Transcript 18 Classical Indian Metaphysics

Classical Indian Metaphysics
Idealism
• Classical Indian metaphysics centers on
the contrast between realism and
idealism
• Buddhism and the most popular school
of Hinduism, Advaita Vedanta, are
thoroughly idealist
• They insist that everything is minddependent
Idealism
• What appear to be independent objects
are mental constructions
• Objects do not really endure over time;
they exist for no more than a moment
• What we take to be objects are really
bundles of momentary entities that we
group together for our own purposes
Realism
• Hindu philosophers of the Logic and
Particularist schools, in contrast, are
realists
• They hold that objects such as rocks,
stones, and trees are truly “out there” in
the world
• These objects in no sense depend on
our minds
• They endure over time
Vaisesika (Particularism)
• Kanada (c. 100): “I will enumerate everything
that has the character of being.”
• Fundamental question of ontology: What is
there?
• Everyday speech and behavior is the
touchstone
• Categories (padartha, types of things to which
words refer)
Basic Categories
• Substance: pot, cloth, fire, soul
• Quality: square, blue
• Motion (action): move, eat, throw
• These correspond to items in Aristotle's
categories, and to
• Nouns, adjectives, and verbs
• They are existent (sat)
Additional Categories
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Universality: triangularity
Inherence: the pot's being blue
Individualizer: differentiates atoms (‘this’)
Absence: the elephant in here
The first three are present (bhava); the last,
absent (abhava)
• But they can all be talked about and named
Inherence
• Quality
• Inherence
• Substance
Individualizer
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Black’s two iron spheres
They are qualitatively identical
But they are different
What distinguishes them?
Absences
Kanada’s Beard?
• How do we know anything
about
– Universals
– Inherence
– Particularizers
– Absences?
Another Trilemma?
• We must either
– Reinterpret sentences that lead us to
introduce these entities (the semantic
strategy)
– Reinterpret the entities as concepts (the
metaphysical strategy)
– Postulate some way of knowing these entities
(the epistemological strategy)
Substance
• All the other categories depend on
substance
• Qualities, quantities, relations, etc., are
always of substances
• There are many senses in which a thing
may be said to be
• But all depend on a focal meaning of
‘being’, substance
Vaisesika: Kinds of
Noncomposite Substance
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Earth
Air
Fire
Water
Ether
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Space
Time
Self
Mind
• Composite substances are the causal result of
combinations of these
Two Concepts of Substances
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Realist (Aristotle/Vaisesika)
The world is divided into
Substances— bearers of
Qualities
We carve the world at joints
Idealist (Buddhist)
We divide the world into
Objects— bundles of
Qualities
There are no joints
Hinduism
• Hinduism is the primary religion of India.
• It regards the Upanishads (900-200
BCE) as sacred.
Henotheism
• There are many gods,
• But all are forms of one being, Brahman.
Rg Veda
• “They have styled Him Indra (the Chief of the
Gods), Mitra (the Friend), Varuna (the Venerable),
Agni (Fire), also the celestial, great-winged
Garutma; for although one, poets speak of Him
diversely; they say Agni, Yama (Death), and
Matarisvan (Lord of breath).”
• All these gods exist, but as diverse appearances
of one God, “the divine architect, the impeller of
all, the multiform.”
Bhagavad Gita
• “Even those who are devotees of other gods,
And worship them permeated with faith,
It is only me, son of Kunti, that even they
Worship, (tho’) not in the enjoined fashion.
For I of all acts of worship
Am both the recipient and the Lord. . . .”
• “I see the gods in Thy body, O God. . . .”
