Transcript Source-end DDoS Defense System

Source-End Defense System against
DDoS attacks
Fu-Yuan Lee, Shiuhpyng Shieh, Jui-Ting Shieh and Sheng Hsuan Wang
Distributed System and Network Security Lab.
Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering
National Chiao Tung University
WADIS‘03
Outline
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Introduction to DDoS attacks.
Current DDoS defense strategies
Review of D-WARD
Proposed DDoS defense scheme
Evaluation
Conclusions and future work
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DDoS attacks
 What is a Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attack
 Degrade the service quality or
completely disable the target
service by overloading critical
resources of the target system or by
exploiting software bugs.
 What is a Distributed DoS
(DDoS) attack
 The objective is the same with DoS
attacks but is accomplished by a of
compromised hosts distributed over
the Internet.
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Mechanisms against DDoS attacks (1)
 Victim-end
 Most existing Intrusion detection systems and DoS/DDoS tolerant
system design fall in this category.
 Used to protect a set of hosts from being attacked.
 Advantages and disadvantages
 DDoS attacks are easily detected due to the aggregate of huge traffic
volume.
 From a network’s perspective, protecting is consider ineffective. Attack
flows can still incur congestion along the attack path.
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Mechanisms against DDoS attacks (2)
 Infrastructure-based
 DDoS defense lines are constructed towards attack sources to reduce
network congestion.
 Attack packets are filtered out by Internet core routers.
 Advantages and disadvantages
 The effectiveness of filtering is improved.
 An Internet-wide authentication framework is required.
 Internet core routers must be upgrade to filter out attack packets in high
speeds
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Mechanisms against DDoS attacks (3)
 Source-end
 DDoS defense mechanism are used to prevent monitored hosts from
participating in DDoS attacks.
 Attack packets are dropped at sources. It allows preventing attack
traffic from entering the Internet.
 Advantages and disadvantages
 The effectiveness of packet filter is the best.
 It is very hard to identify DDoS attack flows at sources since the traffic is
not so aggregate.
 It require the support of all edge routers.
In summary, source-end DDoS defense strategy is the most
effective and with moderate deployment cost.
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D-WARD:
A Source-End DDoS defense scheme
 J. Mickovic et al. “Attacking DDoS at the Source,” IEEE
ICNP’02
 Ideas behind D-WARD: DDoS attack flows can be identified
by comparing flow statistics against normal flow models.
Signals of DDoS attacks:
 High Packet loss rate:
 The level of network congestion (or say packet loss rate) reflects on the
ratio of number of packets sent to and received from the peer.
 High packet sending rate: This may also indicate a DDoS attack
 A large number of connections to the peer
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D-WARD: Architecture
Observation
Component
Internet
Classification
Preprocessing
Pac
ket
For
w
Statistics
a rd i
ng
Cache table
Rate limiting rules
Destination A | limiting rate | timestamp
…………………….
…………………….
Destination N | limiting rate | timestamp
Throttling Component
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te
Ra
-l i m
g
itin
ru l
e
ju
ad
ng
sti
Intranet/
Source
network
D-WARD: Observation Component
 Gather per flow statistics
 Flow: The aggregate traffic between monitored IP addresses and a
foreign IP address.
 Observation interval: A basic time frame for one observation
 The number of packet and bytes sent to and received from the peer
 The number of active connections
 Legitimate flow model
 TCP flows:
 Psent/Prcv < TCPrto
 ICMP flows:
 Psent/Prcv < ICMPrto
 UDP flows:
 nconn < MAXconn
 pconn > MINpkts
 Bsent < UDPrate
(set to 3)
(set to 1.1)
(set to 100)
(set to 1)
(set to 10MBps)
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Motivations
 Using a global threshold of Psent/Prcv for TCP flows would
result in high false positive and high false negative. In the
following context, this ratio is denoted as O/I
 High false positive
 flows with O/I greater than 3 in its normal operation would be classified as
attack flows
 High false negative
 low-rate attacks will not be detected. Consider a flow with O/I =1, then O/I
only reaches 2 when the packet loss rate is 50%.
In one word, using a single O/I threshold for
different flows is problematic.
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Basic Idea
 Ideas behind the proposed scheme
 Focus: detecting DDoS attacks based on TCP
 96% of current attacks are based on TCP. Only 2% use UDP and 2% use
ICMP
 The level of “congestion” should be determined according previous
behavior of the each monitored flow.
 Two more DDoS characteristics are utilized for detecting attacks
 Distribution: the number of hosts sending packets to the destination in each
observation period
 Continuity: reflect to the observation that a DDoS attack always lasts for
an extended period of time.
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Observations on normal traffics (1)
 Observation: Average O/I of different  Standard deviation of the monitored
flows rage from 3.68 to 0.5
flow are low (usually smaller 1). It
indicates that the O/I value of flows
 Flows with highest ratio:
tend to be stable in their normal
 Contains one ftp data connection.
The flow last for 227 second. Total
operation.
86685 packet (68158 packet send out,
18527 packet send in) The average
O/I is 3.68. Standard deviation=0.16.
Packet loss rate is 0%.
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Observations on normal traffics (2)
 Number of sources in each flow
 In each observation interval, most of flows have only one source host
sending packets to the peer.
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Proposed DDoS detection scheme
 There are two phases in our scheme.
 Learning phase: Define legitimate flow model
 Detection phase: Detect malicious flows and apply rate limit
 Learning phase contains two steps.
 Step 1: determine the following thresholds
 Tf: the maximum allowed O/I.
 Nf: the mini-threshold of O/I.
 c: a parameter used to quantify the level of distribution.
 Steps 2: derive other configuration parameters
 α: a value indicating the possibility that the flow is malicious. It is
generated according to the level of congestion and the level of distribution
 αf : the maximum allowed value ofα
 tf : the maximum allowed number of the times that αcan continually
breaches αf
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Flow Classification
 Four types of traffic flows: Normal, Suspicious, Attack, and
Transient.
recovery phase
Normal Flow
Derive α
less then αf
αf
greater than αf
Suspicious Flow
Transient Flow
Increase counter for tf
samll than tf
tf
great than tf
αgreater αf
Attack Flow
Compliant for penalty
period
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Generation of α
 Generating α in an observation interval
1  S f / c   n f  N f

