Transcript File

The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines
(1941-1945)
• Philippine Executive Commission
• Japanese Propaganda
• Kempei Tai
victorious Japanese soldiers in Bataan
PROVISIONAL COMMONWEALTH COUNCIL OF STATE
p. 319
• came about on Japanese insistence that a central government be
organized as early as possible
Objectives :
a. for the maintenance of peace and order
b. promotion of the well-being of the people under the military administration
30 Filipino leaders
Jorge Vargas
Jose Yulo
Jose P. Laurel
Claro M. Recto
Quintin Paredes
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PROVISIONAL COMMONWEALTH COUNCIL OF STATE
p. 326
Council of State Cabinet members
Benigno S. Aquino - Interior
Jose P. Laurel - Justice
Antonio de las Alas - Finance
Rafael R. Alunan – Agriculture and Commerce
Claro M. Recto – Education, Health and Public Welfare
Quintin Paredes – Public Work and Communications
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PHILIPPINE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION (January 26)
pp. 323 - 325
General Masaharu Homma's order No. 1, blatant order to Vargas to
organize the central administrative organ or the Philippine
Executive Commission
- Vargas, chairman of the Executive Commission
- “execution of administration under the commands and
orders of the Commander-in-chief of the Imperial Japanese forces
- “each department shall have a Japanese adviser and
Japanese assistant advisers”
- “Commander-in-chief of the IJF shall exercise jurisdiction
over judicial courts”
- “commissioners shall be a appointed by the commanderin-chief based on the chairman's recommendation”
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PHILIPPINE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION (January 26)
pp. 323 – 325
-“systems and constitutions of the departments of the central
administrative and the judicial courts shall generally be based upon
what have existed hitherto, provided that their outlines be approved
by the commander-in-chief of the IJF”
-“in the execution of administration, the foremost priority shall be
given to the demands of the IJF”
-"the chairman of the EC and the commissioners of the
departments shall comply with the orders of the commander-inchief regarding any important matter.”
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PHILIPPINE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION (January 26)
pp. 331 - 332
Executive Order No. 3
- abolished Congress and transferred legislative powers to the
Executive Commission
- repealed laws and regulations which discriminated against
Japanese nationals and prevented them from : being employed in
governmental offices; exploiting the natural resources of the
country; engaging in mining and fishing; holding of public lands
and lumbering
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PHILIPPINE EXECUTIVE COMMISSION (January 26)
pp. 364
•the EC which was a Japanese creation acted not as a
deliberative body but a recommending body only
•the most important tool that was fashioned out of Philippine
materials to bring about the changes in the thinking and
actions of the Filipinos
•the Japanese succeeded in curtailing the basic freedoms
and in imposing their will upon the people and their hapless
officials
p. 383
“No one had been much taken advantage of and so abruptly
rejected by the Japanese as Jorge B. Vargas.”
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JAPANESE PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES
AND THE CORRESPONDING FILIPINO REACTION
p. 310
When the Japanese entered Manila on January 2, 1942
INITIAL FILIPINO REACTION : “guns look like toys sold in Japanese
bazaars”, disbelief that the Japanese was capable of defeating the
USAFFE, fear because of rumors that women in the provinces were raped
by the advancing troops, suspicion and finally, nursed hatred that was to
deepen in the days to come”
• from the Filipino standpoint, Japan's occupation policy was seen either
as a pendulum swinging back and forth between appeasement and
coercion or mere political schizophrenia
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JAPANESE PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES
AND THE CORRESPONDING FILIPINO REACTION
p. 311
January 2, proclamation of the commander-in-chief of the IJF
- “end of American sovereignty over the Philippines and the reign
of martial law in all occupied areas”
- “to emancipate you from the oppressive domination of the
U.S.A., letting you establish 'the Philippines for the Filipinos' as a member
of the Co-prosperity Sphere in the Greater East Asia and making you enjoy
your own prosperity and culture”
-''the Army recognizes the freedom of your religion and residence
and has a regard for your usual customs, so far as the Military
Administration admits”
FILIPINO REACTION : Filipinos could not help but laugh for they know that
the Japanese will do to the Philippines what they did to Korea, Manchuria
and China.(p. 312)
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JAPANESE PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES
AND THE CORRESPONDING FILIPINO REACTION
p. 312
issued a “Warning” (January 5)
- “anyone who inflicts, or attempts to inflict an injury upon Japanese soldiers or
individuals shall be shot to death”
- “if the assailant or attempted assailant cannot be found, 10 influential persons
will be held hostage”
p.313
Japanese authorities offered cash prizes for the surrender of firearms
FILIPINO REACTION : Filipinos chuckled at Japanese naiveté for commodities
were so high the prizes were not enough to buy these commodities.(p. 313)
p. 319
Japanese proclamation of 17 acts punishable by death or sever punishment
FILIPINO REACTION : fear for it was even prohibited to go out to use the
latrine in unholy hours of the night but Filipinos did not lose their sense of
humor
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JAPANESE PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES
AND THE CORRESPONDING FILIPINO REACTION
p. 335
Dominant ideas (forced abstract ideals upon the Filipinos)
- “building of the New Philippines”
- “development of the Philippines as a worthy member of the Greater
East Asia Co-prosperity sphere”
-''development of a truly oriental culture”
-''doing away with American influences and way of life”
-other such ideas that would enhance the stature of Japan and the
Japanese in the eyes of the Filipinos
-''becoming once more a genuinely oriental people and by ridding
themselves of the degenerating influence of American culture which is based
upon individualism, liberalism and democracy”
FILIPINO REACTION : Filipinos stood silently adamant and considered every
attempt to persuade them to fathom their Oriental moorings as blasphemy for
they never forgot about the Death March and Camp O' Donnell, deemed these
messages as hypocrisy
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JAPANESE PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES
AND THE CORRESPONDING FILIPINO REACTION
p. 337-340
Japanese acts of inconsistency
- Japanese instructions of Homma to treat the Filipinos with kindness when
during the three years of occupation, Filipinos considered him barbarous and
inhuman.
