Transcript II Pravila Hladnog rata i oblikovanje transatlantskog saveza

“Pravila Hladnog rata i
oblikovanje
transatlantskog saveza”
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I Neka teorijska pojašnjenja
II Pravila Hladnog rata i oblikovanje
transatlantskog saveza
III Literatura
I Neka teorijska
pojašnjenja
O Hladnom ratu
- O transatlantskim odnosima
- O savezima
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O Hladnom ratu
Pojam
- Škole proučavanja
- Razvoj i faze
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Tabela 1. Različita gledišta o tome ko je autor termina hladni rat
Autor termina hladni rat
Don Huan Manuel
Vreme nastanka termina
XIV vek
Fred Halidej,
1939 – 1947.
Graham Evans,
Jeffrey Newnham,
Ronald Steel
1947.
G. R. Berridge,
Alan James,
Jan Palmowski,
Volter Lipman
Bernard Baruh
Poznati teoretičari koji
podržavaju taj stav
Tabela 2. Različita gledišta o značenju pojma hladni rat
Različlita shvatanja značenja
pojma hladni rat
Glavne odlike jednog takvog
shvatanja
Poznati teoretičari koji
zastupaju jedno takvo
shvatanje
Džozef Naj;
Oxford Advanced
Learner`s Dictionary of
current English,
Editor Jonathan Crowther,
Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1999, Fifth Edition
Hana Arent;
Ljubivoje Aćimović
Shvatanje hladnog rata
u širem smislu
"svevremensko" značenje
pojma važno je stanje
intenzivnog neprijateljstva
između aktera a ne vreme u
kojem se ono dešava ili
njegovi akteri
Shvatanje hladnog rata u
užem smislu
"konkretno vreme u kojem se
hladni rat odvijao
(1945 – 1990.)
konkretni akteri koji su
učestvovali u hladnom ratu –
SAD i SSSR
dr Andreja Miletić; Jan
Palmovski; G. R. Berridge, Alan
James; Radovan Vukadinović;
Graham Evans, Jeffrey
Newnham
Shvatanje hladnog rata
kao posebnog
međunarodnog sistema
Hladni rat kao poseban
međunarodni sistem
Okvir u kojem se odigrava
celokupan međunarodni život
od 1945 – 1990.
Gordon A. Craig,
Alexander L. George;
Thomas L. Friedman
Tabela 3. Različite "škole" proučavanja hladnog rata
"Škole" hladnog rata
Kriterijum razlikovanja:
"Ko je kriv"
Sovjetski Savez i Staljin
"Radikalna škola"
"Revizionistička škola"
"Postrevizionistička
škola"
"Postradikalna škola"
Vreme u kom je
škola bila aktuelna
Neposredno po
izbijanju hladnog rata
i pedesete godine
prošlog veka
Glavni predstavnici
Herbert Fajs
Sjedinjene Američke Države i
kapitalizam
Od 1960 – ih
do početka 1970 -ih
Kriva je bipolarna struktura
moći u međunarodnom
sistemu posle drugog
svetskog rata ali i pogrešne
percepcije u odnosima između
velikih sila
Od kraja 1970 – ih pa
do završetka hladnog
rata, odnosno
otvaranja sovjetskih
arhiva
Džon Luis Gedis,
Melvin Lefler
Krivi su svi, ali su Staljin i
Sovjetski Savez ipak najviše
krivi
Od kraja hladnog rata
i otvaranja sovjetskih
arhiva pa do danas
Džon Luis Gedis
Džojs i Gabrijel Kolko
Vilijem A. Vilijams
Tabela 4. Faze hladnog rata
Faze hladnog rata
I Postepeni početak
II Proglašenje hladnog rata
III Vrhunac hladnog rata
IV Postepeni detant
V Drugi hladni rat
VI Kraj hladnog rata
Vreme trajanja
Glavni događaji
Glavne ličnosti
Od vremena drugog svetskog rata
pa do februara 1947. (britansko
povlačenje iz građanskog rata u
Grčkoj)
Pitanje Poljske; Pitanje Nemačke;
Pitanje moreuza; Nuklearno
oružje; Ukidanje "lend – liz akta„;
Daleki Istok;
"Dugački telegram"
Frenklin D.Ruzvelt; Vinston Čerčil;
Josif V. Staljin; Hari S. Truman
Klement Atli; Džordž F. Kenan;
Džejms Brns
Od vremena Trumanove doktrine
(11. III 1947.)
do osnivanja NATO- a
(4. IV 1949.)
Grčka i Turska; Blokada Berlina;
Nasilna promena vlasti u
Čehoslovačkoj;
Maršalov plan; Strategija
kontejnmenta;
Sovjetska atomska bomba;
Komunistička Kina
Od vremena izbijanja rata u Koreji
(jun 1950.) do vremena kubanske
raketne krize, uključujući i samu
krizu (oktobar 1962.)
NSC68; Hidrogenska bomba;
Strategija masovne odmazde;
lansiranje Sputnjika;
podizanje berlinskog zida;
kubanska raketna kriza;
Hari S. Truman ; Josif V. Staljin
Mao Ce Tung; Daglas Makartur
Džozef Mekarti; Dvajt Ajzenhauer;
Nikita Hruščov; Džon F. Kenedi;
Džon Foster Dals
Od vremena završetka kubanske
raketne krize pa do vremena
ulaska sovjetkih trupa u
Avganistan 1979. godine
Strategija elastičnog odgovora;
KEBS
Detant – Kisindžerova triangularna
diplomatija;
SALT I (ABM)
Leonid Brežnjev; Ričard Nikson
Henri A. Kisindžer; Josip Broz Tito
Helmut Zonenfeld; Džimi Karter
Od vremena posle ulaska
sovjetskih trupa u Avganistan do
dolaska Mihaila Gorbačova na
vlast (mart 1985.)
Ponovno naoružavanje;
Rakete srednjeg dometa u Evropi;
Rat zvezda;
SSSR kao žiža zla;
Pad cena nafte
Zbignjev Bžežinski; Ronald
Regan
Vilijem "Bil" Kejsi; Jurij Andropov
Konstantin Černjenko
Od vremena dolaska Gorbačova
na vlast u Sovjetskom Savezu do
kraja hladnog rata (1989/90/91)
INF CFE sporazumi;
Talas revolucija u Istočnoj
Evropi;START I; Samit KEBS-a u
Parizu 1990.;
Rušenje berl. Zida
Ronald Regan; Džordž H. W. Buš;
Mihail Gorbačov; Eduard
Ševarnadze
Leh Valensa; Vaclav Havel; Erih
Honeker
Hari S. Truman; Josif V. Staljin;
Džordž F. Kenan; Ernest Bevin
Džordž K. Maršal; Andrej Ždanov
Din Ačeson; Vjačeslav Molotov
O transatlantskim
odnosima
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Transatlantic relations refers to the historic,
cultural, political, economic and social relations
between countries on both side of the Atlantic
Ocean, specifically between the United States,
Canada and the countries in Europe.
Zapadna Evropa, Petrovska Evropa ili Evropa do
Urala ???
Zajedničko poreklo, religija, kultura, pretnje
bezbednosti, zajednički neprijatelji
Zajednički interesi i zajedničke vrednosti
President Barroso
Visit to the White House
8 January 2007, Washington DC
Istorijat transatlantskih odnosa - Charles A. Kupchan, The
Fourth Age - The Next Era in Transatlantic Relations
- Early History – Mit o Eneji na
američki mačin
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The first of the British colonies to take hold in
North America was Jamestown. On the
