Transcript Alternatives to Realism and Idealism

Military and Economy
Lsn 13
Military Instrument of Power
• The military instrument of power must
have the capability to conduct sustained
peacetime engagement activities as well
as respond to two general types of crises
(those with significant escalation potential
and those without)
– Peacetime engagement activities lay the
groundwork necessary to ensure crisis
operations are not conducted off-the-cuff
Carl von Clausewitz
• Prussian officer born in 1780
• Resigned his commission in
1812 and joined the Russian
Army to fight Napoleon
• Ideas on war were heavily
influenced by the mass
popular warfare of the French
Revolutionary period and
Napoleon’s Prussian
adversary Gerhard von
Scharnhorst
• Died in 1831 and his wife
published his On War in 1832
Carl von Clausewitz
• War is neither an art nor a science
– It is a continuation of “policy” (or “politics”) by
other means.
– A form of social intercourse
• War is like a wrestling match
– It is “an act of force to compel our enemy to
do our will.”
– But it is not unilateral. It is a contest between
two independent wills.
Carl von Clausewitz
• Used a trinitarian analysis consisting of (1) primordial
violence, hatred, and enmity; (2) the play of chance and
probability; and (3) war’s element of subordination to
rational policy
– Often loosely expressed as “the people, the military,
and the government”
• Analyzed “absolute war” or “war in theory,” but then
noted that factors such as poor intelligence, chance,
friction, etc make war in practice different than war in the
abstract (the “fog of war”)
• Argued one should focus his military efforts against the
enemy’s “center of gravity” (“Schwerpunkt”)
– Very important concept in modern American military
doctrine
Albert Thayer Mahan
• US naval officer who lived from 1840 to
1914
• Wrote The Influence of Sea Power
Upon History, 1660-1783 and The
Influence of Sea Power upon the
French Revolution and Empire, 17931812
• Considered “sea power” to include the
overlapping concepts of command of
the sea through naval superiority and
that combination of maritime
commerce, overseas possessions, and
privileged access to foreign markets
that produces national “wealth and
greatness”
Albert Thayer Mahan
• Advocated
– “that overbearing power on the sea which drives the
enemy’s flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a
fugitive”
– “(1) Production; (2) Shipping: (3) Colonies and
Markets– in a word, sea power”
• Thought the Navy should be used offensively
and that its principle object should be
destruction of the enemy’s fleet
– Destroying the enemy’s battle fleet would in turn
cause his merchant fleet to find the sea untenable
Albert Thayer Mahan
• Saw the Navy’s economic strangulation of
France by blockade as the key to Britain’s defeat
of Napoleon
– “It was not by attempting great military operations on
land, but by controlling the sea, and through the sea
the world outside Europe,” that the British “ensured
the triumph of their country.”
• Critics argue that Mahan confused a necessary
or important cause with the sufficient cause
– The British Navy was important, but the Army and
diplomacy also played key roles
Albert Thayer Mahan
• Increasingly became an imperialist in
order to gain control of the resources the
US needed to best use its naval power
• Considered the navy to be a better
instrument of national policy than the army
– This was especially true for the United States
which had “neither the tradition nor the design
to act aggressively beyond the seas,” but at
the same time had “very important
transmarine interests which need protection”
Giulio Douhet
• Italian air power theorist who lived
from 1869 to 1930
• Saw air power as a way for Italy to
overcome its inherent weaknesses in
manpower and natural resources
– But to become the dominant weapon it
could be, aircraft had to be freed from
the control of ground commanders who
did not understand the new capability
– Advocated the creation of a separate air
arm to be commanded by airmen
Giulio Douhet
• Saw airpower as being able to crush the
enemy’s will to fight by destroying or
neutralizing a country’s “vital centers”–
those elements of society, government,
and industry essential to the functioning of
the state
– It could do so without the need for the bloody
commitment of ground forces that had made
World War I so costly
Giulio Douhet
• Douhet recognized the importance of targeting
– Aircraft could strike virtually anything but in order to
be most forceful they should not attempt to strike
everything
