Transcript PPT Version

Teredo Security Concerns
draft-hoagland-v6ops-teredosecconcerns-01
Suresh Krishnan & Jim Hoagland
Classification of security concerns





Bypassing network security
Inspecting contents of Teredo data packets
Increased attack surface
Guessable addresses due to structured addressing
Misleading claims in RFC4380
Suresh Krishnan
2
Teredo Security Concerns
2007-07-23
Bypassing network security








Evasion by tunneling is a common problem
Firewall vendors need to add support for detunneling each
tunneling protocol
Current firewalls may not be aware of the IP payload over UDP
Tunnel allows bidirectional traffic
Burden of filtering this traffic is shifted to the host
Bypasses ingress and egress filtering
Source routing past the Teredo host
Recommendations :
–
–
–
–
Suresh Krishnan
disable Teredo in managed networks
Prefer native IPv4 access to IPv6 Teredo
Perform ingress and egress filtering on all teredo packets
Clients to discard source routed packets
3
Teredo Security Concerns
2007-07-23
Content filtering of Teredo packets
 Easy to filter Teredo signaling packets (connection
requests)
 Harder to filter the contents of Teredo data packets
 Algorithm for deep packet inspection is complex
 Recommendations:
– In managed networks filter out Teredo connection requests
– If the network wishes to monitor IPv6 traffic, discourage use
of Teredo
Suresh Krishnan
4
Teredo Security Concerns
2007-07-23
Increased attack surface
 Teredo creates NAT holes
 Teredo NAT holes are usually open for a longer
duration than a typical NAT hole
 External IP address and port are visible in the Teredo
address
 Bubbles
 Recommendations:
– Restrict Teredo use to when it is required and turn it off
otherwise.
Suresh Krishnan
5
Teredo Security Concerns
2007-07-23
Guessable addresses
 Teredo addresses are predictable
– Teredo prefix,server,flags,client port,client ipv4 address
 Cone bit divulges the posture of the NAT and helps the
attacker infer that he/she needs a bubble.
 Recommendations:
– Use random values in flags
– Randomize Teredo service port on client
– Deprecate cone bit
Suresh Krishnan
6
Teredo Security Concerns
2007-07-23
Misleading claim in RFC4380
 “Teredo improves security”
– It does in some ways
– But it makes security worse in some cases
 Recommendation:
– Remove such claims in teredo bis or qualify them
Suresh Krishnan
7
Teredo Security Concerns
2007-07-23
Suresh Krishnan
8
Teredo Security Concerns
2007-07-23
Teredo Deep Packet Inspection
Algorithm














1. The packet is not Teredo if it is not UDP over IPv4.
2. Set T to the UDP payload offset.
3. Set E to the end of the packet plus one.
4. If E-T < 40 (the length of an IPv6 base header), the packet is not Teredo.
5. If the octets starting with T are 0x0001 (an indication of authentication data), T= T+13 plus
the lengths of the client identifier and the authentication value, assuming T is the start of
authentication data.
6. If E-T < 40, the packet is not Teredo.
7. If the octets starting with T are 0x0000 (an indication of origin encapsulation), T= T+8.
8. If E-T < 40, the packet is not Teredo.
9. If the octets starting with T is 0x0000 or 0x0001, loop back to step 5.
10. If the most significant nibble of the octet at T is not 6, the packet is not Teredo.
11. Assuming T is the start of an IPv6 header, set L to value of the payload length field, S to the
start of the source address, and D to the start of the destination address.
12. If E-T != L+40, the packet is not Teredo.
13. If neither S nor D start with 0x20010000 (the Teredo prefix), the packet is not Teredo.
14. The packet is assumed to be Teredo, with the IPv6 header starting at T.
Suresh Krishnan
9
Teredo Security Concerns
2007-07-23
Address Format
+-------------+-------------+-------+------+-------------+
|
Prefix | Server IPv4 | Flags | Port | Client IPv4 |
+-------------+-------------+-------+------+-------------+
Suresh Krishnan
10
Teredo Security Concerns
2007-07-23