Transcript Lecture Notes - Computer Science & Engineering

CSCE 727
Cyber Attacks and Risk
Management
Attack Sophistication vs.
Intruder’s Technical Knowledge
From: http://people.ubuntu.com/~duanedesign/SurvivabilityandInformationAssuranceCurriculum/01survive/01survive.html
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Reading
Required:
 Denning Chapter 8, 9, 14
 Hutchins et al, Intelligence-Driven Computer Network Defense Informed by
Analysis of Adversary Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains, White
paper,http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/corporate/d
ocuments/LM-White-Paper-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf
Interesting Reading:
 DHS repairing internal security operations, Homeland Security News Wire,
April 9, 2014, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/seworld20140409dhs-repairing-internal-security-operations
 Student develops new way to detect hackers, Homeland Security News Wire,
April 9, 2014, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140409student-develops-new-way-to-detect-hackers
 Measuring smartphone malware infection rates, Homeland Security News
Wire, April 9, 2014, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20140409measuring-smartphone-malware-infection-rates
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Attack
Internet Engineering Task Force: RFC 2828:
“ An assault on system security that derives
from an intelligent threat, i.e., an intelligent
act that is a deliberate attempt (especially in
the sense of a method or technique) to
evade security services and violate the
security policy of the system.”
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Normal Flow
Information
source
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Information
destination
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Interruption
Information
source
Information
destination
Asset is destroyed of becomes unavailable - Availability
Example: destruction of hardware, cutting communication
line, disabling file management system, etc.
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Interception
Information
source
Information
destination
Unauthorized party gains access to the asset – Confidentiality
Example: wiretapping, unauthorized copying of files
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Modification
Information
source
Information
destination
Unauthorized party tampers with the asset – Integrity
Example: changing values of data, altering programs, modify
content of a message, etc.
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Fabrication
Information
source
Information
destination
Unauthorized party insets counterfeit object into the system –
Authenticity
Example: insertion of offending messages, addition of records
to a file, etc.
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Phases of Attack
Improve detection by examining which “phase” an
intruder’s behavior is identified
 Attack phases:

– Intelligence gathering: attacker observes the system to
determine vulnerabilities
– Planning: attacker decide what resource to attack
(usually least defended component)
– Attack: attacker carries out the plan
– Inside the system:


Hiding: attacker covers tracks of attack
Future attacks: attacker installs backdoors for future entry
points
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Passive Attack
“Attempts to learn or make use of information
from the system but does not affect system
resources” (RFC 2828)
Sniffer
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Sniffers
All machines on a network can “hear”
ongoing traffic
 A machine will respond only to data
addressed specifically to it
 Network interface: “promiscuous mode” –
able to capture all frames transmitted on
the local area network segment

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Risks of Sniffers

Serious security threat
 Capture confidential information
– Authentication information
– Private data

Capture network traffic information
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Network Sniffing Tools






Used for network analysis and troubleshooting
SecTools.Org: Top 125 Network Security Tools,
http://sectools.org/tag/sniffers/
Free, open source sniffers
Multiplatform support (user needs superuser
privilege, education: drop privilege)
#1: Wireshark: GUI interface
#9: tcpdump: command line
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Wireshark




Examines data from a live network or from a capture
file on disk
GUI interface for editing and visualization
– Green: TCP traffic, dark blue: DNS traffic, light
blue: UDP traffic, black: TCP packets with
problems
Has remotely exploitable security holes
How to Use Wireshark to Capture, Filter and Inspect
Packets, http://www.howtogeek.com/104278/how-touse-wireshark-to-capture-filter-and-inspect-packets/
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Passive attacks
Interception (confidentiality)
Disclosure of message contents
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Traffic analysis
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Disclosure of message content

Intruder is able to interpret and extract
information being transmitted
 Highest risk:authentication information
– Can be used to compromise additional system
resources
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Traffic Analysis

Intruder is not able to interpret and
extract the transmitted information
 Intruder is able to derive (infer)
information from the traffic characteristics
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Protection Against Passive
Attacks

Shield confidential data from sniffers:
cryptography
 Disturb traffic pattern:
– Traffic padding
– Onion routing

Detect and eliminate sniffers
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Detection of Sniffer Tools

Difficult to detect: passive programs
 Tools:
– Promisc – Linux
– cmp – SunOS 4.x: detects promiscuous mode
– AntiSniff (L0pht Heavy Industries, Inc. ): remotely
detects computers that are packet sniffing, regardless of
the OS
 Interesting read: S. Truth, How to Test for Sniffing
Vulnerabilities, http://web.securityinnovation.com/appsecweekly/blog/bid/63274/How-to-Test-for-SniffingVulnerabilities
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Tor

Online anonymity
 Free software and an open network
 Platforms: Windows, Mac, Linux/Unix, and
Android
 Defend against traffic analysis
 Download site: https://www.torproject.org/
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Tor

Tor network: a group of volunteer-operated
servers
 Privacy: user connections through a series
of virtual tunnels using the Tor network
 Censorship circumvention tool: allowing
users to reach otherwise blocked
destinations or content
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How Tor works?

Source:
https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.
html.en
 Cryptographically hide connection between
communicating partners
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Source: The Tor Project, https://www.torproject.org/
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Source: The Tor Project, https://www.torproject.org/
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Source: The Tor Project, https://www.torproject.org/
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Risk of Tor?




