Transcript ATT2613880 - CREC-TAH

SOME THOUGHTS ON Problems
in U.S. Policy During the Era
of the Holocaust
Peter Black, Senior Historian
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
April 28, 2011
Reference Copy.
For additional uses please contact the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
INTRODUCTION:
Three Problems:
1.Immigration & shelter to
refugees
2.Knowledge of Holocaust
3.Action to Stop Holocaust
U.S. IMMIGRATION Policy, 1919-1941
I. 1924 Immigration Act
A. Hostility to Immigrants
1. Hostility to Jews & Catholics
2. Asian entry banned in 1882
3. Africans not permitted to
enter
U.S. Immigration Policy, 1919-1941
B. Mistrust of Europe & Europeans
1. Concern about Communism
2. Struggle Between Management &
Left-Wing Labor Unions
3. Ceiling Quota, 1929: 151,774 per
year
4. 309,782 Germans, Austrians &
Czech Jews applied for visas
U.S. Immigration Policy, 1919-1941
II. IMPACT OF DEPRESSION
A. Concern about Jobs
B. Concern about Communism
1. Sympathies in U.S. with stand of Fascist Italy
& Nazi Germany on Communists
2. Willingness to buy Nazi & Fascist
propaganda on getting out of Depression
a. Class reconcilation—workers should know
their place
b. Depression broke left-wing labor movement
U.S. Immigration Policy, 1919-1941
C. LPC Clause of 1917 Immigration Act
1. Likely to Become Public Charge Clause
a. directed at persons lacking mental &
physical skills for employment
b. Possible interpretation: unable to get
a job under current market conditions
2. September 1930—President Hoover
announced application of this
interpretation to restrict inflow of
immigrants
U.S. Immigration Policy, 1919-1941
D. Attitude toward minorities
1. Anti-Semitism
a. 1920: 3,2 Million Jews in U.S.
1930: 4.4 Million (out of 122,775,000, just under
3.6% of population)
b. 2,885,000 had immigrated, 1881-1930
(87% from Eastern Europe)
c. Link with Communism—Red Scare & Labor Unrest
of 1918-1919
d. Sons of 19th Century immigrants entering
Protestant society
U.S. Immigration Policy, 1919-1941
2. Hostility & indifference to AfroAmericans
a. 1920s: Jim Crow legislation
still being passed
b. 1937-defeat of Law Requiring
Federal authorities to investigate
race murders when locals would
not investigate
JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S. 1914-1937
• 1914: 1,218,000 (Jews: 138,051—11.33%)
– 1921: 119,036 Jewish immigrants
– 1922: 54,000 Jewish immigrants
– 1923: 50,000 Jewish immigrants
• 1924: 707,000
– 1925: 10,267 Jewish immigrants
– 1926: 11,483 Jewish immigrants
– 1927: 11,629 Jewish immigrants
• 1928: 307,000 (Jews: 11,639--3.79%)
• 1929: 279,678 (Jews: 12,479--4.46%)
• 1930: 241,700 (Jews: 11,526--4.77%)
• 1931:
97,139 (Jews: 5,692—5.86%)
• 1932:
36,576 (Jews: 2,755—7.53%)
• 1933:
23,068 (Jews: 2,372—10.3%)
• 1934:
29,470 (Jews: 4,134—14.3%)
• 1935:
34,956 (Jews: 4,837—13.8%)
• 1936:
36,329 (Jews: 6,252—17.2%)
• 1937:
50,244 (Jews: 11,352—22.6%)
•
1933-1937: 28,947 (16.62% of immigrants)
JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S. 1914-1937
•1938: 19,736 Jews (30% of
immigrants)
•1939: 43,450 (52.35% of all
immigrants)
•1940: 36,945 (52.21% of all
immigrants)
•1941: 23,737 (45.85% of all
immigrants)
1938-1941: 123,868 (45.3% of
JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S. 1938-1945
1939-1945: appr.
140,000 Jewish
immigrants
1942-1945: appr.
35,868
POST-WAR JEWISH IMMIGRATION TO U.S.
