Transcript Rigid War Plans!

International Security
and Peace
WWI
Prof. Jaechun Kim
WORLD WAR I
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Ask two critical questions!
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What were the political objectives?
What were the causes?
Why do we have to care about WWI?
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The first global war: 65 million men mobilized, 11-12 million lost lives more
than 21 million wounded; civilians suffered great casualties…
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The whole society was mobilized… the civilian population worked as never
before…
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Repercussions in Int’l Relations: Beginning of drop Europe as center of power;
Emergence of US as a great power
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End of Imperialism… and colonialism…
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Revulsion followed enthusiasm after the war: optimism about the
liberal capitalism… belief in progress and mankind… rise of
communism and fascism…
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Extraordinary scholarly attention with regard to cause of WWI 
“theory of inadvertent war”
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War is not a deliberate choice of leaders
War breaks out because of intl systemic pressure that cause war that no one
really wants…
Backgrounds - Int’l Environment
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Bismarck formed the Three Emperor’s League between G, Italy,
and Austria-Hungary  Triple Alliance in 1882
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B then signs secret treaties with Russians  Reinsurance
Treaties  Isolation of France
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William II clashed with B in Prussian policy toward
Russia… B resigns in 1890
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William II didn’t renew Reinsurance Treaty with Russians
 “Russo-Franco Alliance”
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Dual Entente in 1895 between France and R
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France would support R if R was attacked by G
R would support F if F was attacked by G
If any member of the Triple Alliance mobilizes, both France and
Russians would mobilize…
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Britain abandons policy of “splendid isolation.” Why?
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Britain now begins to look for allies. Anglo-Japanese
Alliance(1902). Entente Cordiale (1904) with France.
Then treaty with Russia
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Triple Entente was formed against Triple Alliance
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The war to end all wars?
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The first crisis between Germany and France (over Morocco
in 1905)
•
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Second crisis: Austrian annexation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (1908)  Serbia backed by Russia vs. Austria
backed by Germany
•
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Germans sending gunboats to Agadir…
Fourth Crisis: Two Balkan Wars, 1914 & 1913
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Russia was not ready for war…
Third Crisis (over Morocco again): Agadir Crisis (1911)
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Kaiser giving speech supporting the independence of Morocco
Serbia emerging the most powerful on the Balkan…
Great tension between Serbia and Austria…
The assassination on July 28ty 1914 was the event which
sparked off a whole series of events and crises; these crises
culminated in the outbreak of WWI…
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Backgrounds-Social Structures and Moods
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Oligarchic state structure and fears of upheaval
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“Even if everything now goes smash, it will be all worth it!” War was a
relief from internal tensions… (German minister for war)
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Particularly on Balkans… Panslavism and Pangermanism…
Social Darwinism
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Period of huge military build-up… Germany - universal conscription; large
reserves; detailed war planning… armies and navies were expanding…
Huge influence of military… civilians weren’t involved in military plans..
War is glorious and even fun!!
(Blind) Nationalism
•
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Oligarchs were not interested in reforms… wanted wars abroad…
War came as relief from internal tensions…
Systemic militarism
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But because of industrial revolution, the new middle class was growing… new proletariat
class… and they wanted reform
Doctrine of racial superiority
Imperialism… Social Darwinism justified the imperialism…
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Causes (Interpretations) of WWI
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Inadvertent War Thesis – Fischer Thesis
(Third Level)
(First Level)
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Inadvertent War Thesis claim that the third level
factors such as the Cult of Offensive, Interlocking
Mobilization System (i.e., rigid war plans), and Alliance
System under the multi-polar system that existed in
th
Europe in the early 19 century led to WWI !!
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Multi-polar system that existed in Europe
led to WWI….
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Tight alliance system, rigid war plans
based on cult of offensive, and system of
interlocking mobilization is to blame…
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P Bracken, P Kennedy, S Van Evera,
T Schelling, M Howard, R Ned Lebow
P Bracken: “The war systems of the day stimulated each
other into a frenzy. Political leaders lost control of the
tremendous momentum built up when their armies went on
alert.”
Schelling: “a great starting of engines, a clutching and gearing
and releasing of brakes and gathering momentum until the
machines were on collision course.”
Howard: “armies were juggernauts which even their own
generals could hardly control.”
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How did the “system” dictate the logic?
(1)
Rigid War Plans!
