Transcript Climate change_5April

Climate change: can the world meet
the targets agreed in Paris?
British Pugwash presentation at an
Open Meeting on 5 April 2016
by
Ian Crossland &
Christopher Watson
1
Summary
• Early work on Climate Change & Greenhouse Gas Emissions
– Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports published 1990-2014
– Early British Government studies & legislation 2002-2009
– Early EU studies and legislation 2007-2014
• A critique of official UK Energy strategy
– DECC energy strategy studies & ‘Pathways to 2050’ software 2009-12
– British Pugwash ‘Three possible UK Energy Strategies’ published 2013
• Critiques of EU Energy strategy
–
–
–
–
Review of national nuclear and renewable energy strategies in EU countries
Renewable Energy: Lessons learned from Germany H Poser et al 2014
European Physical Society Energy Group ‘Position Paper’ published 2015
EU Energy Policy & Reduction of CO2 emissions EST Karlsruhe 2015
• Run-up to the Paris Conference on Climate Change (December 2015)
– Climate Change & the DECC Global Calculator Ongena & Watson EPS Rome 2015
• After Paris: can the world meet the targets agreed?
– The Paris Conference: 195 Participants unanimously adopt global temperature targets
– Can the DECC Global Calculator suggest credible means to that end?
2
1. Early work on Climate Change & Greenhouse Gas Emissions
• Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 1990-2014
– Scientific intergovernmental body set up in 1988 under the auspices of the United Nations at the
request of member governments. Currently 195 members appointed by national governments.
– Reports in 1990, 1992, 1995, 2001, 2007, 2013, documenting steadily-growing evidence for the scale of
anthropogenic Greenhouse Gas emissions, and their environmental consequences.
– Latest report documents computer modelling studies linking GHG emissions to global surface
temperature rises, and giving semi-quantitative links between these.
• Early British Government studies & legislation 2002-2011
–
–
–
–
–
Cabinet Office review of UK energy policy during 2002-3, leading to Energy White Paper in 2003
Stern report 2006 concluding that early action to combat climate change would be cost-effective
Energy Bill 2008 commits the UK to achieve an 80% reduction in GHG emissions by 2050
Carbon Plan 2011 sets baseline at 783.1 Mt CO2e in 1990 & sets quinquennial Carbon budgets to 2027
Development of DECC UK energy strategy software 2009-10: ‘Pathways to 2050’ published in July 2010
• Early EU studies and legislation 2007- 2014
– EU Commission Roadmap 2011 sets out “four main routes to a more sustainable, competitive and
secure energy system in 2050: energy efficiency, renewable energy, nuclear energy and CCS”. It
combines these routes in different ways to create and analyse seven possible scenarios for 2050.
– EU 2030 Framework agreed by Ministers in 2014, setting EU-wide GHG emission reduction targets (eg
40% by 2030) and other policy objectives for 2020-30, enabling it to meet its 80-95% target by 2050.
3
2. A critique of official UK Energy strategy
•
DECC software development project starts 2009
•
•
•
•
Its ‘Pathways to 2050’ software was released in July 2010
This software, which relates exclusively to the UK, calculates the consequences of policy
choices in terms of GHG emissions and cost
The user is invited to specify his/her policy choices by setting 42 policy “levers” broadly
concerned with energy supply and demand
Integral values of the lever settings signify:
•
•
•
•
Level 1 little or no attempt is made to decarbonise or change – “do nothing”
Level 2 ambitious but reasonable
Level 3 very ambitious level of effort - unlikely to happen without significant change from the current system
Level 4 extremely ambitious - the upper end of what is thought to be physically plausible by the most
optimistic observer
The user is allowed to set intermediate values in the range 1-4, correct to one decimal place
• The software outputs the implications of the user’s chosen “pathway to 2050”. These
include energy flows from source to end use, and annual GHG emissions up to 2050, and
warns if the pathway fails to meet the government’s commitment to reduce this by 80%.
• It also gives an estimates of the total investment plus operating costs up to 2050
• DECC has also published four ‘example’ pathways with different suggested policy objectives.