• Instead, focus on the five basic target systems
that Douhet considered the vital centers of a
modern country
– Industry, transportation infrastructure, communication
nodes, and the will of the people
– The will of the people was the most important target
– Douhet did not advocate aircraft attacking or
supporting ground forces; airpower was to be used
strategically, not tactically
Navy
• Safeguards
maritime
commerce
• Shows the flag
• Enables land
power
Air Force
• Maximizes technology
• “Gratification without commitment”
• Sends a message, but seldom can be
decisive
Army
• Can achieve
decisive results
• Provides “boots on
the ground”
• Represents
maximum
commitment
• Very costly
(casualties, time,
logistics, etc)
Traditional Military Strategies
• Attrition
– The reduction of the effectiveness of a
force caused by loss of personnel and
materiel
• Exhaustion
– The gradual erosion of a nation’s will or
means to resist
• Annihilation
– Seeks the immediate destruction of the
combat power of the enemy’s armed forces
Case Study
The Korean War
Divided Korea
• After World War II,
Japan’s former colony
of Korea was divided
into two occupation
zones along the 38th
parallel with the Soviet
zone in the north and
the US zone in the
south
• Before the occupation
forces departed, an
anticommunist regime
was established in the
south and a communist
one in the north
US in Asia
• The US was uncertain as to the
extent of its commitment in
Asia
• It knew its umbrella definitely
covered Japan, Okinawa, and
the Philippines, but it was
unclear about Taiwan, South
Korea, and Southeast Asia
• Believing the US did not intend
to protect South Korea, the
USSR allowed the North
Koreans to invade the south in
1950
Secretary of State Dean
Acheson’s speech to the
National Press Club
omitted South Korea from
the US “defensive
perimeter”
North Korea Attacks:
June 25, 1950
• North Korean army crossed the
38th parallel with an invasion
force totaling over 90,000 troops
and 150 Soviet-built tanks
• By the night of June 28, Seoul
had fallen and the South Korean
forces were in disarray
• South Korea appealed to the
United Nations for assistance
• The UN passed a resolution
recommending that “the members
of the United Nations furnish such
assistance to the Republic of
Korea as may be necessary to
repel the armed attack and to
restore international peace and
security to the area.”
United Nations
• As a member of the UN Security Council, the Soviet
Union could have vetoed UN involvement in the war, but
instead Moscow was boycotting the Security Council at
the time in protest of the UN’s failure to seat a
representative of the newly established People’s
Republic of China
• In the absence of the USSR, the UN passed a resolution
sending a military force to South Korea
• The force was predominately American with Douglas
MacArthur as the Supreme Commander
– There were also substantial contributions from the
UK, Canada and other Commonwealth countries.
Force Comparison
• North Korean People’s
Army (NKPA)
– 14 Divisions (9 in
invasion force)
– Soviet trained, armed
and advised
– 150 tanks, almost 100
modern aircraft
• U.S. Armed Forces in
1950
– 10 Army divisions (4
in Japan)
– 48 USAF air groups
– 331 combatants (64 in
Pacific)
– 2 Marine divisions (-)
Task Force Smith
• To stem the North
Korea advance, the
US deployed “Task
Force Smith,” a
delaying force of two
reinforced rifle
companies to Pusan
• MacArthur thought
this “arrogant
display of strength”
would cause the
North Koreans to
take pause and slow
their aggression
Elements of Task
Force Smith arriving
at Taejon
Task Force Smith
• Task Force Smith began
occupying defensive positions on
July 5 at 3:00 am
– At 7:00 they began seeing enemy
movement
– At 8:16 they began firing artillery
– At 2:30 the commander decided to
withdraw
• When LTC Smith arrived at
Ch’onan on July 6, he counted
185 men
– He began with 540
• After all stragglers returned, the
total loss to TF Smith was 35%
Implications of Task Force Smith
• Task Force Smith has become the
poster child for the cost of military
unpreparedness
• “No more Task Force Smiths”
– GEN Gordon Sullivan, Army Chief of Staff,
1991-1995 (administered the post Desert
Storm Army downsizing)
“Hollow Army”
- World War II peak Army strength was 8,268,000
- 89 combat divisions in June 1945
- June 1950 strength was about 591,000 (1/14 the
peak World War II size)
- 10 active combat divisions
- But to keep them fielded, one battalion from
each infantry regiment and one firing battery
from each field artillery battalion had been
eliminated
- This move effectively reduced combat power
by 1/3
