Internet Security
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Transcript Internet Security
Internet Security
ECT 582
Robin Burke
Outline
Homework #5
Host security
Firewalls
IPsec / VPN
Homework #5
solution
Host security
Every Internet host is vulnerable to
attack
Network port is a front door to the
whole world
How to make hosts more secure?
attacks
defenses
Attacks on Hosts
DoS
flood host with requests to tie up resources
Authentication breach
attack authentication system to gain access
Application vulnerability
attack application program to inject foreign code
Virus/Trojan Horse
attack OS with a malicious program (malware)
Social Engineering
attack organization to obtain authentication or other
information
Denial of Service
Attacks take different forms
bogus requests
abuse of Internet protocols
Characteristics
sudden change in system load
services unavailable or very slow
• may cause system crash
particular hosts targeted
Defenses
Turn off unused services
if bogus packets never received, fewer resources
used
Request throttling
only accept requests at a certain rate
• prevent server overload, but may hamper legitimate
users
Request filtering
only allow requests from certain hosts
allow a fixed number of requests from a given host in
a certain period
• doesn't work against distributed attack
Most other approaches applied elsewhere in network
Authentication breach
Characteristics
attacker tries to get access by
masquerading as legitimate user
Needs user id and password
brute-force attack
sniffing attack
cracking attack
Authentication: brute force
Execution
user ids typically easy to find (email address,
user directory on web)
attempt all passwords
Defense
request throttling
lock-out
• stop allowing authentication after n failed trials
• can create denial of service
Authentication: sniffing
Execution
copy all network traffic
look for packets with authentication
information
Defense
use protocols in which authentication
information is encrypted
• FTPS instead of FTP
• SSH instead of telnet
• HTTPS instead of HTTP
Authentication: cracking
Execution
steal copy of encrypted password file
attempt to decrypt passwords
Defense
access control measures to prevent access
to password files
• vary by system
good passwords
• more than 8 characters
• combinations of numeric and non-alphanumeric,
upper- and lower-case
Application attack
Characteristics
application bug is exploited
• often buffer overflow
inject attacker's code into system
• code executes with application privileges
can be used to launch additional attacks
• classic "worm" behavior
Needs
knowledge of application
needs to know OS
Often downloadable tools can be used
Application attack cont'd
Defenses
attention to software security patches
subscribe to CERT mailing list
investigate vendor's coding practices
incorporate security into development
methodology
examine application logs for
unexpected activities
Malware
Characteristics
user deceived into executing
malicious code
• Many avenues: ActiveX controls, binary
email attachments, web scripts
Many tools exist to create
Worm behavior possible
• email replication
Malware, cont'd
Defenses
anti-virus software
• signatures must be updated regularly
email scanning
• server-based best
application settings
• IE scripting
• MS Office macros
• very problematic
user education
better solution
• less vulnerable applications / OSes
• finer grainer control
Social Engineering
Scenario
Call up individual in company (typically a secretary or
switchboard person) Alice
Ask for name of tech support person (Bob)
Calls 2nd secretary Eve, claiming to work for Bob.
Tell Eve to reset her account password to the one he
will give her.
Eve complies and now hacker has account access
Result
2 phone calls = security hole
Social Engineering, cont'd
Characteristics
very easy to do
• Kevin Mitnick's favorite method
many kinds of information are sensitive
• names, job descriptions, hardware/software
configuration
Defense
need to know
• don't give information to everyone
• what they don't know, they can't reveal
security policies
• "Let me call you back."
user education
Problematic fact
Many avenues for host security to be
compromised
simple user error is enough
a large organization will have many
hosts
Sun Tzu on firewalls
"If [the enemy] sends reinforcements
everywhere, he will everywhere be weak"
-- The Art of War
Translation
enforcing perfect host security everywhere is
impossible
Solution
force the confrontation to take place at a
single known location
concentrate defense at that point
Firewall
A dedicated gateway machine with
special security precautions on it,
used to service outside network,
especially Internet connections and
dial-in lines. The idea is to protect a
cluster of more loosely administered
machines hidden behind it...