These have different approaches to choice of energy supply systems (including nuclear,
renewables, CCS), energy saving in industry & home, choice of transport systems etc)
4
A critique of official UK Energy strategy cont’d
•
British Pugwash: Pathways to 2050 project starts 2011
•
•
Its report ‘Three possible UK Energy Strategies’ was published in 2013
Three experts were selected to ‘champion’ three different pathways
•
•
Ground-rules:
•
•
•
•
•
Pathways must be specified using the DECC software, so as to ensure a level playing field
Each pathway must achieve the 80% emissions target by 2050
Each pathway must use technologies which either already exist or are likely to be available by
2050
Total cost up to 2050 (as calculated using DECC model) must be comparable with alternative
pathways
Outcome:
•
•
‘High nuclear’, ‘High renewable’ and ‘Intermediate (including Carbon capture and storage)’
All three pathways met the specified ground-rules, and had almost identical costs, but each
had one or more potential ‘show-stopper’. So Government was advised to fund R&D until at
least one way forward was clear.
During this period, the Government set a policy of building 16 GW of new (3rd
generation) nuclear power stations, and funded work on wind and solar
power development and work on a full-scale prototype CCS plant to
demonstrate the feasibility of this technology.
•
The government also published a 2011 Carbon plan which set out four quinquennial carbon
5
emission targets, and a scheme to monitor performance against these targets.
A critique of official UK Energy strategy cont’d
Actual achievement of UK in implementing its planned strategy
Nuclear: Planned 16 GW of new build (3rd generation reactors) by ~2025: existing reactors
(10 GW) being decommissioned by 2035
Achieved by 2016: LoI agreed with EDF & Chinese to build 3.2 GW at Hinkley Point
Plans for 3.2 at Sizewell, 2.7 at Wylfa, 2.7 at Oldbury, 3.4 at Moorside
All these plans are subject to uncertainties linked to technology and financing
CCS:
Two small-scale completed projects:
•
•
Renfrew Oxyfuel (Oxycoal2) combustion project. Conversion of 40MW coal-fired burner from air to oxygen. Dec 2007- 11
Ferrybridge project. 5MW post combustion with CO2 capture. 2 year trial (100 tons CO2 per day) Ended Dec 2013
Two tender competitions for CCS demonstration projects have been cancelled :
•
Drax (White Rose) 2007-11, Peterhead 2012-15
All remaining UK projects exist only as proposals, and are as yet unfunded
Renewables: Planned government support for solar panel installations (by Feed in Tariffs)
Feed in Tariffs dramatically reduced from January 2016
Support for land-based wind farms cut from 2016
Support for offshore wind farms capped at £105/MWh in 2016 Budget
Shift to zero emission transport: no significant progress at 2015
6
Home insulation measures: no significant progress at 2015
3. Critiques of EU Energy strategy
Review of background to current EU Nuclear Power policy
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
France is the largest nuclear power generator in the EU, with 58 reactors having an installed capacity
of 63 GWe. It supplies 77% of the French electricity market and exports a further 8 GW. Its annual
power output has remained essentially flat since 1990. In 2012 Francois Hollande was elected as
President with a policy to reduce the proportion of nuclear power in the energy mix, and to increase
the share of renewables in final energy consumption to 32% by 2030. However in September 2013, a
scientific commission of senators and MPs from the upper and lower houses of Parliament said
France risks being exposed to a power price shock if it pursues a speedy reduction of nuclear power
and there is insufficient replacement through renewable energy and energy efficiency measures.
Since then there have been inconclusive debates in the National Assembly and Senate.
Germany experienced a major surge in nuclear power during the 1980s, levelling off at about 20
GWe when two major accidents (in 1986 at Hamm-Uentrop and 1989 in Greifswald) prompted
major anti-nuclear demonstrations. Even larger demonstrations occurred after the March 2011
Fukushima accident and by May, the government announced its intention to close all nuclear power
plants by 2022.
