POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBITY SPIN

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Transcript POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBITY SPIN

Power Without
Responsibility (JN 500)
Journalism, Government and Source Relations
Case Study: Hutton Report
Lecture Outline
 1. Government Communication ‘Spin’
 2. Government and Television;Who is in control
 3. Case Study: The Hutton Report
1. Government Communication
 Churchill in 1951 tried unsuccessfully to live without a
press secretary.
 Position of press secretary grew in importance during
the 1960s (with growing influence of TV).
 Four clear roles emerged:
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Spokesman;
Adviser on media relations;
Agent dealing with news organisations; and
Co-ordinator of information service in all Whitehall
ministries (Seymour-Ure 1996, p. 211).
1. Government Communication
 Growing role of press
secretary as media
manager and early spin
doctor embodied in Bernard
Ingham, Thatcher’s press
secretary vital to her. Used
to rubbish ministers, etc
1. Government Communication
 Blair’s electoral victory in 1997 was based upon a systematic
reworking of the party’s internal media and communications
management framework started in the mid-1980s with a unit
headed by Peter Mandelson and involved party and media
personnel, including advertising professional Philip Gould.
 “Mandelson and Gould succeeded not because they exploited
slick advertising and media management more effectively
than the Conservatives, but because they forged between
themselves an approach to political strategy which has never
before been seen … They welded policy, politics and imagecreation into one weapon” (Hughes and Wintour 1993, p.
183).
1. Government Communication
 Four features of the New Labour/Millbank model:
1. Strong central control and coordination
2. Setting the agenda and proactivity(‘the grid’)
3. Rapid and robust response (esp with 24 hour news)
4. Import of political staffers into the government
machine as ‘Spads’(Sanders 2009, pp. 80-82).
1. Government Communication
 Criticisms of the New Labour model: it undermined
government commitment to parliamentary
accountability, gave unelected officials great
power, contaminating civil servant political
neutrality, it produced great centralization of
control in Downing Street, it spread skepticism
about politics and undermined public trust (Sanders
2009, p. 82).
1. Government Communication
 ‘Spin doctoring’( think cricket…)became synonymous
with New Labour largely through the figure of Alastair
Campbell, Blair’s Director of Communications and
Strategy. Former journalist..Campbell often exerted
great control over journalists through force of his
personality, direct engagements with editors, and
control of the release and dissemination of information
according to the levels of compliance of journalists i.e,
he had favourites and non favourities.
1. Government Communication
“The Most Powerful Man
in Britain Quits”
The Daily Mirror
“PM’s lost his brain” The Sun
Blair without Campbell is like fish
without chips – “Unimaginable”.
1. Government Communication
 ‘Spin’ – the “highly professional selling of the political
message that involves maximum management and
manipulation of the media (Grattan 1998)
 Spin doctor functions:
 control of media access to politicians (preventing spontaneous
questioning, favouring reporters with access – ‘on the drip’)
 packaging of information and control of timing of release of
information for media and public consumption, (pseudoevents, exploitation of deadlines, etc)
 forms of direct communication with journalists about
interpretations of political events and comments (including
attempted control of the sources the journalist might draw
on).
1. Government Communication
 Is the Power of spin doctors overstated ?As with
public relations activity more generally, spin often
is not successful.
 The fragility and indeterminacy of public life
means that the best-planned campaign can
founder.
 Spin encounters counter-spin from opponents, and
spin still receives news media and public scrutiny,
especially over controversial issues.
1. Government Communication
 Errington and Miragliotta (2007, p.86) note
governments employ techniques to foster
journalistic dependence on them as a media
source:
1. Employing journalists who were formerly part of
the Parliamentary press gallery(Campbell,Price)
2. Selectively leaking stories(Westland)
3. Blacklisting journalists who dare to challenge
the government’s agenda (Nick Jones)and
rewarding those who do the government’s bidding
with exclusive stories(Tom Baldwin)
4. Hijacking reporters.
1. Government Communication
 These developments in government communication
are partly in response to the rapidly changing
media environment characterized by ubiquity,
speed, quantity, accessibility, fragmentation
(Sanders 2009, p. 74).
 Twenty four national and global news means the
spin cycle is round the clock. A rumour in Beijing
becomes a ‘fact’ in London in minutes thanks to
the internet.
1. Government Communication
 “Communication has moved to the centre stage
of government and democratic politics.”
(Sanders 2009, p. 74)
 Governments are now major employers of
journalists, public relations practitioners and
advertising personnel.
 UK government employed 3,200 press officers
in 2006 - when Labour came to power in 1997
there were only 300 fully-fledged public
relations officers.
2. The Government and Television
 Eden in 1955 was first PM to
welcome TV. ‘Will the PM
take a question on..’
 Political parties had
ascendency over journalists
in political broadcasting until
introduction of ITV-Robin
Day .
 Until 1959 no radio and TV
coverage of general election
campaigns (although there
were party election
broadcasts). In 1959 there
was ‘invention’ of the daily
campaign press conference.
2. Government and Television
 14 Days Rule: agreement not to broadcast information
on issues in the fortnight before they were debated in
