Transcript Ontological Foundations of EAP

PEDU 7206
Lecture 4 & 5
The Ontological Foundations
of EAP
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The Critical Realist declarations:
“Since Descartes (1596-1650), it has been customary
first to ask how we can know, and only afterwards
what it is that we can know. But this Cartesian
ordering has been a contributory factor to prevalence
of epistemic fallacy: it is easy to let the question how
we can know determine our conception of what there
is. And if in a certain respect the epistemic question
does seem prior, in another it is secondary to the
ontological one.” (Collier, 1993, P. 137)
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The Critical Realist declarations:
“I shall concentrate first on the ontological question of
the properties that societies possess, before shift to
the epistemological question of these properties make
them possible objects of knowledge for use. This is
not an arbitrary order of development. It reflects the
condition that …it is the nature of objects that
determines their cognitive possibilities for us.”
(Bhaskar, 1989)
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Objectivism vs. Constructivism: Antagonism in
ontological perspectives:
Centuries of controversies among social
researchers over epistemological and
methodological perspectives have created two
deeply divided definitions of the reality of the
social world, namely objectivism and
constructivism
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Objectivism vs. Constructivism: ….
 Objectivism: Under the domination of the logicalpositivism and analytical-empirical science, the
prevailing social ontology, which has been
characterized as objectivism, stipulates the social
world as an objectively fixed and given reality as
reality of the natural world.
 In this ontological perspective, social reality is stipulated as
analytical and empirical in form, that is, the social world is
conceived as a composition of particles or elements, the
structures and operations of which are observable by human
senses.
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Objectivism vs. Constructivism: ….
 Objectivism: ….
 Moreover, the social reality has also been stipulated as
nomological and causal in structure, i.e. the constitutive
particles of social reality are presumed to be structured in
causal laws.
 The law-like structures of the social world can further be
defined in terms of their degree of universality and
permanence.
 Accordingly, the “strong” stance within the objectivism would
argue that the law-like structures of social realities are
universal across locations and permanent over time. Such an
ontological stance could be characterized as “objective
absolutism”.
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Objectivism vs. Constructivism: ….
 Objectivism: ….
 On the other hand, the “weak” stance of objectivism would
assume that the laws governing the social world are only
probabilistic laws and their universality and permanence are
limited in particular social and historical contexts.
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Objectivism vs. Constructivism: ….
 Constructivism: In opposite to objectivism and more
specifically in response to the domination and even
assault from the empirical positivists, the social
scientists in the historical-hermeneutic tradition have
turned to interpretivism and constructivism for
havens.
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Objectivism vs. Constructivism: ….
 Constructivism: ….
 By interpretivism, it refers to the research approach which
emphasizes on the meaning-laden and value-laden nature of
the social world. Accordingly, this group of social scientists
focuses on the interpretive (i.e. meaning attributing) features
embedded in social reality and stresses the uniqueness of
each interpretive communities involved as well as the
meanings they imputed to the social reality concerned.
Moreover, some of these interpretativists would even
advocate that the social reality is “a matter of interpretation”
and its features and structures are “open to interpretation” as
well.
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Objectivism vs. Constructivism: ….
 Constructivism: ….
 By constructivism, it refers to the research orientation which
underlines the essential roles of human ideas, believes, and
efforts in the constitution of the social world and more
specifically its social institutions. Accordingly, it is assumed
that realities of the social world are subject to construction by
different interpretive communities according to their own
ideas, believes or even vested interests. As a result, social
realities are conceived to be relative in nature, i.e. relative to
the subjectivities and intersubjectivities of the interpretive
communities that have power over the respective social
realities in point. Such a research approach can be
characterized as “constructive relativism”.
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Objectivism vs. Constructivism: ….
The “paradigm war” between these two perspectives in
social ontology, especially the “dog fights” between
extremists of “objective absolutism” and those of
“constructive relativism” have left the field of social
ontology in complete disarrays if not chaos for
decades. On the one hand, there are advocates holding
the ontological perspective of “structural
determinism”, which insists on the definitude of causal
laws at work in social structures. And accordingly
human relationship and activities found in these social
structures are conceived to be deterministic in nature.
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Objectivism vs. Constructivism: ….
…….On the other hand, there are proponents
promoting the ontological perspective of “constructive
voluntarism”, which emphasizes the intersubjectivity
and forgeability at work in social reality. Caught
between the crossfire of these two camps, most of the
students in social research are helpless at lost in these
ontological, epistemological and methodological
labyrinth.
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The Critical-Realist Movement
Since the second half of the 1970s, Roy Bhaskar, a
British philosopher, has produced a series of work on
philosophy of science and social sciences (1975, 1979,
1986, 1989). His work has motivated a line of academic
work in varieties of disciplines. As a result, they have
together triggered an intellectual movement now
known as Critical Realism.
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(194414
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The Critical-Realist Movement
In the past three decades Critical Realism has gained
significant recognition and development in socialscience researches; for examples economics (Lawson,
1997), social psychology (Greenwood, 1994), sociology
(Archer, 1995; Danermark et al., 2002), geography
(Sayer, 2000), management and organizational studies
(Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000), social research
methods (Sayer, 1992), policy studies (Henry, et al.