•1946: 15,535 Jewish immigrants
•1947: 25,885 Jewish immigrants
•1948: 12,300 Jewish immigrants
•1948-1952: appro. 80,000 Jewish
immigrants under DP Act
Total, 1946-1952: 133,720
U.S. Immigration Policy, 1919-1941
IV. Weakness of Roosevelt
administration
A. 1938/1942 elections: Republicans
win
B. 1937—Court Packing
C. 1940—Roosevelt, 3rd Term
D. Enemy Aliens after 1941
E. U.S. Self-image: A world power?
U.S. Immigration Policy, 1919-1941
V. Wagner-Rogers Bill
A. Feb 1939, rejection of
Wagner-Rogers bill to
bring in 20,000
children above quota
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
VI. S.S. ST. LOUIS
A.
938 passengers (one died en
route)
1. 743 had applied for U.S. visas
2. 22 had U.S. visas & could
disembark
3. 6 more could legally disembark
Emigration
Passengers aboard the "St. Louis." These refugees from Nazi Germany were forced to
return to Europe after both Cuba and the U.S. denied them entry. May or June 1939.
U.S. Immigration Policy, 1919-1941
VI. S.S. ST. LOUIS—June 1939
B. 908 returned to Europe (JDC Negotiations)
1. 1 non-refugee returned to Hungary
2. 288 to Great Britain
3. 620 returned to continent (254 died)
a. Belgium: 214 (died: 84)
b. Holland: 181 (died: 84)
c. France: 224 (died: 86)
C. 87 emigrated before May 1940
D. 278 survived the Holocaust in Europe
U.S. Immigration Policy, 1919-1941
VII. How Many Jews in Danger?
A. 213,000 Jews left Germany in May 1939.
B. 94,601 Jews left in Austria in May 1939
C. Increasing concern that general public
believed that arrival of more Jews
would increase pressure for U.S.
involvement in war, 1939-1941.
D. Polish & Romanian Jews seeking
religious freedom & economic opportunity
POLLING DATA:
ATTITUDES
TOWARDS JEWS
IN THE U.S.
Source:
Charles H. Stember et al., Jews in the Mind of America (New York:
Basic Books, 1966).
IS PREJUDICE AGAINST Jews
Increasing or Decreasing in U.S.?
Increasing (%)
Decreasing (%)
Aug-37
29
23
Nov-38
37
18
Dec-38
33
46
Mar-39
45
17
Sep-39
42
11
Apr-40
48
13
Feb-41
48
15
Oct-41
43
16
Dec-42
47
12
Jun-44
56
10
Mar-45
58
8
Feb-46
58
7
Nov-50
16
20
Are Jews as patriotic, more
patriotic, or less patriotic
than other U.S. citizens?
3/38-10/41:
Less patriotic: Between 25% & 31%
More patriotic: Average of 5%
As patriotic: Average of 67%
Do Jews have too much power in the
United States?
Yes (%)
No (%)
Don't Know (%)
Mar-38
41
46
13
May-38
36
47
17
Nov-38
35
49
16
Feb-39
41
48
11
Apr-40
43
40
17
Aug-40
42
42
16
Feb-41
45
41
14
Oct-41
48
37
15
Feb-42
47
38
15
Dec-42
51
33
16
May-44
56
30
14
Mar-45
56
29
15
Jun-45
58
29
13
Feb-46
55
33
12
Jun-62
17
66
17
What is your attitude to allowing German,
Austrian, & other political refugees to come
into U.S. (July 1938)
• “encourage them to come even if we have
to raise immigration quotas” 4.9%
• “we should allow them to come but not
raise immigration quotas” 18.2%
• “with conditions as they are, we should try
to keep them out” 67.4%
• “don’t know” 9.5%
When asked whether the U.S. government
should permit a “larger number of Jewish
exiles to come to the united states”:
March 1938
Yes: 17%
No: 75%
Don’t Know: 8%
November 1938
Yes: 21%
No: 71%
Don’t Know: 8%
gallop poll, January 1939: “it has been proposed that
the government permit 10,000 refugee children from
Germany to be brought into this country and taken
care of in american homes. do you favor this plan?”
