Transcript Problem-Solving Courts - National Association for Court Management

Problem-Solving
Courts: The Latest
Results
Michael Rempel
Center for Court Innovation
([email protected])
Presented at the 2008 NACM Annual Conference,
Anaheim, CA, July 14, 2008
Aims of This Presentation
Participants will gain information concerning:

Whether problem-solving courts work

Why problem-solving courts work (which
practices are most effective)

How to critically assess current and future
problem-solving experiments
Rise of Problem-Solving Courts

1989
First drug court opens in Miami (FL)

1998
347 drug courts
< 50 other problem-solving courts

2008
> 2,000 drug courts
> 1,000 other problem-solving courts
Source: Huddleston et al. (2008)
Problem-Solving Models (USA)

Drug Courts – adult, juvenile, family, DWI: 2,147

Mental Health Courts: 219

Domestic Violence Courts – criminal, juvenile,
and integrated: 323

Community Courts: 32

Other Models – e.g., homelessness, reentry,
truancy, sex offense, child support, and youth
courts: > 500
Sources: Drug courts, mental health courts, and “other models”: Huddleston et al. (2008); domestic violence courts:
Bradley et al. (2008); and community courts: Karafin (2008).
Unifying Themes

Focus on Underlying Problems

Focus on Outcomes

Rise of the “Proactive Court”

Staffing Meetings

Ongoing Judicial Supervision

Intermediate Sanctions and Rewards

Case Management

Drug Testing
Alternative Models

Rehabilitative: e.g., drug courts and mental
health courts

Accountability: e.g., domestic violence courts
and sex offense courts

Community Justice: e.g., community courts,
truancy courts, and youth courts
The Problem-Solving Space
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
Community
Justice
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
Accountability
0
1
Rehabilitation
2
Today’s Focus

Rehabilitative Models:
The Case of Adult Drug Courts

Accountability Models:
The Case of Domestic Violence Courts

The Future of Problem-Solving Courts:
Community Justice and Other Directions
Part One.
Rehabilitative Models:
The Case of Adult Drug Courts
Retention in Treatment
Conclusion: Drug court retention rates far exceed
those for the general treatment population.
 Treatment Generally:
10-30% one-year retention (e.g., Condelli and DeLeon 1993; Lewis and Ross 1994)
 Adult Drug Courts:
National average: ~60% one-year retention (Belenko 1998)
 Likely Explanation = The Proactive Court:
Legal coercion + ongoing oversight
Recidivism
Conclusion: Drug courts reduce recidivism when
compared with conventional case processing.

Forty-eight of 55 drug courts reduced recidivism
(Wilson et al. 2006)

Average reduction was 26% (Wilson et al. 2006)

Impacts exceed three years duration (e.g., Aos et al. 2001;
Finigan et al. 2007; GAO 2005; Gottfredson et al. 2002; Rempel et al. 2003)

Magnitude of impact varies by site (from zero to
more than 50%)
New York State Impacts
Impact on Recidivism at One Year Post-Program
50%
45%
Drug Court Participants
40%
Comparison Group
3 7%*
3 5%
35%
3 2 %*
2 9 %* *
30%
28%
2 5%* * *
2 3 %*
25%
20%
16 %
30%
23%
17%
15%
12 %
10%
5%
0%
Bronx
Brooklyn
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
Note: Percentages are re-conviction rates.
Source: Rempel et al. (2003).
Queens
Suffolk
Syracuse
Rochester
The Role of Graduation
Im p a c t o n R e c id ivism a t O n e Ye a r Po st-Pro g ra m :
G ra du a te s, F a ilu re s, a n d C o m p a riso n G ro u p
50%
D rug C ourt G raduates
P ercen tag e with a N ew C o n victio n
45%
D rug C ourt Fa ilures
40%
40%
39%
C o m pariso n G roup
36%
35%
37%
35%
32%
29% 29%
30%
27%
25%
25%
23%
22%
20%
15%
12%
10%
12%
12%
S yracuse
Ro c h e s te r
8%
6%
5%
4%
0%
B ron x
B r o o k ly n
Note: Percentages are re-conviction rates.
Source: Rempel et al. (2003).
Queens
S u ffo lk
Cost-Benefit Results
Conclusion: Studies consistently show net savings.