Sweden has an installed capacity of 9.5 GW, but has plans to decommission several older plants and
currently plans to replace them with renewable sources
The UK published in 2009 a policy of ‘new nuclear build’ aimed at producing 16 GWe of power, so as
to permit the decommissioning of most of its remaining nuclear fleet, currently producing ~9 GWe.
The first new plant, at Hinkley Point, is designed to produce 3.3 GWe, but is experiencing funding
problems. These may be related to time & cost overruns on the chosen EPR design elsewhere.
Spain currently has 10 reactors producing 7.4 GWe, and has no plans to expand or contract.
Belgium currently has 7 reactors producing 5.8 GWe. Two of these reactors (Doel-3 and Tihange-2)
are the subject of anti-nuclear protests because of safety concerns over their pressure vessels.
The remaining 8 countries contribute 17 GWe in total
7
3. Critiques of EU Energy strategy
Review of background to current EU Renewables Energy Policy
– German Renewable Energy Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz EEG 2000) set FITs financed by an
EEG levy paid by consumers
– Publication of book called ‘Energiewende’ by the Öko-Institut (1980), Chernobyl disaster (1986)
– EU Lisbon Treaty 2009 reforms the structure of EU following enlargement to 28 nations
– Fukushima disaster 12 March 2011 Chancellor Merkel leads the German change to Energiewende
– EU Roadmap 2050 published in March 2011: emphasis on energy efficiency and renewables
– By 2013 the EU-28 production of renewable energy was a 24.3 % share of the EU total – a growth
of 84.4 % since 2013. equivalent to an average increase of 6.3 % per year. Among renewable
energies, leaders were Biomass and renewable waste, accounting for 64.2 %, followed by
Hydropower 16.6 % , Wind 10.5% and solar energy 5.5%
– The largest producers of renewable energy within the EU-28 are Germany (17.5 %), Italy (12.2 %),
France (12.0 %) Spain (9.1 %) and Sweden (8.7 %). The EU is now the world’s second largest
producer, and contributes 70% of solar and 40% of its wind energy.
– EU Renewables Directive (April 2009) set national targets for renewables in 2020, ranging from
Belgium (13%) to Sweden (49%), within an overall EU target of 20%. Most are well behind target.
– To achieve these targets, most EU states are giving large government subsidies. In 2012, an EUfunded study by Ekofys indicated that in B€ these were dominated by Germany (25), Italy, Spain
and UK (~10 each). But these figures do not include FIT. For Germany FITs may reach 680 by 2022.
8
3. Critiques of EU Energy strategy
Recent developments in EU thinking on its energy strategy
Informed protests against the distortion of the energy market by the scale of government subsidies, and
their effect on energy prices (and hence on international trade competitiveness) have become very
strong: eg
– Renewable Energy: Lessons learned from Germany H Poser et al 2014. This report by an independent
group of European finance & investment experts argued that current policy:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Has underestimated the cost of renewable subsidies and the resulting strain on national economies
Has increased the retail price to many electricity consumers (eg in Germany from €0.18/kWh in 2000 to €0.29/kWh in 2013)
Has caused a fall in the wholesale price of baseload power from €90-95/MWh in 2008 to €37/MWh in 2013 due to subsidised
renewable facilities undercutting gas-fired plants, and has led to plunging stock values for German utilities.
Has changed energy pricing policy: previously wholesale prices followed demand, now they increasingly follow the weather
Has forced fossil and nuclear plants to follow weather-related supply cycles, leading to additional maintenance-linked costs
Has increased the peak capability required of back-up plant to cover for intermittency of renewables over short durations
Has created a need for major investment in grids to transfer power from renewable plants and the location of demand
– European Physical Society Energy Group ‘Position Paper’ published in Nature in 2015. This paper,
issued by a group of independent (and largely academic) energy experts concluded that:
•
•
•
•
EU policy does not take sufficient account of the relatively small (and still decreasing) fraction of world emissions coming from the
EU (currently about 11%). It cannot solve the problem alone: its objective should be to be a role model for the wider world.
