Transcript Pleh_ducogVIIIx

VIII Dubrovnik Conference on Cognitive Science
DUBROVNIK, 28 APRIL - 1 MAY, 2016.
Comparative Cognition
from Ethology to Cognitive Science
THE RIVALRY BETWEEN COMPETITIVE AND COOPERATIVE MODELS
OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE MIND
Csaba Pléh
Central European University, Budapest
Ottilia Boross
Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Budapest
Throughout the 150-year history of the human mind’s modern evolutionary theories, there is a distinctive sequence of rival models reappearing. Our historical survey introduces
two stages of this development: the birth of evolutionary models of the mind from the late 19th century, and the modern developments starting with the reemergence of
evolutionary psychology from the 1980s.
At both stages two attitudes can be distinguished:
Comprehensive competition and selection models
cooperation with an attempt to account for sociality
Competition and cognition in early and recent times
Early 19th Century
Adaptation explained by competition.
The ’survival of the fittest’ in Darwin and Spencer.
Interspecies and intraspecies competition
Late 20th Century
General adaptation-selection model of evolutionary psychology.
Mind is a set of adaptations, explained by selection pressures.
Cosmides-Tooby, Pinker.
mechanical algorythms
postulating mental as real; interpreting natural selection and sexual selection the same way
language, cognition etc, are fitness markers
general adaptation models
combining evolution, development, and neuronal organization (like in Baldwin)
the place and levels of selection
Programs of epigenesis
Darwin’s dangerous idea : blind mechanisms of selection
universal for all aspects of life, including the mind
Features
Pool of selection
Means of selection
Proofs
Instinct
Habit
Individuals
Behaviors
Darwinian
Reinforcement
Species
New associations
behavior
Organization
Naturplan
Associative net
Table 1 Multiple selection in Karl Bühler
Intellect
Thoughts
Insight
Detour
A new element. Sociality. Humans are by necessity social beings.
Society being merely a modulation or a derived feature of this primary sociality.
The roots of sociality are biological, have to be looked for in individuals.
Mental order
Figure 1 The selection cycle in the evolutionary epistemology of Popper
Domain
Example
Science
Hypothesis-Solution-Choice
Cultural accumulation
Selection in technology
Language
Language variation
Observation and imitation
Social insects
Thought supported by memory
Imagery-based solution
Visually supported thought
Köhler: insights in apes
Habit
Rearranging control systems
Instinct
Organismic perceptual systems
Vicariating locomotion
Echolocation
Problem-solving, independent from memory
Tropisms
Genetic adaptation
Genetic variation and change
Table 3 Social individualism and its relation to rival approaches
New social models. Cooperation supplemented with attribution of mind .
A combination of theory of mind and its attribution.
Table 2 10 layers of selection in the EvolEpist of Campbell (1974)
- all inductive growth of knowledge involves a blind variation-selective retention cycle
- this entails variations, consequental selections, and a retention and transmission of selected elements
- short-cutting mechanisms have an element of trial and error in their functioning as well, replacing
From Humphrey to Dunbar: the social mind
Humphrey (1976) even in anthropogenesis: the challenges of crucial adaptation and crucial environment
were created by our conspecifics. The original function of intellect was to give orientation in social life,
either in a positive way, via imitation, empathy, role modelling and similar functions, or in a ‘negative
way’, by means of manipulation, by developing a Machiavellian intelligence.
locomotion by mental search, e.g., and risking your ideas rather than risking your life
Early cooperative biological models.
Kropotkin, Mechnikov, Huzella. Cooperation on the level of histology.
Early synthetic attempts. J.M. Baldwin.
Selection and model following as a social factor. Evolution is too slow
ToM and intentionality:
Varieties of change
Biological issue (Premack, Leslie, Perner, Gergely & Csibra)
1. Organic selection
Social control and social learning (Tomasello)
2. Learning based on reinforcement.
3. Imitation
Not merely cooperation but cooperation combined with mind-reading
4. Social heritage.
Acquisition of functions from social environment. It is heredity, it influences the direction
of phylogenetic variation by keeping socially adaptive creatures alive; social adaptation
sets the direction of physical phylogeny (physical heredity is determined in part by this
factor). Extra-organic transmission from generation to generation… it keeps alive
variations, sets the direction of ontogenetic adaptation, influences the direction of the
Figure 2 Sharing intentions and learning in te moldel of Tomasell oet al (20005)
available congenital variations of the next generation, determines phylogenetic
development “(see Baldwin, 1896, p. 553)
THE FUTURE of Darwinian psychology
EPIGENETICS
clarifying multiple mappings between evolutionary tools and social roles
The dichotomy of nature vs nurture refers to competition
serious interpretation of Evo-Devo-Brain-Genes interface
which one wins/dominates/determines?
new paradigm comes with epigenetics: there is mutuality, continuous
feed-back
finding a proper frame for determinism
combining theoretical functionalism with individual variation research
no fight, neither of them could work without the other
References
Baldwin, J.M. (1894). Mental Development in the Child and the Race. Methods and Processes. New York: Macmillan, Bühler, K. (1922). Die geistige Entwicklung des Kindes. Jena: Fischer. III. Edition Campbell, D. T. (1974). Evolutionary epistemology. In: Paul A. Schilpp (ed.): The philosophy of Karl Popper. La Salle, ill.: Open Court,
413-463. Changeux, J.P. & Dehaene, S. (1989). Neuronal models of cognitive functions. Cognition, 33,63-109 Cziko, G. (1995). Without miracles: Universal selection theory and the second Darwinian revolution. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press Csibra, G. & Gergely, G. (2009). Natural pedagogy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13, 148153Dennett, D. (1994). Darwin's Dangereous Idea. New York: Simon and SchusterHuzella, T. (1936) Az élet tudománya. (The science of life) Budapest: Franklin Társulat. Jacob, F.(1982). The Possible and the Actual. Seattle : University of Washington Press Kropotkin, P. (1902) Mutual Aid: A Factor o f Evolution (London: William
Heineman, 1902), Piaget, J., (1972). Psychology and Epistemology: Towards A Theory Of
Knowledge Harmondsworth:Penguin Metchnikoff, E. (1903). The Nature of Man: Studies in Optimistic Philosophy (London, 1903).Piatelli-Palmarini, M. (1989). Evolution, selection and cognition. Cognition, 31, 1-44Popper, K. R. (1972).
Objective knowledge. An evolutionary approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Richerson, P.J. & Boyd, R. (2005). Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Tomasello, M (1999). The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
DUCOG VIII 2016 Dubrovnik, 2016 April