1998; Pawson, 2006, 2013; Mark et al., 2000), …
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The Critical-Realist Movement
and education (in particular sociology of education)
(Maton, 2014; Maton & Moore, 2010; Muller, 2000;
Moore, 2007, 2009; Scott, 2010; Shipway, 2012;
Wheelahan, 2010; Young, 2008a, 2008b).
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What is critical realism?
Realism as doctrine in philosophy or more specifically
in the philosophy of science “belief that there is a
world existing independently of our knowledge of it.”
(Sayer, 2000, P. 2). It assumes that the objects of study
in science “is ontologically independent of human
mind.” (Niiniluoto, 1990, P. 10)
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What is critical realism?....
Critical realism as a theoretical branch within realism
makes several specific theoretical claims: (Collier,
1994, P.6-7)
 Objectivity: It refers to the ontological stance that “what is
known would be real whether or not it were known. Something
may be real without appearing at all.” (P. 6)
 Fallibility: It refers to the epistemological stance that
knowledge claims made by critical realists are “not about
some supposedly infallible or corrigible data of appearance.”
Instead, they “are always open to refutation by further
information.” (P. 6) Therefore, social researchers must always
be vigilant and critical to their research results and knowledge
claims.
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What is critical realism?....
 Critical realism as a theoretical branch within realism
makes several specific theoretical claims: …
Transphenomenality (going beyond appearance): It indicates
that “knowledge may be not only of what appears, but of
underlying structures, which endure longer than those
appearances, and generate them or make them possible.” (P. 6)
Counter-phenomenallity: It refers to the epistemological stance
which claims that “knowledge of the deep structure of
something may not just go beyond, and not just explain, but
also contradict appears. …It is precisely the capacity of science
for counter-phenomenality which made it necessary: without
the contradiction between appearance and reality, science
would be redundant, and we could go by appearance.” (P.7)
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
 Roy Basher starts his buildup of critical realism first
with the analysis of the work and enterprise of
natural sciences. One of his initial points of
departure is to criticize the validity of empirical
realism, which was the dominant approach in
scientific research. Instead Bhaskar proposes to
replace empirical realism with what he called
transcendental realism. It means that the reality of
the natural world is not confine its appearances or to
what we could have experienced. He claims that
there are deeper layers of mechanism and system at
work than the mere appearances that we could
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sensorily experience. (Collier, 1994, Pp. 25-29)
Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
Concept of Depth Realism: The first conception
of Bhaskar’s Critical Realism is his distinction of
reality into three domains:
Empirical domain: It refers to the aspect of reality
which we have experienced with our senses.
Actual domain: It refers to events which have
occurred without our noticing, while we can infer from
their effects.
Real domain: It refers to the properties within entities,
which are able to triggers events to take place or to
constraint them from occurring.
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Bhaskar’s Depth Realism: Three Domains of Reality
Domain of
Real
Domain of
Actual
Mechanism
✓
Events
✓
✓
Experiences
✓
✓
Domain of
Empirical
✓
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
Features of the domain of the Real: Bhaskar has
further differentiated the features of the reality
into levels:
Power and liability: Powers or emergent power, in
Bhaskar’s term, refers to the potentials which are able
trigger events to take place; while liability are
properties which can prevent or constraint events
from happening.
Mechanism: It refers to a set of powers working interconnectively to set off the occurrence an event or a
chain of events.
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
Features of the domain of the Real: ……
Structure of the system: It refers to the
interconnections among operative mechanisms, which
constitute the underlying structure against which
events are taking places.
Open/closed system: It refers the openness or closure
(i.e. boundary) of a given system. According to Critical
Realist conception, “no system in our universe is ever
perfectly closed.” (Collier, 1994, P. 33) And
accordingly both our natural and social world are by
definition open systems.
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
Stratification of causation: Taking together these
conceptions of the natural world stipulated by
the Critical Realists, theories and models of
causal explanations formulated by scientists can
be categorized into several strata
 Cause-effect explanation
 Explanatory mechanism
 Explanatory structure
 Structure of closed system: Nomological/law-like
explanations
 Structure of open system: Theories of tendency or
emergency
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
The work of science: Given all these
specifications of the operations of the natural
world, Critical Realists contend that the work of
natural science is in no way close to the
conceptions of experimental work stipulated by
empiricism (based solely on sensory
observation) and positivism (aimed solely at
verifying nomological explanations). Instead,
Critical Realists specify the features of the work
of experimental science as follows:
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
The work of science:
Science as work: Science in essence “is work, not
contemplation, not observation, not taking up of some
kind of scientific attitude.” “It is an active intervention
into nature, made by people with acquired scientific
skills, usually using special equipment.” (Collier, 1993,
P. 50) And “the ‘product’ is not the new arrangement
of matter brought about by the experiment. …It is the
deepened knowledge of some mechanism of nature.”