Far East Command (FEC)
• 108,500 troops under MacArthur
• 4 infantry divisions in Japan (7th, 24th, 25th and 1st Cavalry)
• Authorized peacetime divisions strength was 12,500 (13,500 for the
25th )
• Authorized wartime strength was 18,900
• 3 of the 4 divisions in Japan had about 11,000 men
• In addition to the missing infantry and artillery battalions each
• Lacked three anti aircraft artillery batteries
• Lacked the regimental tank companies
• Had only a company of M24 Chaffee light tanks in place of the
divisional tank battalion
• Estimated the divisions could field 62% of normal infantry firepower,
69% of normal anti-aircraft capability, and 14% of armored support
Equipment in FEC
• Mostly outdated World War II equipment and much of it
was unserviceable
– Of 18,000 jeeps only 8,000 were serviceable
– Of 13,780 2 1/2 ton trucks, only 4,441 were
serviceable
• Had none of the new 3.5 inch antitank rocker launchers
– Only the 2.36 inch Bazooka which had proved
inadequate in 1944 – 1945
• Hydraulic fluid for recoil mechanisms in the M24 tanks had
been on backorder for two years, so most of their 75 mm
guns had never been fired
• Some men were wearing tennis shoes because of a lack
of boots
• ¼ of the small arms were defective
Training Problems
• Occupation duties took
precedence over training
• No unit training above the
company level had taken
place in Eighth Army before
April 1949
• Limited maneuver area
and an annual personnel
turnover rate of 43%
impeded training
• The four divisions were
rated as 65% to 84% combat
ready
– Some senior officers
felt that 40% was more
realistic
US troops parade across
the Yoshida Bridge
Pusan Perimeter:
June 27 to Sept 15
• The American forces
were unprepared for the
North Korean attack
• By the end of July, the
North Koreans had
pushed the UN forces to
the southeast corner of
the peninsula, where they
dug in around the port of
Pusan.
Korean War Case Study
• What role did diplomatic communications play in
the North Korean decision to attack?
• How was “risk” not properly considered in the
configuring of the post World War II US Army?
• How did the American application of its military
power in Korea fail in its peacetime engagement
activity?
• How did it fail in its response to a crisis?
Instruments of Power
Economic
Economic Instrument of Power
• Nations pursue the economic instrument
of power to obtain broadly conceived
welfare goals including security, prestige,
autonomy, and access to markets and
sources of supply all designed to enhance
domestic economic growth
• Economic power is influenced by a
nation’s people, technology, financial
resources, and raw materials
Economic Instrument of Power
• People
– Acquisition, preparation, production,
management, and innovation all depend on
human resources
– A motivated and dedicated population can
create many conditions of economic
greatness despite the lack of raw materials
– Japan is a good example
Post World War II Japan
• Japan’s large and mostly
compliant work force fueled an
economy based on
manufactured goods slated for
export to markets with higher
labor costs like the US
• In the 1960s the Japanese used
their profits to switch to more
capital-intensive manufacturing
but “Made in Japan” usually was
associated with a cheap product
Economic Instrument of Power
• Technology
– People alone cannot manufacture products or
provide services
– Technology is required to enable an economy
to alter, modify, build, or turn materials into
products faster, better, and cheaper than
before
– Technology involves the application of science
towards solving a particular objective or to
produce selected products
Post World War II Japan
• In the 1970s, Japan
took advantage of a
highly trained and
educated work force
to shift their economy
toward
technologicallyintensive products
and “Made in Japan”
came to represent
state of the art
technology
Sony turntable
Economic Instrument of Power
• Financial Resources
– Required for a nation to expand its economic
power
– Allow nations to invest in new plants and
equipments, conduct research, purchase raw
materials, hire and educate labor, and provide
resources in an emergency
– Financial resources can be acquired by
savings and/or increased trade
Post World War II Japan
• During the 1980s Japan used its strong economy to
greatly expand its investments abroad, especially in the
US
• One survey reported that in 1970 there were only 12 US
manufacturing companies in which Japanese firms held
more than 50 % of the stock
– By 1985, there were nearly 400 such companies, plus
more than 500 Japanese-owned plants.