• Supported: 26%
• Opposed: 66%
• No opinion: 8%
When refugees were specifically identified as Jewish:
Supported: 30%
Opposed: 61%
No opinion: 9%
If you were a member of the Congress would
you vote “yes” or “no” on a bill to open the
doors of the U.S. to a larger number of
refugees than now admitted under our
immigration quotas?
Vote for:
8.7%
Vote against: 83.0%
Don’t know: 8.3%
In your opinion, what nationality, religious, or
social groups in this country [U.S.] are a
menace to america? choices: “Jews, negroes,
catholics, germans, Japanese.”
Jews
Germans
Japanese
Catholics
"Negroes"
Aug-40
17
14
6
6
2
Feb-41
18
14
6
5
3
Oct-41
20
16
4
4
2
Feb-42
15
18
24
5
2
Dec-42
15
14
19
3
4
Jun-44
24
6
9
5
11
Mar-45
19
4
5
3
11
Feb-46
22
1
1
9
15
Nov-50
5
1
0
6
6
Jun-62
1
0
0
0
16
U.S. Knowledge of holocaust
I. Allies “Knew Early and Did Nothing about the
Holocaust” When did the Allies Know?
A. What was known? Need to define.
1. Germany
a. Persecution of Minorities (1933)
b. Violation of Civil Rights, including murder (1933)
i. Response of Black & White-Owned Newspapers
in the South (1934)
c. Sporadic Violence against Jews (1933, 1935, 19371938)
d. Kristallnacht Violence (91 killed) (1938)
U.S. Knowledge of holocaust
2. Poland
a. Indiscriminate murder of civilians
(Poland, 1939)
b. Systematic Persecution & Physical violence
against Jews (1939-1940)
c. Systematic mass murder of civilians (Polish
elite, 1940)
3. USSR
a. Soviet Jews, Communists & others, 1941
b. plan to eliminate European Jews (August
1942—confirmed Nov 1942)
U.S. Knowledge of holocaust
II. When was military intervention possible?
What kind of intervention? When was
political intervention possible?
A. Prioritization of European Theater
B. Allied statement of Dec 17, 1942
C. Development of rescue
infrastructure: “a statecraft of
carefully calibrated compassion.”
Report of H. Höfle, 1.43
U.S. Rescue Operations
II. When was military intervention possible?
What kind of intervention?
D. Bermuda Conference on Refugees, Apr 1943
1. strong opposition in U.S. & Great Britain to
accepting large numbers of refugees.
2. unwillingness to emphasize Jews specifically
as priority refugees, for fear of stirring
ethnic hatred at home and undermining
will of others to fight for the Jews.
U.S. RESCUE OPERATIONS
3. Achievements:
a. reactivation of Intergovernmental Committee
on Refugees
b. Recommendation to establish refugee camp in
North Africa for refugees trapped in Spain
E. U.S. & U.K. never willing to relax immigration
quotas.
1. U.S. & British leery about sending funds into
Axis controlled Europe, where they could be
used to prolong the war
2. Soviets paranoid about Western intentions
U.S. RESCUE OPERATIONS
F. War Refugee Board (Jan. 1944) too late;
1. impetus: failure of Treasury Department officials
to overcome British objections to sending funds for
relief of Romanian Jews returning from
Transnistria in late fall 1943, when the Antonescu
regime was willing to permit the funds.
2. Significant success in Hungary
a. financing activity of Wallenberg & others in
Budapest.
b. assisting Red Cross in removing prisoners
from concentration camps
U.S. RESCUE OPERATIONS?
III.BOMBING AUSCHWITZ
A. Questions
1. Militarily Feasible?
2. Saved Lives?
3. PR Effect?
B. Morse-Wyman Thesis
1. Roosevelt Administration at best
indifferent, at worst hostile to Jews.
2. Argument that winning war would
save more people an excuse
C. McGovern’s wish that he had orders to bomb
Auschwitz when he flew over in Dec. 1944
U.S. RESCUE OPERATIONS?