(P.52)
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
The work of science:
Dr = Da = De coincide: Deepening of knowledge of
nature means to penetrate the empirical world and the
actual events and to obtain the mechanism and
structure underlying all human experiences. It is
through scientific experiment, “we can set up a
situation in which three domains (Dr, Da, De) coincide
— in which a mechanism is actualized, i.e. isolated
from its usual codeterminants, so that it can operate
as a closed system, and to manifested as an event
exemplifying the law to which it corresponds.” (Collier,
1994, P. 45)
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
The work of science:
Experiment as closure: “What the experiment does
…is to isolate one mechanism of nature from the effect
of others, to see what that mechanism does on its
own.” (Collier, 1994, P. 33) It is “an attempt to trigger
or unleash a single kind of mechanism or process in
relative isolation, free from the interfering flux of the
open world, so as to observe its details workings or
record its characteristic mode of effect and/or to test
some hypothesis about them.” (Bhashar, 1986, P. 35;
quoted in Collier, 1994, P. 33)
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
The work of science:
Theory-led endeavor: “The classical sequence of
experimental science is…: first we construct a theory,
then we design an experiment to test it, then we
receive nature’s answer to our question.” (Collier,
1994, P. 40) This indicates that experimental practice
cannot replace theoretical thinking in the work of
science. Power of abstraction and theoretical
synthesizing is not only the initial point of departure
for formulation of problems but also the guiding
signposts throughout the path of scientific enquiry.
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
The hierarchy of science:
In view of the distinct domains, levels and strata
specified by Critical Realists so far, the enterprise of
science itself can then be further differentiated into
“distinct sciences — physics, chemistry, biology,
economics etc. — which are mutually irreducible, but
which are ordered. Physics is in this sense more basic
than chemistry, which is more basic than biology,
which is more basic than the human sciences.”
(Collier, 1994, P. 107)
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
The hierarchy of science: ….
For example, Benton and Craib proposed a hierarchy
of sciences as follows. (Benton & Craib, 2011, P. 127)
social sciences
psychology
physiology/anatomy
organic chemistry/biological chemistry
physical chemistry
physics
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
The hierarchy of science: ….
Andrew Collier posposes another hierarchy, which he
calls “tree of science” (Collier, 1994, P. 132)
?
psychological and semiological sciences
social sciences
biological sciences
Molecular sciences
?
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
The hierarchy of science: ….
“This way of ordering the sciences could be justified
in terms of the mechanisms characteristic of each
level are explicable in terms of those of the nest one
below it. This corresponds to a view of science as
explaining wholes in terms of the parts of which they
are composed.” (Benton and Craib, 2011, Pp. 126-127)
However, it must be underlined that the causal flows
can be construed in both directions, that is, “causality
can flow down the hierarchy as well as up it.” (P. 128)
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
Intransitive and transitive dimensions of science:
Intransitive dimension of science: According to the
basic tenet of Critical Realism, the natural world exists
independently of human minds and knowledge.
Hence, this object of science studies — the natural
world and with all its substances, mechanisms and
structures — constitute the intransitive dimension of
the work of science.
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
Intransitive and transitive dimensions of science:
…
Transitive dimension of science: Scientists, with their
concepts and theories, their skills and practices, as
well as their communities, associations and rival
schools of thought, they constitute the transitive
dimension of science. What scientists do is to strive to
deepen the existing scientific knowledge of the nature
world.
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
Intransitive and transitive dimensions of science:
…
Accordingly, “the ‘results’ of scientific inquiry at any
time are a set of theories about the nature of the world,
which are presumably our best approximation to truth
about the world….However much science deepens its
knowledge of its intransitive object, its product
remains a transitive object.” (Collier, 1994, P. 51)
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Conceptual constituents of Transcendental
Realism of Natural Sciences
Intransitive & transitive dimensions of science:…
 In light of these distinctions between intransitive and
transitive dimensions in science, we can see that
Critical Realists take on different stances for their
ontological and epistemological foundations.
Ontologically, Critical Realists assume its objects of
their enquiry are intransitive and real and the products
of their enquiry could be truth. However,
epistemological, Critical Realists admit that their
scientific work and practice at any given in time are
only relative to the material, social as well as
theoretical configuration of the scientific enterprise, in
which they find themselves.
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Distinction between the Natural & the Social
Sciences: Conceptual Constituents of
Critical Naturalism
The debate between the natural and the social
sciences has been raging on since the
nineteenth century around the issue of the unity
of scientific method. Recently Roy Bhaskar
reformulates the issue at the beginning of his
book The Possibility of Naturalism as follows.
“To what extent can society be studied in the
way as nature?” (Bhaskar, 1998, P. 1) Two
conventional answers to this issue are
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Distinction between the Natural & the Social
Sciences: Conceptual Constituents of
Critical Naturalism
Two conventional answers to this issue are …
Naturalism: The positive answer to the issue can be
summarized under the doctrine, which Bhaskar called
naturalism. By naturalism, it refers to the doctrine
which asserts that there “is (or can be) an essential
unity of method between the natural and the social
sciences.” (Bhaskar, 1998, P. 2) With this naturalist
camp, subdivisions can further be differentiated
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Distinction between the Natural & the Social
Sciences: Conceptual Constituents of
Critical Naturalism
Two conventional answers to this issue are …
Naturalism:…subdivisions can further be differentiated
 Reductionism, which claims that “there is an actual
identity of subject matter” between the two sciences.”
(Bhaskar, 1998, P. 2)
 Scientism, which “denies that there are any significant
differences in the methods appropriate to studying social
and natural subject.” (Bhaskar, 1998, P. 2) That
appropriate method is of course the scientific method.