basis of a charter which King James I granted
to the Virginia (or London) Company, a group
of about 100 men set out for the Chesapeake
Bay in 1607. Seeking to avoid conflict with
the Spanish, they chose a site about 60
kilometers up the James River from the bay.
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In 1620, a group of Leyden Puritans secured a land patent from
the Virginia Company, and a group of 101 men, women and
children set out for Virginia on board the Mayflower. A storm sent
them far north and they landed in New England on Cape Cod.
Believing themselves outside the jurisdiction of any organized
government, the men drafted a formal agreement to abide by
"just and equal laws" drafted by leaders of their own choosing.
This was the Mayflower Compact.
In December the Mayflower reached Plymouth harbor; the
Pilgrims began to build their settlement during the winter. Nearly
half the colonists died of exposure and disease, but neighboring
Wampanoag Indians provided information that would sustain
them: how to grow maize. By the next fall, the Pilgrims had a
plentiful crop of corn, and a growing trade based on furs and
lumber.
Balance of Power Era:
1776 - 1905
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During the first phase of interaction between
the United States and Europe, trans-atlantic
relations were guided by balance- of-power
logic. The Atlantic order was one of
militarized rivalry, with the major players—the
United States, Great Britain, France and
Spain—regularly jockeying for territory, trade
and geopolitical influence. Each balanced
against the power of the other, capitalizing on
opportunities for individual gain.
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For the most part, America steered clear of intraEuropean struggles. However, to defend its
hemispheric interests, the United States fought two
major wars with Britain and one with Spain. A host of
other militarized disputes among the Atlantic powers
punctuated the nineteenth century. No sense of
community existed between the two sides of the
Atlantic. On the contrary, the European powers and
the United States saw their respective interests as
separate and divergent, embracing a zero-sum view
of the security environment.
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As Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist 11,
Europeans "have gravely asserted that all animals,
and with them the human species, degenerate in
America—that even dogs cease to bark after having
breathed awhile in our atmosphere.“
“The choice is between an endless multitude of little
insignificant clans and tribes at eternal war with one
another for a rock, or a fish pond…and a nation,
coextensive with the north American continent,
destined by god and nature to be the most populous
and most powerful people ever combined under one
social compact” (John Quincy Adams, 1811)
Balance of threat Era 1905 - 1941
TEORIJA РАВНОТЕЖE
ПРЕТЊИ-STEPHAN WALT
(power, proximity, offensive
capabilities, aggressive
intentions)
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The players no longer balanced against any
concentration of power, but only those that they
deemed threatening. Regime type started to matter
in shaping great-power alignments; the United
States and Europe's democracies began to enjoy
pacified relationships. National interests were still
viewed as separate, but were becoming contingently
convergent. The strategic environment was no
longer zero-sum, enabling militarized rivalry to give
way to peaceful coexistence.
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Compatible identities replaced oppositional ones,
furthered by a growing sense of racial and political
affinity. On both sides, talk of Anglo-American
"kinship“ became commonplace. As early as 1896,
Arthur Balfour, leader of the House of Commons,
ventured that "the idea of war with the United States
carries with it some of the unnatural horror of a civil
war . . . The time will come, the time must come,
when someone, some statesman of authority . . . will
lay down the doctrine that between Englishspeaking peoples war is impossible."
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But the Atlantic democracies were not yet prepared for deeper
forms of peacetime cooperation; they had banded together only
as necessary to respond to common threats. The United States
entered World War I and World War II only after coming under
direct attack. Britain was similarly reluctant to fight alongside
France in both wars. And the interwar period made all too clear
the contingent nature of common interest. The Senate rejected
U.S. participation in the League of Nations, unwilling to take on
standing obligations to collective action. Europe's democracies
were more willing to undertake such commitments in principle,
but their reluctance to uphold them through action readily
became clear during the 1930s. The interwar period proved to be
the era of fragile "coalitions of the willing", not collective security.
Cooperative Security
Era: 1941 - 2001
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During the Cold War, the Atlantic democracies had common
interests, not just contingently convergent ones, making their
security indivisible and encouraging them to take on
institutionalized obligations. Whereas the League of Nations
foundered on the shoals of America's reluctance to formalize its
foreign commitments, the United Nations enjoyed nearunanimous support in the Senate. Whereas the United States
steered clear of Europe's troubles in the 1930s, during the Cold
War the United States deployed troops in Germany, legally
bound itself to Europe through the North Atlantic Treaty, and took
other steps to ensure that the two sides of the Atlantic would not
be decoupled.
The compatible identities of the interwar period gave way to a
shared Western identity during the Cold War.
