Transcript Unit 8.

Unit 8.
Economics of Other
Business Management Strategies
(Ch. 9, 10, 11, 13)
LR Competitive Market
Equilibrium
 SR profits lead to entry
 S  Mkt P  Df shifts down
 P = MR = MC (socially efficient)
 P = Min ATC
 0 excess profits
 efficient plant size
Managing a Price Taking Firm
 Understand market forces to anticipate
changes in input and output prices
 Use cash market contracts, futures
markets, etc. to establish favorable
prices at times other than delivery
 Costs must be minimized
 Look into specialty products, niche
markets, forming cooperatives,etc.
Managing a Price Setting Firm
 Create barriers to entry
 Advertise
 Proliferate new products (introduce first)
 Maintain excess production capacity
 Seek out sustainable niches
 Guard trade secrets/plans
 Obtain and/or extend patents
 Entry limit pricing
Managing a Price Setting Firm
(contd)
 Pursue pricing strategies that:
 Decrease competitive P rivalry
Match P
 Random P
 Non price competition

 Attempt
to capture more consumer surplus
Price discrimination
 2-part block (package) pricing
 Bundling

Entry Limit Pricing
Third Degree Price Discrimination
 The practice of charging different
groups of consumers different prices for
the same product
 Examples include student discounts,
senior citizen’s discounts, regional and
international pricing
Profit-Maximizing Prices
  P where MR = MC
 E 0  1
 P
 MC

 E0 
 E0 
 P
MC

 E 0  1
 E0 
 E  1  ' markup' factor applied to MC
 0 
Profit-Maximizing ‘Markup’ Factors

E0
 E0 


E

1
 0 
-1.05
21
-1.1
11
-1.2
6
-1.4
3.5
-1.6
2.67
-1.8
2.25
-2.0
2
-2.5
1.67
-3.0
1.5
-4.0
1.33
Assume:
 Q
=
 QUS =


QJ =


 QT =
total demand for Kodak film
US demand = 15 – PUS
PUS = 15 – QUS
MRUS = 15 – 2QUS
Japan demand = 18 – 2PJ
PJ = 9 - .5QJ
MRJ = 9 – QJ
QUS + QJ
= 33 – 3P (for P 9)
 P = 11 – 1/3Q
 MR = 11 – 2/3Q
 MC = ATC = 3 in both the US & Japan
Profit Max Example
(with P Discrimination)
  max  max US + max J
 QUS to max US  MRUS = MC




15 – 2QUS = 3
QUS* = 6
PUS* = 9
max US = TRUS – TCUS
= (9)(6) – (3)(6) = 54 – 18 = 36
Profit Max Example
(with P Discrimination)
 QJ to max J  MRJ = MC
 9 – QJ = 3
 QJ* = 6
 PJ* = 6
 max J = TRJ – TCJ
= (6)(6) – (3)(6) = 36 – 18 = 18
 max  = max US + max J
= 36 + 18 = 54
P Discrimination  Differential
Markup Pricing
 E0 in US at PUS = 9
Q P
9

  ( 1)  150
.
P Q
6

E0
150
.
15
.