EU energy policy ought to be framed to strengthen Europe’s economic position in the world, not to undermine it
The EU should expand its R&D programme on tackling the intermittency of renewables (eg by storage and grid systems)
The EU should revisit its Energy Roadmap, taking full account of external costs of all energy options and subsidies.
– EU Energy Policy & Reduction of CO2 emissions J. Ongena & C Watson EST Karlsruhe 2015 (BPG EC 2015-5 P6)
•
•
•
The EU Energy Roadmap implies a vast transformation of the power sector by 2050. It currently uses 50% of fossil fuel.
Renewable energy is low intensity (mostly < 10 W/m2 of surface used: contrast that with ~100,000 W/m2 for large power plant)
9
Intermittency of output creates large shortfalls and excess power generation in a system dominated by renewables
4. Run-up to the Paris Conference on Climate Change (Dec 2015)
Shift to emphasis on global energy policy
–
–
Recognition that global emissions are currently dominated by: China 30%, US 15%, EU 10%, India 7%
UN conferences aimed at tackling the threat of climate change by controlling world-wide GHG emissions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
–
Development of DECC Global Calculator to enable individuals to devise their own energy strategy (2011-13)
•
•
•
•
•
•
–
COP15 Copenhagen (2009) recognised the scientific case for keeping temperature rises below 2 °C, but did not get emissions commitments
COP16 Cancun (2010)
COP17 Durban (2011)
COP18 Doha (2012) focus on financing by rich countries and compensations to vulnerable communities for their loss and damage
COP19 Warsaw (2013)
COP20 Lima (2014)
COP21 Paris (2015) agreement reached on global target for temperature rise of 1.5-2 oC, but not on how to reach this target
Software design based on UK Pathways to 2050, but now all parameters relate to global averages – no attempt to identify national contributions
As before, software package based on Excel spreadsheet design, and made publicly available in September 2013
Two different versions – the webtool version, aimed at users without detailed knowledge of Excel, giving a user-friendly interface and outputs
- the spreadsheet version, consisting of some 36 linked spreadsheets, which underlies the webtool version, but gives the
user greater freedom to specify inputs and outputs, and has a wider range of graphical outputs
The user inputs his/her chosen vales for 48 input parameters (‘levers’) which specify global average values which define the global energy system.
These include 10 levers defining the input energy mix (fossil, renewable, nuclear, bioenergy etc), the remainder defining the end uses – heating
buildings, domestic machinery, industrial processes, transport etc. The software has much additional input data which enable it to convert the
user-supplied information into final outputs, and to compute the overall energy parameters of the energy system , including energy losses and
emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases, and hence computing the annual and cumulative GHG emission statistics.
The software has its own algorithms for converting the data on emissions into an estimate of the mean surface temperature rise by 2010. These
are based on the best available IPCC information, but are approximations, based on available geophysical research, and are subject to uncertainty
DECC has also published a set of 26 ‘Example pathways’, with the user-defined inputs specified by a range of very different energy system experts.
Their choice of the 48 input parameters is given, thus permitting users to run the Global Calculator and view all the outputs.
EPS/Pugwash Commentary on early results obtained using the Global Calculator
•
Rome conference paper: Climate Change & the DECC Global Calculator Ongena & Watson September 2015. This paper selected three of the
‘Example pathways’ given by DECC, aiming to define three very different global energy systems – High Nuclear, High Renewable and intermediate.
