Transcript 10-epiphenomenalism-criticisms

Whiteboards!
Outline the theories of occasionalism and preestablished harmony.
What is the difference between the two?
Epiphenomenalism Recap
What does this picture
represent about
epiphenomenalism?
What can you
remember about
epiphenomenalism?
A Better View: Epiphenomenalism
According to epiphenomenalism, mental events are caused by
physical events but do not themselves cause physical events: the
interaction is one-way. Mental events are pictured as
epiphenomenal by-products that sit “above” physical processes.
The idea that the mental states sit “above” the physical is
supervenience.
“Volition” concludes Huxley, “is an emotion indicative of
physical changes, not a cause of such changes.”
Considering Epiphenomenalism
What criticisms of Epiphenomenalism can you think of? Do
the following questions help you?
- Do you have any good reasons for supposing your volitions
(mental states) really cause your actions?
- Do you have any good reasons for supposing your sense
experiences cause behaviour? (e.g. pain causing you to
flinch)
- What of conscious perception? Is there a good reason to
suppose your visual perception of tea is causally involved in
you reaching for it?
- Consider other mental states such as beliefs. In what ways
do they seem to be physically related to the world? Do you
have any reason to suppose they really are so related?
Considering Epiphenomenalism
Use the 6 sheets to identify and record 6 problems with
Epiphenomenalism. Swap with people to cover all the
different issues.
Evidence of Introspection
Epiphenomenalism seems to go against what we intuitively believe through
common sense and what is revealed to us through introspection.
It seems very obvious that when I reach out to grab a
cup of tea it is a conscious decision causing that
action, or when I decide to get out of the bed in the
morning it is my mind making my body move. To
deny this seems to fly in the face of everyday
experiences.
Introspection also seems to show us that different
mental states are causally related, for example the
smell of chips might make me remember the smell of
my grandmother’s kitchen. The belief that it is raining
may cause the mental desire to stay dry. Our
introspection strongly suggests our minds have causal
power.
The Role of Qualia
What of our reactions to qualia?
It surely seems obvious that it is
our mental state of pain that
causes me to jerk my hand back
from something hot. Similarly, if I
hit my thumb with a hammer it is
this feeling of pain that makes me
cry out. Moreover, if pain did not
cause actions in my body, then
why would I take much greater
care when dealing with the
hammer in future?
Qualia definitely seem to cause
physical reactions in our bodies. It
seems odd to deny this.
Free Will
When I deliberate over whether to go to bed early or to go to the cinema, I seem to
be exercising my free will. If I decide to go out, this decision was reached freely,
meaning I could have chosen to stay in.
However if my actions are purely down to
physical processes, and the intention or
decision is causally useless, then it seems I
have no choice over my actions. If human
actions are governed by physical laws then
the choices I make are a result of these
laws and I could never do otherwise.
Perhaps more importantly, the idea of
freedom is important to our idea of moral
responsibility. If I decide to murder someone
then it usually requires the idea that I could
have done otherwise (i.e. not forced) for us
to say I am morally responsible.
But if my action of killing him was not down
to my decision but instead physical laws that
determined this outcome, it’s hard to see
how we could say I am truly morally
responsible.
Evolution
If conscious experiences play no role in our behaviour, then we may wonder why
we have them at all. The universe and all human behaviour would, it seems, be
exactly the same as it is now if there were no mental phenomena at all.
This concern can be given additional force if we consider human evolution. If we
accept the process of evolution is driven by natural selection then we are
committed to the idea that evolved traits must benefit the species in some way.
But, if mental states have no causual role to play, then they cannot have survival
value. Why has evolution favoured beings with minds over beings without?
Important Note: There are currently parts of our body that are functionally useless
(appendix etc.) and one might respond by saying the mind is similar, it evolved but is
pointless. This is forgetting that the parts of our body we no longer use had a
function once, we have just evolved past their use. The mind on the other hand, has
seemingly never had a use and therefore should not have been naturally selected.
