Comparing Global Environmental Agreements
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Transcript Comparing Global Environmental Agreements
Global Environmental Regimes:
An Overview
Presentation on Occasion of the
Staff Education Program of GTZ
Gustav-Streseman-Institute, Bonn
20 August 2002
Detlef Sprinz
PIK - Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact
Research & University of Potsdam
http://www.sprinz.org
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Overview
“Modern” Global Environmental Regimes
Dimensions of Comparison
Conclusions
2
“Modern” Global
Environmental Regimes
(Mostly) Global Environmental Regimes
Since the 1990s
(> 1992 UNCED Conference at Rio de Janeiro)
climate change
stratospheric ozone depletion (from 1980s)
biodiversity
deforestation
desertification
persistent organic pollutants (global)
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Overview of Agreements & Institut. Design (1)
Legally
binding
agreement
s
Major
institutions
Climate Change
Stratospheric
Ozone Depletion
Framework Convention on
Climate Change (1992),
Kyoto Protocol (1997, did
not yet enter into force)
Vienna Convention
(1985), Montreal
Protocol (1987) and
amendments
COP & MOP (Kyoto
Protocol), Secretariat
(Bonn, Germany), SBI,
SBSTA, Financial
Mechanism (GEF)
COP & MOP,
Secretariat (UNEP,
Nairobi), Multilateral
Fund (MLF), various
panels
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Overview of Agreements & Institut. Design (2)
Loss of Biodiversity
Deforestation
Legally
binding
agreement
s
Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD, 1992),
Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety (2000, not yet in
force)
International Tropical
Timber Agreement
(ITTA, 1993), Forest
Principles (1992, not
legally binding)
Major
institutions
COP & MOP (Cartagena
Protocol), Secretariat
(Montreal, Canada),
SBSTTA, Clearing House
Mechanism, Financial
Mechanism (GEF)
Intergov. Panel on
Forests (IPF,
abandoned in 1997),
Intergov. Forum on
Forests (IFF, now
UNFF), ITTO, TFAP,
UNFF
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Overview of Agreements & Institut. Design (3)
Desertification
Persistent Organic
Pollutants
Legally
binding
agreement
s
Convention to Combat
Desertification (CCD,
1994); various regionspecific annexes
LRTAP POPs Protocol
Major
institutions
COP, Secretariat (Bonn,
Germany), Committee
on Science and
Technology (CST),
Global Mechanism
(IFAD), new Committee
for the Review of the
Implementation of the
Convention (CRIC)
INC, Criteria Expert Group
as subsidiary body to INC;
global convention
stipulates: COP, Secretariat,
Subsidiary Body, POPs
Review Committee, Interim
Finamcial Mechanism
(GEF)
(Europe and North America,
1998), Stockholm POPs
Convention (2001, not yet
in force)
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Comparing Global Environmental Accords:
Decision Making (1)
FCCC & Kyoto
Protocol
Vienna Convention & Biodiversity
Montreal Protocol
(CBD)
Failed to arrive at
rules of procedure;
unanimous voting in
most cases; in
practice: exceptions
from consensus if
number of opposing
countries is small
and does not
include a major
country
Strong voting
mechanism: adjustments
(without need for national
ratification) to already
controlled substances by
2/3 majorities, plus
majorities of DC & IC; for
the addition of new
substances: 2/3 of the
parties; decisions on
financial mechanism: 2/3
majorities plus majorities
of DC & IC
Failed to arrive at
rules of procedure;
amendments to the
convention require
consensus or twothirds if consensus
fails; annexes
require two-thirds
majority decisions
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Comparing Global Environmental Accords:
Decision Making (2)
Desertification (CCD)
Failed to arrive at rules of
procedure; simple majority only
for procedural decisions;
amendments to the convention:
two-thirds majority; parties that do
not approve the amendment will
not be affected by the amendment
Persistent Organic
Pollutants (POP
Convention)
COP-decisions require twothirds majority; amendments to
the convention require threefourths majority
8
Comparing Global Environmental Accords:
Reporting & Compliance (1)
FCCC & Kyoto
Protocol
Vienna Convention
& Montreal Protocol
Biodiversity
(CBD)
Regular reporting