 Positivism, which claims that the products of studies in
both the natural and social sciences are the same, that is,
to verify causal laws, which can account for the events
under study to the full. (Bhaskar, 1998; Collier, 1994, P.
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102-102)
Distinction between the Natural & the Social
Sciences: Conceptual Constituents of
Critical Naturalism
Two conventional answers to this issue are …
 Hermeneutics and interpretive theory: In opposite to
the naturalists positive answer to the issue, social
scientists in hermeneutic and interpretive tradition
insist that it is impossible to study society in the way
as nature! They have argued for centuries that human
and social sciences are essentially distinct from
natural sciences in terms of their methodology and
epistemology, but most importantly in their ontological
foundation. (These arguments have been explicate on
Topic 2 and 3 in this course)
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science:
Critical Realists have distanced themselves from the
epistemological arguments between positivism and
hermeneutics and the methodological arguments
between quantitative and qualitative research
practitioners; they have chosen a different approach
to the issue, by looking into the ontological
differences between the natural world and the social
reality. They have synthesized a series of concepts,
which attempt to build a conceptual framework of
social ontology of critical realism.
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science: …
Human agents and their agency: Critical Realists
assert that one of the major differences between
nature and society is that society is made up of human
agents, who would not act or behave mechanically to
antecedent causes or stimulus. Human beings are
“meaning making animals”, who forge ideas, hold
believes, adhere identities, plan intentional actions,
and carry out projects and agencies. ……
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science: …
Human agents and their agency: ……
As a result, in accounting for social events, social
scientists could not simply look for antecedent
causes, in the form of necessary and/or sufficient
conditions. They must dig deep into social reality and
look for “reasons”. In fact, Critical Realists have
argued at length that reasons, which include beliefs,
desires, ideas, intentions, should belong to the causal
orders in accounting for social events. (Bhaskar,
1998, Pp.80-119; Collier, 1994, Pp. 151-156)
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science: …
Activity-dependent structure and Transformational
Model of Social Activity (TMSA): One of the
fundamental differences between structures of society
and nature is that “social structures are maintained in
existence only through the activities of agents
(activity-dependence), whereas this is not true of
structures of nature.” (Benton & Craib, 2011, P. 135)
…..
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science: …
Activity-dependent structure and Transformational
Model of Social Activity (TMSA): …..
More specifically, the continuity and consistency of a
given social structure depends mainly on the
willingness and capacity of its members to participate
and carry out the obligations and duties prescribed to
their specific positions within the structure. Therefore,
the endurance of a social structure rely on the
efficacies of its institutions of production,
socialization, social control and reproduction.
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science: …
Activity-dependent structure and Transformational
Model of Social Activity (TMSA): …..
Bhaskar has named this characteristic of social
structure as Transformation Model of Social Activity
(TMAS). That is, social structures are more likely to
transform than structures of nature and their
endurance are only relative in nature.
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science: …
Concept-dependence and the cultural dimension of
social structure: Since the reproduction of social
structures are subject to human agents’ participations
and actions, they are therefore more fundamentally
depending on members’ impressions, perceptions,
beliefs, and conception about the respective
structures. As a result, social structures are not only
built on their material grounds same as the structures
of nature, but are also based on their cultural
resources, such as linguistic, cultural and social
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capitals.
Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science: …
Space-time-dependent and context specific: Unlike the
structure of entities found in nature, which are
universal across both time and space; social
structures constituted by human agents are heavily
embedded in the specific contexts, in which particular
groups of human agents found themselves. These
contexts include historical contexts, socio-cultural
contexts, geo-political contexts, natural-ecological
contexts, etc.
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science: …
Impossibility of experimental closure: Incomparable to
natural scientists, social scientists are practical
impossible to isolate any fragments of social reality
and to design an experimental closure, in which they
can test their hypothesis about specific causal
relations found in society. In fact the openness of the
social system is so immense that it is basically unable
to control and/or randomize all the other codeterminants confounding the specific cause-effect
explanatory models that social scientists are
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supposed to verify.
Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the
possibility of naturalism of social science: …
Unsustainability of intransitive-transitive division in
knowledge of social science: Unlike knowledge of
natural science, in which the distinction between the
intransitivity of the natural world and the transitivity of
the knowledge produced by particular groups of
natural scientists is empirically definitive; the division
is practically indistinct. It is because social reality is
transitive in nature. They are subject to change with
the beliefs and ideas of human agents. Furthermore,
they may even transform themselves according to
findings and theories produced by social scientists.55
Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ conception of social reality:
Given these essential distinctions between
natural and social reality, Critical Realists’
conception of social reality may be summarized
as follows:
Relational model of society: Bhaskar suggests that
“society does not consist of individuals (or we might
add, groups), but expresses the sum of relations
within which individuals (and groups) stand.”
(Bhaskar, 1998, P. 26)
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ conception of social reality:
….
Studying the persistence and endurance of relations:
Bhaskar further indicates that social sciences in
general and sociology in particular are
“concerned…with the persist relations between
individuals (and groups) and with relations between
these relations (and between such relation and nature
and the products of such relations).” (Bhaskar, 1998,
P. 28-29; my emphasis)
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ conception of social reality:
….