 
 i 1  T f  N f




Level of congestion
i
The impact of distribution
 Sf: : the number of source in the flow.
 nf: : the O/I of the current interval.
 λ: a magic number used to restrict α between 0 and 1. λ is a number
between 0 and 1.
 Characteristics of α
 It is between 0 and 1
 It increases with nf . If nf approaches Tf, α approaches to 1
 α increases with the number of sources
in the flow.
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Rate limiting and recovery
 Rate-Limiting
Psent
rl  min(rl , rate)  (1   ) 
Psent  Pdrop
 rl: imposed rate limit
 rate: realized sending rate
 Mini-rate: The lowest limited rate which can be imposed on network
flows.
 Recovery
 If the attack flow show compliance with normal flow model for
consecutive penalty observation periods, it is classified as transient, the
recovery process begins.
Psent
rl  rl  
 Psent  Pdrop
1
 Max-rate: Once the rate limit reaches Max-rate, it is classified as
normal
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Thresholds
 Configuring thresholds and other parameters:
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Observation period = 1 second
Tf: The maximum of the observed O/I * 2
Nf: the average O/I
c: the maximum number of sources in a flow in the monitored network.
αf: the averageαin the learning process.
tf: the maximum consecutive number of time that αexceeds αf
λ= 0.5
 Parameters learned from a monitored flow
 Sending rate 10 pkts to the destination host per second. Maximum O/I
is 1.25, Average O/I is 1.25
 Tf: = 2.5, nf = 1.04
 c=3
 αf = 0.18
 tf = 3
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Experiments
 Types of Experiment
 Resource consumption
 TCP SYN flooding
 link flooding
 Attack scenarios
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Constant rate attack
Pulsing rate attack
Increasing rate attack
Gradual pulsing attack
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Topology
DDoS defense
system
Attack agents
Switch
Switch
Router
Attack agents
Attack agents
Attack agents
Attack agents
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Victim
Bandwidth
Controller
TCP SYN Flooding Attack
DDoS defense
system
Attack agents
Switch
Switch
Router
TCP SYN
attack flow
Attack agents
Attack agents
Attack agents
Attack agents
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Victim
Bandwidth
Controller
SYN flooding:
Constant Rate and Pulsing Rate
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SYN flooding
Increasing Rate and Gradual Increasing Rate
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Link Overloading
DDoS defense
system
Attack agents
Switch
100KBps
Switch
100KBps
100KBps
Attack agents
Router
100KBps
100KBps
Aggregate of
attack traffic:
500KBps
Link Bandwidth:
250KBps
Attack agents
Attack agents
Attack agents
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Victim
Bandwidth
Controller
Bandwidth flooding
Constant Rate and Pulsing Rate
constant
pulsing
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Bandwidth flooding
Increasing Rate and Gradual Increasing Rate
increasing
gradual increasing
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Conclusion
 The O/I used to define the level of network congestion must be
determined according to the previous behavior of the flow.
 The number of source in the flow and the number of
observation intervals that the signal of DDoS attacks lasts
should be taken into consideration.
 Evaluation results show that the performance of proposed
system is better than D-WARD, in terms of false positive and
false negative.
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Future work
 More experiments on estimating the effectiveness of the
proposed scheme are required
 A mechanism that can deal with new flows which are not in
the flow profile database
 A space-effective mechanism that helps to reduce the storage
requirement for storing the profiles of flows.
 Schemes which can detect DDoS attacks based on one-way
flows such as ICMP and UDP.
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