  3 markup
E0  1 150
.  1 .5
 E0 in J at PJ = 6
Q P
6
  ( 2)   2
P Q
6
E0
2


  2 markup
E 0  1 2  1

  Max if PU = PJ
 MRT = MC
 11 – 2/3Qr = 3
 2/3QT = 8
 QT = 12
 P
= 11 – 1/3(QT)
= 11 – 1/3(12)
=7
 =
(P-ATC)(QT)
=
(7-3)(12)
=
48
 NOTE:
QU = 15 - PU
= 15 – 7
= 8  U =(4)(8) = 32
QJ = 18 – 2PJ
= 18 – 2(7)
= 18 – 14
=4
 J = (4)(4) = 16
Peak-Load Pricing
 When demand during
peak times is higher
than the capacity of the
firm, the firm should
engage in peak-load
pricing.
 Charge a higher price
(PH) during peak times
(DH)
 Charge a lower price
(PL) during off-peak
times (DL)
Extracting Consumer Surplus:
1.
2.
Block Pricing: For items sold in a package
(block), add units up to point where
consumer willingness to pay = MC of
adding last unit. Charge P = consumer
surplus value at that point.
Two-part Pricing: For items sold where the
seller can limit buyer access to the product,
charge P = MC and also charge a ‘fee’ = to
remaining consumer surplus.
An Algebraic Example
 Typical consumer’s demand is P = 10 –
2Q
 C(Q) = 2Q
 Optimal number of units in a package?
 Optimal package price?
Results with Standard MR =
MC Profit Max
 P = 10 – 2Q
  MR = 10 – 4Q
 TC = 2Q
  MC = 2
  Max
  MR = MC
  10 – 4Q = 2
 Q = 2, P = 6
  TR – TC = (6)(2) – (2)(2) = 12-4 = 8
Optimal Quantity to Package: 4 Units

Optimal Price for the Package: $24

Costs and Profits with Block Pricing

Costs and Profits with Two-Part
Pricing
Price
Charge fee = CS
10
8
½ (4) (10-2) = $16
6
Costs = $8
4
2
D
1
2 3
4
5
Set P = MC = $2
Quantity
Commodity Bundling
 The practice of bundling two or more
products together and charging one
price for the bundle.
 Examples
 Vacation
packages
 Computers and software
 Film and developing
An Example that Illustrates Kodak’s
Moment
 Total market size is 4 million customers
 Four types of consumers
 25% will use only Kodak film
 25% will use only Kodak developing
 25% will use only Kodak film and use only Kodak
developing
 25% have no preference
 Zero costs (for simplicity)
 Maximum price each type of consumer will
pay is as follows:
Reservation Prices for Kodak Film and
Developing by Type of Consumer
Type
Film
Developing
F
$8
$3
FD
$8
$4
D
$4
$6
N
$3
$2
Demand for Kodak Film

Revenue-Maximizing Film P?

P
Buyers
TR
8
F, FD
8 x 2 = 16
4
F, FD, D
4 x 3 = 12
3
F, FD, D, N
3 x 4 = 12
Demand for Kodak Developing

Revenue-Maximizing Developing P?

P
Buyers
TR
6
D
6x1=6
4
D, FD
4x2=8
3
D, FD, F
3x3=9
2
D, FD, F, N
2x4=8
Maximum TR Pricing Items
Separately?
 = Max Film TR + Max Developing
TR
 16 + 9
 = 25
Pricing a “Bundle” of Film and
Developing
Demand for Film & Developing
‘Bundle’

Revenue-Maximizing ‘Bundle’ P?

P
Buyers
TR
12
FD
12 x 1 = 12
11
FD, F
11 x 2 = 22
10
FD, F, D
10 x 3 = 30
5
FD, F, D, N
5 x 4 = 20
 Note: previous Max TR pricing items
separately = 25.
Cross-Subsidies
 Prices charged for one product are
subsidized by the sale of another
product.
 May be profitable when there are
significant demand complementarities
effects.
 Examples
 Browser
and server software
 Drinks and meals at restaurants
Principal-Agent Problem
 Problem  agent has incentive to
pursue their own goals which hinders
principal’s ability to achieve their goals.
Principal = individual
who employs or
supervises others
(agents)
• stockholders
• management
• business owner
• defendant
• team owner
Agent = individual
employed to
assist a principal
• management
• employees
• sub contractor
• lawyer
• team player
Principal-Agent Solutions
 Supervision of Agent
 Time clock
 Spot check
 Internal Incentives
 Profit sharing (e.g. bonus)
 Revenue sharing (e.g. tips, commissions)
 Piece rate pay
 External Incentives
 Reputation concerns
 Takeover threat