Duality of objectivity and subjectivity in social
structure:
Durkheimian objective-factual conception of social structure
Weberian subjective-meaningful conception of social
structure
Critical Realist synthesis: TMSA and M/M approach
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Conceptual Constituents of Critical
Naturalism
Critical Realists’ conception of social reality:
….
Duality of individualism and collectivism in social
structure:
Atomic reductionism and methodological individualism
Structuralism and methodological collectivism
Critical realist synthesis: SEPM and M/M/ Approach
Duality of stability and change in social structure
Conception of relativity of persistence and Morphostasis
Conception of Morphogenesis
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Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
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Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
Meaning of morphogenesis:
The prefix ‘morpho’ refers to ‘of or pertaining to form’ and
‘genesis’ refers ‘mode of formation’. Hence, morphogenesis is
commonly in biology to mean formation of the structure
biological organisms, while in physical geography it refers
formation of landscapes or landforms. (Oxford English
Dictionary)
Margaret Archer uses the word in morphogenetic approach to
connote that “the ‘morpho’ element is an acknowledgement
that society has no pre-set form or preferred state; the
‘genetic’ part is a recognition that it takes its shape from, and
is formed by, agents, originating from the intended and
unintended consequences of the activities.” (Archer, 1995, p.
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Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
Meaning of morphogenesis:
…
The approach can then be construed as an echo of the TMSA
in Critical Realism in sociological analysis. It emphasizes both
the possibility of transforming the social structure through
social actions of the agents, and at the same time underline
the relative endurance and resilience of social structures and
their conditioning (not determining) effects on the social
actions of human agents.
62
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
Morphogenetic approach in structure-agency debate
in sociology: Archer allocates her morphogenetic
approach against the longstanding structure-agent in
the debate on social ontology in sociology. Archer
asserts that her approach can address three common
“conflations” found in the debate. They are …..
63
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
….structure-agency debate in sociology: ….
 The downwards conflation: It refer to those theoretical stances
which put special emphasis on the determinacy of the social
structure over the agents and their plans of actions (i.e.
agencies). They includes “any uncompromising version of
technological determinism, economism, structuralism or
normative functionalism.” (Archer, 1995, P. 81) As a result, these
theoretical stances constitute a kind of “downwards conflation
where structure and agency are conflated because action is
treated as fundamentally epiphenomenal has many
variants….The bottom line is always that actors may be
indispensable for energizing the social system.” (Archer, 1995,
P. 81) The methodological ground grown out the social ontology
of structuralism is commonly known as methodological
64
collectivism.
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
….structure-agency debate in sociology: ….
 The upwards conflation: It refers to the theoretical stances
which is argued for “the primacy of the agent” and underlines
that structure is but the creation of agency. Social structural are
hence reduced to “a series of intersubjectively negotiated
constructs”. (Archer, 1995, P. 84) The methodological ground
generated from such social ontology is called the
methodological individualism.
65
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
….structure-agency debate in sociology: ….
 Central conflation: It is “an approach based upon the putative
mutual constitution of structure and agency and finds its most
sophisticated expression in modern ‘structuration theory’.”
(Archer, 1995, P. 87) The structuration theory is called made
well-known by the work of Anthony Giddens. However, Archer
argues that what has been suppressed (or conflated) in this
mutually constituting activity is the historical-temporal
thickness of society, more specifically, the enduring
institutional practices sedimented over time. .....
66
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
….structure-agency debate in sociology: ….
 Central conflation:
…..In Archer’s own words, “structural properties (defined
reductively as rules and resources) are held to be outside time,
having a ‘virtual existence’ only when instantiated by actions.
In exact parallel, when actors produce social practices they
necessarily draw upon rules and resources and the inevitable
invoke the whole matrix of structural properties at that
instance.” (Archer, 1995, P. 87) Archer therefore criticizes that
Giddens has not given adequate treatment to the temporal
dimension in the structuration theory.
67
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
Taking time to link structure an agency: In rectifying
these conflations found in the structure-agency
debate, Archer formulated her theory of
morphogenesis by injecting a time dimension into the
framework. She underlines that “the distinctive feature
of the morphogenetic approach is its time dimension,
through which and in which structure and agency
shape one another.” (1995, P. 92)
68
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
Taking time to link structure an agency: …
Three-part cycles of the morphogenesis: “Morphogenetic
analysis, in contrast to the three foregoing approaches,
accords time a central place in social theory. By working in
terms od its three-part cycles composed of (a) structural
conditioning, (b) social interaction and (c) structure
elaboration, time is incorporated as sequential tract and
phases rather than simply as a medium through which events
take place.” (Archer, 1995, P. 89)
69
Source, Archer, 1995, p. 76
70
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
Taking time to link structure an agency: …
As a result, Archer claims that her analytical framework has
rectified the three prevailing approaches to structure-agency
debates in sociological theory.
71
Source, Archer, 1995,72P. 82.
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
 Structural condition: This part of the cycle represents
the structural properties accumulated and passed on
from past agencies. It also signifies that this structural
property could in fact assert “causal influences upon
subsequent interaction.” These influences are
working through facilitating the some types of
interactions but at the same time constraining some
others. In Critical Realists’ terms they impose
selectively either “powers” or “liabilities” on human
interactions. …..
73
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
 Structural condition: …..