either House – lasted up to 1956-7. Broken by Granada.
 “By 1956-7 the questioning of political leaders on TV by
impartial interviewers had become established custom”
(Goldie quoted in Seymour-Ure p. 187).
 “Between 1955 and 1959 … the balance started to tip:
politics began to adapt to broadcasting, as politicians
became keener to use it, by opening their arenas [party
conferences] or by using the arena of the TV studio”
(Seymour-Ure 1996, p. 186).
2. Government and Television
 1960s saw rise of current affairs
programming and political news
satire programmes, such as That
Was The Week That Was.
 http://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=okH2Bb2Fj7A
 Politics, then, became more of
an everyday, cultural and
televised phenomenon.
Entertainment.
 Harold Wilson described as the
first “TV prime minister”
(Seymour-Ure 1996, p. 191).
Appeared on breakfast TV with
David Frost.
2. Government and Television
 Thatcher had ‘media
makeover’ her hair, her
voice, her clothes.Gordon
Reece and Tim Bell.
 http://www.telegraph.co.u
k/news/politics/margaretthatcher/8999746/HowMaggie-Thatcher-wasremade.html
2. Government and Television
 1980s – Televised
proceedings in the Lords
and the Commons. Over
time it has changed PM’s
Question Time into more of
a media performance every
Wednesday.
 Political identity and
performance oriented to
TV. Kinnock’s election as
Labour leader in 1983
partly prompted by his
perceived telegenic
qualities.
2. Government and Television
 1990s – Increased
detachment of political
role from political place).
Decline of Parliament in
political reportage.No more
whole pages on Parliament.
 Growth of sketch writers
like Parris and Johnson
 Greater intrusion into and
promotion of private lives
of politicians.
2. Government and Television
 TV gave greater emphasis to political leaders.
 TV’s effects on the position of Prime Minister:
 Greater time and effort in media work;
 Increased role as opinion leader or mobiliser;
 Drew PM away from natural parliamentary base (SeymourUre 1996, p. 202
 Tony Blair more than anyone in recent decades understood
tv (he learned from Bill Clinton).The photo opp and the
controlled interview at the centre of his ‘strategy’.
 David Cameron natural heir to Blair.
2. Government and Television
 “Something few people will
say, but most know is
absolutely true [is that] a
vast aspect of our jobs
today – outside of the
really major decisions … is
coping with the media, its
sheer scale, weight and
constant hyperactivity. At
points, it literally
overwhelms.” (Tony Blair)
Cameron and TV
Sees himself n the Blair mould
His Director of Comms is Craig Oliver
Former Producer and Editor at the BBC/ITV
‘Government by photo opp’ think George Osborne/hard hats
Ministers also ration their appearances. They control the agenda
3. Case Study: Hutton Report
 Political Context:
 Publication of government
dossier in September 2002,
six months before the Iraq
War started. It claimed
Saddam Hussein had
weapons of mass destruction
and they could be launched
within 45 minutes of an
order being given.
 On 15 February 2003
between 1 and 2 million
people at an anti-war
demonstration, the largest in
the country’s history.
3. Case Study: Hutton Report
 After military operations no
WMD were found.
 Andrew Gilligan, defence
correspondent of the BBC Today
programme, met David Kelly, a
weapons inspector.
 Gilligan subsequently reported
that government knew that the
45-minute figure was wrong and
Downing Street ordered that the
dossier be “sexed up.”
Subsequent article identified
Alastair Campbell as person who
influenced re-working of
document.
3. Case Study: Hutton Report
 After appearances before
the Foreign Affairs Select
Committee by Kelly,
Campbell and journalists,
Kelly committed suicide
and the PM ordered an
independent judicial
inquiry headed by Lord
Hutton.
3. Case Study: Hutton Report
 Hutton’s report was almost complete vindication for the
government and disastrous for the BBC (Barnett 2005, p.
334). He argued it was not improper to take into
account redrafting suggestions from Downing Street.
 Gilligan was criticised as well as BBC management for
not investigating whether Gilligan’s allegations could be
supported. BBC Chairman Gavyn Davies, DirectorGeneral Greg Dyke and Gilligan all resigned.
3. Case Study: Hutton Report
 Barnett (2005, pp. 335-6) argues three reasons in
defence of BBC:
 “…there is no question that BBC journalists had discovered
a legitimate story of huge public significance…”;
 “…there was no question about Kelly’s status as a senior
and reliable source”; and
 “…there was no question that changes had been made to
the dossier after – and almost certainly as a result of –
discussions with Number Ten advisers.”
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/uk/2003/david_kell
y_inquiry/default.stm
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eNvDTRGqXKs
References

Barnett, S 2005, ‘Opportunity or threat? The BBC, investigative journalism and the Hutton Report’, in S
Allan (ed.), Journalism: Critical Issues, Open University Press, Maidenhead.

Errington, W. and Miragliotta, N 2007, The Politics of Spin, in: Media & Politics: An Introduction, Oxford
University Press, South Melbourne, pp. 80-99.

Grattan, M 1998, ‘The Politics of Spin’, Australian Studies in Journalism, vol. 7, pp. 32-45.

Hughes, C. and Wintour, P 1993, Labour Rebuilt: The new model party, London, Fourth Estate.

Jones Nicholas 1999 The Sultans of Spin London Gollancz (and other books by Nick Jones on ‘spin.)

Marsh Kevin 2011 Stumbling over Truth .The inside story of the ‘sexed up dossier’ and the Hutton Report
London Biteback publishing

Sanders, K. 2009 Communicating Government, in: Communicating Politics in the Twenty-First Century,
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire, pp. 73-91.

Seymour-Ure, C 1996, ‘Media, Government and Politics: Prime Ministers and Parties’, The British Press
and Broadcasting since 1945, 2nd edn, Blackwell, Oxford.