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War plans were worked out in advance down to the last detail
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Very rigid… Could not be adjusted to changing situations
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War plans had a momentum of their own! Statesmen could
not modify them…
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In the war planning process itself, political considerations
were never really taken into account! The plans were
elaborated on the basis of military considerations… (at odds
with Clausewitz…)
Ned Lebow: “The German Army’s almost total autonomy enabled
it to plan for war in a political vacuum. When the July crisis came,
G’s political leaders were confronted with a military plan that had
been formulated solely with reference to narrow organizational
criteria and requirements.”
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Schilieffen Plan
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Conversation between German Ambassador in Britain and
the Kaiser
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Alfred von Schilieffen
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In case of war, attack France first, then attack Russia… 
can’t fight both F and R at the same time…
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Decisive victory over France  British neutrality…; It was
believed that Russians would take about 6 weeks to
mobilize..
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March through Belgium…
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Britain – Belgian security treaty… and Russians moved
rather quickly to eastern border!
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The rigidity of Russian military plan
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Russian plans called for immediate attack against both A-H and
Germany
P Kennedy of History Dept at Yale: “The Russians possibly possessed the
most inflexible plan of all, and their inability to mobilize separately against A-H
proved to be one of the most fateful errors of the July crisis.”
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Political leaders were ignorant of the military plans
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Political leaders in Germany didn’t understand that if they attack
Belgium and France, they would invite Brits into the war. Russian
leaders didn’t know their war plan required mobilization against
both AH and G…
•
They didn’t understand the consequences of their order to
mobilize…
Schilieffen Plan
(2) Cult of Offensive (Stephen Van Evera) and theory of
offense - defense balance…
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Offense had the advantage over Defense
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Van Evera: Germany’s expansionist policy was rooted in a (baseless) belief
that the offense had the advantage.
Firepower enhancing technology – favors defense!
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Clausewitz: Defense is always easier in land warfare because of the
advantages of cover and the capability to choose and prepare terrain and
fortify positions
•
Van Evera: If the military realities had been understood, if the actual power of
the defense had been understood, the whole system would have been much
more stable.
Leaders didn’t understand the meaning of technological
change… that introduced firepower enhancing technology…
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War could and should be won by quick and decisive offense…
Windows of opportunities are closing… because of the construction
of Russian railroads.. So win wars quickly!
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S plan was a highly offensive-oriented war plan..
(3) Interlocking mobilization system
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S plan – by mobilizing rapidly and then attacking in the west G
would be able to defeat F before facing R…
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The Germans could not allow a Russian general mobilization to run
its course w/o ordering their own mobilization and in fact attacking
France…
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By mobilizing rapidly and then attacking in the west G would be able
to defeat F before having to face Russians…
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Russian Mobilization would lead to German mobilization, and under
the German war plan mobilization meant war against France!
Because it mandated surprise attack of France…  interlocked!!!
Lloyd George (Prime Minister of Britain): “The governments of Europe
simply stumbled and staggered into war.”
(4) Tight alliance system under multipolar
international system…
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Chain-ganging…
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Validity of Inadvertent War Theory
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In order for the inadvertent war theory to hold
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lack of understanding (on the part of the political
leaders)
 Russian leaders did not understand that their
mobilization would lead to German mobilization…
 German
leaders did not understand the
implications of S plan…
•
political leaders were not free “agents”
 “Moltke had superseded the Chancellor in all but
names.” “The military logic took over…”
 Sazonov in Russia lost control over the situations
 No room for political leaders to maneuver…
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Fischer Thesis (Fritz Fischer)
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Minimalist Germany-blaming view
: G might have risked a continental war, but G
preferred the prewar status quo to a continental war.
G knowingly risked a continental war.
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Intermediate G-blaming view
: G preferred a continental war to the prewar status
quo, but she preferred the prewar status quo to a
great war. Fischer school moderates.
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Maximalist G-blaming view
: G preferred a great war (including GB) to the prewar
status quo; decision to fight against France and Russia
was already made
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Which is more convincing, Fischer thesis or
systemic theory?
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Clausewitz and WWI
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War plans (S plan of Germany and Russian war plan)
were based on military considerations w/o political
considerations  separation between military and
political…
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War plans did not adjust to changing situations…
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War plans were not based on the fact that political
considerations should precede military means…
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What were the political aims that Germany was pursuing? Did means match to
pursue these goals?