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Individual countries maintained their own national
institutions and symbols, but they also worked hard
to build a transnational sense of unity and solidarity.
Backed up by a discourse of shared values,
common culture and durable partnership,
transatlantic cohesion took on a taken-for-granted
quality during the Cold War years. The Atlantic
community was not just an alliance, but also a
security community— an international society knit
together by a sense of "we-ness."
Balance of Threat Era
II: 2001- ?
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The Atlantic community has suffered a serious
reversal, rather than an advance. The deterioration
began well before the election of George W. Bush
and the tragedies of September 11. The reasons are
no surprise. The strategic priorities of America and
Europe started to diverge soon after the dissolution
of the Soviet Union. In the absence of a common
external threat, Europe and America no longer relied
on each other to defend first-order security interests.
NATO has continued to exist as a military alliance
only in name, its provisions for collective defense
having become moot after it shifted its focus to outof-area missions.
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Cooperative security—the linchpin of the Cold War
order—is no longer the exclusive logic governing
relations. Balance-of-threat thinking is making a
distinct comeback. Europe is not balancing against
American power, but it is balancing against U.S.
behavior. Europe's resistance to U.S. policy.
The Atlantic order has suffered similar setbacks on
matters of identity. The sense of "we-ness" that
emerged amid World War II and the Cold War has
dimmed considerably.
On paradise and Power – Robert Kagan
- O savezima
-Pojam
značaj
- kontroverze
-
O pojmu saveza u
međunarodnim
odnosima
Савез (Alliance):
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“Две или више држава формирају савез (alliance)
када закључе уговор који обавезује земље
потписнице да предузму одређене акције у случају
рата.” (James D. Morrow, Alliances: Why write them
Down?, Annual Review of Political science, 2000,
Volume 3, p. 63.)
“ Савези су формални или неформални споразуми
у које суверене државе улазе у циљу осигурања
узајамне безбедности.” (Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,
Understanding International Conflicts, Longman, New
York, 1997, Second Edition, p. 58.)
Савезништво (Аlignment):
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“Савезништва не подразумевају
закључење уговора између држава
чланица односно потписе њихових
представника. Разлог за то је чињеница
да је заједнички интерес између тих
држава очигледан.” (James D. Morrow,
Alliances: Why write them Down?, оп. цит., p.
64.)
Одбрамбени пакт (Defense Pact):
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“Одбрамбени пактови су узајамне обавезе
које државе прихвате на себе, a које
подразумевају да прискоче једна другој у
помоћ ако су нападнуте.” (James D.
Morrow, Alliances: Why write them Down?,
оп. цит., p. 63.)
partners and allies – Lord
Robert Skidelski
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The first lesson is that, in thinking about foreign policy, we need
to distinguish between partners and allies. Of the four countries
that made up the Grand Alliance, two (the United States and
Britain) became partners, and the other two (Russia and China)
ceased even to be allies. Allies are for temporary objectives;
partners are for the long haul. Wars between partners are
unthinkable; future wars between allies remain possible.
What converts allies into partners? Shared values and past
associations are obviously important. But they are not enough.
The argument that democracies never go to war with each other
should be treated skeptically. Nor does free trade automatically
guarantee international amity, as 19th-century liberals fondly
believed. As long as there are nation-states, there will be
conflicts of national interest, and therefore the possibility of war.
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Just as important as shared values in converting allies into
partners--and this is the second lesson suggested by the wartime
alliance--is asymmetry of power. Great Britain did not really
become a "reliable" partner of the United States until it was no
longer powerful enough to be a serious rival. To adapt Harry
Dexter White's phrase, the "going" powers have to be "gone"
before they become partners in a joint enterprise. The
relationship between the United States and Western Europe had
reached this point by the end of the Second World War. The
partnership was consolidated in the NATO treaty during the Cold
War and is now unbreakable. Talk of setting up Europe as a
"third force" between the United States and the Soviet Union
after the Second World War was never realistic. The historical
moment had passed.
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Asymmetry of power does not negate the need for partners to be
treated with consideration. They must believe they have some
influence over the partnership. Otherwise, the full value of the
partnership is lost. Partners can also be very useful as
intermediaries or go-betweens. Such was the role played by
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in her shuttles between
U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet President Mikhail
Gorbachev in the mid-1980s. Today, British Prime Minister Tony
Blair has been playing the same kind of role in Europe, the
Middle East, and Asia.
In any partnership, there will always be an awkward member. In
the Western alliance, this part has been played by France with
great elegance and to the frequent irritation of the United States,
but with some benefit to the partnership as a whole by making it
appear as not wholly subservient to U.S. wishes.
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States, though perhaps Russia would like to be. But Russia is