Washington State: Six sites: $3,892 saved per participant
(or $1.74 saved per $1 invested) (Aos et al. 2001)


California: Nine sites (Carey et al. 2002, 2006):

Results by agency: (1) court, (2) pub. defender, (3) prosecutor, (4)
law enforcement, (5) treatment, (6) probation, and (7) corrections.

Bottom-line: For every $1 invested, 8 of 9 sites produced savings.

Impact at median site: $3.50 in savings for every $1 invested.

Main explanation: Lower recidivism rates
Victimization Savings
(Portland, OR: Carey and Finigan 2003; Maryland: Crumpton et al. 2003)
How Drug Courts Work

Substance abuse treatment

Immediacy (early identification and placement)

Legal incentives to succeed

Judicial supervision

Sanctions and incentives

Perceptions of fairness
Substance Abuse Treatment
Conclusion: Treatment generally works if
participants are retained.

More time in treatment predicts better post-treatment
outcomes (less drug use, lower recidivism, etc.)

At least 90 days of treatment is critical

Long-term heroin users will probably require
residential treatment and/or methadone to succeed

Caveats:

Drug court graduation may be pre-condition

Many programs do not follow evidence-based practices (NIJ 2006,
reporting on Anspach and Ferguson)
How Drug Courts Work

Substance abuse treatment

Immediacy (early identification and placement)

Legal incentives to succeed

Judicial supervision

Sanctions and incentives

Perceptions of fairness
How Drug Courts Work

Substance abuse treatment

Immediacy (early identification and placement)

Legal incentives to succeed

Judicial supervision

Sanctions and incentives

Perceptions of fairness
Legal Coercion: Leverage
Impact of Legal Coercion on Retention
(The Brooklyn Treatment Court, N = 2,184)
100%
90%
80%
80%
One-Year Retention Rate
66%
70%
60%
50%
47%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Misdemeanor
Median Jail Alternative:
6 months in jail
Source: Rempel and DeStefano (2001).
First Felony
Median Jail Alternative:
1 year in jail
Predicate Felony
Median Prison Alternative:
3-6 years in prison
Legal Coercion: Perceptions

Information:

Number of criminal justice agents (CJAs) who explained program rules*
 Number of CJAs who explained consequences of failure to the client*
 Number of times client made promises to CJAs to complete treatment*

Monitoring:

A CJA would learn within a week if client absconded from the program*
 Number of CJAs who would learn if client absconded from the program**

Enforcement:

Warrant is issued if the client absconds from the program**
 Client would be returned to custody in a month or less of leaving treatment*

Severity:

CJA has told client s/he will serve severe penalty for absconding or failing*
 Length of time client expects to serve in jail or prison for program failure**
(* p < .05 ** p < .01)
Source: Young and Belenko (2002)
How Drug Courts Work

Substance abuse treatment

Immediacy (early identification and placement)

Legal incentives to succeed

Judicial supervision

Sanctions and incentives

Perceptions of fairness
Measures of Supervision
Intensity of Program Supervision:
Six-Month Survey Results
Comparison
Drug Court
Number of Drug
Tests
Number of
Supervision Officer
Contacts***
Number of Judicial
Status Hearings*
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
+ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
Source: The Multi-Site Adult Drug Court Evaluation (MADCE), see Rossman and Rempel (2008).
35.00
Judicial Supervision
1. Judicial Supervision with Drug-Involved Offenders
(not Drug Court): The Washington, D.C. Study

Sanctions docket: drug testing plus regular judicial
supervision and sanctions in the event of noncompliance

Standard docket: drug testing without regular judicial
supervision or sanctions

*** Both dockets: treatment not required ***

One-year post-program: Sanctions docket had:

Lower re-arrest rate (19% vs. 27%)

Lower rate of “serious” drug use (35% vs. 48%)
Source: Harrell et al. (1998)
Judicial Supervision (Cont.)
2. For Whom Does Judicial Supervision Work Best?
The Doug Marlowe Experiments

“High risk” participants (anti-social personality
disorder and/or previous failed treatment): benefit
from biweekly judicial monitoring

“Low risk” participants: perform as well with “as
needed” monitoring
Source: Marlowe et al. 2003.
Judicial Supervision (Cont.)
3. Role of the Judge

Qualitative Evidence: Focus group participants
consistently point to the impact of the judge (Farole and
Cissner 2005; Goldkamp et al. 2002)

General Supervision Finding: Engaging offenders
in an individualized “process of change” is more
effective than simple surveillance (e.g., Farole et al. 2004; Petersilia
1999; Taxman 2002)
How Drug Courts Work

Substance abuse treatment

Legal incentives to succeed

Immediacy (early identification and placement)

Judicial supervision

Sanctions and incentives

Perceptions of fairness
Sanctions
Key Behavior-Modification Principles:

Certainty: Each infraction receives a response.