Japanese direct
investment flows
1980–90 ($ million)
Economic Instrument of Power
• Raw Materials
– Include minerals,
metals, and energy
sources
– Growing economies
often outstrip
domestic supplies
Petroleum refinery in
Saudi Arabia
Post World War II Japan
• Japan lacks abundant internal raw resources
• In 2008 it held a trade fair aimed at boosting investment
in Africa, in part to compete with China for a share of
Africa’s oil resources
Economic Instrument of Power
• Economic Tools
– Improve domestic capability to out-compete potential
foes
• Large part of President Reagan’s strategy to defeat the
USSR during the 1980s
– Provide instant, direct assistance to a country in need
• The Marshall Plan helped Europe recover after World War II
– Debt forgiveness
• In 1991 the US fully forgave Egypt’s military debt in
recognition of Egypt’s role in forging the Desert Storm
coalition
– Sanctions
• Throughout the 1980s the US imposed sanctions on Libya for
being a state sponsor of terrorism
Case Study
Marshall Plan
Marshall Plan
• The economic devastation suffered
by Europe in World War II made
many European countries vulnerable
to the spread of communism
• On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State
George Marshall called on the
Europeans themselves to draw up a
plan for European recovery, which
the US would then financially support.
• In four years, the US would contribute
$13 billion.
Dresden, 1944
Berlin, 1945
Results of the Marshall Plan
Hamburg's Moenckebergstrasse in the business
district at the end of the war (left) and in 1950 (right).
Results of the Marshall Plan
Results of the Marshall Plan
• By 1951 Marshall Plan
countries had raised their
industrial output 40% over
1938.
• Dramatic economic recovery
both reduced the threat of
the spread of communism to
western Europe and set that
region on the road to
independence in world
affairs.
• Offer extended to eastern
bloc countries but USSR
ensured there are no takers.
• Marshall awarded Nobel
Peace Prize in 1953.
Case Study
The Continental System
Napoleonic Wars: Trafalgar
• In the Napoleonic era, the British navy
dominated the sea while the French army
dominated the European continent
• Napoleon hoped to draw the British fleet
away from the English Channel where it
blocked a French invasion
Trafalgar
• British Admiral Horatio Nelson and French Admiral Pierre
de Villeneuve met off Cape Trafalgar on the southern tip
of the Spanish coast on Oct 20, 1805
• The British gained one of the most decisive victories in
naval history
– The British took or destroyed 18 of the enemy’s 34
ships of the line while losing none of their own
• Trafalgar gave the British undisputed control of the seas
and the French were confined to the land and made
vulnerable to strikes from the coast
Continental System
• With Britain safe from attack, Napoleon turned
more energetically to economic warfare
• In Nov 1806, he established the Continental
System which sought to blockade the British
Isles and close the ports of France and its
satellites to ships coming from Britain or its
colonies
• The idea was to ruin Britain’s trade-based
economy by eliminating its chief market
• By the fall of 1807, all the nations of continental
Europe except Portugal and Sweden had joined
the Continental System
Continental System
• Enforcing the Continental System proved
difficult because:
– Europeans had become reliant on cheap
British goods
– The British worked around the system through
smuggling and bribery
– The system hurt the French too
Peninsular War
• Napoleon’s efforts to enforce the
Continental System eventually led him into
battle on the Iberian Peninsula
– Napoleon arranged with the king of Spain to
attack Portugal through Spain
– Although Napoleon occupied Portugal easily
he ultimately became embroiled in a guerrilla
war in Spain and Portugal that greatly
weakened his empire
Case Study
Yom Kippur War and the 1973 Oil
Embargo
The Yom Kippur War (1973)
• Egypt attacked Israel along
the entire front of the Suez
Canal on Saturday, Oct 6,
both the Jewish Sabbath
as well as the holy Day of
Atonement (Yom Kippur)
• Syria simultaneously
attacked in the Golan
Heights
• The Egyptians were able to
defeat Israeli armored
attacks with Sagger
antitank missiles provided
by Russia
Israeli tank driving by
wounded soldiers
The Yom Kippur War (1973)
• President Nixon promised, “We will not let
Israel go down the tubes.”
– On October 13 he ordered a massive
airlift of military material to Israel
• Newly arrived US TOW antitank missiles
helped Israel destroy 200 Egyptian tanks in
a subsequent battle
The 1973 Oil Embargo
• On October 20, Saudi
Arabia began embargoing
oil shipments to the US to
punish the Americans for
supporting Israel
• By October 21 most of the
Arab members of the
Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries
(OPEC) had joined the
embargo
Gas lines during
the oil embargo
The 1973 Oil Embargo
• The US was importing between
10 and 15% of its oil from the
Middle East
• The US was plunged into an
energy crisis and gas prices
soared
• The embargo was finally lifted
in March 1974 but prices
remained high
• America’s vulnerability to
foreign oil had been exposed
• The Yom Kippur War and the
ensuing oil embargo showed
the political and economic
power of OPEC
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