D. Six Chronologies
1. CHRONOLOGY: ALLIED BOMBING CAPACITY
Sep 30, 1943: Allies capture Foggia in southern Italy
Spring 1944: Allies could first hit targets in Silesia from
airstrips at Foggia, but only with RAF
Mosquitoes & USAF B-25 medium
bombers—problematic
May 31, 1944: First aerial photograph of AuschwitzBirkenau (April 14 for Auschwitz I).
July 1944:
B-17, B-24 bombing missions with escorts
possible for Silesia.
July 18, 1944: Monowitz designated a target
Aug 20, 1944: First bombing of Monowitz
Issue of accuracy of bombing—Buchenwald, 7/7/44
Aerial view of Auschwitz-Birkenau Concentration Camp. Upper left corner, bombs
from US planes are visible. Auschwitz, Poland, September 1944.
2. CHRONOLOGY: DEPORTATION OF HUNGARIAN JEWS
March 19, 1944: Germans occupy Hungary
April 6-7, 1944: Germans demand 100,000 laborers
April 13, 1944: Hungarians agree to deport 100,000
Jews
Apr 28-9, 1944: Two trains containing political arrestees\
go from Kistacsa to Auschwitz
May 15-July 9: Deportations from provinces (440,000)
July 6, 1944:
Hungarian government halts
deportations
July 9, 1944:
Last deportation train leaves for
Auschwitz
July 1944:
15,000 Jews deported, Austrian border
July 15, 24, Aug 2: 3 transports to Auschwitz: 4,026 Jews
Oct-Nov, 1944: footmarches to Austrian border resume
3. CHRONOLOGY: KNOWLEDGE OF AUSCHWITZ
April 7, 1944: Vrba-Wetzler escape Auschwitz
April 27, 1944: Auschwitz report written in Slovakia in German
language, as Vrba & Wetzler reconstruct data
Late Apr-May: report reaches Budapest, is translated into
Hungarian & other languages
May, 1944:
report sent to Jewish representatives in
Switzerland, Istanbul, & London--& Papal Nuncio
in Bratislava
May 1944:
Jewish groups demand bombing of gas chambers
June 19, 1944: Diplomat in Romanian embassy in Bern
disseminates report widely in Switzerland.
July 7, 1944: Horthy announces halt of deportations
July, 1944:
War Refugee Board gets Vrba report.
Aug 9, 1944: War Refugee Board writes McCloy suggesting
bombing of gas chambers as inducement to halt
killing
August 14, 1944: McCloy letter, “decisive operations”
4. CHRONOLOGY: U.S. DIPLOMATIC RESPONSE
March 7, 1944: U.S. Govt warns Hungarian govt against taking
harsher measures against Jews
Mar 24, 1944: Roosevelt warns the Horthy Govt.
June 12, 1944: Roosevelt statement to Congress: condemns
continued annihilation of European Jews
Jun 12-13, 1944: Senate debate & speech of Hull had impact in
Hungarian Foreign Ministry
Jun 22, 26, 1944: threat of Roosevelt & House Foreign Affairs
Committee to retaliate with force if atrocities
not stopped.