A summary of the resulting input and output parameters obtained at that date are give in the following table:
10
DECC Global Calculator
webtool interface
11
Webtool outputs from three ‘representative’ pathways
Energy figures from Sankey
diagrams
High nuclear
(WNA Allegro)
Energy Inputs (EJ)
Renewables
Nuclear
Fossil
Biomass
652
206
131
240
75
End-use Outputs (EJ)
Buildings
Manufacturing
Transport
Agriculture
Losses
640
136
170
97
8
229
High renewable
(Climact)
32%
20%
37%
11%
458
176
26
187
69
21%
27%
15%
1%
36%
441
90
114
83
6
148
Intermediate (ICEPT)
38%
6%
41%
15%
646
218
49
274
105
34%
8%
42%
16%
20%
26%
19%
1%
34%
631
135
211
88
6
191
21%
34%
14%
1%
30%
Emissions (Gt)
Cumulative to 2100
22.5
3003
17.7
2882
19
2768
Temperature rise (0 C)
2.45
2.15
2.1
Gt CO2e in 2050
Chr. Watson & J.Ongena
EPS Energy Group Meeting
12
Roma, 23-24 September 2015
Run-up to the Paris Conference on Climate Change (Dec 2015)
Commentary on results obtained prior to Paris Conference
–
–
–
The selection of the three Example Pathways chosen was somewhat arbitrary. We sought to select one
pathway which adequately represented each of the descriptions given in the paper. The ‘High Nuclear’
pathway choice was easy – only one of the 26 Examples met that description. The High Renewable pathway
was more difficult, since most of the pathways meeting that description also had a very significant nuclear
component . Of the two that did not, we excluded the Friends of the Earth pathway, because its lever
settings involved too many extreme values, reflecting policies which we felt might be rather socially
unacceptable. That left the Climact pathway as the one chosen. For the Intermediate pathway, we wanted a
relatively even mix of nuclear, renewables and abated fossil input, and the ICEPT pathway seemed a
reasonable compromise, with no extreme lever choices.
As the table shown above indicates, all three selected pathways end up with a similar cumulative emissions
figure to 2100 of about 3000 Gt of CO2e and a forecast surface temperature increase of slightly over 2 oC.
These latter figures were obtained by taking the arithmetic mean of the upper and lower bounds given in
the Calculator outputs (eg on the overview page of the webtool version).
In our work with the Global Calculator at that time, we had a number of reservations about it.
•
•
•
•
•
•
–
The software is very inadequately documented. It uses some very advanced Excel facilities which are unfamiliar to the normal user, making it
difficult to understand how the calculations are made, and what assumptions are made. In particular it is difficult to identify the source of errors
(eg the fact that the energy input and output figures do not exactly balance)
The treatment of ‘unabated fossil fuel technologies’ is hard to understand. It seems that the Calculator ‘builds’ unabated thermal plants to make
good any shortfall in the electricity supply if the system otherwise fails to meet the specified user demand.
The treatment of CCS is hard to understand. The CCS capacity is specified by the user in levers 22 and 25, and the resulting plant capacity is
given in GW in the Webtool Compare table , but the route from that to reduced emissions is not clear.
The treatment of BioEnergy, and in particular the Bioenergy credit is not explained
There is an almost complete absence of reference to variations between geographical regions, and the consequent need for (and possible
benefits from) energy distribution networks (long-range grids and pipelines). The word ‘oversupply’ is mentioned in passing.
The documentation of the temperature rise calculation is particularly unclear and confusing.
For the above (and other) reasons, it is very difficult for the user to design a new pathway from scratch.
Attempts to do so by making small incremental changes to an Example pathway lead to paradoxical results,
13
presumably because of the very non-linear nature of this model
5. After Paris: can the world meet the targets agreed?
Decisions reached at, and following, Paris Conference (COP21)
– The 195 Participants unanimously adopted global average surface temperature rise
targets, without identifying how to reach them.
– Each participant country agreed to prepare, and submit to the UNFCCC on a
quinquennial basis, its non-binding ‘Intended nationally determined contribution’
(INDC) to the global response to climate change. Some 158 climate pledges, relating
to 94% of global emissions, have been submitted to the UNFCCC
– An independent consortium of experts has been set up to serve as the ‘climate
action tracker’. This body has already warned that the ‘emissions gap’ is not
narrowing fast enough to achieve the global temperature targets by their due dates.
It has concluded that the pledges to date (if all met in full) would result in around
2.7°C of warming by 2100. This falls well short of the target reduction agreed at Paris
(COP21). There is still a large ‘gap’.
14
After Paris: can the world meet the targets agreed?
What are credible warming projections based on present trends?
