Transcript 0510POLICYDIRECTORSPRIOR02 (PowerPoint Presentation)

Pandemic Influenza Response – Can you say “OUTBREAK”
Quotes re Quarantine & Pandemic Influenza
Quarantine and isolation were widely imposed, but probably did little to
stop the contagion. Predictably, quarantine could delay spread
somewhat but, having no impact on population susceptibility, could do
nothing to reduce the numbers who would eventually fall ill.
Quarantine measures were applied in several countries and were generally
found to be ineffective, managing at best to postpone the onset of an
epidemic by a few weeks to two months. The WHO expert panel found that
spread within some countries frequently followed public gatherings, such as
conferences and festivals, with infection dispersed as participants returned
home. The banning of public gatherings and the closing of schools were
considered the only measures that could dampen the spread of pandemic
influenza.
Antivirals – Not A Panacea
• Antiviral resistance and side effects may limit use
• Global production capacity limited*; high cost
• Ability to use antivirals to limit spread depends on rapid
case detection and contact tracing
• Need to start treatment early
• Effectiveness on serious illnesses and mortality unknown
• Prophylaxis may require ongoing use for 6 weeks or
longer
* Orders placed now (10:2005) – Delivery 2008
Pandemic Vaccines – No Magic Bullet
 Evolving virus = Unpredictable target
 Production limited
 High dose required
 Limited (if any) efficacy data
 Logistics issues
 Priority groups
 Labeling
 Distribution
Public Health Measures – Scope I
Decrease contact
Isolate cases
Quarantine contacts
Restrict travel
Restrict mixing
Hospital
Advisory
School closure
Home
Screening:
exit / entry
Ban mass
gatherings
Conveyances
Ban
Avoid crowded
places
Public Health Measures – Scope II
Decrease effective contact
Case hygiene
Contact hygiene
Environment
hygiene
Wear mask
Wear mask
Disinfection
Wash hands
Wash hands
Ventilation
Respiratory hygiene
Public Health and Border Measures
– To avert a pandemic or appreciably slow the
spread of a novel virus, prior to the development
of efficient and sustained human to human
transmission
Ways to Increase Effective
Social Distance
Social distance is defined as: The proximity to which a
member of one group permits members of another
group to his/her person
• Implement “Snow Day” restrictions
– Close schools, daycare centers, etc.
– Cancel large public gatherings (concerts, theaters)
– Minimize other exposures (markets, churches, public transit)
• Ask non-essential workers to stay home
Priority Issues for SD & MAR
Implementation requires the trust and participation of the
general public
• Communication
• Logistics & resources
• Economic
• Special needs populations
• Psychological & Psychosocial
• Tipping points & Flashpoints
• Communication
HHS Interagency Public Affairs
Committee on
Influenza Preparedness and Response
Mission:
• Established in July 2005 as a subgroup of the HHS Secretary's
Interagency Task Force on Influenza Preparedness.
• Primary focus is government-wide coordination of public affairs
activities related to pandemic influenza.
• Chaired by HHS with invited representatives from all U.S.
government departments and agencies. In addition, membership
is also extended to interested state and local partners, foreign
governments, and other appropriate U.S. and international nongovernment organizations.
Why Communication and Outreach are
Critical Components of Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness
•
Research continues to document the importance of risk
communication and early public discussion for effective
health/emergency preparedness activities
•
Need to begin laying the foundation of expectation with
communities (business, education, labor)…..
•
Preparedness tool – communication is a critical part of
our preparedness efforts
•
Will be one of the few, if not the only tool, available in
the early days of a pandemic
National Survey of US Public
• To measure the public’s general awareness
of pandemic influenza
• To measure the public’s level of concern
and beliefs about pandemic influenza
• To assess amount of confidence in and
attitudes toward public health measures that
might be employed during a pandemic
Study Method:
ConsumerStyles Survey
• Mail survey administered every year in April and May since
2002 by Porter Novelli, a public relations firm.
• Covers a wide variety of U.S. consumer behaviors including
media choices and general health attitudes.
• 2005 survey sent to a stratified random sample of 20,000
potential respondents from a panel of 600,000 households
– 63% response rate
• Data post-stratified and weighted to U.S. Census Current
Population Survey on gender, age, income, race, and
household size
• confidence interval approximately +/- 1%
Conclusions
• Awareness of pandemic influenza is generally very low
• Respondents expressed some concern, although a large number
(20%) were not concerned and feel pandemic influenza risk is
being exaggerated.
• There is a lack of public awareness about vaccine and antiviral
availability and lack of confidence that they will be distributed
fairly.
• Most respondents feel that federal and local health officials are
not prepared to respond to an influenza pandemic.
• Many predict they will not be willing to comply with public
health measures.
Preliminary Recommendations
• Efforts are needed to increase public awareness of
pandemic influenza and why this is a concern now.
• Messages and materials for use during a pandemic
(on prioritization of vaccines and antivirals,
quarantine and isolation, home care, and other
pandemic response measures) should be drafted and
tested now.
• Focus group and community forum experiences
suggest that providing the rationale for response
measures may increase acceptance.
Findings, Recommendations,
Comments
•
•
•
•
•
Flu vs. emerging infection
Google for information
Desire for more information
Immediacy and preparedness
Misunderstanding about vaccines and
therapeutics – how used
• Concern about fairness
• “priority groups”
Challenges for
Community Continuity Planning
• Uncertainty and denial
• Lack of understanding of potential threat
• Focus on what others – the government,
potential leaders – should do
• Lack of awareness of personal responsibility
What do we need?
Risk communication
Dynamic, actionable, context-rich products
 What you need to know
 What you need to watch for
 What you can do (you & your family)
‘Just in time’ plans, procedures, & policies*
 Training
 Resources
 Response
* Recognizing uncertain timelines, competing priorities, and an evolving problem
What should we do?
 Don’t reinvent the wheel
 Don’t buy a ‘square’ wheel
 Share your plans, policies, procedures & fears
 Develop a ‘clearing house’ for:
 Best practices
 Resource assessment
 Expert advice
 Recognize that self-reliance will be the norm
Risk communication &
Actionable Information
Simple But Effective
Interventions
Dr. Stephen Prior
National Security Health Policy Center
[email protected]
Office: 703-562-4512