Climate Change and India`s National Strategy
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Transcript Climate Change and India`s National Strategy
Climate Change and
India’s National
Strategy
Sandeep Sengupta
Merton College, Oxford
23 December 2010
[email protected]
Structure of Presentation
Threat of climate change to India
Regional threats to India
International climate negotiations and India’s foreign
policy positions and challenges
A national strategy for India on climate change:
Managing trade-offs and choices
Not to be cited without permission
The Threat of Climate Change
IPCC (2007) - threat of climate change is ‘unequivocal’
Effects of rising temperatures on Asia:
declining crop yields; reduced fresh water supplies; rising sea-levels;
increased floods, droughts and extreme weather events; biodiversity loss;
higher risk of diseases
India-specific assessments:
NATCOM (2004): General country-wide vulnerability assessment; post2070 scenarios
INCCA (2010): Finer-grained 4x4 assessment; 2030 time-horizon
Western Ghats, Himalayan Region, Coastal India, North-East
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Agriculture, Water, Forests, Human Health
Expected climate change in
India by 2030 and its impacts
Warmer seasons
Increased annual precipitation
lower frequency of rainy days; increased intensity
Cyclonic disturbances
Avg. temp rise: 2.0 deg C predicted
1.0-4.0 deg C at extreme ranges
lower frequency; increased intensity
increased risk of storm surges
Sea-level rise
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1.3mm/year on average
Effects of climate change in India
Agriculture
Fresh water supply
High variability predicted in water yields (from 50% increase to 40-50% reduction)
10-30% increased risk of floods; increased risks of droughts
Forests and natural ecosystems
Up to 50% reduction in maize yields
4-35% reduction in rice yields (with some exceptions)
Rise in coconut yields (with some exceptions); reduced apple production
Negative impacts on livestock in all regions
Increased net primary productivity
Shifting forest borders; species mix; negative impact on livelihoods and biodiversity
Human health
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be cited heat
without permission
Higher morbidity and mortality
stress and vector/water-borne diseases
Expanded transmission window for malaria
Overall risks posed to India
Food security - predominantly monsoon dependent and rain-fed
agriculture
Water security - glacier-fed river and stressed ground water systems
Coastal security - 7,000 km long, densely populated coastline;
vulnerable Andaman & Nicobar and Lakshwadeep islands
Livelihood security - natural resource-dependent rural communities
Energy security - climate change further complicated by our
dependence on coal (50% of total energy mix)
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Regional security challenges
India is surrounded by institutionally weak and highly vulnerable
states:
Maldives (pop. 300,000): over 80% of country <1m above MSL
Bangladesh (pop. 160 m): 1m rise in sea-level can inundate 17.5% of its land area
and 11% of its population
Greater number of IDPs but considerable risks of climate-induced
transboundary migration
Tensions over river-water sharing with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal
and China
Tensions over shifting coastal and maritime borders resulting from
sea-level rise (e.g. Sir Creek)
Effects of climate change Not
in toA&N
andpermission
Lakshwadeep islands can
be cited without
potentially impact India’s power projection ability in the wider region
International negotiations on
climate change (1)
India has been a key actor in international climate negotiations
since 1980s
Influential voice and defender of the global South
Important producer of ideas and international norms and rules
Effective coalition-builder
Aggressive protector of its own interests
Traditional Indian position
Primary responsibility of the North
Emissions of developing countries need to grow to meet their legitimate poverty
reduction and development needs
Every human being has the right to an equal share of the Earth’s atmosphere
South cannot bear burden of climate change without adequate financial and
technological support
Per-capita convergence of emissions is the only equitable long-term solution to
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climate change
International negotiations on
climate change (2)
UNFCCC (1992)
Kyoto Protocol (1997)
Developed countries took on legally binding targets to reduce their collective emissions by 5%
below 1990 levels over a commitment period of 2008-12
Developing countries were exempted from similar targets, or from any ‘voluntary commitments’
Marrakesh Accords (2001)
Countries agreed to tackle climate change on the ‘basis of equity’ and their ‘common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (CBDRRC principle)
Developed countries agreed to ‘take the lead’ on this issue and stabilize their GHG emissions to
1990 levels by 2000
It was agreed that emissions of developing countries needed to grow to meet their social and
development needs
Developed countries agreed to provide ‘new and additional’ finance to developing countries to
meet their ‘agreed full incremental costs’ of climate mitigation and adaptation
established rules to operationalise the Kyoto Protocol, including penalties for non-compliance
to be cited
without permission
Kyoto Protocol entered intoNotforce
(2005)