Celerity: Responses imposed soon after the infraction.

Severity: Responses severe enough to deter noncompliance;
but do not foreclose more severe future responses

Consistency: Comparable responses always result from
comparable infractions.

Drug court significance: Many do not apply these principles
rigorously (e.g., Marlowe 2004; Rempel et al. 2003; Roman 2004)
Source: For discussion of the principles and how they apply to drug courts, see Marlowe and Kirby (1999).
How Drug Courts Work

Substance abuse treatment

Legal incentives to succeed

Immediacy (early identification and placement)

Judicial supervision

Sanctions and incentives

Perceptions of fairness
Perceptions of Fairness
The Multi-Site Adult Drug Court Evaluation
Offender Perceptions of Fairness
Comparison (6 sites, N = 524)
Drug Court (23 sites, N = 1,009)
Attitudes Toward
Supervision Officer***
Attitudes Toward
Judge***
Perceptions of Court
Fairness***
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
Source: The Multi-Site Adult Drug Court Evaluation (MADCE), see Rossman and Rempel (2008).
5.00
Towards an Empirical Model
Higher Treatment
Dosage
Drug Court
Participation
Perceptions of
(Judicial) Fairness
Positive Outcomes
More Supervision
Officer Contacts
(less drug use and less
criminal activity at six
months)
More Judicial Status
Hearings
Background
Characteristics
(demographics, SES, prior
drug use, criminal history,
etc.)
More Required Drug
Tests
Source: The Multi-Site Adult Drug Court Evaluation (MADCE), see Rossman and Rempel (2008).
Part Two.
Accountability Models:
The Case of Domestic
Violence Courts
Offender Accountability
Conclusion: DV courts appear to hold offenders
more accountable

Judicial Supervision: More frequent compliance
hearings (often monthly) (Gondolf 1998; Newmark et al. 2001; San Diego
Superior Court 2000)

Enforcement of Noncompliance: More frequent
probation violations and revocations (Harrell et al. 2006) or
other sanctions (Newmark et al. 2001; San Diego 2000).
Victim Services
Conclusion: DV courts appear to link more victims
with services.

Brooklyn: From 55% to 100% of victims linked to
advocates after DV court opened (Newmark et al. 2001)

Shelby, TN: From barely any to 56% of victims
linked to advocates after DV court opened (Henning and
Kesges 1999)
Victim Satisfaction
Conclusion: DV courts appear to elicit more
positive victim perceptions.

Perceive Improved Case Handling
(Eckberg and Podkopacz 2002;
Gover et al. 2003; Hotaling and Buzawa 2003)

Perceive Fairer Outcomes

Express greater likelihood of reporting future
violence and cooperating with future prosecutions
(Gover et al. 2003; Hotaling and Buzawa 2003)
(Newmark et al. 2001, Safe Horizon and Courtroom Advocates Project data 2003, Smith 2001)
Recidivism
Conclusion: Recidivism results are mixed.

Mixed Results: Of seven recidivism studies:

Three show positive results
(Lexington, KY, San Diego, CA, and
Dorchester, MA)


Three show no impact (Brooklyn, NY, Shelby, TN, and Ann Arbor, MI)

One shows mixed results (Milwaukee, WI)
Expectations Problem: Are accountability and victim
services more attainable than offender behavior change?
Sources: Ann Arbor and Dorchester studies (Harrell et al. 2007); Brooklyn study (Newmark et al. 2001), Lexington study
(Gover et al. 2003), Milwaukee study (Harrell et al. 2006), San Diego study (San Diego Superior Court 2000), Shelby
study (Henning and Kesges 1999).
Role of Batterer Programs
Conclusion: Batterer programs cannot be relied on
to rehabilitate.


