Transcript Ex 4.9

Frank Cowell: Microeconomics
November 2006
Exercise 4.9
MICROECONOMICS
Principles and Analysis
Frank Cowell
Ex 4.9(1) Question
Frank Cowell: Microeconomics
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purpose: to analyse “short-run” constraints on the consumer
method: build model up step-by-step through the question
parts. Start with simple Lagrangean maximisation
Ex 4.9(1): Checking the U-function
Frank Cowell: Microeconomics
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Given the utility function
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The indifference curves must look like this:
x2
x1
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They do not touch the axes…
So it is clear that we cannot have a corner solution
Ex 4.9(1): Setting up the problem
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From the question, the budget constraint is
So the Lagrangean for the problem is
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We know that we must have an internal (tangency) solution
So, differentiating, the first-order conditions are
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…plus the (binding) budget constraint
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Ex 4.9(1): Ordinary demand functions
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From the FOCs we get
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Using this and the budget constraint we find l = n/y.
Using the value of l in the FOCs we have
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the ordinary demand functions for i=1,2,…,n…
Take logs of the demand functions and differentiate
to get the elasticities:
Ex 4.9(1): Solution functions
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The indirect utility function is just maximised utility
expressed in terms of p and y
 u = V(p, y) = U(x*)
Evaluating this from x* we get:
This gives a implicit relationship between u and y.
Rearrange to get the cost (expenditure) function:
Ex 4.9(1): Compensated demand
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Take the cost function n[p1p2p3…pneu]1/n
Differentiate with respect to p1:
This is the compensated demand function for good 1
Take logs and differentiate to get compensated
elasticities:
Ex 4.9(2) Question
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purpose: introduce a single side-constraint
method: show that modified model is closely related to
original one. Reuse the original solution
Ex 4.9(2): Modified problem
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xn is now fixed at An
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a contract with a high cancellation penalty?
Define y' := y – pnAn
Problem is equivalent to
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max x1x2x3…xn1An
subject to adjusted budget constraint:
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Apply results from part 1 to modified problem
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Ordinary demand is now:
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Compensated demand is:
Ex 4.9(2): Elasticities (ordinary )
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Some results are just as before
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Own price:
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Cross-price (j<n)
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But something new for the nth (precommitted) good:
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This is just a pure income effect:
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the person is precommitted to an amount An
if the price goes up this reduces the income available to spend on
other goods
Ex 4.9(2): Elasticities (compensated)
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Some results are essentially as before
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Own price:
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Cross-price (j<n)
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Note: the own-price effect is less elastic (closer to 0)
Also for the nth (precommitted) good:
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Ex 4.9(3) Question
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purpose: introduce many side-constraints
method: show that modified model is just a
generalised version of that solved in part 2
Ex 4.9(3): Further modified problem
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Given that for k = n – r,…,n we have xk fixed at Ak
The problem is equivalent to max x1x2x3…xmA´
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where m := n – r – 1, A´ :=
subject to the adjusted budget constraint:
where
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Again apply results from previous parts
Ordinary demand is now:
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Compensated demand is:
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Ex 4.9(3): Elasticities (ordinary)
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Again, some results are just as before
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Own price:
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Cross-price (j < n − r)
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And now for all the precommitted goods:
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Interpretation of this income effect is just as in part 2
Ex 4.9(3): Elasticities (compensated)
Frank Cowell: Microeconomics
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Results follow from part 2, replacing n1 by m:
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Own price:
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Cross-price
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The smaller is m the less elastic is the own-price effect
Also for all precommitted goods:
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Ex 4.9: Points to remember
Frank Cowell: Microeconomics
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The problem works just like the short-run for the firm
The problem with one side-constraint follows just by
replacing one variable by a constant
The problem with many side constraints follows in a
similar manner
Effect of adding more precommitment constraints:
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the smaller is the number m (i.e. the larger is r)…
…the less elastic is good 1 to its own price
The result is similar to a rationing model
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but we cannot determine for which commodities the side-constraint
is binding
this is arbitrarily given in the question