on efforts to
achieve the
objectives of the
convention; noncompliance
procedure for Kyoto
Protocol agreed
(30% penalty)
Yearly reports on
production, exports, and
imports; strong
implementation review;
soft and hard
noncompliance
procedures, including
sanctions for illegal trade
and threat of terminating
funding
Reports on measures
to implement
provisions of the
convention; only
general rules on
arbitration,
conciliation, and
compliance
(Cartagena Protocol);
extensive information
provision (Cartagena
Protocol); clearing
house mechanism 9
Comparing Global Environmental Accords:
Reporting & Compliance (2)
Desertification (CCD)
Reports on measures to
implement provisions of the
convention; countries affected
by desertification have to
provide a detailed description of
the implementation of the
convention, including the
implementation of national
action programs (NAPs); only
general rules on arbitration and
conciliation; new Committee for
the Review of the
Implementation of the
Persistent Organic
Pollutants (POP
Convention)
Will report on measures to
implement provisions of the
convention; COP shall decide on
a non-compliance procedure
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Comparing Global Environmental Accords:
Development Component (1)
FCCC & Kyoto
Protocol
Vienna Convention Biodiversity
& Montreal Protocol (CBD)
Common but differentiated responsibilities;
no targets and timetables for developing
countries within the
first commitment
period of the Kyoto
Protocol; CDM
designed to reward
developing countries
for emission
reductions and
provide access to
Different reduction
schedules for
developing countries;
MLF finances
incremental project
costs of developing
countries; preservation
of the ozone layer
mainly perceived by
developing countries as
an interest of the North;
considerable bargaining
power of developing
Industrialized
countries aim at
protecting and
preserving
biodiversity;
developing countries
want to protect their
right to exploit their
own genetic
resources
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Comparing Global Environmental Accords:
Development Component (2)
Desertification (CCD)
Scale of environmental problem
mostly local but with global
effects for climate change;
developing countries demand
financial assistance from
industrialized countries; strongly
connected with development
goals due to socioeconomic
causes of desertification
Persistent Organic
Pollutants (POP
Convention)
Developed countries shall
provide new and additional
financial resources to developing
countries as well as economies
in transition to meet the agreed
full incremental costs of
implementing measures;
developing countries won the
right to produce and use DDT to
fight vector-borne diseases
12
Comparing Global Environmental Accords:
Funding & Regime Effect (1)
FCCC & Kyoto
Protocol
Funding:
Vienna
Convention &
Montreal Protocol
Funding:
Global Environmental
Facility
Multilateral Ozone
Fund
Global Environmental
Facility
Regime
effectiveness:
Regime
effectiveness:
Regime
effectiveness:
Some effect
Major effect
Minor effect
Biodiversity
(CBD)
Funding:
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Comparing Global Environmental Accords:
Funding & Regime Effect (2)
Desertification (CCD)
Funding:
Persistent Organic
Pollutants (POP
Convention)
Funding:
Global Mechanism hosted by
the International Fund for
Agricultural Development
(IFAD) (temporary solution)
Interim Financial Mechanism to
be provided by the Global
Environmental Facility
Regime effectiveness:
Regime effectiveness:
Minor effect
Not yet in force
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Conclusions
Not All Conventions or Protocols Have Yet
Entered Into Force
Broad Similarity in Institutional Setup
Across Global Environmental Regimes
Development Component Clearly Visible
Rules of Procedure Are Contentious
Substantial Variation in Regime
Effectiveness
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Where to Find More
Full text:
Urs Luterbacher and Detlef F. Sprinz (eds.,
2001):"International Relations and Global
Climate Change," Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 247-277
Further Information & Update:
[email protected]
http://www.sprinz.org
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