Transcript The US in WWII - BTHS World History

The U.S. in WWII
Strategic Bombing
Total War?
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Total war: one in which the whole
population and all the resources of the
combatants are committed to complete
victory … and thus become legitimate
military targets
… and rules of war are disregarded.
Blurs combatant/non-combatant lines
Carl Spaatz
Henry H.
“Hap” Arnold
Curtis LeMay
B-17
B-29
B-24
USAAF Doctrine
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Pre-war: Precision strikes on industrial and
transportation targets to paralyze enemy’s
economy and logistical capacity.
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Attacks to be made at high altitude.
Assumed bombers could fly unescorted to
targets.
During the war: Also strikes on military
targets.
Required daylight bombing missions.
The Blitz
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Britain isolated but Churchill won’t negotiate
Hitler actually wants to offer generous terms to avoid two front war (real
goal is Russia)
Hitler believes destruction of Royal Air Force (RAF) will force negotiations
Initial assaults on Channel Ports then airfields
 Alternative views that Br. was on the edge of defeat v. Revisionists
(Overy) who claim it wasn’t effective
 German losses rise
 Bomber Command bombs Berlin August 25
 Hitler permits shift to night attacks on cities
 Traditional view is this gives RAF respite to recover
 Also Range to cities is very long and fighters can’t cover Ger. Bombers
The Blitz Outcome
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German bomber and fighter losses become too high
Spitfire and Hurricane fighters of RAF are effective
German fighter range (Bf-109) is limited and bombers are not
suited to strategic bombing (too small)
British use early warning radar (This is the key to victory)
Shift to terror attacks on cities gives RAF breathing space to
recover
British lose 832 fighters (1/4 of pilots dead/wounded)
Germans 668 fighters, 600 bombers
Hitler now faces 2-front war if he attacks USSR
On Targeting Civilians: The
British Experience
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Sept. 3, 1939: Hitler issued War Directive No. 2
• No bombing of French, British cities
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No mention of Poland, Holland
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Battle of Britain, August 24, 1940 (Shift to civilian targets)
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• German bombers accidentally attacked London
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• RAF bombed Berlin the next night (Churchill)
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• Hitler turned Luftwaffe against London, other
cities (Fuehrer Directive 17)
On Targeting Civilians
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The Nazis entered this war under the rather childish
delusion that they were going to bomb everyone else,
and nobody was going to bomb them. At Rotterdam,
London, Warsaw, and half a dozen other places, they
put their rather naive theory into operation.
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Air Marshall Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris, RAF
The British Experience
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Arthur Harris is Architect of Br. Strategic Bombing
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Daylight raids produced large losses of places and crews.
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Destroy factories and workers living nearby (Morale targets)
Bomber offense is best defense
Lack long range fighters to protect bombers
Early bombers lack range, payload, altitude
Lack navigational systems to find targets
1941 only 1/3 of bombs fall within 5 miles of the target
Accuracy a problem.
Shift to Morale Targets
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RAF Bomber Command adopted policy of bombing cities
during night missions.
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Chief Air Marshall Portal: …new aim point…built up areas
Actually believes workers will rebel v. Hitler because he can’t
protect them (opposite result: intense hate of British)
System is called “Area Bombing”
Use new Halifax and Lancaster Bombers
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Enormus bomb loads (10 tons but little defense ability)
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Short Sterling (1939)
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Avro Lancaster (1941)
US Eighth Air Force arrives
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August 1942
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Different Philosophy
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Highly accurate Norden Bombsight
Heavily armed B-17 (tradeoff is bomb load only 2 tons of bombs)
Daylight precision bombing to destroy German industry
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B-17
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B-24
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Norden Bomb Sight
Drop a “bomb in a pickle barrel from
20,000 feet”
U.S. efforts, 1942 – early 1943
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Small: planes diverted to other operations.
U-boat facilities made a high priority.
Most targets in France or Low countries – bomber
missions had fighter cover.
After June 1943
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• Fighter aircraft
• Ball bearings
• Petroleum
Prior to D-Day target transportation
U.S. efforts, 1942 – early 1943
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Major Dispute
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US wants daylight attacks against industrial “Bottlenecks”
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Example: Almost all German ball-bearings are made in two cities
(Schweinfurt, Regensburg) Destroy them and German machinery grinds to a
halt
British say daylight raids won’t work
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They seem to be right as US loses 60 Bombers (15%) over Schweinfurt in
one raid
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B-17 Defensive Formation
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Flak
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Enemy Fighters
Casablanca Conference
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Allied leaders commit themselves to
pursuing strategic bombing, authorize the
Combined Bomber Offensive
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Operation POINTBLANK
British will pursue night missions, area
bombing
U.S., day missions and precision bombing.
Summer 1943
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Strategic bombing effort ramps up.
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USAAF forces in Europe get enough planes to
launch large raids into Germany.
Facilities engaged in producing aircraft or
related components made a priority.
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Included ball-bearing plants.
Bomber Tactics
Element Formation
Element Formation
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Fockewulf 190 D
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Messerscmidt 109
Improved Bomber Armament
Added defense against head-on attacks
Deep raids result in prohibitive losses
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Bombers unescorted by fighters for all or
part of journey.
Stiff resistance put up by Luftwaffe and
anti-aircraft batteries.