Results: Five Randomized Trials:

Earliest Study

Four Latest Studies (2000s): None show clear positive
impact (Bronx, NY; Brooklyn, NY; Broward Co., FL, and San Diego Navy Base)
(Hamilton Ontario, 1992):
Reduction in re-arrests
Meta-Analysis: Negligible net effect on official rearrests and zero effect on victim reports of re-abuse
(Feder and Wilson 2005)
Sources: Hamilton study (Palmer et al. 1992); Bronx study (Labriola et al. 2005); Brooklyn study (Davis et al.
2000), Broward study (Feder and Dugan 2002), San Diego Navy Base study (Dunford 2000).
Role of Judicial Monitoring
Conclusion: Judicial monitoring may work if
implemented effectively; more research needed.

Suggestive Studies: Higher program completion and
lower re-arrest rates after DV court opened – linked to
monitoring (San Diego: San Diego Superior Court 2000; and Pittsburgh: Gondolf 1998)

Bronx, NY: Judicial monitoring shows no effect –
involved simple “surveillance” (monthly check-ins),
with little judicial interaction or sanctions (Labriola et al. 2005)
Role of Probation Monitoring

Accountability: Specialized DV probation units:

More often impose and enforce special conditions
(Buzawa et al. 1998; Harrell et al. 2007; Hayler et al. 1999)


Generate higher technical violation and revocation
rates (e.g., Klein et al. 2005; Harrell et al. 2006)
Recidivism:

Rhode Island: Intensive DV probation led to lower rearrest rates among low-risk DV offenders (Klein et al. 2005)
Part Three.
The Future of Problem-Solving
Courts: Community Justice and
Other Directions
Community Impacts

Community Restitution: e.g., Red Hook’s community
service mandates contribute > $500,000/year in labor to
the local community (Center for Court Innovation, results memorandum, 2008)

Public Confidence in Justice:

Community courts lead to positive stakeholder and
resident attitudes toward the court (Justice Education Center 2002; Moore
2004; Sviridoff et al. 2001; Weidner and Davis 2000)

DV court stakeholder meetings lead to increased
collaboration, mutual understanding, and confidence in
the court (Harrell et al. 2007; Henning and Klesges 1999; and Newmark et al. 2001)
Other Models in Brief

Community Courts – appear to produce:

More use on alternative sanctions and less use of jail
(Sviridoff et al. 2001, Soroushian and Hakuta 2008)

Better community service compliance (Sviridoff et al. 2001, Eckberg 2001)

Increased litigant perceptions of fairness (Abuwala and Farole 2008;
Frazer 2006)

Mental Health Courts – appear to produce:

Lower recidivism, based on four recent impact studies
(Bess 2004; McNeil and Binder 2007; Moore and Hiday 2006; and Cosden et al. 2005)

Improved psychosocial functioning, based on just two
recent impact studies (Bess 2004; Cosden et al. 2005)
Other Models in Brief (Cont.)

Family Drug Courts – appear to produce:



Increased treatment retention and completion rates
Increased case length and time to permanency
Increased probability of family reunification
Source: Four-site national evaluation: Worcel et al. (2007).

Juvenile Drug Courts – may not reduce recidivism:

Twenty impact studies yield mixed results (see Kralstein 2008):




Seven show lower recidivism
Five show higher recidivism
Eight show zero difference or mixed results by measure
Average recidivism reduction is significantly greater in
studies of adult than juvenile drug courts (Schaffer 2006)
The Problem of Scale

Most Problem-Solving Courts:


Serve small fraction of those eligible (Bhati et al. 2008; Zweig and Schaffer 2004)
Require substantial up-front investments (e.g., see Carey et al. 2006; Farole
et al. 2004, Farole et al. 2005)

Two Paths:
1.
2.
Expand problem-solving courts: Increase the number of
specialized courts or number of litigants served by them
Apply problem-solving methods in conventional courts:



Threat to efficacy: piecemeal application of practices;
possible “watering down” of the model
Threat to problem-solving court institutionalization: siphon
cases, resources, and political support.
Potential to expand reach: expand benefits to large numbers
For More Information

Center for Court Innovation: www.courtinnovation.org (research
page at www.courtinnovation.org/research)

Minnesota Center Against Violence and Abuse:
http://www.mincava.umn.edu

National Center for State Courts: http://www.ncsconline.org
(problem-solving court resources at
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/ProblemSolvingCourts/P
roblem-SolvingCourts.html

National Drug Court Institute at: http://www.nadcp.org/

New York City Criminal Justice Agency at: http://www.nycja.org

NPC Research: http://www.npcresearch.com

The Urban Institute at: http://www.urban.org (Justice Policy
Center at http://www.urban.org/justice/index.cfm)