George W. Bush withdraws US from treaty citing lack of similar targets for China and India
Recent changes in India’s
positions on climate change (1)
June 2007 - pledge by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that India’s per capita
emissions would never exceed that of the developed world, but noting that time
was ‘not ripe’ for ‘quantitative targets’ (G8+5 Summit, Heiligendamm, Germany)
July 2007 - Prime Ministers Council on Climate Change (PMCCC) established
June 2008 - National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) launched
8 national missions: Solar, Energy Efficiency, Sustainable Habitat, Water, Himalayan
Ecosystem, Green India, Sustainable Agriculture, Strategic Knowledge
July 2009 - Singh signed MEF Leaders Declaration that recognised that global
temperature rise ‘ought not to exceed 2 degrees C’ and the need for a ‘global
goal’ to reduce ‘global emissions by 2050’ (MEF and G8 Summit, L’Aquila, Italy)
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Recent changes in India’s
positions on climate change (2)
December 2009 - declaration in Parliament by Environment Minister Jairam
Ramesh that India would voluntarily reduce the ‘emissions intensity’ of its GDP
by 20-25% by 2020 compared to 2005 levels (Lok Sabha, New Delhi)
January 2010 - Expert Group set up by Planning Commission to develop a
Low-C Economy strategy for the 12th FYP process
December 2010 - Ramesh suggested that ‘all countries must take binding
commitments under an appropriate legal form’ (UNFCCC CoP-16, Cancun,
Mexico)
Visible shift in India’s position also on external review and scrutiny of
domestic mitigation actions
1992 - total refusal
2007 - conditional acceptance
2009 - international consultations and analysis (ICA) through more frequent
and detailed NATCOMs Not to be cited without permission
Arguments for change:
20 year North-South deadlock has not been leading anywhere
inability of the South, including BASIC, to coerce the North to deliver on its promises
Growing knowledge of India’s high domestic vulnerability to climate
change, and that global inaction will only harm India in the long run
Considerable change in India over the last 20 years
From economically-vulnerable post-Cold War state to major economic and political
powerhouse
Higher global expectations not only from North but also from South
(AOSIS/ LDCs)
Sentiment that with its growing power and responsibility, India should now
shed its ‘naysaying’ image in international negotiations
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permission
Changing dynamic of international
politics
and alliances; less logical for
India to just oppose the US or the North in a one-dimensional manner
Arguments against (1):
2009 Copenhagen Accord and 2010 Cancun Agreements have set the
stage for the slow unraveling of Kyoto Protocol and key principles of
UNFCCC
India has now made itself a complicit party to the North’s revisionist
agenda to renege on their earlier commitments made under
international law, which can undermine its longer-term commitment to a
rules-based international order
Allowing selective deviations from UNFCCC and KP have weakened
the overall integrity of these treaties
Self-funding of domestic mitigation actions which have incremental costs has
undermined what was agreed to under the UNFCCC
India is still a relatively poor country and future climate mitigation costs are likely to be
high and uncertain, with most climate technologies still controlled by the developed
world
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cited without permission
Loss of the KP will end the Clean
Mechanism (CDM ) which Indian
industry has considerably benefited from over the years
Arguments against (2):
UNFCCC and KP were one of the few international treaties
agreed in favour of the developing world
no guarantee that whatever replaces the current regime will be as advantageous
to the South
no guarantee that any new agreement will even combat climate change better
the North has been ‘let off the hook’ for uncertain gains
India’s management of alliances has become more complicated
Long-heritage of arguing for a fairer and more equitable international in
international negotiations
Risks losing credibility, especially with its developing country partners, if its
bridge-building efforts with the North fail, and if the final outcome is weak,
inequitable, and unfair to them
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Developing a National Strategy for
India on Climate Change
India faces key trade-offs and choices on this issue
Respect for international law v/s need to revise it to make it more effective
Need to balance interests v/s values while determining and managing its new and old
alliances
Need to be flexible, open-minded and forward looking v/s being prudent, tough and
alone, if necessary, to defend positions and principles that are right and serve the
greater good
Need to resolve these competing sets of arguments in a coherent,
well thought-through, and strategic manner keeping India’s overall
domestic and foreign policy interests and long-term security and
prosperity in mind
Need to have policy decisions based on sound institutional
processes and through solid argumentation and reason-giving
Need for better human and
capacity to deal with the
Not toorganizational
be cited without permission
intellectual demands of such challenges
Thank you
Sandeep Sengupta
Merton College, Oxford
23 December 2010
[email protected]