still very different from the West and is right to think of itself as a
coming, not going, power. Both of these things are even more
obviously true of China. There is no reason to anticipate that
either country will become actively hostile to the United States.
But they are, or will soon be, in a position to bargain their place in
the international order, and therefore to shape its future. The
same will be true of India. In its relations with these powers, the
United States will be much more in that intermediate area of
international relations--more like a balance-of-power situation--in
which it has never been comfortable.
Појмовно разграничење:
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Савезе треба разликовати од савезништва
Савези се потписују а савезништва не
Нека савезништва, као што је оно између Израела и САД-а,
подразумева блиске односе између те две државе током
дужег временског раздобља, док је рецимо савезништво
између САД-а и Сирије у Првом заливском рату, прошло са
престанком рата. ДАКЛЕ, САВЕЗНИШТВО НЕ
ПОДРАЗУМЕВА ОЧЕКИВАЊЕ СТАЛНОГ КВАЛИТЕТА У
ОДНОСИМА МЕЂУ ДРЖАВАМА; ЗАЈЕДНИЧКИ ИНТЕРЕСИ
ТУ НОСЕ ЦЕЛОКУПНЕ ОДНОСЕ, ТЕ ОНИ НЕ ТРЕБА ДА СЕ
ПРЕГОВАРАЈУ ФОРМАЛНО.
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Савези подразумевају формално обавезивање између
држава, док се одређене специфичне обавезе стављају на
папир и потписују
Савези захтевају спецификације обавеза због тога што
савазници, треба да разјасне степен њихових заједничких
интереса и између себе, и према другима изван савеза
Од савезништва до савеза је значајан корак напред у
формализацији обавеза, и даљи кораци су могући ка већем
степену обавезе. Савези се могу сматрати као део једног
континуума безбедносних односа између држава, од
савезништва до федерације.
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“Државе које су формирале савез, увећале су сопствену
безбедност.” ((James D. Morrow, Alliances: Why write them
Down?, оп. цит., p. 65.)
“Државе могу улазити у савезе и из невојних разлога.
Идеологија на пример, често држи државе заједно.
Економија такође може бити још један разлог за улазак у
савезништво са неким, особито у оним деловима света где су
чисто војни проблеми у односима између држава у
повлачењу.” (Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International
Conflicts, оп. цит., pp. 58- 59.)
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“ У ствари, арапске државе су водиле политику
уравнотеживања једне против других не путем
повећања броја војника, већ повећавањем броја
гласача. Стога војно безначајни савези између
различитих арапских држава, имају дубоке
политичке ефекте.” (Michael Barnett, Alliances,
Balances of Threats, and Neorealism- the Accidental
Coup, in, John A. Vasquez, Colin Elman, (Eds.),
Realism and the Balancing of Power, A New Debate,
Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2003, pp. 222- 249.)
Summary Characteristics of Security Relationship
– David Lake
RELATIONSHIP
DEFINING CHARASTERISTIC
Alliance
Both Parties retain full decision making authority
Sphere of Influence
Subordinate polity restrained from entering into
security relationship, of whatever form with third
parties
Protectorate
Subordinate polity cedes decision-making
authority over foreign policy to the dominant
state
Informal Empire
Subordinate polity cedes decision-making
authority over foreign policy and areas of
domestic policy to the dominant state.
Subordinate polity conducts relations with others
on basis of sovereignty
Empire
Subordinate polity cedes decision-making
authority over both foreign and domestic policy
and areas of domestic policy to dominant state.
Subordinate polity does not conduct relations
with others on basis of sovereignty.
Značaj saveza
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“Ратови су мање вероватни кад је моћ савеза већа и кад су савези
укључивији, док је рат вероватнији онда када моћ најјаче државе (у
систему) није повезана у ширу коалицију.” (Richard N. Rosecrance,
“Review Article: War and Peace”, World Politics, Volume 55 No 1,
October 2002, pp. 137- 166.)
“Постоје савези који су средство уравнотеживања и савези који су
средство управљања... Често је жеља да се врши контрола над
политикама савезника, била главни узрок уласка у савезе.” (Paul
Schroeder, “Alliances 1815- 1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of
Management”, in, Klaus Knor, (Ed.), Historical Dimensions of National
Security, University Press of Cansas, Lawrence, 1975)
Питања достизања моћи- виђење Хане Арент
Проблематика људске природе
О могућностима сарадње између људи, група људи и политичких
јединица
“Лов на мамуте” и првобитни људи
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Ото фон Бизмарк и његов чувени “Kissinger Diktat”: “Треба
створити универзалну политичку ситуацију у којима смо ми
неопходни свим силама осим Француске, а које ћемо помоћу,
наших међусобних односа, држати што је могуће даље од
формирања коалиције против нас.” (Josef Joffe, Defying History
and Theory: The United States as the “Last Remaining
Superpower”, in, G. John Ikenberry, America Unrivaled- the Future
of Balance of Power, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2002, pp.
155- 180.)
Ото фон Бизмарк: “Правило Шабулов”- “Целокупна политика
може се свести на ово правило: Покушај да будеш у тројству
док год светом управља непоуздана равнотежа између пет
великих сила. То је стварна заштита против каолиција.”
(Josef Joffe, Defying History and Theory: The United States as
the “Last Remaining Superpower”, оп. цит. P. 162.)
“Kontroverze”
“Постоји само једна ствар гора од
борбе са савезницима, то је борба
без њих” (Винстон Черчил)
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Проблем људске природе
Проблем варања
Проблем апсолутних и релативних добитака
Проблем обезбеђивања”општег добра” и
проблем “слободних јахача”
Проблем поделе терета
Разликовање партнер- савезник (Лорд Роберт
Скиделски)