- Homma spoke of kindness and humane consideration when he was
responsible for the Death March
-Few thoughtful Filipinos believed there was some validity on the Japanese
official's plea for a return to the Oriental culture but blunt and unrestrained
Japanese attacks on individual liberty and democracy was too much to bear.
-Japanese profession of friendship and love for the Filipinos was followed by
all kinds of brutality, injustice and cynicism
FILIPINO REACTION : Filipinos was filled sharply sharply with contempt and
hostility (p. 340)
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JAPANESE PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES
AND THE CORRESPONDING FILIPINO REACTION
p. 341-342
• Japanese atrocities
-robbing, stealing and confiscating foodstuffs like eggs, fruits, bananas,
rice, chickens etc.)
-brutalizing Filipinos (slapping, kicking, bayonetting, raping, abducting and
behaeading)
FILIPINO REACTION : Retaliatory acts of the victims' relatives, sense of
humor as shown on how they called the Japanese “singkit” or “sakang”
and the GEACPS as “Sama-samang Pagnanakawan sa lalong Malaking
Silangang Asya”
• Speeches of General Homma and his subordinates who spoke glowingly
of oriental culture, of the GEACPS and of brotherhood never touched the
hearts of the Filipinos
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JAPANESE PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUES
AND THE CORRESPONDING FILIPINO REACTION
p. 338
Why Japanese propaganda failed in winning the hearts and minds of
Filipinos?
First : THE AVERAGE JAPANESE DID NOT, NOR DID THEY TRY TO
UNDERSTAND THE FILIPINO PSYCHOLOGY.
Second : THE FILIPINOS THEMSELVES DEEPLY MISTRUSTED
THE JAPANESE FROM THE BEGINNING.
Third : THE JAPANESE MILITARY USED FORCE TO PERSUADE
FILIPINOS TO COOPERATE WITH THEM.
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THE KEMPEI TAI
( JAPANESE MILITARY POLICE )
• from the outset of the occupation years, majority of the Filipinos
feared or dreaded the Kempei Tai
•
Kempei or Kempei Tai = torture methods
• if someone was brought to a Kempei Tai detachment or
substation, he was as good as dead
•
spearhead of Japanese military rule in the Philippines
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THE KEMPEI TAI
( JAPANESE MILITARY POLICE )
Objectives :
a. Occupation and subjugation
-prevent looting and plundering of Japanese soldiers from slapping faces;
discipline Japanese troops
-preservation or maintenance of peace and order in areas were
detachments are located
(arrest and punish Filipino anti-Japanese propaganda groups; violators of
military laws; criminals; and guerillas and anti-Japanese espionage or
intelligence groups)
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THE KEMPEI TAI
( JAPANESE MILITARY POLICE )
Objectives :
b. Ensuring the success of Intelligence work
-spy on individuals or groups involved in anti-Japanese activities
-employ local and foreign informers or agents because most of the
Kempeis spoke neither English nor any of the other native dialects
(loyalists or sympathizers; paid local and foreign I informers; opportunists;
people fighting for survival; bribed former prisoners, those threatened and
had families held as hostages by the Kempeis)
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THE KEMPEI TAI
( JAPANESE MILITARY POLICE )
Why the Kempei Tai failed in their objectives?
-most Japanese soldiers were not in full agreement with the policy of
leniency as instructed by Kempei Tai commander-in-chief Nagahama
-few Kempeis were assigned in the Philippines that made it difficult to
control the Japanese soldiers
-the language barrier that caused misunderstandings and
misinterpretations that led to deaths of many innocent Filipinos
- the use of force or intimidation in the implementation of peace and order
that many victims were killed on mere suspicion that they were guerillas
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THE KEMPEI TAI
( JAPANESE MILITARY POLICE )
Why the Kempei Tai failed in their objectives?
-“zonas” that were launched made Filipinos suffer economic hardships
and alienated the Japanese more
-unreliable Filipino and Japanese interpreters that were contributed to the
failure of its intelligence and spying activities
-Kempeis behaved arrogantly in the Philippines as they did in pre-war
Japan which incurred the ire of Japanese civilians
- war situation intensified the horrid behavior of some of the Kempeis
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The Escolta of the Pre-War Period
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