Transcript Wireless Security

Wireless Security
The Current Internet: Connectivity
Cable
and Processing
Modem
Premisesbased
Access
Networks
Core Networks
WLAN
Transit Net
WLAN
Operatorbased
Cell
Cell
Cell
Regional
LAN
Transit Net
Premisesbased
WLAN
LAN
Analog
NAP
Public
Peering
Data
Voice
LAN
Private
Peering
Transit Net
H.323
RAS
H.323
PSTN
DSLAM
Data
Voice
Wireline
Regional
How can it affect cell phones?
 Cabir worm can infect a cell phone
 Infect phones running Symbian OS
 Started in Philippines at the end of 2004, surfaced
in Asia, Latin America, Europe, and recently in US
 Posing as a security management utility
 Once infected, propagate itself to other phones via
Bluetooth wireless connections
 Symbian officials said security was a high priority of
the latest software, Symbian OS Version 9.
 With ubiquitous Internet connections, more
severe viruses/worms for mobile devices will
happen soon …
Outlines
 802.11 Basics
 Mobile link access: CDMA/CA
 Security in 802.11b
 Example and more attacks
 Trend: 802.16 Wireless MAN
IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN
 802.11b
 2.4-5 GHz unlicensed
radio spectrum
 up to 11 Mbps
 widely deployed, using
base stations
 802.11a
 5-6 GHz range
 up to 54 Mbps
 802.11g
 2.4-5 GHz range
 up to 54 Mbps
 All use CSMA/CA for
multiple access
 All have base-station
and ad-hoc network
versions
Base station approch
 Wireless host communicates with a base station
 base station = access point (AP)
 Basic Service Set (BSS) (a.k.a. “cell”) contains:
wireless hosts
 access point (AP): base station
 BSS’s combined to form distribution system (DS)

Ad Hoc Network approach
 No AP (i.e., base station)
 wireless hosts communicate with each other
to get packet from wireless host A to B may
need to route through wireless hosts X,Y,Z
 Applications:
 “laptop” meeting in conference room, car
 interconnection of “personal” devices
 battlefield

CSMA (Carrier Sense Multiple Access)
CSMA: listen before transmit:
 If channel sensed idle: transmit entire frame
 If channel sensed busy, defer transmission
 Human analogy: don’t interrupt others!
CSMA collisions
collisions can still occur:
propagation delay means
two nodes may not hear
each other’s transmission
collision:
entire packet transmission
time wasted
note:
role of distance & propagation
delay in determining collision
probability
spatial layout of nodes
CSMA/CD (Collision Detection)
CSMA/CD: carrier sensing, deferral as in CSMA
collisions detected within short time
 colliding transmissions aborted, reducing channel
wastage

 collision detection:
 easy in wired LANs: measure signal strengths,
compare transmitted, received signals
 difficult in wireless LANs: receiver shut off while
transmitting
 human analogy: the polite conversationalist
CSMA/CD collision detection
IEEE 802.11: multiple access
 Collision if 2 or more nodes transmit at same time
 CSMA makes sense:
 get all the bandwidth if you’re the only one transmitting
 shouldn’t cause a collision if you sense another transmission
 Collision detection doesn’t work: hidden terminal
problem
IEEE 802.11 MAC Protocol: CSMA/CA
802.11 CSMA: sender
- if sense channel idle for
DISF sec.
then transmit entire frame
(no collision detection)
-if sense channel busy
then binary backoff
802.11 CSMA receiver
- if received OK
return ACK after SIFS
(ACK is needed due to
hidden terminal problem)
Collision avoidance mechanisms
 Problem:
 two nodes, hidden from each other, transmit complete
frames to base station
 wasted bandwidth for long duration !
 Solution:
small reservation packets
 nodes track reservation interval with internal
“network allocation vector” (NAV)

