Transcript VET – Vetting Commodity IT Software and Firmware

VET – Vetting Commodity IT Software and Firmware
DARPA – SN – 13 – 07
In about April of 2012 it was noted by the DoD and other groups that foreign governments
had access to 80 percent of the world’s communications, event military-grade encryption.
This was mainly being done to two companies that provided the world with equipment and
services used by 45 of the top 50 telecommunication centers in the world. This company
brag that a third of the world’s population is hook up to its network gear, as well as being
the third largest of Smart Phone company in the world. This access gave their
government’s unbridled, backdoor access into data and proprietary information belonging
to some 140 nations. This access could have allowed widespread spying and sabotage in
the event of any hostilities .
To answer this attach on our communication system on March 26 2013 the president
signed into law restrictions on the acquisition of equipment from the offending company /
government to not be used by the National Science Foundation, NASA, and the
Departments of Commerce and Justice. As well as action being taken by the Australian,
British, and Indian governments. In addition DARPS has put out a proposal for the creation
of their VET program. This proposal with was dated for 12-19-2012 was extended until 2-12013 covering the tools and technology needed to protect our communication networks.
The DARPA VET program will seek to demonstrate that it is technically feasible for the
Department of Defense (DoD) to determine that the software and firmware shipped on
commodity Information Technology (IT) devices are free of broad classes of backdoors and
other hidden malicious functionality. Some common examples of commodity IT devices
include mobile phones, network routers, servers, printers, fax, and computer workstations
With the main charge to the ACTA from the FCC being to protect the network from harm
then it should be a natural next step for the ACTA and the Test LABs to add the DARPA
“VET Program” test requirements for testing before an US Number is applied to any device
under test. It should also be noted that because the devices being affected to-date, can be
both IP and TDM. It is subjected that the device testing requirement governing the ACTA
should be extended to cover IP based devices as well. There by covering every types of IT
and telecommunication equipment that can be connected to the National Network from
harming the Network be it IP or TDM. It should also be noted that with the test sampling
requirement on the Test LADs under the ACTA rules that the repeat testing of any device
from time to time should keep harmful technology from being added to any device after
the fact.
The VET program must overcome three major technical challenges in order to
demonstrate that potential deployment scenarios, are technically feasible:
(1) Defining malice - Given a sample device, how can DoD analysts produce a prioritized
checklist of software and firmware components to examine and broad classes of
hidden malicious functionality to rule out?
(2) Confirming the absence of malice - Given a checklist of software and firmware
components to examine and broad classes of hidden malicious functionality to rule out,
how can DoD analysts demonstrate the absence of those broad classes of hidden
malicious functionality?
(3) Examining equipment at scale - Given a means for DoD analysts to demonstrate the
absence of broad classes of hidden malicious functionality in sample devices in the lab,
how can this procedure scale to non-specialist technicians who must vet every individual
new device in DoD before deployment?