Concepts of Brahman
• Nirguna brahman: God without attributes; neti
. . . neti (not this)
• Saguna brahman: God with attributes
Attributes of God
• Abstract:
– Sat: being
– Chit: awareness
– Ananda: bliss
• Concrete
– Creator (Brahma)
– Preserver (Vishnu)
– Destroyer (Shiva)
Six Orthodox Schools
(darshanas)
• Vedanta (end of Veda, or sacred
knowledge)
• Samkhya (nature)
• Yoga (discipline)
• Purva Mimamsa (exegesis,
interpretation)
• Vaisesika (realism)
• Nyaya (logic)
Vedanta
• Brahman: the Absolute, ground of all being,
reality as it is in itself
• Atman: the soul
Advaita
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Nondualism: soul (atman) = Brahman
Monism: Everything is ultimately one
Everything is Brahman
Brahman is the child and the elephant, you and
me
• We are one with everything
• Everything is holy
Advaita
• Idealism: The world as it appears is not real
• Distinctions are illusory
• The world is maya (play, illusion)
Theism
• Dualism: soul (atman) ≠ Brahman
• Not everything is identical with everything else
• Realism: Some aspects of the world are
independent of us
• At least some distinctions are real
Buddhaghosa (-400)
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There are 89 kinds of consciousness
Nothing unifies them
There are only streams of consciousness
Nothing unites past, present, and future
Buddhaghosa
• A living being lasts only as long as one
thought
• People, minds, objects are only ways of
speaking
People and Passengers
• Jane flies from Austin to Houston and back
<———————————>
• She is one person
• She is two passengers
• ‘Passenger’ is just a way of counting
• Buddhaghosa: every noun is like ‘passenger’
Questions to King Milinda
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“there is no ego here to be found”
“there is no chariot here to be found”
No one element is the whole
The combination isn’t the whole; parts
could change while object remains the
same
Consciousness-Only
• Vasubandhu’s idealism —> Dharmapala —>
Xuanzong (596-664)
• Idealism: Everything depends on mind
• No-self: There is no mind
The Atomic Theory of Matter
• The atomic theory poses a challenge to this
conception of substances
• Atomic theory: things are composed of
atoms; properties of things depend on
nature and motion of atoms
Dignaga (c. 450), Buddhist
• “Though atoms serve as causes of the
consciousness of the sense-organs, they are not
its actual objects like the sense organs; because
the consciousness does not represent the image
of the atoms. The consciousness does not arise
from what is represented in it. Because they do
not exist in substance just like the double moon.
Thus both the external things are unfit to be the
real objects of consciousness.”
Plato’s Philosophy of Mind
The Good
•
Participation
This is a
triangle
Form
Recollection
Perception
Object
Nyaya-Vaisesika Philosophy of Mind
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Instantiation
Quality
This is a
triangle
Universal
Inherence
Perception
Object
Making Universals Mind-Dependent
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Application
Quality
This is a
triangle
Concept
Inherence
Perception
Object
Buddhist Philosophy of Mind
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Application
This is a
triangle
Concept
Dharma
Perception
Internal Object
Actual Object
Nyaya-Vaisesika Conception
• There are continuing substances
• Qualities inhere in substances
• Our talk of substances is a good guide to
metaphysics
• Substances are the basic constituents of the
world
• They have essences— properties necessary
to them
• Their essences give them identity through
change
The Buddhist Conception
• There are no continuing substances
• Everything is momentary
• “Substances” are just bundles of qualities
(dharmas)
• Our talk of substances is a convenient fiction
• “Substances” are conceptual constructions
• Nothing gives them unity
• They have essences only as constructed
Yogi Berra
• “Here’s your pizza, Mr. Berra. Would you like
me to cut it into four pieces or eight?”
• Yogi: “Better make it four. I don’t think I can
eat eight.”
Actual and Internal Objects
• Aristotle: objects cause perceptions, and are
represented in them
• Causes of perception = objects of perception
• Dignaga: No—
– causes are the atoms— actual objects [alambana]
– objects are appearances— internal objects [artha]
Causes and Effects
• Causes of perception are the atoms
• We don’t see atoms, but their effects
• What we see doesn’t exist in reality; it is
“like the double moon”
• How could we distinguish aspects of the
effects (appearances) that do match the
causes?