July 2, 1944: Budapest bombed by USAF; leaflets dropped,
repeating warning
July 6, 1944: Horthy orders deportations halted
July 9, 1944: Last deportation train leaves
5.CHRONOLOGY: MILITARY ADVANCES
March 19, 1944: Germany occupies Hungary
April 15, 1944: Germany stabilizes Eastern Front in East Galicia,
North Bucovina & East Belarus
June 4, 1944:
Allies capture Rome
June 6, 1944:
Allies land in France, on Normandy Coast
June 22, 1944: Soviet offensive in Belarus begins
July 22, 1944:
Having destroyed Army Group Center, Soviets
enter eastern Poland
July 25, 1944:
Allies break out of Normandy beachhead
August 1, 1944: Soviets reach Vistula River, eastern suburbs of
Warsaw; Warsaw uprising begins
August 23, 1944: Romania switches sides; Soviets invade Trianon
Hungary
August 25, 1944: Paris liberated
Sep 16, 1944:
Allies reach German border
6.CHRONOLOGY: MILITARY ADVANCES
July 1944: 130,000 prisoners in Auschwitz complex
Jul 12, 1944: 51,117 in Birkenau (31,406 women &children)
August 1944: 135,000 prisoners in Auschwitz complex
August 7, 1944: 19,115 male prisoners in Birkenau
August 21, 1944: 58,658 prisoners in Birkenau
(39,234 women & children)
+30,000 Hungarian Jews in transit camp
October 2, 1944: 26,230 female prisoners in Birkenau
17,202 Jewish Women in “Mexico”
Oct 14, 1944: 100,000 prisoners in Auschwitz complex
Nov 27, 1944: 14,206 Jewish women in Birkenau
January 4, 1945: 11,713 Jewish women & children in
Birkenau women’s camp
Jan 17, 1945:
67,000 prisoners in Auschwitz complex
(15,058 in Birkenau).
In Auschwitz
Barracks, Auschwitz-Birkenau, Poland,
January 29, 1945
PERSONS MURDERED IN GAS CHAMBERS IN
AUSCHWITZ-BIRKENAU, JUL 15-NOV 25, 1944
Gas Chamber Victims
Registered Prisoners
July 15-31, 1944
3,127
9,027
August 1-31, 1944
8,921
12,203
September 1-30, 1944
7,793
7,185
October 1-31, 1944
46,015
4,221
November 1-2, 1944
81
0
Total
65,937
32,636
CONCLUSION: what can be done?
I. NO ONE CAN PREDICT FUTURE
A. Example of Libya today
II. WHAT CAN BE DONE?
A. More open borders--populations in
danger.
1. U.S. could have allowed in more Jews
& political refugees
B. Earlier stand vs. intl aggression
1. Example of first Gulf War, 1991
CONCLUSION: what can be done
III. MORE RESPONSIVENESS TO EFFORTS OF
RESCUE SMALLER, MANAGABLE GROUPS, WHEN
OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS
A. Failure to pass special legislation to bring in
children to U.S. in 1939
B. Antonescu’s efforts to sell Jewish children
IV. EARLIER ESTABLISHMENT & BETTER FUNDING
FOR REFUGEE AGENCIES (WRB)
A. Success of WRB through neutral legations in
protecting Jews of Budapest
CONCLUSION: what can be done?
V. NEGOTIATIONS & PEACEKEEPERS
A. Probably inapplicable to Nazi regime—
bent on world conquest.
B. Strong peace-keeping force on ground in
Rwanda
1. Talks between factions may have
prevented genocide in Angola in 1990s
2. Negotiated settlement of Southern
Sudan’s separation from Sudan.
CONCLUSION: what can be done?
C. Int’l criminal jurisdiction
1. Agreed to & adhered to by all
D. Reacting to mass murder despite
perceived national interests.
1. U.S. support of murderous
Khmer Rouge regime against
Vietnamese invasion.
CONCLUSION: what can be done?
VI. BOMBING KILLING CENTERS?
A. Four dismantled before Allies could hit them
B. Bombing Auschwitz carried costs without
guaranteeing success.
1. bombing Budapest may, however, have
some effect.
2. would it have been effective in Darfur to
bomb villages from which the innocent
victims were being expelled or put to
death?
CONCLUSION: what can be done?
C. Invasion w/ground forces difficult
without international consensus
1. Most chance of success when
criminal regime seeks to impose
will on neighbors.
a. Missed opportunity: Munich, 1938
b. Successful response to Iraq, 1991
CONCLUSION: what can be done?
VII. SUCH MEASURES REQUIRE BROAD POPULAR
CONSENSUS IN DEMOCRACIES
A. Consensus that murder & abuse of civilians or
unarmed soldiers is against our interests—
regardless of more narrow economic &
strategic interests
B. Consensus on prosecuting those who use state
security to justify criminal acts, including our
own—no matter how long it takes.