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
Balancing/ buck passing
Balancing/ chain ganging
Balancing/ bandwagoning
Однос старог Рима према савезницима


“Alliance Security Dilemma- то је тензија
између страха да се може остати
напуштен или пак бити ухваћен у клопку
од стране неког савезника.” (Glenn H.
Snyder, “Mearsheimer’ s World- Offensive
Realism and the Struggle for Security- A
Review Essay”, International Security, Vol. 27
No 1, Summer 2002, pp. 149- 173.)
Проблем управљања савезништвима
II Pravila Hladnog rata i
oblikovanje transatlantskog
saveza

Veoma zanimjlivo viđenje hladnog rata daju Gordon
Krejg i Aleksander Džordž u njihovoj poznatoj knjizi Sila
i Državništvo (Force and Statecraft). Oni smatraju da je
Hladni rat opisni termin koji je bio opšte prihvaćen
kasnih 40-ih da okarakteriše neprijateljski odnos koji se
razvio između Zapada i Sovjetskog Saveza. Ono što
njihovo viđenje ovog problema izdvaja od prethodnih
shvatanja jeste shvatanje hladnog rata kao
međunarodnog sistema. Ispitujući da li su postojala tri
preduslova koja oni postavljaju da bi jedan međunarodni
sistem bio efikasan i uopšte postojao (usaglašeni ciljevi,
odgovarajuća struktura i opšte prihvaćene procedure),
autori su utvrdili sledeće:

1) Jedini zajednički cilj Sovjetskom Savezu i
Zapadnim silama bio je izbegavanje III svetskog rata
2) Struktura međunarodnog sistema bila je
bipolarna, pošto nije bilo dovoljno jakih drugih velikih
sila da organizuju multipolarni sistem. Treba
napomenuti da su postojale i države izvan domašaja
supersila, ali je preovlađujuća struktura
međunarodnog sistema bila bipolarna 3) Što se tiče
procedura koje su bile opšte prihvaćene to su
zastrašivanje (odvraćanje) i upravljanje krizama da
ne bi eskalirale u nuklearni sukob širih razmera .