Self-Knowledge
An uncomfortable consequence of epiphenomenalism is that is it
appears to be incompatible with actually being able to form beliefs
about, or meaningfully talk about your own mental states. For if
mental states cannot cause anything physical then they cannot cause
my body to describe them in any way. So when I say “I am in pain”
this cannot have been caused by any introspective awareness of pain.
But then what am I talking about when I complain about being in
pain? Similarly what about explaining that I feel happy?
Other Minds
How do we know for sure other
people have minds? If their
behaviour is based on physical
causes, then it would be the same
if they did not have minds as it
currently is now.
We use behaviour to infer mental
states (if someone steps on a nail
and then hops around screaming
– I use that to infer that he is in
pain), if that behaviour is entirely
explained through physical causes
then there is no good reason to
assume others have mental states
as we do.
Criticisms of Epiphenomenalism
Evidence of Introspection
Our mental states seem to
cause our actions and other
mental states!
The Role of Qualia
Our subjective qualia (things
we can’t always help) seem
to cause physical reactions
in our bodies.
Free Will
How can we say I have free
will if all my actions are
physically determined?
Evolution
Self-Knowledge
What evolutionary purpose How can I talk about mental
does the mind play? Why do states if they have no causal
we need one? Why did it
power?
ever appear?
Other Minds
How do we know other
people have minds if their
behaviour would be the
same without?
How might an Epiphenomenalist respond?
Epiphenomenalism seems to go against what we intuitively believe through
common sense and what is revealed to us through introspection. Our minds
seem to cause physical and other mental states!
The problem with this view is just
because they seem to cause these
states does not mean they actually do.
All our experience reveals is that
mental states are conjoined with
particular physical actions, and this is
consistent both with them being a
cause and a side effect.
This also applies to the qualia
argument, just because we can see
them happening at the same time does
not mean there is a causal relation.
How might an Epiphenomenalist respond?
When I deliberate over whether to go to bed early or to go to the cinema, I
seem to be exercising my free will. If I decide to go out, this decision was
reached freely, meaning I could have chosen to stay in. Epiphenomenalism
means our actions are governed by purely physical causes, we have no true
decisions and we are therefore not truly free.
Even if we accept the idea that we
have a causally active mind, this would
still mean our actions are governed by
causes, it’s just they would be mental
rather than physical.
So if I decide to kill Jones because I
think about the slights he has made
against me in the past and how much I
dislike him, it is still just as much
determined as if physical causes made
me pull the trigger.
How might an Epiphenomenalist respond?
Our minds are evolutionary pointless! Why would natural selection
keep them if we didn’t need them for some specific reason?
The same could be said of our eye
colour and hair colour – we don’t need
them for any specific evolutionary
reason so why are they different for
different people?
Just because something doesn’t serve
a specific evolutionary purpose does
not mean it shouldn’t exist – it may
instead be a by product of something
that does have a purpose.
(Jackson uses the example of a Polar
Bears coat not needing to be heavy – it
is a by product of it being warm)
How might an Epiphenomenalist respond?
How can we talk about mental states if they don’t actually have any
causal effect?
In response the epiphenomenalist may
argue that the brain could evolve some
capacity to employ sensation words
without them having any causal connection
with the sensations themselves.
Is it not possible there is some physical
prompt that causes us to start talking about
these mental states as if they were being
caused?
For example: Speaking of certain colours
when our eyes pick up certain wavelengths?
Which do you think is the strongest?
Evidence of Introspection
Our mental states seem to
cause our actions and other
mental states!
The Role of Qualia
Our subjective qualia (things
we can’t always help) seem
to cause physical reactions
in our bodies.
Free Will
How can we say I have free
will if all my actions are
physically determined?
Evolution
Self-Knowledge
What evolutionary purpose How can I talk about mental
does the mind play? Why do states if they have no causal
we need one? Why did it
power?
ever appear?
Other Minds
How do we know other
people have minds if their
behaviour would be the
same without?