By focusing mainly if not solely on this part of the
morphogenetic process, structuralists are of course
confident to endorse the dominance of the structure
on the agency and as a result have committed the
downwards conflation that Archer has aptly
highlighted.
74
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
Social interaction: This tract of the cycle indicates that
the causal influences of structural properties on
agencies are never deterministic but only conditional
and interactive in nature. It is because Critical Realists
presume that “agents possess their own irreducible
emergent power”. Hence, structural properties and
agencies are engaging in mutually “structurating” and
“destructurating” interactions. This is the point in time
where Giddens theory of structuration comes in.
75
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
Morphogenetic Approach
Structural elaboration: After the social interactions
between the structure and agent in each generation
have played out, an elaborated structure-agency
relation will emerge. Analytically, this may take one of
the following outcomes:
Morphostasis: It refers to the outcome where the new
generation of human agents in a social system are socialized
and incorporated into the existing structure as well as culture.
And the system has practically “reproduced” itself.
Morphogenesis: It refers to the outcome where the prevailing
structure and culture of a given social system has been
elaborated, transformed and to the greatest extent revolted.
76
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
The integration of Morphogenetic approach into
the conceptions of Critical Realism:
77
78 160.
Source: Archer, 1995, P.
Institutional
level
System level
Structure
Time
Sector level
Organization level
Interaction level
Agent
Individual level
79
Comparative-Historical Method for
Institutional Research: In Search of the
Methodological Foundations for EAP Studies
The limitations of social knowledge: In light of
the explications of the ontological and
epistemological foundations of EAP studies in
more generally of the social sciences, we can
conclude that social scientific researchers are
confront with numbers of limitations in
comparison with their fellow researchers in
natural sciences. They include ….
80
Comparative-Historical Method for
Institutional Research:…
The limitations of social knowledge: ….
Social sciences are expected to render causal
explanations to social events, that is, to be
“explanatory sciences.” (Collier, 1994, P 1611)
Social sciences are “sciences without closure.”
(Collier, 1994, P. 161) More importantly, social
scientists are possible to set up experimental closure.
Social sciences are “sciences with hermeneutic
premises.” (Collier, 1994, P. 161) That is they are
required to reveal the meanings embedded in social
reality.
81
Comparative-Historical Method for
Institutional Research:…
The limitations of social knowledge: ….
The explanations social scientists rendered should be
more than immediate causes for empirical events, but
must include reasons and intentions attributed by
human agents participated in the respective events.
These explanations should also include contextual
factors (including temporal, spatial, and socioeconomical contexts) in which the human agents
concerned find themselves.
Last but not the least, social scientists must take into
account the transformative potentials embedded in
social realities and more importantly the emancipatory
82
powers endowed in human agents.
Comparative-Historical Method for
Institutional Research:…
In order to eliminate these limitations, social
scientists must transcend the demarcations
between the empiricist-positivism and the
interpretive-hermeneutic tradition, more
specifically, between the quantitative and
qualitative methods. One of the cornerstones in
bridging these epistemological and
methodological chasms is the comparativehistorical method. …
83
Comparative-Historical Method for
Institutional Research:…
In order to eliminate these limitations…..
Margaret Archer, one of the leading sociologists in
Critical Realism, has demonstrated some convincingly
the validities of the comparative-historical method in
one of her early research work Social Origins of
Educational Systems (1979).
In the study, Archer traces the historical paths of
developments of modern educational systems in four
European countries in two pairs, namely
England and Denmark representing Substitutive Model
France and Russia representing Restrictive Model
84
Margaret S. Archer’s
Morphogenetic/Morphostatic Approach
85
86
Comparative-Historical Method for
Institutional Research:…
 Comparative-historical method has a long, if not
the longest, tradition in the research of social
sciences. It can be traced back to the works of
the founding fathers of social sciences, such as
Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim.
87
Comparative-Historical Method for
Institutional Research:…
 More recently in the past three decades, there
are growing numbers of publications on
empirical research and methodological
discussions. For examples, Collins (1979, 1999),
Carnoy & Levin. (1985), Green (1990), Mahoney &
Rueschemeyer (2003), Ragin (1987), Schriewer
(1990), Skocpol (1979, 1982), Somers (2008), Tilly
(1984, 1990), etc.
88
Explanatory Critique
Given the specific natures of social reality and the
explanatory power realist social sciences
characterized above, Bhaskar asserts that CriticalRealist social theorists are equipped with what
Bhaskar called “explanatory critiques” in
accounting for social phenomena….
89
Explanatory Critique
Models of explanation in social sciences: So far
we have covered three methodological
approaches and epistemological perspectives, it
is revealed that each of them apply different
modes of explanation to account for the social
phenomena under study.
Nomological causal explanation: It refers to the
explanatory models, which aim to provide law-like
explanation in the form of antecedent cause and
subsequent effect causation to the social phenomena
under study. To a less extent, it substantiates at least
probabilistic covariance connection between two
90
variables under study.
Explanatory Critique
Models of explanation in social sciences: ….
Teleological explanation: it refers to the explanatory
models, which attempt to provide intentional explanation
to human actions. It intends not to trace antecedent
causes for human action but motives and intentions at
work behind given action aiming to the future. Under the
working assumption that humans are rational actions,
this explanatory models has been modified into what is
now commonly known as rational-choice model.