Hladni rat “kao specifičan fenomen
posleratnih međunarodnih odnosa“ posmatra
i poznati zagrebački profesor međunarodnih
odnosa i spoljne politike, Radovan
Vukadinović. Glavna obeležja hladnog rata
on vidi u dugotrajnom suočavanju supersila
bez upotrebe oružja, u snažnoj bipolarizaciji
snaga te striktno uniformnim gledanjima na
sva zajednička pitanja
Hladni rat kao poseban
međunarodni sistem

Shvatajući međunarodni sistem kao
"dominantni okvir u kome se organizuju i
dešavaju međunarodni poslovi ... ali i
unutrašnja politika... koji ne oblikuje sve, ali
oblikuje mnogo stvari", Fridman iznosi
mišljenje da je proces globalizacije kao
glavno obeležje poslednje decenije XX veka,
poseban međunarodni sistem koji je nasledio
sistem hladnog rata.
Kriterijum
Međunarodni sistem Hladnog rata
Međunarodni sistem globalizacije
Struktura moći
ravnoteža snaga između
Sjedinjenih Država i Sovjetskog
Saveza
Ravnoteža između nacionalnih
država, tržišta i MNC, kao i
pojedinaca
Pravila u vođenju spoljnih poslova
neuplitanje u suparničke zone
uticaja
Intervencionizam
ekonomija
Nerazvijene zemlje – razvoj,
zemlje u razvoju - povećanje
izvoza, komunističke zemlje na
autarkiju a zapadne ekonomije na
regulisanje trgovine
Deregulacija; privatizacija;
liberalizacija; slobodna trgovina;
tržišna ekonomija
Glavne ideje
Kapitalizam, komunizam, detant,
nesvrstanost, pererstrojka
Amerikanizacija – univerzalizacija
zapadne (američke) kulture –
McDonalds, Miki Maus ...
Demografski trendovi
Od Juga ka Severu
Ka svim stranama sveta
Izgled sveta - perspektiva
Podela: Blokovi + neutralni +
nesvrstani
Integracija
Definicija tehnologije
Nukl. oružje; srp i čekić; industrija
minijaturizacija, digitalizacija,
sateliti, fiber optika i internet,
Šta je ono što se meri
Težina
brzina
Glavni ekonomisti
Džon Majnard Kejnz; Karl Marks
Jozef Šumpeter; Endi Grou
Definišući dokumenti
Sporazumi – paktovi (Treaty)
Posao (Deal)
Glavni zakon
E= m x c2
Murov zakon
Glavno pitanje
Koliko je velika vaša raketa
Koliko je brz vaš modem, procesor
Glavni sport
Sukob SAD i SSSR kao boks meč
Trka na sto metara
Odnosi između rivala
Svet prijatelja i neprijatelja – Karl
Šmit
Odnos konkurencije i takmičarstva
Simbol
Zid
World Wide Web
Od čega ljudi strahuju
Strah od nuklearnog uništenja od
dobro poznatog neptrijatelja
Neizvesnist, strah od nepoznatog
neprijatelja, gubitka posla
Characteristics of the Cold War
International System – Donald Snow



First, the Cold War political and military
competition dominated International Politics
Second, the conflict was viewed as
protracted, a long term competition for which
only great patience would suffice and the
management of which required great
vigilance.
A third characteristic of the Cold war system
was that it became global
“The Cold War was fought at
different levels in dissimilar ways
in multiple places over a very
long time” –
Any attempt to reduce its history exclusively
to the role of great forces, great powers, or
great leaders would fail to do it justice. Any
effort to capture it within a simple
chronological narrative could only produce a
mash.” – John Lewis Gaddis
Global Posture Transformation: Cold War 1985
LEGEND
> 5,000 Personnel
Europe:
358,000 personnel
> 15,000 Personnel
> 25,000 Personnel
> 100,000
Personnel
Persian Gulf:
9,000 personnel (afloat)
East Asia:
125,000 personnel
• Legacy from the end of 20th century wars
• Forces were located and equipped to fight where they were based.
Global Posture Transformation: Post-Cold War 1995-2002
LEGEND
Force concentrations
> 5,000 Personnel
> 15,000 Personnel
> 25,000 Personnel
Europe:
~118,000
personnel
East Asia:
~89,000 personnel
Persian Gulf:
8,000-25,000 personnel
• US no longer assumes we know where our forces will have to operate
—and no longer assumes they will fight where they are based.
U. S. Presidential
Doctrines
Monroe doctrine

In close conformance with Adams’ recommendation, Monroe’s
message to the Congress on December 2 set forth three
essential points. The first committed the United States to a
policy of noncolonization by affirming that “the American
continents, by the free and independent condition which they
have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be
considered as subjects to future colonization by any European
powers.” The second endorsed a policy of “hands off ” while
arguing that the monarchical system of the Old World “is
essentially different from that of America” and that “any
attempt” by the Europeans to “extend their system to any
portion of this hemisphere” would appear as “dangerous to
our peace and safety” and as evidence of “an unfriendly
disposition toward the United States.” The third recalled
Washington’s farewell address by embracing a policy of
abstention from European political affairs.

