etri03-part1 - Princeton University
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Characterizing the Internet Hierarchy
from Multiple Vantage Points
Jennifer Rexford
Internet and Networking Systems
AT&T Labs - Research; Florham Park, NJ
http://www.research.att.com/~jrex
Work with L. Subramanian, S. Agarwal, and R. Katz
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~sagarwal/research/BGP-hierarchy/
Outline
Internet
architecture
– Autonomous Systems (ASes) and IP addressing
– Interdomain routing and AS relationships
Type-of-relationship
problem
– Motivation, formulation, and practical challenges
Analyzing
partial views of the AS graph
– Assigning a rank to each AS from a single vantage point
– Comparing ranks of ASes across multiple vantage points
Analysis
results
– Interdomain routing data and inferred AS relationships
– Five-level classification of the Internet hierarchy
Conclusions
Internet Architecture
Divided
into Autonomous Systems
– Distinct regions of administrative control (~14,000)
– Set of routers and links managed by a single institution
– Service provider, company, university, …
Hierarchy
of Autonomous Systems
– Large, tier-1 provider with a nationwide backbone
– Medium-sized regional provider with smaller backbone
– Small stub network run by a company or university
Interaction
between Autonomous Systems
– Internal topology is not shared between ASes
– … but, neighboring ASes interact to coordinate routing
Autonomous Systems (ASes)
Path: 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1
4
3
5
2
7
1
6
Web server
Client (128.235.184.76)
IP Addressing (for the host www.etri.re.kr)
32
bits in dotted-quad notation (129.254.19.28)
Divided
into network and host portions
129.254.0.0/16:
129
16-bit prefix with 232-16 addresses
254
19
28
10000001 11111110 00010011 00011100
Network (16 bits)
Host (16 bits)
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
ASes
exchange info about who they can reach
– IP prefix: block of destination IP addresses
– AS path: sequence of ASes along the path
Policies
configured by the AS’s network operator
– Path selection: which of the paths to use?
– Path export: which neighbors to tell?
“I can reach 129.254.0.0/16
via AS 4766”
“I can reach 129.254.0.0/16”
ETRI
3748
129.254.19.28
7018
4766
KIX
AT&T
Customer-Provider Relationship
Customer
pays provider for access to the Internet
AS exports customer’s routes to all neighbors
AS exports provider’s routes only to its customers
Traffic to the customer
Traffic from the customer
d
provider
advertisements
provider
traffic
customer
d
customer
Peer-Peer Relationship
Peers
exchange traffic between their customers
Free of charge (assumption of even traffic load)
AS exports a peer’s routes only to its customers
Traffic to/from the peer and its customers
advertisements
peer
d
traffic
peer
Moving Beyond the AS Graph
AS
graph doesn’t capture effects of routing policies
– Some paths not allowed (e.g., transit through a peer)
– Local preference of paths (e.g., prefer customer path)
– Can’t simply compute shortest path on the graph
AS
graph doesn’t capture the Internet hierarchy
– Large AS may have few neighbors (mostly peers)
– Small AS may have many neighbors (mostly providers)
– Can’t simply rely on node degree to rank the nodes
Need
to know the relationship between AS pairs
AS Relationships Matter
Understanding
the Internet’s basic structure
– More than just a graph of interconnected ASes
Placement
of servers for content distribution
– Place replicas so they can reach everyone well
Selection
of new peers or providers for an AS
– Select peers/providers with good “reach” to others
Installing
route filters to protect the network
– Filter customer routes that include other large providers
Analyzing
the convergence properties of BGP
– Hierarchical relationships avoid protocol oscillation
Inferring Relationships from Routing Data
Practical
realities of the Internet
– AS graph is not known
– AS relationships are proprietary
– … at least some routing data is publicly available!
Exploiting
routing data
– Available via traceroute experiments or BGP tables
– Provides a set of AS paths, such as “7018 4766 3748”
– Implies existence of edges (7018, 4766) & (4766, 3748)
– Implies that 4766 (KIX) allows AS 7018 (AT&T) to
transit to AS 3748 (ETRI)
Valid and Invalid Paths
AS
relationships limit the kinds of valid paths
– Uphill portion: customer-provider relationships
– Plateau: zero or one peer-peer edge
– Downhill portion: provider-customer relationships
AT&T
Qwest
AT&T
UUNET
Invalid
Invalid
Valid
Sprint
Rutgers
NJIT
AT&T Research
Lixin Gao, “On inferring Autonomous System relationships in the
Internet,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, December 2001.
AT&T
UUNET
Type-of-Relationship Problem
Given
the inputs
– AS graph G(V,E) with vertices V and edges E
– Set of paths P on the graph G
Find
a solution that
– Labels each edge with an AS relationship
– Minimizes the number of invalid paths in P
Properties
of the problem
– NP complete (?)