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Radar-assisted air defenses
German pilots discovered successful tactics to
attack bomber formations.
Example: Schweinfurt
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August 17, 1943: 60 of 315 bombers lost.
October 14, 1943: 60 of 230 bombers lost.
Heavy Losses
Damage
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Targets often hit.
But German industrial infrastructure more
resilient than anticipated.
 Simply disperse industry so raids can’t destroy
whole production systems
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Ex: make wings, engines, fusilage of planes in
several different locations (very difficult to target)
In some arms categories, production increases
through 1944.
British Area Bombing
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1943 Mar.-Jul.
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Battle of the Ruhr
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Attack Ruhr Cities at night
July 30,000 die in firestorm in Hamburg
Overall 45,000 more die in other cities
Berlin Raids 1943-Mar. 1944
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16 Raids
Give up when losses rise too high
German use night fighters and radar controlled AAA
Chaff or strips of aluminum dropped to confuse radar fails
Germans improve radar and mount it in planes as well
Br. Area Bombing close to defeat Spring 1944
1944: Help for the Bombing Campaign
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New fighters: P-51
More planes.
Attacks from the
Mediterranean.
Attrition of German
pilots.
Switch in priorities
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Oil
Transportation
These targets can not be dispersed
February 1944 “Big Week”
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Raids of up to 1000 B-17s supported by long-range P-51
Fighters
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Focus on aircraft production and oil
Use P-47 and P-38 Escorts with drop tanks to increase range
Real key is P-51 it can go as far as the bombers but has the
performance as good as any fighter in the world
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Considered the best fighter of WWII
Germans have to defend the oil and their fighter force is
shattered with over 400 shot down in a week
Breaks the back of the Luftwaffe
Mid 1944-1945
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US diverts bombers to Normandy after Big Week to
prepare for D-Day Invasion
Resume Strategic Bombing March 1944
Combined British and US Attacks
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Oil production down from 316,000 tons to 17,000 by late 1944
Railroad cars decline from 900,000 to 214,000
Around the clock attacks on cities
With destruction of Luftwaffe losses fall to 1% per raid
Accomplishments of the Strategic
Bombing Campaign
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Broke the Luftwaffe
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German logistical system crippled late in
the war.
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Allies had air superiority over Normandy
Could not get arms to front.
Vehicles lacked oil to move.
How much of the Allied victory was due to
the air campaign?
The Costs
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29,000 U.S. airmen, 8,200 bombers lost.
About 600,000(?) civilian casualties.
 87,000 Dead in Ruhr, 50,000 each in Hamburg and Berlin, 2%
are children
Firestorms:
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Hamburg: July, 1943
Dresden: Feb., 1945
How much of the victory is owed to the bombers???
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Never break German morale
Transportation in cites never really breaks down (freight transportation
does!!!!)
Industrial production collapses only very late if at all
USAAF Strategic Bombing: Japan
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Regular raids from Marianas begin in November 1944.
Problems:
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Japan disperses factories like Germans
Japanese cities and housing are less vulnerable to high explosive
due to light construction to resist earthquakes
Home islands extreme range for B-29’s
Clouds
Strong winds
Curtis LeMay provides the solutions
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US reluctantly abandons high level
daylight precision attacks
LeMay arrives Feb. 1945
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Conduct raids at lower altitudes.
Night missions.
Pursue area bombing.
Incendiaries (fire bombs not explosives)
Tokyo Fire Raid
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Mar. 9, 1945
 Burn out 16 square miles of Tokyo with 325 bombers
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By June Nagoya, Kobe, Osaka, Yokohama, Kawasaki
all burned out
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B-29 used in Japan (larger and much longer range and
bigger bomb load than B-17
89,000 dead, 180,000 injured in 1 night
Bomber losses 2%
260,000 dead, 2 million buildings destroyed, 9-13 million
homeless
By July 60% of the 60 largest cities burned out
Debut of new
tactics:
The Tokyo
Raid,
March 9-10,
1945
Remainder of war:
Japan’s cities systematically destroyed
Impact of the Bombing
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Japanese government attitude is largely unchanged,
fight on
Food rationed to 1500 calories a day (certain starvation)
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Economy
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People eat pine roots
Chemical industry collapses
Less than 1 million tons of shipping left (subs and aircraft
attacks) down from 7 million
Japan rejects offer by Secretary of State Dulles in May to
Negotiate
Hiroshima:
August 6, 1945
Nagasaki:
August 9, 1945
Moral Considerations…
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Attacks on non-combatants.
Intent: The role of non-combatants in war (are they legitimate
targets as they build weapons?)
Moral vs. immediate concerns.
 Reduces British and then US to same level as the Germans
and Japanese
 Causation: Use Blitz of London as an excuse?
 Is it the only option available?
Critics
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Can’t justify civilian attacks: The fact that factories are located in cities
doesn’t change fact that night attacks are really aimed at civilians
Bombing really didn’t have much of an impact anyway
Moral Considerations…
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In General Germany was able to maintain transportation in
cities and disperse industry
Even Hamburg maintained 80% of pre-war production into
1945
However….
 The attacks on fuel were a major success
 Problem here is oil attacks are far the most effective
and they do not require civilian attacks
 Oil production did collapse
 Also the Axis had divert enormous resources to repel air
attacks