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Expansion of territories… annexation of Belgium and Eastern France (maybe
Poland and Lithuania, too…)
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Germany: By the and of 1914 it was obvious that their previous war plans
would not work…
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Peace could have been available earlier… The Allied terms were still not that
harsh
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Withdrawal to her prewar frontiers in the west
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The abandonment of Alsace-Lorraine
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Indemnity for Belgium
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Creation of independent Poland
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German leadership was fighting for objectives
that could be obtained only by total victory…
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Erich von Ludendorff’s bent on total victory (or
absolute war)…
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Absolute war involves total subordination of
politics to war efforts.
Civil-Military Relations in Germany before and
during the WWI
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Gen. Erich von Ludendorff and his bent on absolute
war
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Classic example of militaristic society
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Military assuming large role in public life
Military supported by powerful interest groups…
Political leaders were onlookers..
Public had confidence in military leadership…
Ludendorff’s war aim included expansion of
territories – annexation of Belgium and Eastern
France… basically unatainable…
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Ludendorff vs. Bethmann
Firing of Foreign Minister…
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Unrestricted submarine warfare (1918)
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Toward 1916 G could not attain a decisive
victory as planned…
But Ludendorff ordering indiscriminate
submarine warfare…
Rejecting Woodrow Wilson’s peace terms…
Dissolving Reichstag…
*Georges Clemenceau (French Prime Minister):
“War is too serious a business to be left
exclusively in the hands of generals.”
Some of the Characteristics of Battlefields
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Influence of Clausewitz on battlefields
 “buffalo” tactics – violent frontal assaults
 Deadlock of trench warfare
 War of Attrition
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Blind emphasis on moral forces  Élan in France
(600,000 casualties during first six months of the war)
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Skeptical of strategic maneuver;
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Accumulation of maximum force at the decisive point in
order to defeat the enemy main force in battle;
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The conduct of operations so as to inflict the
greatest possible number of losses on the enemy;
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One more push or more will power would earn
victory;
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Desperate attempts by soldiers field to redefine old
concepts of courage and valor;
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Dogged refusal to be put off by heavy casualties;
WORLD WAR II
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WWII in context
* About 60 million people were dead
* Truly world wide war
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National Policies and Ideas
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Germany
• practiced creative history!
• V treaty were too harsh  Lebensraum
• Rise of Hitler
Japan
• Militarism appears in Japan.. Dominate foreign
policies and national ideas..
• A sugar-coated self image
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Italy
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Britain and France
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Russia
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weakened by WWI
Bolshevik Revolution & Aftermath
How the Storm Gathered
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Non-aggression pact at Locarno in 1925
Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact in 1928
World-wide economic depression – 1929
Hitler comes into power in 1933
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Hitler’s recoveries & conquests
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The Rhineland (industrial heartland of G) 1936
Austria 1938 – assassination of Chancellor
Dollfuss
Czech 1938-39 - demanded Sudentenland
 Munich conference *Emil Hacha..
Poland next – 1939 (Sept. 1)
Far East
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Japan invaded Taiwan (1895), Korea(1905),
Manchuria, and China…
The US wanted neutrality until late 1930s
Pearl Harbor (Dec. 7th 1941)
Origins (Causes) of WWII
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Hitler blaming view
Cf. AJP Taylor, Origins of the Second World War
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3rd level explanation to the outbreak of WWII
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Problems in multi-polar system
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K. Waltz and BOP theory
Chain-ganging
Buck-passing
Why is bipolar system stable compared to multi-polar
system?
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Neither chain ganging nor buck passing
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Chain ganging and buck passing and advantage
of offense and defense
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Cult of defensive and WWII
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Military-fueled cult of offensive vs. civilian-based
cult of defensive – WWI  spiral process in
which alliance dynamics magnified the
consequences of local disputes, turning them
into global issues. WWII  deterrence failure in
which buck-passing diplomacy by the status quo
powers encouraged expansionist powers to risk
aggression!
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German Strategy
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Strategy of Piecemeal Expansion
Strategy of limited liability and buck-passing
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Soviet Union
: Stalin-Soviet Union would not pull others’
chestnuts out of the fire; Stlalin to Khruschev
- Couldn’t they put up any resistance at all?
France : pass the cost to Brits (buck-passing)
Britain : strategy of limited liability
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Churchill: “There was never a war in all history
easier to prevent by timely action than the one
which has just desolated such great areas of
the globe.”
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Why did the W Democracies adopted a
strategy of appeasement?
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2nd level explanation-Democratic Peace?