– May have multiple solutions
– We propose a heuristic algorithm
Practical Challenges
Peer-peer
relationships are hard to infer
– Mislabeling a peer-peer edge as provider-customer does not
change a valid path into an invalid path
– We use heuristics to detect the peer-peer edges
Some AS
pairs have unusual relationships
– Sibling ASes that provide transit service for each other
– Backup relationship for connectivity under failure
– Misconfiguration of a conventional AS relationship
– We detect these cases by analyzing the “invalid” paths
Getting
access to a large path set P is hard
– We exploit BGP routing tables from multiple vantage points
Validation Approaches
Quantify
the number of invalid paths
– Small number suggests better results
– …still, this doesn’t mean that inferences are correct
Compare
results with other inference algorithms
– Higher confidence if inferences are the same
– … still, both algorithms could give wrong answers
Compare
results with Routing Arbiter Database
– Higher confidence if consistent with RADB routing policies
– … still, RADB information is incomplete and out-of-date
Compare
results with proprietary ISP data
– Higher confidence if answers are correct for this AS
– … still, answers may be wrong for other ASes
Partial View of the AS Graph
Routing
data from a single source AS
– Collection of paths starting from the source
– Directed graph from union of all edges in these paths
E
Actual graph
C
B
A
D
E
F
D
B
F
C
C
D
B
E
A
F
A
Assigning Rank to AS in a Partial View
Reverse
pruning algorithm to assign rank
– Rank 1 to the leaves, then remove leaves
– Rank 2 to the leaves, then remove leaves…
– Single (largest) rank to nodes in connected component, if any
5 E
5 B
4
D
3
F 1
4
C
C
3
D
2
B
2
E
1
A
1
F
A 1
Combining Information From Multiple Views
Vector
of ranks for each AS
– A single element for each of the n views
Dominance:
provider-customer relationship
– Provider has higher ranks than customer in most views
– For example, B has (2,5) and A has (1,1)
Equivalence:
peer-peer relationship
– Peers have equal ranks in or inconsistent ranks
– For example, C has (3,4) and D has (4,3)
Probabilistic
inference
– Thresholds to tolerate some variations across the views
– E.g., an AS dominates in n-1 views and dominated in 1
Applying Our Algorithm
Applying
the algorithm to ten public BGP tables
– RouteViews table and nine Looking Glass servers
– Extracted set of unique paths P for each view
– Applied reverse pruning algorithm to each view
– Applied inference rules to the vectors of ranks
Results
of the analysis on data from April 2001
– AS graph with 10,698 ASes and 23,935 edges
– Inferences were made for 99.2% of the edges
– 94.5% provider-customer and 4.7% peer-peer edges
– Most inferences do not require the probabilistic rules
Advantage of Multiple Vantage Points
A single
vantage point is not enough
– 15% of the edges appear in exactly one BGP table
– Only 25% of the edges appear in all ten BGP tables
Analyzing Invalid Paths
Checking
the validity of inferences
– Assume the relationship inferences are correct
– Identify paths that are invalid under these inferences
– Compute the number of invalid paths
– Investigate common anomaly triples (A, B, C)
Results
of our analysis
– Applied to paths in 2 of the original 10 BGP tables
– Applied to paths in 4 other BGP tables
– 0.5-3% of paths are invalid for five of the six tables
– 8.7% of paths are invalid for the KDDI table
Common Anomaly Patterns
Misconfiguration
– (1, 65112, 6461): 65112 is a private AS that should not
appear between Genuity and AboveNet
Sibling
relationships
– (7018, 6841, 3300): Infonet Europe merged with AUCS
– (1239, 1740, 7018): Cerfnet was acquired by AT&T
– (1239, 8043, 6395): IXC Communications acquired
SmartNAP and renamed Broadwing
Heuristic
for identifying sibling relationships
– AS pair that appears in a large number of “invalid” paths
– Our analysis identified 22 possible sibling relationships
AS Classification
Directed AS
graph
– Directed edge from provider to customer
– Bidirectional edge between two peers
Lowest
level: Stubs
– Leaf nodes: no peers or downstream customers
– 8898 of the 10915 ASes (82.5% of ASes)
– Ex: UC Berkeley (25), AT&T Labs (6431), and ETRI (3748)
Next
lowest level: Regional ISPs
– Leaf nodes after successive pruning of leaf nodes
– 971 ASes of the 10915 ASes (8.9% of ASes)
– Ex: PacBell (5676), US West (6223), and UUNET Canada (815)
Remaining
1046 ASes: Core
Dense Core
Ways
to classify so-called “tier-1” ASes
– Any AS with no upstream provider (98 such nodes)
– AS set that forms the largest clique of peer edges (13 nodes)
Relaxing
the definition
– Tolerate some missing or misclassified edges
– Tolerate some ASes with sibling relationships
“Almost
a clique”
– Subgraph of m nodes with in and out degree at least m/2
– Greedy algorithm for locating the largest near-clique
20 ASes
in the near-clique
– 15 of the ASes form a subgraph just 3 edges short of a clique
– Genuity, Sprint, UUNET, AT&T, Verio, Level3, C&W,…
Transit and Outer Core
Transit
core
– ASes that peer with the dense core and each other
– Notion of a “weak in-way cut” to isolate these ASes
– Algorithm for identifying the ASes in transit core
– 129 ASes, including top providers in Europe and Asia
– Ex: UUNET Europe, KDDI, and Singapore Telecom
Outer
core
– All of the remaining ASes in the core
– 897 ASes, including large regional and national ISPs
– Ex: Turkish Telecom and Minnesota Regional Network
Node Degree is Not Enough
Node
degree ignores relationships
– A stub AS may have many upstream providers (one bankrupt!)