--- FOLDOC
Firewalls
Idea
Build security measures into a single host
Force all inbound and outbound Internet
traffic to pass through
Enables
establishing a single security policy that all
machines share
machines behind the firewall have some
protection
firewall machine can be specially configured
Firewall policies
Both in-bound and out-bound
what the outside world can do
what local users can do
Applications
which applications are accessible
• boils down to port numbers
Hosts
which hosts are accessible
Users
which users have access
Firewall features
Minimal
Better
port blocking
host blocking
configurable logging
user authentication / blocking
Best
stateful inspection
• track the progress of individual sessions
• allow only legal actions
Other features
Often implemented at the firewall
NAT
network address translation
internal machines can "illegal" IP addresses
• can't be reached by routing
firewall pretends to originate requests
VPN
virtual private network
encrypted traffic between firewall and external host
host authenticates and then is "inside" the firewall
Limitations
Firewall only defends the connection it is on
dial-in not protected
wireless LAN not protected
walking out with a CD-ROM, etc.
Firewall can't protect against malware
Firewalls can't protect against malicious
insiders
Firewalls must be carefully configured and
closely monitored
Firewalls can lead to a false sense of
security
Firewall types
Packet-filtering
Application-level gateway
Circuit-level gateway
Packet-filtering
Firewall inspects packets and filters
according to a policy
usually host- and port-based
Circuit-level gateway
Firewall decides whether to allow
connection
Then just passes packets along
Application-level gateway
Firewall is a proxy for all interactions
TCP/IP Packet
Internet communication is done through
packets
A packet is a fixed-size set of bytes with a
specific format
A typical TCP/IP packet contains:
Source IP, Source Port, Destination IP,
Destination Port
Payload
• message part
Packet routing
Email
Port
Port
Browser
File
My Computer
IP address: 140.192.32.123
Web Server
Email Server
Internet
FTP Server
Remote Computer
IP Address: 207.46.249.27
Packet-Filtering Router
A router applies a set of rules to each IP packet and
forward or discards the packet
The filter is typically set up as a list of rules based on
matches to fields in the IP or TCP header
The fields are source/destination IP address, port
number, etc.
If there is a match to one of the rules, that rules is
invoked to determine whether to forward or discard
the packet
If there is no match, the a default action is taken
• Default discard policy
• Default forward policy
Example
Action
Ourhost
Port
Theirhost
Port
comment
Block
*
*
*
*
Default
Action
Ourhost
Port
Theirhost
Port
comment
Block
*
*
207.46.29.27
*
We don't trust this host
Allow
140.192.32.1
25
*
*
Connection to our SMTP
port
Action
Ourhost
Port
Theirhost
Port
comment
Allow
140.192.*.*
*
*
25
Connection to their SMTP
port
Windows Firewall
Note this is a software firewall
not a dedicated firewall machine
Outbound policies
Typically less restrictive than in-bound
But – good citizenship
make it more difficult for hackers
A packet filter can reject outbound packets with illegal
IP addresses
could not have been legally generated inside the
network
Example
140.192.*.* are DePaul IP addresses
if an outbound packet has a source address of
207.34.102.2
• it is probably forged
Characteristics
Pluses
Packet-filtering routers are simple, transparent to
users, and fast
Minuses
The router cannot prevent attacks that employ
application-specific vulnerabilities or functions
The logging functionality in the router is limited
Most routers do not support advanced user
authentication schemes
The router is vulnerable to attacks and exploits that
take advantage of flaws in TCP/IP
The routers are susceptible to security breaches
caused by improper configurations
Circuit-Level Gateway
It does not permit end-to-end TCP connection
It can be a stand-alone system
Or, it can be a specialized function performed by
an application-level gateway for certain application
It sets up two TCP connections
One TCP connection between inner host to the
gateway
Another TCP connection between the gateway to
outside host
It relays TCP segment from one connections to
the other without examining the contents
Characteristics
Pluses
