms of cost or risk reduction, has not been proven yet.)
Factors in Risk-Based
Authentication
• Device Identification
– Signed Key of (Browser + OS + Language + Time Zone) + Specific
User Account
– Can be mapped to particular IP, ISP, Country
– Stored as HTTP Cookie and/or Flash Shared Object
• Geolocation / IP Risk Profiling
– Behavioral analysis of user login activity
– Blacklist or flag certain countries, ISPs
– Subscribe to a “fraud network”
• Transaction-level analysis
– Anomalous transaction activity increases risk profile
• In all of these cases, when a risk threshold has been
breached, the application can force “stronger”
authentication.
Second-Level
Authentication Decisions
• Challenge questions or other KnowledgeBased schemes
• SMS messages as One Time Passwords
• Voice or Registered Telephone verification
• E-mail verification
• Access from previously registered device
• Fall-back to 2FA: Smart-cards, Physical OTP
tokens, biometrics, etc.
Credential Disclosure:
Threat Models
• Shoulder-Surf or The “Post-It” Debacle
• Keyloggers, Malicious Browser Helper Objects, and
Rootkits
– Differing Impact: Interactive vs. Harvesting Mode
– Can the attacker generate traffic from the victim host?
• Man-in-the-Middle
• Phishing Sites (trust subversion / trickery)
• Cross-Site Scripting and Request Forgery and other
client-side web vulnerabilities
• Acquaintance fraud (weakening the credential)
Attack
Considerations
• Tomfoolery with enrollment / site-in-transition
– Phishing vectors
– Increased site complexity
• Challenge question fuzzy logic
• Can the phisher ask the challenge questions?
• Is the device identifier subject to attack?
Design
Considerations
• How tight is the restriction by IP?
• The conditioning problem: How often do you
challenge?
• Do you want to be married to images and
watermarks? Hard to take away.
• Support issues
– Customers struggle or want to expand images
– Account lockout / reset gets more complicated