Furthermore, there is also another kind of explanatory
model generally called quasi-teleological explanation in
use in social sciences, which render explanations for
social actions in macroscopic scale in the formats of
91
functional and institutional accounts.
Explanatory Critique
Models of explanation in social sciences: ….
 Explanatory critique: As critical social scientists, they
have employed yet another kind of explanatory model,
which the critical realists named “explanatory
critique”.
92
Explanatory Critique
What is explanatory critique?
As formulated by Critical Theorists, such as
Horkheimer and Habermas, they are not contented
with verifying causality or/and revealing meanings,
intentions and values in accounting for social
activities; they intends to go beyond the regularities
and persistence found in social structures and/or
belief-systems and look for the possible systemic
biases, injustice, and false believes (i.e. ideologies) at
work behind these social regularities.
93
Explanatory Critique
What is explanatory critique?
...
Having revealed the systemic biases and ideologies,
critical social scientists would feel obliged to criticize
the “incorrectness”, injustice, and social ills found in
the phenomena under study.
Lastly, in order to justify their critique, critical social
scientists must elevate their explanatory tasks from
empirical-causal explanations and/or interpretiveintentional/functional explanations to the level of
“explanatory critique”, i.e. to provide explanations for
their critiques.
94
Explanatory Critique
In search of the evaluative ground for the critical
social science:
In the last section of the concluding chapter of the
two-volume work The Theory of Communicative
Theory, Jurgen Habermas underlines that “In this work
I have tried to introduce a theory of communicative
action that clarifies the normative foundation of the
critical theory of society.” (Habermas, 1987, P. 396-7)…
95
Explanatory Critique
In search of the evaluative ground for the critical
social science:
…
This quotation underlines that one of the essential
“task of a critical theory” is to provide “the normative
foundation of the critical theory of society.” And the
normative foundation that Habermas renders for his
own critical theory is exactly the theory of
communicative action, rationality and ethics.
(Habermas, 1984 & 1987)
96
Explanatory Critique
In search of the evaluative ground for the critical
social science:
Accordingly, in reviewing any critical theories and the
explanatory critiques they provided, one must look for
the normative foundation on which the explanatory
critiques and evaluations are based. For examples,
97
Explanatory Critique
In search of the evaluative ground for the critical
social science:
Marx’s normative foundation of explanatory critique:
Karl Marx builds his explanatory critique of capitalism
on the normative foundation that the mode and relation
of production of capitalism has generated
the extreme inequality of economic distribution biased in
favor of the bourgeoisie against the proletarian, which is the
causal result of the exploitative nature of the relation of
production;
the ever accelerating process of commodification, which has
not only alienated and reified the process of production, but
also the labor process as well;
98
….
Explanatory Critique
In search of the evaluative ground for the critical
social science:
Marx’s normative foundation of explanatory critique:
 ….
the contradictions between the infrastructure and the
superstructure of the capitalism, most notably the hegemony
of the ideology of the capitalists over the culture of the whole
society.
99
Explanatory Critique
In search of the evaluative ground for the critical
social science:
Weber’s normative foundation of explanatory critique:
Max Weber builds his explanatory critique on the
normative foundation not only on the economic sphere
of capitalism but also on the bureaucratization of the
modern state. Weber underlines that the expansion of
the instrumental rationality into various human
organization has produced the “iron cage” in which
humans have loss both the meanings and freedom in
lives.
100
Explanatory Critique
In search of the evaluative ground for the critical
social science:
Habermas’ normative foundation of explanatory
critique: As cited above, Habermas has indicated that
the normative foundation of his critical theory of
society is the theory of communicative action. By the
theory of communicative action, it refers to “the
theory…aims at the moment of unconditionality of
processes of consensus formation. As claims they
transcend all limitations of space and time, all the
provincial limitations of the given contexts.”
(Habermas, 1987, p. 399) ….
101
Explanatory Critique
In search of the evaluative ground for the critical
social science:
Habermas’ normative foundation of explanatory
critique: ….
However, Habermas argues that in modern society the
money steering apparatus of the market and the
power-steering apparatus of the state have proliferated
to such a great extent that the primary operating
ground of communicative actions, i.e. the Lifeworld,
has practically been colonized. (to be explicated in
details on Topic 6 & 8)
102
Explanatory Critique
Critical Realists’ normative foundation of
explanatory critique:
Critical realists, in particular Bhaskar and Collier,
approach the issue of finding the normative ground or
in their terms “evaluative language” for their
explanatory critique from another perspective, namely
from methodological an epistemological perspectives
rather than from the substantive theoretical
perspective as Marx, Weber and Habermas. They
approach the issue by addressing one of the
fundamental debates in social research, namely the
entanglement between fact and value.
103
Explanatory Critique
Critical Realists’ normative foundation of
explanatory critique: ….
 The fact and value aporia in social research: In
natural-scientific research, fact and value are two
separate domains, which should not be conflated in
any ways. However, within the tradition of social
research and sociological research in particular, the
relation between fact and value has been one of the
most controversial topics annoying its practitioners.
….
104
Explanatory Critique
Critical Realists’ normative foundation of
explanatory critique: ….