•
•
•
•
The ‘Big six’ were responsible for about 70% of GHG emissions in 2011 –
China 28%, US 16%, EU-28 10%, India 6%, Russia 6%, Japan 4%
The emissions trend for each of these can be forecast to be largely flat over the
next two decades, except for China and India, for which emissions due to
economic growth are forecast to increase by 5-8% p.a. up to 2030.
All six have submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)
showing significant planned reductions by 2030. Those for China and India are
‘relative to GDP’ – ie are partially offset by foreseen economic growth forecasts.
With that qualification, the INDC reductions by 2030 are generally ~25-30%. These
can be regarded as reductions with respect to a ‘business-as-usual’ baseline, and
are regarded by the independent ‘climate action tracker’ as seriously insufficient to
meet the Paris Agreement targets.
15
After Paris: can the world meet the targets agreed?
Can the DECC Global Calculator suggest credible candidate pathways?
•
As noted above, the published Global Calculator has some weaknesses, which need to be
rectified before it can be regarded as a fully reliable source of guidance on pathways. The
most critical of these are:
–
–
–
–
Its treatment of ‘unabated fossil fuel technologies’ and CCS.
Its treatment of BioEnergy, and in particular the Bioenergy credit
It takes no account of variations between geographical regions, requiring energy distribution networks (longrange grids and pipelines), or other means of tackling the problem of ‘over- or under-supply’ & intermittency
Its account of the calculation of temperature rise from cumulative emissions is unclear.
•
The 26 ‘example’ pathways given by DECC indicate the wide diversity of expert choices of
the 48 user-specified ‘levers’ which define a pathway, leading to temperature rise
estimates ranging from <1 to >6 0C. Of these 26 pathways, only 4 lie below 2 0C, indicating
that the task of finding pathways which meet the Paris targets may be very demanding.
• Generally speaking, lever choices leading to reduced emissions temperature rise are:
–
–
–
–
Reduced energy demand, better demand management, increased electrification (decarbonisation), less travel
Energy efficiency measures in industry and the home - better insulated or cooler houses, better appliances etc
Replacement of high-emission sources by low carbon - renewables, nuclear, biomass, CCS
Improvements in the energy system - storage, smart meters, improved interconnectors, reduced losses
16
After Paris: can the world meet the targets agreed?
Can the DECC Global Calculator suggest credible candidate pathways? Cont’d
• However, the task of devising lever values which implement these choices is
complicated because the Global Calculator represents a highly non-linear system.
Changes to one lever value can have unforeseen consequences for the effect of
another. Examples of this are given in our report at the Rome Conference.
• We have not yet made a systematic attempt to engage in a computer search for local
minima in the temperature rise adjacent to any of the example pathways. This is
probably premature before the weaknesses of the Global Calculator have been fixed.
• However we have selected three pathways which represent promising starting points
for such a search – the High Nuclear, High Renewable and intermediate pathways
mentioned above – each of which comes close to achieving the 2 0C target.
• It should be noted that each of these pathways makes extensive use of lever values
which DECC classifies as either ‘very ambitious’ or ‘extremely ambitious’. However
pathways which do not do so generally have a significantly higher temperature rise.
17
Conclusions
•
•
•
The current Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) (especially those
of China and India) will almost certainly be insufficient to limit warming to 2 0C
More ambitious INDCs will be required, and much will depend on future GDP growth
in these countries
Multiple technologies will be needed to limit GHG emissions sufficiently – especially:
–
–
–
–
•
•
•
•
Nuclear power
CCS
Hydroelectric projects (large dams)
Use of surplus land for growing energy crops
The DECC Global Calculator gives some useful indications on the changes in the world
energy infrastructure, and in the personal lifestyles of its population which are
required if we are to achieve the Paris (COP21) climate goals
These changes will be very expensive, though not necessarily as expensive as the
consequences of failing to meet those targets
There is a debate to be had on the limits to personal freedom if we are to make the
lifestyle changes that may be required
There is certainly a need for further debate on who should bear the costs involved,
and how the decisions should be taken on which pathway should be adopted.
18