chapter 16 making simple decision - Der

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Transcript chapter 16 making simple decision - Der

Making Simple Decisions
Chapter 16
Copyright, 1996 © Dale Carnegie & Associates, Inc.
Outline
Combining beliefs and desires under
Uncertainty
The basis of Utility Theory
Utility functions
Multiattribute Utility functions
Decision Networks
The value of Information
Decision-Theoretic Expert Systems
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Combining beliefs and desires
Decision-theoretic agent



An agent that can make rational decisions based on what it
believes and what it wants.
Can make decisions in contexts where uncertainty and conflicting
goals.
Has a continuous measure of state quality.
Goal-based agent

Has a binary distinction between good(goal) and bad(non-goal)
states.
We can make decision based on probabilistic reasoning
(Belief Networks), but it does not include what an gent
wants.
An agent’s preferences between world states are captured
by a utility function - it assigns a single number to express
the desirability of a state.
Utilities are combined with the outcome probabilities for
actions to give an expected utility for each action.
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The utility function U(S)
•An agent’s preferences between different
states S in the world are captured by the
Utility function U(S).
If U(Si) > U(Sj) then the agent prefers
state Si before state Sj
If U(Si) = U(Sj) then the agent is indifferent
between the two states Si and Sj
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Combining Belief and Desires
Utility: captures the desirability of a state,
U(S)
A: nondeterministic action
Resulti(A): Outcome states of action A
E: available evidences of the world
Do(A): perform action A
EU: expected utility
EU(A|E) = ∑ iP(Resulti(A) | Do(A), E) *
U(Resulti(A))
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MEU
MEU: maximum expected utility
A rational agent should choose an action that
maximizes the agent’s expected utility
Simple decision: (single action)
Complex decision: sequences decisions
This is a framework where all of the components
of an AI system fit
If an agent maximizes a utility function that
correctly reflects the performance measure by
which its behavior is being judged, then it will
achieve the highest possible performance score if
we average over the environments in which the
agent could be placed.
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16.2 The basis of utility theory
Why should maximizing the average utility be so
special?
Constraints on rational preferences are orderability,
transitivity, continuity, substitutability,
monotonicity, decomposability.
The six constraints form the axioms of utility
theory.
The axioms of utility:


Utility principle
Maximum Expected Utility principle
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Constraints on rational preference
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The six axioms of utility theory
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Utility principle
If an agent’s preferences obey the axioms of utility,
then there exists a real-valued function U that
operates on states such that U(A) > U(B) if and
only if A is preferred to B and U(A) = U(B) if and
only if the agent is indifferent to A and B.


U(A) > U(B)  A > B
U(A) = U(B)  A ~ B
Maximum Expected Utility principle


The utility of a lottery is the sum of the probability of
each outcome times the utility of that outcome.
U([p1, S1; … ; pn, Sn]) = ∑ pi U(Si)
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16.3 Utility functions
Utility functions map states to real numbers.
Agent can have any preference it likes.
Preferences can also interact.
Utility theory has its roots in economics ->
the utility of money
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Utility of money, Figure 16.2
Monotonic preference for definite amounts
of money.
Expected Monetary Value, EMV




Sn : the state of processing wealth $n
take $1000 or 50% chance of $3000
EU(Accept) = .5 *U(Sk) + .5*U(Sk+3000)
EU(Decline) = U(Sk+1000)
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Utility of money
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Utility of money




Risk averse
Risk seeking
Certainty equivalent
Risk neutral
Utility scales and utility assessment

Utility functions are not unique
 U’(S) = k1 + k2 * U(S), k2 > 0


Normalization
Standard lottery
 u┬, best possible outcome, 1
 u┴, worst possible outcome, 0
Micromort (1:1,000,000 chance of death), $20 in 1980
QALY: quality-adjusted life year
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6.4 MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY
FUNCTIONS
Problem’s outcomes are characterized by
two or more attributes, are handled by
multiattribute utility theory.
The attributes X = X1, ... , Xn; a complete
vector of assignments will be x = (x1, ... ,
xn). Each attribute is generally assumed to
have discrete or continuous scalar values.
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Dominance
Suppose that airport site S1 costs less, generates
less noise pollution, and is safer than site S2. One
would not hesitate to reject S2. We then say that
there is strict dominance of S1 over S2.
In general, if an option is of lower value on all
attributes than some other option, it need not be
considered further.
Strict dominance is often very useful in narrowing
down the field of choices to the real contenders,
although it seldom yields a unique choice.
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Strict dominance
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Stochastic dominance
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CDF
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Preference without uncertainty
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Preference with uncertainty
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6.5 Decision networks
Extend Bayesian nets to handle actions and
utilities
 a.k.a. influence diagrams
Make use of Bayesian net inference
Useful application: Value of Information
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Decision network representation
Chance nodes: random variables,
as in Bayesian nets
Decision nodes: actions that
decision maker can take
Utility/value nodes: the utility of
the outcome state.
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R&N example
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Simplified representation
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Evaluating decision networks
Set the evidence variables for the current
state.
For each possible value of the decision node
(assume just one):
 Set the decision node to that value.
 Calculate the posterior probabilities for the
parent nodes of the utility node, using BN
inference.
 Calculate the resulting utility for the action.
Return the action with the highest utility.
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Exercise: Umbrella network
take/don’t take
P(rain) = 0.4
Umbrella
Weather
Lug umbrella
P(lug|take) = 1.0
P(~lug|~take)=1.0
Forecast
Happiness
U(lug, rain) = -25
U(lug, ~rain) = 0
U(~lug, rain) = -100
U(~lug, ~rain) = 100
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f
w
p(f|w)
sunny rain
0.3
rainy
rain
0.7
sunny no rain 0.8
rainy no rain 0.2
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16.6 The value of information
One of the most important parts of decision
making is knowing what questions to ask.
For example, a doctor cannot expect to be
provided with the results of all possible diagnostic
tests and questions at the time a patient first
enters the consulting room.
Tests are often expensive and sometimes
hazardous (both directly and because of
associated delays). Their importance depends on
two factors:


whether the test results would lead to a significantly
better treatment plan, and
how likely the various test results are.
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Information value theory
information value theory, which enables an
agent to choose what information to acquire.
The acquisition of information is achieved by
sensing actions.
Because the agent's utility function seldom refers
to the contents of the agent's internal state,
whereas the whole purpose of sensing actions is
to affect the internal state, we must evaluate
sensing actions by their effect on the agent's
subsequent "real" actions.
Thus, information value theory involves a form of
sequential decision making.
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Simple example
Suppose an oil company is hoping to buy one of n indistinguishable
blocks of ocean drilling rights. Let us assume further that exactly one
of the blocks contains oil worth C dollars and that the price of each
block is C/n dollars. If the company is risk-neutral, then it will be
indifferent between buying a block and not buying one.
Now suppose that a seismologist offers the company the results of a
survey of block number 3, which indicates definitively whether the
block contains oil.
How much should the company be willing to pay for the
information?
With probability 1/n, the survey will indicate oil in block 3. In this case,
the company will buy block 3 for C/n dollars and make a profit of

C - C/n = (n - 1)C/n dollars.
With probability (n-1)/n, the survey will show that the block contains
no oil, in which case the company will buy a different block. Now the
probability of finding oil in one of the other blocks changes from 1/n to
1/(n — 1), so the company makes an expected profit of

C/(n - 1) -C/n = C/n(n - 1) dollars.
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Simple example
The value of information derives from the fact that with the
information, one's course of action can be changed to suit
the actual situation.
One can discriminate according to the situation, whereas
without the information, one has to do what's best on
average over the possible situations.
In general, the value of a given piece of information is
defined to be the difference in expected value between
best actions before and after information is obtained.
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Value of Perfect Information
(VPI)
How much is it worth to observe (with certainty) a random
variable X?
Suppose the agent’s current knowledge is E. The value of the current
best action  is:
EU(α | E) = maxA ∑i U(Resulti(A)) p(Resulti(A) | E, Do(A))
The value of the new best action after observing the value of X is:
EU(α’ | E,X) = maxA ∑i U(Resulti(A)) p(Resulti(A) | E, X, Do(A))
…But we don’t know the value of X yet, so we have to sum over its
possible values
The value of perfect information for X is therefore:
VPI(X) = ( ∑k p(xk | E) EU(αxk | xk, E)) – EU (α | E)
Probability of
each value of X
Expected utility
of the best action
given that value of X
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Expected utility
of the best action
if we don’t know X
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(i.e., currently)
Example
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VPI exercise: Umbrella
network
What’s the value of knowing the weather forecast before
leaving home?
take/don’t take
P(rain) = 0.4
Umbrella
Weather
Lug umbrella
P(lug|take) = 1.0
P(~lug|~take)=1.0
Happiness
U(lug, rain) = -25
U(lug, ~rain) = 0
U(~lug, rain) = -100
U(~lug, ~rain) = 100
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Forecast
f
w
p(f|w)
sunny rain
0.3
rainy
rain
0.7
sunny no rain 0.8
rainy no rain 0.2
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The value of information
One of the most important parts of decision
making is knowing what questions to ask.
To conduct expensive and critical tests or
not depends on two factors:


Whether the different possible outcomes would
make a significant difference to the optimal
course of action
The likelihood of the various outcomes
Information value theory enables an agent
to choose what information to acquire.
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Properties of the value of information
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Information-gathering agent
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16.7 Decision-theoretic expert
systems
The decision maker states preferences between
outcomes.
The decision analyst enumerates the possible
actions and outcomes and elicits preferences from
the decision maker to determine the best course
of action.
The addition of decision networks means that expert
systems can be developed that


recommend optimal decisions,
reflecting the preferences of the user as well as the available
evidence.
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Design process
Create a causal model.

Determine what are the possible symptoms, disorders,
treatments, and outcomes.
Simplify to a qualitative decision model.
Assign probabilities.

Probabilities can come from patient databases, literature
studies, or the expert's subjective assessments.
Assign utilities.

When there are a small number of possible outcomes,
they can be enumerated and evaluated individually.
Verify and refine the model.

To evaluate the system we will need a set of correct
(input, output) pairs; a so-called gold standard to
compare against.
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Design process
Perform sensitivity analysis.



This important step checks whether the best decision is
sensitive to small changes in the assigned probabilities
and utilities by systematically varying those parameters
and running the evaluation again.
If small changes lead to significantly different decisions,
then it could be worthwhile to spend more resources to
collect better data.
If all variations lead to the same decision, then the user
will have more confidence that it is the right decision.
Sensitivity analysis is particularly important, because
one of the main criticisms of probabilistic approaches to
expert systems is that it is too difficult to assess the
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Inference diagram
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Summary
Probability theory describes what an agent should
believe based on evidence
Utility theory describes what an agent wants
Decision theory puts the two together to describe
what an agent should do
A rational agent should select actions that
maximize its expected utility.
Decision networks provide a simple formalism for
expressing and solving decision problems.
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