The fact and value aporia in social research:
……On the one hand, social researchers are supposed
to observe the code of “value-free” in the investigation
as suggested by Max Weber, yet on the other hand,
the same Weber has also advocated that social
actions are laden with subjective meanings and
values. As a result, bridging the gap between objective
fact and subjective value has been one of the aporia
confronting social researchers for generations.
105
Explanatory Critique
Critical Realists’ normative foundation ….
One of the manifestations of the fact-value aporia in
social research is on the issue whether the objects of
study, i.e. social phenomena, are embodied with
values or should they be treated as objective facts.
Bhaskar approaches the issue with an example from
put forth by Isaiah Berlin, “that of the following four
statements about what happened in Nazi Germany:
‘the country was depopulated’, ‘millions of people
died’, ‘millions of people were killed’ ‘millions of
people were massacred’——the fourth is both the most
evaluative and the most precise and accurate;
it gives more truth than the others. …..
106
Explanatory Critique
Critical Realists’ normative foundation ….
 …..That is so, but the evaluative force arises entirely
out of the factual content. It is not that by bringing
values into the discourse one makes it a fuller
statement of the truth, but that by making a fuller
statement of the truth one implies more value.”
(Collier, 1994, P.178) This example in fact reveals that
it is a common feature in social phenomena to proceed
from factual statements to value statement and more
importantly such a proceeding will practically bring out
“more truth” about the social phenomenon in point.
107
Explanatory Critique
Critical Realists’ normative foundation ….
 This example has also revealed another issue involved
in research in the critical social science in general and
explanatory critique in particular, that is what type of
truth has the explanatory critique brought out in their
investigation?
First of all, the critique on Nazi’s act of massacred is built on
the normative foundation that it is morally wrong to kill people
in large scale.
Based on factual evidences generated from investigations,
social researchers may and even can infer from “depopulated”
to “massacred”. As a result, the argument has in fact elevated
from factual statement to value judgment/conclusion.
108
Explanatory Critique
Critical Realists’ normative foundation ….
….. what type of truth has the explanatory critique
brought out in their investigation?
….
With the normative foundation and the evidence-based
inference, social researchers can substantiate their critique on
the social phenomenon under study as structural biased,
ideological false or simply morally wrong.
109
Explanatory Critique
Critical Realists’ normative foundation ….
….. what type of truth has the explanatory critique
brought out in their investigation?
….
Taking together this line of criticism, we can see that
the kind of truth that critical social scientists is
pursuing is quite different from the objective truth of
the analytical-empirical scientists and the practical
truth of the hermeneutic researchers, it can be
characterized as the normative truth, which is based
with a strong normative foundation or even conviction
and at the same time supported with explanatory
110
critiques.
Explanatory Critique
Typology of explanatory critiques: Bhaskar has
outlined different types of explanatory critiques,
but they are to be developed into substantive
theories by means of “realistic” social
researches in various social domains.
Explanatory critique on “cognitive ills” (i.e. cognitive
deceptions) and “communicative ills” (i.e.
communicative distortions) in social reality, i.e.
ideology
Explanatory critique on “practical ills” in social reality,
i.e. institutional injustice, illegitimate power and
systemic bias
111
Explanatory Critique
Typology of explanatory critiques:
…
Explanatory critique on “ethical ills” in social reality,
i.e. psycho-pathological acts and irrational agencies
112
Explanatory Critique
Explanatory critique and normative truth in
educational research
In light of the precedent discussions about the
meanings of explanatory critique and normative
truth, we can see that educational research in
general and studies of educational
administration and policy in particular are in
essence a critical science. …
113
Explanatory Critique
Explanatory critique and normative truth in
educational research …
The emancipatory and critical nature of education:
Education as a human and social science and practice
aiming at developing the potentials of every members
of a given society to the full, it is therefore by definition
an emancipatory project working for the betterment of
human possibilities and potentialities. On the contrary,
educators must be critical to any systemic biases and
distortions which may restraint or suppress the
developments of human potentials. This is in fact the
very normative foundation of education.
114
Explanatory Critique
Explanatory critique and normative truth in
educational research …
Explanatory critique in educational research: In light
of the above normative foundation or even conviction,
education researchers are obligated to render
explanatory critiques, which can provide evidences in
criticizing any form of restraints and suppression of
the developments of human potentials. In more
positive sense, educational researchers should also
provide explanatory critiques, which can improve the
current institutional structure and belief in educational
system, i.e. for the betterment of the status quo.
115
Explanatory Critique
Explanatory critique and normative truth in
educational research …
In defense of the normative truth of education: Based
on the normative foundation and conviction of helping
every human to develop their potential to the full, and
built on the evidences substantiated from concrete
educational research and the substantive explanatory
critiques concluded, educational researchers come to
the position to defend the normative and educational
truth they are obligated to defend. …..
116
Explanatory Critique
Explanatory critique and normative truth in
educational research …
In defense of the normative truth of education:
…..They may be in the forms of educational inequality
and injustice institutionalized in particular educational
organizations and/or policy institutions. They may also
appear in the forms of false believes and ideologies
about educational practices which in fact produce
distorting, detrimental or even suppressive effects to
the development of school-children’s potentials.
117
Topic 4-5
Ontological Foundations of EAP
End