“In the wars of the European powers in matters
relating to themselves we have never taken part, nor
does it comport with our policy to do so.” A related
policy of “no transfer” already had taken shape in
April 1823 when Adams warned Spain against
selling Cuba to Great Britain. In his words, “Cuba,
once disjoined from its own unnatural connection
with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can only
gravitate towards the North American Union, which
by the same law of nature cannot cast her off from
its bosom.” Such an expectation guided U.S. policy
all through the nineteenth century.
The Theodore Roosevelt Corollary of
Monroe doctrine

In his annual message of December 6, 1904, Theodore
Roosevelt enunciated not a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine but
an entirely new principle which epitomized his “big stick” view of
foreign relations: the United States was to act as sole policeman
of the Western Hemisphere and deny the European powers any
right of interference in what it regarded as its rightful “zone of
influence,” given Washington’s obvious supremacy in that part of
the world at the dawn of the twentieth century. An initially
defensive dictum had therefore been turned into an aggressive
policy by a man who had long pondered over America’s standing
and role in the world. Strictly speaking, it was a “perversion” of
Monroe’s original intent, but fundamentally it reflected a new,
innovative conception of security and defense, as well as
changing geopolitical conditions.

The catalysts of that drastic mutation were the necessary
protection of the projected isthmian canal and Germany’s
aggressiveness in the Caribbean. In time the United States
would tighten its grip on some of its “sister republics” and
incur the charge of imperialism by developing a
“protectorate policy” that belied its oft-proclaimed
commitment to self-determination. Repeated interventions
in the name of law and order would leave an enduring
legacy of anti- Americanism in South America. The
Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine would guide
hemispheric diplomacy throughout World War II and during
the Cold War, assurances to the contrary notwithstanding.
Truman Doctrine

Addressing a joint session of Congress on March
12, 1947, President Harry S Truman requested $400
million in military and economic aid for Greece and
Turkey. Convinced that both countries faced
Communist aggression, the president enunciated a
old new foreign-policy doctrine: “It must be the policy
of the United States to support free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities
or by outside pressures.”
Eisenhower doctrine

The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 declared that the United
States would distribute economic and military aid and, if
necessary, use military force to stop the spread of
communism in the Middle East. Eisenhower found it difficult to
convince leading Arab states or Israel to endorse the
doctrine’s purpose or usefulness. Nonetheless, he applied the
doctrine in 1957-58 by dispensing economic aid to shore up
the Kingdom of Jordan, by encouraging Syria’s neighbors to
consider military operations against it, and by sending U.S.
troops into Lebanon to prevent a radical revolution from
sweeping over that country. The doctrine consisted of a major
commitment by the United States to the security and stability
of the Middle East and signaled a new level of U.S. resolve to
exert influence in international affairs. By issuing the doctrine,
Eisenhower raised the prospect that the United States would
fight in the Middle East and accepted responsibilities in the
region that the United States would retain for decades to
come.
Johnson doctrine

In May 1965, when U.S. troops landed in the Dominican
Republic, President Lyndon Johnson pronounced his
“Johnson Doctrine,” declaring that the United States would
never again permit the establishment of a Communist
regime in the Western Hemisphere. Although the
Dominican intervention marked the first armed, overt U.S.
intervention in Latin America in over three decades, the
intervention and the Johnson Doctrine did not mark a signal
departure in inter-American relations. Since the late
nineteenth century, the United States has maintained a
sphere of influence within the Western Hemisphere,
exercising predominant influence in the region and limiting
the freedom of action of Latin American nations.
Nixon doctrine

Nixon delivered his first public comments
about what would later become known as the
Nixon Doctrine in Guam on the evening of
July 25, 1969. The island was at the end of
the second leg of a thirteen-day around-theworld political and diplomatic voyage, on
which Nixon had embarked from Washington,
DC on July 23.

Nixon opened the press conference in Guam telling reporters that before he
took their questions he wanted to give them his “perspective” on the U.S. “role
in Asia and in the Pacific,” because Asian leaders were wondering whether
Americans’ “frustration over the war in Vietnam” would cause the United States
to “withdraw from the Pacific and play a minor role” in the future. “This is a
decision that will have to be made, of course, as the war comes to an end,” but
he pointed out that in any case the administration needs to take the “longrange view” and make plans ahead of time. Rejecting the option of withdrawing
from the Pacific as had the British, French, and Dutch, Nixon argued that he
“was convinced that the way to avoid becoming involved in another war in Asia
is for the United States to continue to play a significant role.” Like it or not, he
pointed out, the United States sits astride the Pacific Ocean and has
historically been a Pacific power. “As we look at Asia today,” Nixon continued,
“the peace of the world” is threatened by China, North Korea, and North
Vietnam. Considering these “factors,” he said, we must therefore realize that
“down the long road”—four to twenty years from now—“potentially the
greatest threat to that peace will be in the Pacific.” At the same time, he
observed, “We should not let that obscure the great promise that is here” for
economic development. Look, he said, at the progress already made in Japan,
Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia. Therefore, he
concluded, “We need policies that will see that we play a part and a part that is
appropriate to the conditions that we will find.” Among those conditions were
“national pride” and “regional pride.”
Carter doctrine