False sense of privacy
Legal risk of Tor relay operators?
Bad guys use Tor, too!
Interesting reading:
– EFF: 7 Things You Should Know About Tor, 2014,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/7-things-you-shouldknow-about-tor
– B. Schneier: Has Tor Been Compromised?, 2013,
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/08/has_tor_be
en_co.html
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Active attacks
“Attempts to alter system resources of affect
their operation” (Internet Enginering Task
Force, RFC 2828)
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Active attacks
Interruption
DOS, DDOS
(availability)
Modification
(integrity)
Replay
(Authentication)
Masquarade
(Authentication)
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Fabrication
(integrity)
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Protection against DoS, DDoS

Hard to provide full protection
 Some of the attacks can be prevented
– Filter out incoming traffic with local IP address
as source
– Avoid established state until confirmation of
client’s identity

Internet trace back: determine the source of
an attack
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Degradation of Service

Do not completely block service just reduce
the quality of service
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Intrusion Control
It is better to prevent something than to plan
for loss.
Problem: Misuse happens!
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Need:

Intrusion Prevention: protect system
resources
 Intrusion Detection: (second line of
defense) identify misuse

Intrusion Recovery: cost effective recovery
models
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Intrusion Prevention

First line of defense
 Techniques: cryptography, identification,
authentication, authorization, access
control, security filters, etc.
 Not good enough (prevention,
reconstructions)
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Intrusion Detection System
(IDS)

Looks for specific patterns (attack
signatures or abnormal usage) that indicate
malicious or suspicious intent
 Second line of defense against both internal
and external threats
 See recommended reading!
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Intrusion Detection Systems

Deter intruders
 Catch intruders
 Prevent threats to fully occur (real-time
IDS)
 Improve prevention techniques
 IDS deployment, customisation and
management is generally not trivial
 See required reading!
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Audit-Based Intrusion
Detection
Profiles,
Rules, etc.
Audit Data
Intrusion Detection
System
Decision
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Need:
• Audit data
• Ability to characterize
behavior
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Audit Data

Format, granularity and completeness depend on
the collecting tool
 Examples
–
–
–
–
System tools collect data (login, mail)
Additional collection of low system level
“Sniffers” as network probes
Application auditing

Honey Net
 Needed for
– Establishing guilt of attackers
– Detecting suspicious user activities
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Audit Data Accuracy

Collection method
– System architecture and collection point
– Software and hardware used for collection

Storage method
– Protection of audit data

Sharing
– Transmission protection and correctness
– Availability
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IDS Categories
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Time of data analysis
 Real-time v.s. off-the-line IDS
Location where audit data was gathered
 Host-based v.s. network-based v.s. hybrid
Technique used for analysis
 Rule-based v.s. statistic-based
Location of analysis
 Centralized, distributed, network-based
Pattern IDS looking for
 Misuse v.s. anomaly-based v.s. hybrid
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Intrusion Recovery





Actions to avoid further loss from intrusion
Terminate intrusion and protect against reoccurrence
Law enforcement
Enhance defensive security
Reconstructive methods based on:
– Time period of intrusion
– Changes made by legitimate users during the effected
period
– Regular backups, audit trail based detection of effected
components, semantic based recovery, minimal rollback for recovery.
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What is “Survivability”?
To decide whether a computer system is
“survivable”, you must first decide what
“survivable” means.
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Risk Assessment
Threats
RISK
Vulnerabilities
Consequences
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Real Cost of Cyber Attack

Damage of the target may not reflect the
real amount of damage
 Services may rely on the attacked service,
causing a cascading and escalating damage
 Need: support for decision makers to
– Evaluate risk and consequences of cyber attacks
– Support methods to prevent, deter, and mitigate
consequences of attacks
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Risk Management Framework
(Business Context)
Understand Business
Context
Identify Business
and Technical Risks
Carry Out Fixes
and Validate
Synthesize and Rank
Risks
Define Risk
Mitigation Strategy
Measurement and Reporting
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Understand the Business Context
“Who cares?”
 Identify business goals, priorities and
circumstances, e.g.,

–
–
–
–

Increasing revenue
Meeting service-level agreements
Reducing development cost
Generating high return investment
Identify software risk to consider
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Identify Business and Technical
Risks


“Why should business care?”
Business risk
– Direct threat
– Indirect threat

Consequences
–
–
–
–

Financial loss
Loss of reputation
Violation of customer or regulatory constraints
Liability
Tying technical risks to the business context in a
meaningful way
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Synthesize and Rank the Risks
“What should be done first?”
 Prioritization of identified risks based on business
goals
 Allocating resources
 Risk metrics:

–
–
–
–
Risk likelihood
Risk impact
Risk severity
Number of emerging risks
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Define the Risk Mitigation
Strategy
“How to mitigate risks?”
 Available technology and resources
 Constrained by the business context: what
can the organization afford, integrate, and
understand
 Need validation techniques

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Carry Out Fixes and Validate

Perform actions defined in the previous
stage
 Measure “completeness” against the risk
mitigation strategy
– Progress against risk
– Remaining risks
– Assurance of mechanisms

Testing
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Measuring and Reporting

Continuous and consistent identification
and storage of risk information over time
 Maintain risk information at all stages of
risk management
 Establish measurements, e.g.,
– Number of risks, severity of risks, cost of
mitigation, etc.
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Assets-Threat Model (1)
Threats compromise assets
Threats have a probability of occurrence and
severity of effect
Assets have values
Assets are vulnerable to threats
Threats
Assets
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Assets-Threat Model (2)
Risk: expected loss from the threat against an
asset
R=V*P*S
R risk
 V value of asset
 P probability of occurrence of threat
 V vulnerability of the asset to the threat

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Risk Acceptance
Certification

How well the system meet the security
requirements (technical)
Accreditation

Management’s approval of automated system
(administrative)
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Next Class: Privacy
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