Each established connection can be logged
Can protect against some DoS attacks
Minuses
May slow establishment of TCP connections
Does not protect against attack to legal
services
• buffer overflow
Application-level gateway
Also "proxy server"
The firewall relays application-level traffic
external host contacts gateway
gateway contacts internal host
If the gateway does not support a specific
application
the service cannot be forwarded across the
firewall
Characteristics
Pluses
every operation can be inspected and
logged
user authentication can be done at the
gateway
identity of internal system is hidden
Minuses
slowest firewall
hardest to configure
costliest
Asymmetric gateway
Application-level gateway on inbound
connections
Circuit-level gateway on outbound
connections
internal users implicitly trusted
lower overhead
Bastion host
From firewall definition
"dedicated gateway machine"
"special security precautions"
Precondition for gateway firewalls
need a computer to perform gateway
operations
but this computer is the first thing
hackers will attack
Host
Secure operating system
OpenBSD
Minimal services installed
Very restrictive authentication
one-time passwords
Often some type of write-once logging
CD-ROM, uni-directional tape
Proxy software
Specialized proxy software for each service
being gatewayed
Relay only to specific internal hosts
Each proxy process runs without disk
access
except for startup
Each proxy process runs with minimal
system privileges
Each proxy process maintains detailed logs
Example firewalls
singled-homed screened host
dual-homed screen host
screened-subnet
Single-homed screened host
Router allows inbound IP packets only to bastion
host, and outbound IP packets from bastion host
Bastion host performs authentication and proxy
functions
Dual-homed screen host
Bastion host has two network addresses
one internal, one external
If router is compromised, firewall host still
protects internal network
Screened-subnet
Internal network is completely separate
Internal network is invisible to Internet
Tunneling
Restrictive firewall is good for security
bad for availability
users cannot work from home
Firewall F
Host B
X
Host A
Please access service
S on Host B
Denied. Local users
only!
internal
service
S
Tunneling cont'd
Tunnel encrypts original packet and creates a new
packet
source = tunnel entrance
destination = tunnel exit
Tunnel exit decrypts payload and insert packet into
local network
as if packet had originated locally
Firewall
Please deliver
contents to
tunnel at Host F
Host A
Please access service
S on Host B
Tunnel
Host B
Tunnel
Please access
service S on
Host B
internal
service
S
Please access
service S on
Host B
IPsec
Goals
authenticate packet origins
provide integrity for packet contents
encrypt packets
tunnel packets
IPsec, cont'd
Two protocols
Authentication Header Protocol
authentication + integrity
Packet Encryption Protocol
authentication + integrity +
confidentiality
Authentication Header
Protocol
source IP cannot be spoofed
depends on secret key agreement
based on public key certificates
message contents cannot be modified
secure hash of payload is computed
by sender
verified by receiver
Packet Encryption Protocol
Use AHP and
Symmetric encryption of packet
payload
Diffie-Helman key agreement is part
of protocol
Security association
Endpoints of tunnel must agree on
protocol type
cryptographic algorithms
keys
duration of key
Each packet contains an identifier
labeling the particular security
association used for that packet
VPN
Establish a tunnel between
remote user (or site)
local firewall
Requires
availability of IPsec
installing VPN software on each remote
client
VPN server at firewall, called the gateway
public key certificate for gateway
VPN, cont'd
Users
access Internet normally (dial-up,
DSL, etc.)
then turn on VPN
VPN has authentication procedure
User's machine becomes part of the
internal network
• inside the firewall
VPN, cont'd
Need good authentication of users
because once authenticated, machine becomes
virtually local
"trusted"
Tunnel is reasonably secure
IPsec cryptographic hash protects against
modification
DH key exchange provides mechanism to share
secret keys
secret key exchange prevents session hijacking
server public key certificate protects against man-inthe-middle
Next week
Web application security
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