Buddhist Arguments
Yogacara (Buddhist idealism):
Vasubandhu, Asanga,
Samghabhadra (4th century)
Argument from Change
• Distinctness of discernibles: The same thing
can’t have contrary properties
• Any difference in properties implies numerical
difference
• Change implies a difference in properties
• So, change implies numerical distinctness
• Change occurs at every moment
• So, things persist only for a moment
Nyaya-Vaisesika Response
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Substances can endure through change
Substances can have contrary properties
Change does not occur at every moment
These relations are different:
– Substance/properties
– Whole/parts
– Properties/parts
• Things have essences
• Qualities
• Substance
• Atoms
Argument from Destruction
• Everything is destroyed by its own nature,
with no external cause
• Everything destroyed by its own nature is
destroyed immediately
• So, everything is destroyed immediately
• So, nothing persists for more than a moment
Against External Destruction 1
• A cause can’t have contradictory effects
• External causes of destruction would also be
causes of production (e.g., fire causing ash)
• Destruction and production are contradictory
• So, there are no external causes of
destruction
Against External Destruction 2
• Nonexistence can’t have a cause
• Destruction is nonexistence
• So, destruction can’t have a cause
• Nyaya-Vaisesika response: absences
can be causes and effects
Immediate Destruction
• Say an object is destroyed, not at t, but at a later
t’
• Some contributing factor must have absent at t
but present at t’
• But no external factor can contribute to the
thing’s destruction
• So, the factor must be part of the thing’s nature
• But the thing has the same nature at t and t’;
contradiction
Argument from Causality
• Everything that exists is causally efficient
• Everything causally efficient is momentary
• So, everything that exists is momentary
Capacities
• There are no unrealized capacities
• So, anything that can cause something causes it
immediately
• So, things have different capacities at different
times
• Difference in capacities implies numerical
distinctness
• So, nothing persists for more than a moment
Argument from
Momentariness
• Mental states are momentary
• Anything that depends on something
momentary is momentary
• The body depends on mental states
• So, the body is momentary
Argument from
Momentariness
• Mental states are momentary
• Anything that causes something momentary is
momentary
• Physical objects cause mental states
• So, physical objects are momentary
Argument from consciousness
• Dignaga: We know world only through sense
organs
• So, we know objects only insofar as they become
internal objects
• They are objects of consciousness, constituted
by consciousness
• We know objects only as conditioned by
consciousness
Jainist Perspectivism
• Jainism, a religion and philosophy
tracing from Mahavira (599-527 BCE),
is best known for its emphasis on
nonviolence
• Jainism also advances a version of
perspectivism
Jain Ethics
• Jains base their ethical views on five
great vows:
– 1. noninjury
– 2. truthfulness
– 3. respect for property
– 4. chastity
– 5. nonattachment
Jain Metaphysics
• They believe that these vows can be
fulfilled only from a certain metaphysical
standpoint
• A conviction that one has the absolute
truth, for example, is likely to lead one
to be willing
– to injure others for its sake, and
– to become attached to it
Nonabsolutism
• Nonabsolutism (anekantavada, nonone-sidedness): no statement captures
the truth absolutely
• Everything we say is true, at best, in
some respect
• Nothing is true simpliciter
Nonabsolutism
• The same is true of falsehood
• Every statement approaches its topic
from one point of view
• To understand any topic, however, we
must see it from many points of view
Respect
• We should respect people no matter
what they believe or say, therefore,
because every statement contains
some element of truth
• Everything is true in some respect, or
from some point of view
Multifaceted Reality
• Reality is many-sided
• Indeed, it has infinitely many facets,
some of which are opposites
• Whatever we say is true syat, maybe,
perhaps, in some respect
• It is also false in some respect
• We never capture the whole truth
Language
• Accompanying nonabsolutism is a view
of language
• Maybeism, or relativism (syadvada):
language can express the truth only
from some point of view
Law of Sevenfold Predication
• Vadi Devasuri (twelfth century) develops this
into a theory of language based on the Law
of Sevenfold Predication:
– 1. It is
– 2. It is not
– 3. It is and is not
– 4. It is indeterminate
– 5. It is and is indeterminate
– 6. It is not and is indeterminate
– 7. It is and is not and is indeterminate
Pluralism
• Nonabsolutism implies a positive
pluralism of perspectives
• Reality is so rich that it makes true, with
qualifications, every intellectual stance
• Reality is so incredibly rich that it can
underlie and give rise to opposed
pictures
Skepticism
• Nonabsolutism ≠ skepticism
• It promises reconciliation of apparently
opposed points of view
• It targets only the absolutism that
partisans propose for their preferred
positions, blind to the truth in their
opponents’ theories
Intellectual Nonviolence
• The point is not to deny but to affirm
seemingly incompatible perspectives
• The special sevenfold logic, the
maybeism, was developed to facilitate
the disarming of controversy
• Here are the tools of intellectual
nonviolence (ahimsa)
Self-Defeating?
• Is the Jain position self-defeating?
• Jainists say no. It is not meant to be an
absolute claim
• That would be like practicing ahimsa
toward everyone except oneself
• Nonharmfulness requires humility
• So, the Jainist offers it merely as one
perspective alongside others