The Carter doctrine was policy proclaimed by the
President of the United States Jimmy Carter in his
State of the Union Address on 23 January 1980
which stated that the United States would use
military force if necessary to defend its national
interests in the Persian Gulf region.
“Let our position be apsolutely clear: An attempt by
an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf
region will be regarded as an assault on the vital
interests of the United States of America, and such
an assault will be repelled by any means necessary,
including military force”
Reagan doctrine


Ronald Reagan never planned to announce what became known
as the Reagan Doctrine. Two months after Reagan declared in
his 1985 State of the Union address that the United States
should not “break faith” with anti-Communist resistance groups, a
political commentator called that declaration the Reagan
Doctrine.
What Reagan said that February evening on his seventy-fourth
birthday was a version of what he had said many times before:
that anti-Communist resistance movements deserved U.S.
support. That idea had shaped his thinking since the beginning of
his presidency and, indeed, from the time that he became
involved in national politics in the mid 1960s.
Clinton doctrine



Clinton doctrine is not a clear statement in the way that many
other United States Presidential doctrines were. However, in
February 26, 1999 speech, President Bill Clinton said the
following, which was considered the Clinton doctrine.
“It’s easy… to say that we really have no interests in who lives in
this or that valley in Bosnia, or who owns a strip of brushland in
the Horn of Africa, or some piece of parched earth by the Jordan
River. But the true measure of our interests lies not in how small
or distant these places are, or in whether we have trouble
pronouncing their names. The question we must ask is, what are
the consequences to our security of letting conflicts fester and
spread. We cannot, indeed, we should not, do everything or
everywhere. But where our values and our interests are at stake,
and where we can make a difference, we must be prepared to do
so”
Enlargement and fighting “rogue states”
George W. Bush doctrine



The Bush doctrine is name given to a set of
foreign policy guidelines first unveiled by
President George W. Bush in his
commencement speech to the graduating
class of West Point on June 1, 2002.
Strategy of preemption, unilateral use of force
Ko nije sa nama, taj je protiv nas
USA Strategy Landmarks

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1944 Bretton Woods World Order: Economic Underpinnings
1947 Truman Doctrine Containment: Policy Commitment
Marshall Plan Containment: Economic Instruments
NSC 4/A Containment: Covert Political Instruments
1949 North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) Containment: Military Commitment
1950 NSC-68 Containment: Grand Strategy
1951 U.S.-Japan Peace Treaty Intra-Alliance Containment
1952 NATO Lisbon Conference Conventional Defense: Dreams
1953 NSC 162/2 “The New Look”
1954 NATO MC 48 The New Look on the Ground
Manila Pact/SEATO “Pactomania”
1957 NATO MC 14/2 Prelude to Flexible Response
1961 Berlin Contingency Planning Flexible Response: Nightmares
NSAM 2 Counterinsurgency
1962 McNamara Ann Arbor Speech Nuclear Counterforce
McNamara Athens Speech Dissembling to Allies
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DoD General Purpose Forces Study “2 _ Wars:” Apex of Military Ambitions
1963 “Assured Destruction” DPM Condition vs. Strategy
1967 NATO MC 14/3 Flexible Response: Diplomatic Blessing
1969 Nixon Doctrine “1 _ Wars”: Orderly Retreat
1972 Shanghai Communiqué Rebalancing Power
ABM Treaty Codifying Strategic Contradiction
1977 PD-18 Petroleum and a New Front: Pre-Strategy
1978 PD-30 World Order: Human Rights
1980 PD-59 Reinvigorating Flexible Response
1982 Reagan Doctrine Toward Rollback
1983 SDI Strategic Dreams vs. Realistic Irrationality
1992 Draft Defense Planning Guidance Strategy for Primacy
1994 NSSUS, "Engagement and Enlargement” Primacy and World Order Arm
in Arm
2002 NSSUS, “Preemption” Primacy in Your Face
2006 NSUS, “Preemption” Primacy in Your Face II – “Speak easy, but carry a
big stick”
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
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http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/
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http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/
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http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.hom
e
Cold War International History Project
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/
The National Security Archive, the George Washington University
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/
Intervjui s najpoznatijim akterima Hladnog rata
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/index2.htm
Cold War Studies at Harvard University
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/jcws
Journal of Cold War Studies
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