– A core AS may have a small # of peers (TeliaNet USA degree 40)
– Some ASes have customers that don’t have AS numbers
Related Work
AS
graph characterization
– Constructing graph from BGP tables or traceroute experiments
– Characterizing the topological properties of the graph
Inferring AS
relationships (Lixin Gao)
– Identifies the key properties of paths (uphill, downhill, etc.)
– Heuristic using node degree to infer boundary point between the
uphill and downhill portions of the path
– Application of the algorithm using RouteViews routing table
Characterization
of the hierarchy of ASes
– Early work by Govindan/Reddy based on node degree
– Recent work by Ge et al based on AS relationships
Conclusions
Inferring AS
relationships
– Reverse pruning to assign rank to each AS
– Comparison of ranks from different vantage points
Performance
evaluation
– Application of algorithm to collection of ten BGP tables
– Exploration of the anomalies that cause invalid paths
Characterization
of Internet hierarchy
– Stub, regional ISP, outer core, transit core, & dense core
– Algorithms for identifying the three parts of the core
– Application to AS graph inferred from the BGP tables
Ongoing Work
Classification
of siblings
– Use anomalous triples (A, B, C) to identify siblings
– Group siblings into a single node (with union of edges)
– Repeat classification of the AS hierarchy on new graph
Longitudinal
study
– Repeat the study over a period of time with new data
– Study how AS relationships and hierarchy changes
Validation
of our inference results
– Compare to RADB, Lixin’s results, AT&T data, etc.
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~sagarwal/research/BGP-hierarchy/
Digression #1: Really Weird “Invalid” Paths…
1 701 703 9304 7018
Genuity
Properties
UUNet
Hutchinson AT&T
of the path
– Two tier-1 U.S. providers (Genuity and UUNet)
– One service provider in Hong Kong (Hutchinson)
– Another tier-1 U.S. provider (AT&T) at the end of the path
Looking
at internal AT&T configuration data…
– AT&T does not have a BGP session with AS 9304
– AT&T does not originate the prefixes (e.g., 152.141.116.0/24)
Explanation
– Another AS was using the AT&T AS number (for over a year!)
– We sent them an e-mail and asked them to stop, and they did
Digression #1: How Could This Happen, and Persist?
BGP configuration
is done locally by neighbors
– Customer configures its router with AS number 7018
– Provider configures its router with neighbor of 7018
The
misconfiguration didn’t necessarily cause a problem
– Hop-by-hop routing took the traffic to the right place
– Most BGP policies don’t look at the identity of the ASes
Could
have caused a problem: route filtering
– Large providers might applying filtering to customer routers
– Discard routes with other large providers in the path
Could
have caused a problem: loop detection
– The bogus routes did not appear in AT&T’s routing tables
– AT&T router saw 7018 in the path and discarded the route
– AT&T router did have a route for the supernet (152.141.0.0/16)
Digression #2: Making Up The Examples
Getting
an IP address
– E-mail from [email protected]
– “nslookup adm.njit.edu” gave 128.235.184.176
Finding
the AS number and a sample path
– telnet://route-views.oregon-ix.net/
– “show ip bgp 128.235.184.176”
– One of the paths is “7018 209 4246”
Double
checking this belongs to NJIT
– “whois –h whois.arin.net 128.235.184.176”
– “whois –h whois.arin.net 4246”
Digression #2: whois –h whois.arin.net 128.235.184.76
OrgName: New Jersey Institute of Technology
OrgID:
NJIT
Address: 323 Martin Luther King Boulevard
City:
Newark
StateProv: NJ
PostalCode: 07102
Country: US
NetRange: 128.235.0.0 - 128.235.255.255
CIDR:
128.235.0.0/16
NetName: NJIT
NetHandle: NET-128-235-0-0-1
Parent: NET-128-0-0-0-0
NetType: Direct Assignment
NameServer: DNS1.NJIT.EDU
NameServer: DNS2.NJIT.EDU
NameServer: THORIN.UTHSCSA.EDU
Comment:
RegDate:
Updated: 2001-04-05
TechHandle: PT35-ARIN
TechName: Teklinski, Peter
TechPhone: +1-973-596-2908
TechEmail: [email protected]