Transcript Philosophy of Science

Philosophy of Science
Course program
• Wed, March 4: What is science? The scientific
method. The aims and goals of science.
Naturalism and relativism.
• Thu, March 5: The issue of scientific realism.
Introducing pragmatist philosophy of science (in
relation to the realism issue and generally).
• Fri, March 6: Pragmatism (and its history) in the
philosophy of science. Science and values,
science and religion, etc.
– The participants can present their own brief papers,
discussing their own research problems and
methodology from a philosophical perspective.
What is science?
• ”Science” (”Wissenschaft”, ”tiede”, ”scientia”):
– the scientific community
– the research process
– the results/contents of scientific research (the scientific
worldview)
• ”Science is systematic, rational acquisition of new
knowledge.” (Haaparanta & Niiniluoto)
– What is (new, previously unknown) knowledge? (the classical
conception of knowledge: justified true belief)
– What is rationality (in science and elsewhere)?
– What is systematicity (in science and elsewhere)?
• E.g., ontological, logical, explanatory, institutional, etc. – different
dimensions of scientific systematicity.
Perspectives on science
• Science (and Technology) Studies (STS):
interdisciplinary, empirically informed research on the
nature of science, including history, sociology, and
philosophy of science (and technology).
– What exactly is the relation between science and technology?
• Philosophy of Science: normative vs. descriptive (factual,
empirical).
– The philosopher of science doesn’t merely describe facts about
science but tries to determine what science ought to be like. (Cf.
the normativity of epistemological theories of knowledge and
justification, etc.: epistemology is not just concerned with the
ways we actually form beliefs but with how we ought to form and
justify our beliefs.)
Philosophy of science and other
areas of philosophy
• Problems in the philosophy of science are deeply
connected with other philosophical problems, e.g.:
– Metaphysics: do the objects of scientific research exist
independently of us (and of scientific theories, etc.)? (The
problem of realism.)
– Epistemology: what is scientific knowledge? (Philosophy of
science can be seen as the application of general epistemology
to the special case of scientific knowledge.)
– Logic: what is (valid) scientific inference like?
– Philosophy of language: do scientific theories (theoretical terms
and concepts) refer to independently existing entities, and are
theories true or false (in the correspondence sense)?
– Ethics and political philosophy: is science value-free or valueladen; what kind of ethical and social problems do science
involve?
– Philosophy of religion: does science refute religion?
Philosophy of science:
general and special
• General philosophy of science: problems common to all
scientific disciplines (including the humanities): truth,
inference, explanation (vs. understanding), etc.
• Special problems in relation to different scientific
disciplines, e.g.:
– Philosophy of mathematics: do mathematical entities exist, what
is mathematical truth?
– Philosophy of physics: time and space, the interpretation of
quantum theory?
– Philosophy of biology: the nature of life, the reality of species?
– Philosophy of history: the reality of the past, the determinacy of
the truthvalues of claims about the past, historical explanation?
– Philosophy of education: the scientific worldview and education,
the science vs. religion issue, etc.?
The aims and goals of science
• Cognitivism: Science
aims at knowledge and/or
truth about the world
(classical definition of
knowledge as justified
true belief).
– Truth (knowledge) is
valuable as such, for its
own sake (intrinsic value).
– Cf. scientific realism:
there is a world out there,
independently of us, and
science aims at finding out
what it’s like.
• Behavioralism: Science
aims at practical
recommendations and
problem-solving.
– Knowledge and truth are
not sought for their own
sake.
– Instrumentalism:
knowledge has only
instrumental value, not
intrinsic value. (N.B. In a
more specific sense,
instrumentalism denies that
scientific theories have
truthvalues.)
Basic and applied research
• A moderate cognitivist admits that knowledge can be
instrumentally valuable and applicable to practical
problem-solving, even though the primary motivation for
seeking knowledge is not instrumental but, e.g., pure
intellectual curiosity.
• Basic research: knowledge/truth for its own sake.
– Scientists aim at true (or truthlike) theories about the way the
world is.
• Applied research: instrumentally valuable knowledge,
applicable to practical problems.
– Applying the results of basic research, scientists aim at workable
solutions to various problems we face in our practices.
– ”Design science” (Niiniluoto): designing a solution to a practical
problem, etc.
Science and human interests
• Jürgen Habermas: natural science is motivated by a
technical interest (governing nature), the human
sciences by a hermeneutical interest (understanding),
and critical social theory by an emancipatory interest
(liberating humans from domination structures, etc.).
– Background: Frankfurt School cultural critique, the ”dialectics of
the enlightenment” (Adorno, Horkheimer).
• Is ”pure” natural science independent of technical
domination of nature possible at all?
– A major issue in science and technology policy. Should scientific
research simply be seen as a tool for business, and society in
general?
– The value-ladenness vs. value-independence of scientific
research (we will return to this problem in due course).
Applied research
• Typically, the results of applied research are not
theoretical statements about the way the world is (as in
basic research) but ”technical norms”: if you want to
achieve goal X, then you ought to do Y (cf. von Wright
1963).
– If you want to cure a patient with an infection, you ought to use
antibiotics.
– If you want to achieve maximum destructive potential for your
nuclear bomb, you ought to build it like this…
• N.B. The interests upon which the technical norms arrived at in
applied research are based are not morally neutral! There is always
room for valuational discussion of what kind of interests we ought to
pursue, and why.
– Technical norms have truthvalues: they are true or false
statements about the relations between aims and the means
necessary for achieving those aims.
Applied research (continued)
• We might consider the relation between basic and
applied research in, e.g., the following scientific
disciplines:
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Medicine
Agricultural science
Education
Political science
History (of ideas)
Aesthetics (and art education) …
• Is it always possible to draw a clear distinction between
basic and applied research? Sometimes, even the
most ”basic” research problems might be motivated by
the potential applicability of the results of research.
Science and technology
• Some etymology: episteme (knowledge) vs. tekhne (skill).
– Technology: tekhne + logos, ”the study/doctrine of skills”.
• Is technology just applied science, or the construction of
applications based upon applied research? Or is
(contemporary) science crucially dependent on technology?
– Science (today) necessarily requries a technological
context.
– Tecnology can be understood very broadly (cf. John
Dewey, Larry Hickman): any tools intelligently used to
promote human purposes are technological – including,
e.g., language.
• Philosophy of technology studies the nature of our
technological culture. Technopessimism (Heidegger) vs.
moderate optimism, meliorism (Dewey, Hickman).
• Science and technology studies: taking seriously the
technological context of modern science. Normativity?