Collision Avoidance: RTS-CTS
exchange
 sender transmits short
RTS (request to send)
packet: indicates
duration of transmission
 receiver replies with
short CTS (clear to send)
packet

notifying (possibly hidden)
nodes
 hidden nodes will not
transmit for specified
duration: NAV
Collision Avoidance: RTS-CTS
exchange
 RTS and CTS short:
collisions less likely, of
shorter duration
 end result similar to
collision detection
 IEEE 802.11 allows:
 CSMA
 CSMA/CA: reservations
 polling from AP

Outlines
 802.11 Basics
 Mobile link access: CDMA/CA
 Security in 802.11b
 Example and more attacks
 Trend: 802.16 Wireless MAN
802.11b: Built in Security Features
 Service Set Identifier (SSID)
 Differentiates one access point from
another
 SSID is cast in ‘beacon frames’ every few
seconds.
 Beacon frames are in plain text!
Associating with the AP
 Access points have two ways of initiating
communication with a client
 Shared Key or Open Key authentication
 Open key: need to supply the correct SSID
 Allow
anyone to start a conversation with the AP
 Shared Key is supposed to add an extra layer
of security by requiring authentication info as
soon as one associates
How Shared Key Auth. works
 Client begins by sending an association
request to the AP
 AP responds with a challenge text
(unencrypted)
 Client, using the proper WEP key, encrypts
text and sends it back to the AP
 If properly encrypted, AP allows
communication with the client
Wired Equivalent Protocol (WEP)
 Primary built security for 802.11 protocol
 Uses 40bit RC4 encryption
 Intended to make wireless as secure as a
wired network
 Unfortunately, since ratification of the
802.11 standard, RC4 has been proven
insecure, leaving the 802.11 protocol wide
open for attack
Case study of a non-trivial attack
 Target Network: a large, very active university
based WLAN
 Tools used against network:
Laptop running Red Hat Linux v.7.3,
 Orinoco chipset based 802.11b NIC card
 Patched Orinoco drivers
 Netstumbler

• Netstumbler can not only monitor all active networks in the
area, but it also integrates with a GPS to map AP’s
 Airsnort
• Passively listen to the traffic
 NIC drivers MUST be patched to allow Monitor
mode (listen to raw 802.11b packets)
Assessing the Network
 Using Netstumbler, the attacker locates a
strong signal on the target WLAN
 WLAN has no broadcasted SSID
 Multiple access points
 Many active users
 Open authentication method
 WLAN is encrypted with 40bit WEP
Cracking the WEP key
 Attacker sets NIC drivers to Monitor Mode
 Begins capturing packets with Airsnort
 Airsnort quickly determines the SSID
 Sessions can be saved in Airsnort, and continued
at a later date so you don’t have to stay in one
place for hours
 A few 1.5 hour sessions yield the encryption key
 Once the WEP key is cracked and his NIC is
configured appropriately, the attacker is assigned
an IP, and can access the WLAN
More Attacks in Wireless Networks
 Rogue Access Point
 Solution: Monitor the air space for unexpected AP
 Radio Frequency (RF) Interference
 AP Impersonation
Rogue AP spoofs its MAC address to the identity
of an authorized AP
 Man-in-the-middle attack
 Denial of service attack

Outlines
 802.11 Basics
 Mobile link access: CDMA/CA
 Security in 802.11b
 Example and more attacks
 Trend: 802.16 Wireless MAN
IEEE 802.16 WirelessMAN
Standard for Broadband Wireless
Metropolitan Area Networks
 Broad bandwidth
 Up to 134 Mbps in 10-66 GHz band
 Comprehensive and modern security
 Packet data encryption
• DES and AES used

Key management protocol
• Use RSA to set up a shared secret between subscriber
station and base station
• Use the secret for subsequent exchange of traffic
encryption keys (TEK)
Backup Slides
Summary of MAC protocols
 What do you do with a shared media?

Channel Partitioning, by time, frequency or code
• Time Division,Code Division, Frequency Division

Random partitioning (dynamic),
• ALOHA, CSMA, CSMA/CD
• carrier sensing: easy in some technologies (wire), hard in
others (wireless)
• CSMA/CD used in Ethernet